# Conditions CPs

## 1NCs

### 1NC – Saudi Conditions

#### Text: The United States federal government should condition Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales of arms from the United States to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on concrete steps by Riyadh to peacefully end the war in Yemen including an end to the targeting of civilians and assurances that Saudi Arabia will support the free passage of humanitarian aid to Yemen.

#### The CP solves the case but avoids the DAs – Conditions are goldilocks – they induces behavior change, but still preserves the relationship.

Fontaine ‘18 (Richard Fontaine is the president of the Center for a New American Security, former foreign-policy adviser to Senator John McCain. “Saudi Arabia is Hurting American Interests”. OCTOBER 24th, 2018. Defense One. <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/10/jamal-khashoggis-murder-hurt-american-interests-not-just-american-values/152264/>. Lowell-KY)

Most observers have seen the murder of Jamal Khashoggi as the latest example of an age-old tension in U.S. foreign policy: the pursuit of national interests versus the defense of American values. Our leaders, this reading goes, abhor the brutal killing of a U.S. resident and Washington Post columnist, but security and economic considerations must temper their reactions. The government of Mohammad bin Salman is, after all, a friendly autocracy whose dollars buy our weapons and whose oil exports supply global markets. The United States needs Saudi help in opposing Iran, its support for a Middle East peace deal, its intelligence and operations to fight terrorism, and its commitment to ensure regional stability. Better, then, to signal displeasure at this latest horror but leave the broader relationship relatively undamaged—or even unchanged. A balance between interests and values is implicit in statements by President Trump and Secretary of State Pompeo about the strategic partnership between Washington and Riyadh. Calling Saudi Arabia a “very strong ally,” the White House advisor Jared Kushner explained that “we have to be able to pursue our strategic objectives,” while “deal[ing] with what is obviously a terrible situation.” Others, like foreign policy scholar Walter Russell Mead, have urged Washington not to “ditch Riyadh in a fit of righteousness.” But this frame represents a misreading of both the incident and the last several years of Saudi foreign policy. It’s also likely to encourage the wrong policy response. The hard reality is that the Khashoggi murder is one in a series of recent Saudi actions that have set back U.S. objectives in the Middle East—and Saudi ones as well. Continued partnership with Riyadh is possible and even desirable, but only if Saudi Arabia changes its approach. The most prominent example of recent Saudi misfires is the grinding war in Yemen. Launched as a short-term operation to marginalize then-limited Iranian support for Houthi rebels, the conflict has dragged on for more than three years, with no end in sight. Riyadh and its Emirati allies have failed to reinstall the ousted government of Abdrabbu Mansur Hadi, and Iranian influence in Yemen is greater today than it was before the war began. As the conflict drags on, the belligerents have produced countless civilian casualties and induced famine and cholera. The war redirected Saudi and Emirati bombers away from the U.S.-led effort to hit Islamic State targets in Syria and Iraq, and it has undermined our shared aim of containing Iran’s regional expansion. The Saudi-initiated embargo of Qatar proved no wiser. Accusing Doha of supporting terrorism and sympathizing with Iran, Riyadh – with no warning to Washington— joined the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain in severing diplomatic links, closing travel routes, and cutting off trade ties. The Saudi government issued public demands, apparently believing that combined pressure would induce Qatar to cave. But Doha didn’t fold, and the embargo only drove it closer toward Iran, which sensed economic and geopolitical opportunity in the Arab Gulf vacuum. Now Washington struggles to maintain productive relations with Qatar, host of the largest U.S. military base in the region, as well as its security partners in the Saudi-led bloc. The net result, as a State Department spokesperson put it, is an American “desire to see the Gulf dispute eased and eventually resolved, as it benefits Iran.” Another false step was the Saudi kidnapping and forced resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, again after no consultation with Washington. Riyadh’s purported goal was to sideline Hezbollah—part of Hariri’s coalition government—as well as its Iranian sponsor. After being lured to the kingdom, Hariri resigned on Saudi television under obvious duress. As demanded, he blamed Iran. When a Houthi missile from Yemen landed near Riyadh, the Saudis went on to accuse Beirut of an act of war and order the evacuation of Saudi citizens from Lebanon. Yet the effort stemmed from a deep misunderstanding of Lebanese politics, and all of the measures backfired. Hariri regained power within weeks, and in the aftermath of the peculiar affair, Hezbollah emerged stronger than before. The result was the empowerment of a terrorist organization explicitly hostile to the United States and Israel. Now the Khashoggi killing, wholly apart from its moral offensiveness, will make it far harder for the Trump administration to cooperate with Saudi Arabia on security and other matters, given the political backlash it has prompted in Washington and capitals around the world. In carrying out the attack in Istanbul, the Saudi government rested a measure of its fate in the hands of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who ordered the distribution of criminal evidence to the media. Erdogan no doubt recalls the crown prince’s characterization of Turkey (a troublesome but enduring American and NATO ally) as part of a “triangle of evil” that wishes to reestablish the Ottoman-era Islamic Caliphate. These incidents do not tell the entire story of American interests in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh shares intelligence, collaborates on counterterrorism operations, and has cracked down on illicit finance. It has relaxed its previous hostility to Israel and reduced its support for extremist ideology abroad. And the Saudis are still capable of leveling an oil supply shock – particularly in an era in which the Trump administration expects their barrels to make up for diminishing Iranian exports – that would affect global prices and thus American consumers. Yet Saudi Arabia is a less valuable strategic partner to the United States today than it was before Jamal Khashoggi’s horrific killing. Whether American leaders prioritize hard-headed security and economic interests, and look at Saudi Arabia through the cold lens of realpolitik, or favor emphasizing values, a reset in relations with Riyadh is badly needed. The goal of U.S. policy should be not merely to punish transgressions but to induce better foreign policy behavior. As such, the Trump administration can use this latest tragic event as leverage. Washington should push Mohammad bin Salman and his government toward greater constructiveness and less adventurism. It could start by applying sanctions under the Global Magnitsky act to those who carried out the Khashoggi murder, but it shouldn’t stop there. Congress and the Trump administration should condition weapons sales on concrete steps by Riyadh to end the disastrous war in Yemen. They should push hard for a repair of the Gulf rupture. The Trump administration should begin a serious dialogue with the Saudis about how to develop effective regional strategies. Above all, Washington should telegraph that a continued strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia is possible and desirable – but only if Riyadh acts more responsibly and with far greater principle. The Khashoggi murder has catalyzed global opinion and opened up new possibilities in relations with Saudi Arabia. By demanding better behavior, it’s possible that even such a horrifying event could produce something constructive. That would be an outcome conducive to both American interests and American values.

### 1NC – China Conditions

#### The United States federal government should substantially reduce its Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of arms to the Republic of China if, and only if, the People’s Republic of China agrees to peacefully resolve maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas.

#### The CP’s solves the case but gets concessions in return – this maintains US credibility in the region and solves conflict in the SCS.

Eric Gomez ‘16 (Eric is a policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He holds a Masters of Arts in International Affairs from Texas A&M University, September 28th, 2016, “A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship” from https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship, accessed 7/2/19 || OES-AT

Why the United States Should Step Down from its Commitment ¶ The United States should step down from the implicit commitment to use military force to preserve Taiwan’s de facto independence. American credibility is slowly eroding as China becomes more powerful, and the commitment will be more costly to maintain for a relatively minor benefit. Broadly speaking, the United States has two options for how it could implement this policy option: it could try to draw concessions from China to get something in return for stepping down from the commitment, or it could unilaterally drop the commitment. In either scenario, Taiwan would have to take on sole responsibility for deterring Chinese military action. ¶ A policy that wins concessions from China would be the more desirable of the two options. Concessions could include resolution of other territorial disputes involving China and American allies or dropping the Chinese threat to use force against Taiwan. This would be characteristic of what Charles Glaser calls a grand bargain, “an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issues to create a fair deal … that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue.”95 Making the end of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan contingent upon Chinese concessions to resolve its other territorial disputes peacefully would benefit both the United States and China.96 The United States would free itself of an increasingly costly and risky commitment to Taiwan’s defense, but only if China compromises in ways that align with U.S. allies’ interests in the South and East China Seas. China would have to limit its objectives in the South and East China Seas, but in return would earn a major policy concession from the United States on a core national interest that has much more importance than the other territorial disputes. ¶ If China proves unwilling to make concessions across multiple issue areas, the United States could still push for concessions on China’s military posture toward Taiwan. Instead of demanding a concession on the South China Sea dispute, U.S. policymakers could press China to take actions that reduce the military threat it poses to Taiwan via an incremental, reciprocal process of concessions.97 Refusing to sell Taiwan any new military equipment would be a good way to initiate a cooperation spiral. ¶ Stopping the sale of new equipment would not significantly reduce the Taiwanese military’s ability to defend itself for three reasons. First, most equipment sold to Taiwan by the United States does not represent the latest in U.S. military technology and is not necessarily superior to new capabilities fielded by the PLA.98 Second, Taiwan’s domestic defense industry is capable of producing new equipment that is well-suited to asymmetric defense, although it will take time for Taiwan’s relatively small and underdeveloped defense industry to reach its full potential.99 Finally, stopping the sale of new weapons still gives the United States the latitude to sell spare parts and ammunition for weapons systems that have already been sold. Halting the sale of new types of weapons systems will signal a reduced U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security that would not be overly disruptive to Taiwan’s self-defense. ¶ One of several ways that Beijing might respond to this U.S. concession on arms sales would be to reduce the number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) within firing range of Taiwan. Currently there are more than 1,000 conventionally armed SRBMs (with a maximum range of approximately 500 miles) in the PLA arsenal that could strike Taiwan.100 Improvements in guidance technology have transformed these missiles from inaccurate “terror weapons” that would likely target cities to precision munitions better suited for strikes against military airfields and ports.101Stationing the SRBMs out of range of Taiwan would be a low-cost, but symbolically important, action. The missiles are fired from mobile launchers that could be moved back into range of Taiwan. However, the act of moving the missiles out of range would, according to Lyle J. Goldstein, “show goodwill and increasing confidence across the Strait and also between Washington and Beijing.”102 If China agrees to America’s demand to relocate its ballistic missiles, then additional steps could be taken to further reduce the threat China poses to Taiwan. ¶ If China proved unwilling to make any concessions, either in other territorial disputes or in cross-strait relations, the United States could still unilaterally withdraw from its military commitment to Taiwan. No demands or conditions would be placed on Chinese behavior. American policymakers are unlikely to accept such a course of action given recent shows of Chinese assertiveness. Charles Glaser explains, “China appears too likely to misinterpret [unilaterally ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan], which could fuel Chinese overconfidence and intensify challenges to U.S. interests.”103 Unilateral withdrawal would reduce the likelihood of U.S.-Chinese armed conflict, but the dearth of other benefits would make the policy difficult for policymakers to implement. Extracting some kind of concession from China, either in cross-strait relations or in other territorial disputes, should be a priority. ¶ Finally, stepping down from the commitment to defend Taiwan with military force does not remove America’s interest in keeping the Taiwan Strait free of armed conflict. The United States would retain the ability to punish China in other ways should it attack Taiwan. Diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions may not inflict the same kinds of costs on Beijing as military force, but they are additional costs that would have to be absorbed.104 Additionally, U.S. arms sales are separate from the implicit commitment to defend Taiwan and could continue, albeit in some reduced or modified form.105 Continuing to sell arms to Taiwan while stepping down from the implicit commitment to use military force to defend the island allows the United States to demonstrate support for Taiwan’s defense without taking on the risks associated with direct intervention.106 ¶ Conclusion ¶ The United States should no longer provide the military backstop for Taiwan’s de facto independence. The security commitment to Taiwan outlined in the TRA is a product of a different time, when the United States enjoyed clear military advantages over China, and Taiwan could be defended on the cheap. China’s growing military power strains the credibility of the American commitment. Policymakers in Washington could respond to this changing environment by restoring American military superiority, sustaining a minimum military advantage, or stepping down from the commitment. All of these options carry risks and negative consequences, but it is in the best long-term interest of the United States to step down from the commitment to Taiwan. ¶ American policymakers must come to terms with the idea that the balance of power has become much more favorable for Beijing since the TRA was adopted in 1979. Defending Taiwan is more difficult now than ever before, and this trend will be very hard to reverse. The most realistic way to reorient U.S. policy is to reach out to China to take incremental, reciprocal steps that slowly bring about the end of America’s commitment. This policy will be very difficult for the United States to implement, but the advantages to U.S.-China relations could be substantial. Changing the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship would greatly reduce the likelihood of armed conflict between the United States and China and could create opportunities for U.S.-China cooperation that are currently beyond reach.

## 2NC – GENERIC

### S – General

#### The CP creates a durable signal that spills over to affect future arms sales

Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

(Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207_Dalton_OversightAccountability_Web.pdf>)//AP

When strategically applied, **conditionality** has the potential to **mitigate risks, strengthen security partnerships, and incentivize good behavior**. Policymakers can employ punitive conditionality to mitigate the risk that a partner country will abuse U.S. SSA Transparent, positive conditionality, in which U.S. policymakers collaborate with recipient countries to develop a road map for SSA, would help incentivize reform and likely result in stronger partnerships and a better alignment of policy objectives between donor and recipient countries 47 Conditioning SSA to promote interna-tional norms and human rights demonstrates U.S. commitment to these values, mandates better behavior among current partner countries, **and may also signal and influence the behavior** of those seeking SSA **in the future**. 48

#### Conditioning has empirically worked

Erickson ’13 – Department of Political Science, Boston College (Jennifer, “Stopping the legal flow of weapons: Compliance with arms embargoes, 1981–2004” Journal of Peace Research 50(2) 159–174, 2013, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343312470472>)//AP

From 1991 to 2003, major exporters halted legal arms transfers to Iraq – on paper and in practice.40 But was the embargo successful? Armed with better evidence about sender compliance, such questions deserve further research and debate. The persistence of the Iraqi regime despite severe sanctions might suggest failure (Pape, 1997). Yet **the embargo seems to have ‘successfully restrained** [the regime’s] **military** **capabilities’** (Cortright & Lopez, 2002: 155), **easing the 2003 invasion** that contributed to Saddam Hussein’s downfall. What seems clear is that this time, **senders complied**. Explanations for the outcome – whether the embargo was effective or ineffective, however defined – must take supplier compliance into account. Indeed, this analysis shows that, on average, major exporters do restrict arms to embargoed recipients, although the effect has weakened somewhat in recent years. Policies concentrated on enhancing supplier compliance may therefore only go so far to improve embargo effectiveness. And despite their potential value, material penalties for embargo violations at the international or regional level seem unlikely to become institutionalized in the near future and are dependent on the interests and ability of political groups at the domestic level. Consequently, it is worth considering two additional points I do not test here to potentially explain and improve arms embargo success.

### AT: Perm – Do Both

#### 1. The perm’s is impossible—can’t reduce arms sales and condition them simultaneously --- means [X COUNTRY] has no incentive to change its behavior because the plan already yanks the bargaining chip

#### 2. Links to the net benefits –

### AT: Perm – DCP

#### 1. The perm severs the entire aff --- the aff substantially reduces arms sales, while the CP continues those sales if [X COUNTRY] meets the conditions --- severance is a voting issue, allows them to dodge all neg offense

#### 2. The aff must defend that arms sales will be reduced no matter what, or it makes them not topical

#### A. “Resolved” is to be determined

**Random House Unabridged 6** (http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved&r=66)

re·solved Audio Help /rɪˈzɒlvd/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[ri-zolvd]

–adjective firm in purpose or intent; determined.

#### B. “Reduce” means diminish is size and is distinct from discussing a reduction

**Guy, 91** - Circuit Judge (TIM BOETTGER, BECKY BOETTGER, individually and as Next Friend for their Minor Daughter, AMANDA BOETTGER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. OTIS R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services (89-1832); and C. PATRICK BABCOCK, Director, Michigan Department of Social Services (89-1831), Defendants-Appellants Nos. 89-1831, 89-1832 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 923 F.2d 1183; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 671)

The district court concluded that the plain meaning of the statutory language does not apply to the termination of employment one obtains on his own. A termination, the court held, is not a refusal to accept employment. In this case, the plain meaning of the various words suggests that "refuse to accept" is not the equivalent of "terminate" and "reduce." As a matter of logic [\*\*18] and common understanding, one cannot terminate or reduce something that one has not accepted. Acceptance is [\*1189] a pre-condition to termination or reduction. Thus, a refusal to accept is a precursor to, not the equivalent of, a termination or a reduction. n3 n.3 This distinction is also reflected in the dictionary definitions of the words. "Accept" is defined in anticipatory terms that suggest a precondition ("to undertake the responsibility of"), whereas "terminate" and "reduce" are defined in conclusory terms ("to bring to end, . . . to discontinue"; "to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number."). See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1985).

#### C. “Substantial” requires certainty and immediacy

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; **certain**: absolute: **real at present time**, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

#### D. “Should” means immediate and certain

Summers 94Justice for the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant,” 11/8/1994, https://www.leagle.com/decision/19942238885p2d135312225 //AY

13. "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as **more than** merely indicating **preference** or **desirability**. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an **obligation** and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wn.App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligsation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the **same as "shall" or "must**" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14. In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

## 2NC – SAUDI SPECIFIC

### S – Saudi Say Yes

#### The possibility of resuming sales in the event Saudi Arabia makes durable changes possible

Newton ’17 – Professor @Vanderbilt Law School (Michael, “An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen,” 2017, date accessed: 6.25.2019, Vanderbilt University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971208>)//AP

The United States cannot provide assistance to particular units or individuals under the FAA or the AECA where there are credible reports they have committed gross human rights violations. Where, as here, there is significant information in the public record concerning allegations of widespread abuses but little information on particular units, it is the practice of the United States to seek further information on which units were responsible and to limit assistance to those units that are determined not culpable. Given the extensive re-fueling operations conducted by the United States in support of the air campaign, specific information concerning particular units of concern should be readily available. 109 The re-fueling operations are, as a supportive measure providing supplies, also subject to vetting requirements.110 Assistance may be restored if the recipient government takes effective measures to hold those responsible accountable. 111 As discussed above, Saudi investigations to date have only examined a small fraction of the incidents of concern identified by credible sources and have broadly failed to acknowledge any wrongdoing. 112 It is unclear whether individuals responsible in those cases have been held accountable in an “effective” manner, e.g. in a manner proportionate to the alleged misconduct. This exception, therefore, clearly does not apply to the majority of units in question.

#### Conditioning sales on ending the Yemen conflict solves peace better

Hartung, 2016 (William D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy and a senior adviser to the Security Assistance Monitor, 6/29/2016, <https://lobelog.com/why-is-the-united-states-still-backing-saudi-arabia-in-yemen/>, SHD)

Contrary to administration claims, pouring more weapons into Saudi Arabia, which is already far more heavily armed than its regional rival Iran, is unlikely to “promote stability” in the region. The current policy of backing the Saudis to the hilt as a way of reassuring them over possible gains by Iran has not been working. Instead, President Obama and the next administration should use U.S. economic, military, and economic influence to promote what the president has described as a “cold peace” between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Unlimited sales of weaponry to Saudi Arabia can only undermine that goal.∂ Beyond the brief official readout supplied by the White House, details of President Obama’s meeting with MBS have been hard to come by. But it’s clear that the president did not threaten to do what should be done: condition U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia on an end to its bombing campaign in Yemen, as well as on good faith efforts to end the war there. The myth that U.S. arms sales promote peace and stability in the Middle East must be abandoned in favor of a more balanced approach that values diplomacy over arms transfers. The alternative—more war and more civilian carnage—is unacceptable.

#### Yes leverage – countries perceive fill-in as infeasible

Guay ’18 – Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University (Terrence Guay, 10-19-2018, "Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair," Conversation, https://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-khashoggi-affair-104998, accessed 6-25-2019)//AP

**US leverage** While it’s true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S. weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs to buy from another country could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from American and European companies. That is why **the U.S. has significant leverage** in this aspect of the relationship. **Any Saudi threat to retaliate** **against a ban on U.S. arms sales** by buying weapons from countries that have not raised concerns about the Khashoggi disappearance would not be credible. And is probably why, despite worries in the White House, such a threat has not yet been made.

#### The Aff eliminates the CARROT—Only the CP provides an incentive for Saudi to moderate—MBS says yes

Tabatabai 18

Ariane M. Tabatabai, associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct senior research scholar at the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Truman national security fellow and CFR term member, former assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown U SFS, non-resident scholar with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, senior associate in the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS, adjunct senior fellow in the Middle East Program at CNAS, Ph.D. & M.Phil in War Studies and MA in Internat’l Peace & Security—King's College London, and Becca Wasser, Policy Analyst—RAND and MSFS-Georgetown University, Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis' Behavior?, November 2018, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html>

The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power.

This approach is not without risk—the Saudi government could, for example, reduce intelligence sharing, or switch off the proverbial oil tap, like the OPEC states did in 1973. But 2018 is not 1973, and the United States is no longer as reliant on Saudi oil. More so, the Saudi government's assertive actions also pose operational and reputational risks to important U.S. interests, as the Khashoggi affair demonstrated, and therefore the benefits of this approach are likely to outweigh any costs Riyadh may seek to impose.

On the surface, making U.S. support provisory may appear to be an unpalatable approach, one that legitimizes the crown prince. But wielded correctly, the White House can use this leverage to recalibrate the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Blanket support need not be granted in a way that emboldens Saudi behavior, leading to actions that are damaging to U.S. interests. Instead, the administration could consider also making conditional its support for the Saudi government's priority programs with the goal of altering and shaping its behavior. This includes making the Saudis take responsibility for Khashoggi's brutal death, putting an end to indiscriminate targeting practices in Yemen, altering the government's harsh response to opposition inside and outside of the Kingdom, and ending the rift with Qatar.

Naysayers of such an approach might claim that it only deepens the transactionalism on which the U.S.-Saudi relationship is presently based. But it is worth recognizing that the partnership was founded on an explicit alignment of interests, not values. By acknowledging this, the United States would be better positioned to adopt an approach that best serves its own interests. At this point, the Saudi government needs U.S. support more than the White House needs Saudi Arabia.

#### Applying more pressure forces Saudi to comply

Tabatabai and Wasser 18 – Ph.D. in war studies in King's College London, M.P.H.IL in war studies, King's College London; M.S. in foreign service, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (Ariane M, Becca, “Could America Use Its Leverage to Alter the Saudis' Behavior?” RAND, November 15 2018, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/11/could-america-use-its-leverage-to-alter-the-saudis.html>)//al

In reality, the United States may have more leverage over Saudi Arabia today than at any other time except during the 1991 Gulf War.Trump's ascension to the U.S. presidency helped alleviate some of Saudi Arabia's concerns that stemmed from President Obama's Middle East policies and, consequently, afforded the United States more influence over the kingdom. The Saudis had grown distrustful of U.S. commitment to the region due to President Obama's plans to pivot to Asia and his administration's response to the Arab Spring and pursuit of a nuclear deal with Tehran. But President Trump made Riyadh the destination of his first foreign trip in office and pledged to support the kingdom while harshly criticizing its archenemy, Iran, and withdrawing from the nuclear deal this past May. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become more reliant on the United States than when President Obama was in office. Riyadh's contentious policies—like the war in Yemen and the rift with its neighbors—have constrained its options and inadvertently reinforced Saudi Arabia's need for U.S. military and political support, including security cooperation and intelligence sharing. Prince Mohammed's legacy and perhaps even power is presently tied to two initiatives: The Yemen war and Vision 2030—an ambitious program of social and economic reforms that Riyadh plans to institute to diversify its economy. Neither objective is apparently proceeding as the crown prince had hoped. And to succeed, they will likely require continued U.S. support. Until recently, President Trump was not inclined to use these developments as leverage. Instead, he stood by the crown prince even as U.S. military support to Saudi forces in Yemen—including aerial refueling and advising on intelligence sharing and targeting procedures—have come under attack in Congress and by international rights groups. Some have argued that the administration has emboldened Riyadh, giving it carte blanche to pursue its more assertive policies. New details pertaining to Khashoggi's murder have emerged, ostensibly tying the young Saudi monarch to the incident and leading to mounting congressional pressure. But the Trump administration has been willing to give the Saudis only a mere slap on the wrist without fundamentally altering the dynamics of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The Trump administration is unlikely to end its support for Saudi regional efforts or radically change its approach. But it could consider using its influence to encourage the Saudi leadership to moderate its assertive and damaging policies abroad. Rather than providing its assistance freely to Saudi Arabia, Washington could utilize it to extract concessions from the Saudi leadership to alter its behavior. Making U.S. support conditional to initiatives tied to Prince Mohammed's success provides Washington with a degree of sway over the brash monarch, who increasingly needs to produce a “win” in light of the reputational harm the Khashoggi affair has done to the kingdom, his legacy and perhaps even his hold on power.

#### Saudi Arabia follows on – US oversight will limit civilian casualties and ensure successful Yemen negotiations

Byman and O’Hanlon, 2018 (Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Director of Research of Brookings, 10/26/2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/26/its-time-to-put-the-brakes-on-saudi-arabias-war-in-yemen/>, SHD)

As the Trump White House comes to grips with the Saudi government’s role in the killing of writer Jamal Khashoggi, it confronts a major dilemma that has bedeviled previous American administrations: How do we punish a country with which the United States is locked in a relationship of profound mutual dependence? The kingdom needs American military protection, despite having the world’s third-largest military budget and lots of shiny Western weaponry. And the United States, despite the North American shale revolution, still relies on Saudi oil (in the sense that the world oil market cannot function without it). The Saudis are also a vital partner for counterterrorism. For these reasons, American punishment for the murder of Khashoggi, a Post contributing columnist, is likely to consist of the usual wrist-slapping: no high-level summits for a while, a bit less pomp in any official meetings for some time after that and maybe a visa ban or two for complicit individuals. Congress, for its part, may issue a resolution expressing its collective outrage. That would be a woefully inadequate response. The brazenness of the killing in Istanbul is stunning. Moreover, it targeted an American resident who was a powerful advocate of free speech and political accountability. The even bigger problem, however, is that this murder fits a pattern of outrageous and harmful Saudi behavior. The kingdom’s de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, is a brash young man who has by now made many mistakes because of arrogance and inexperience—from his brutal and extralegal “anti-corruption drive” to his abduction of the Lebanese prime minister to his unnecessary public standoff with Qatar. Against this background, the Khashoggi murder is less an exceptional act of recklessness than an emblem of the new normal for the kingdom. One tempting option would be to stop U.S. arms sales—a measure that could impose pain on Riyadh without disrupting America’s de facto security guarantee, or the world’s unquenchable thirst for Saudi hydrocarbons. Yet President Trump resists this step, arguing that American jobs are on the line. But there’s a natural compromise. We should use this crisis as a chance to do what we should have been doing all along—namely, to force the Saudis (and, ideally, their key ally, the United Arab Emirates) to rethink their disastrous war in neighboring Yemen. Three years into the Saudi intervention, there is no longer any reasonable argument for believing that what the Saudis are doing will work. Meanwhile, the intelligence support, logistics assistance and specific types of weaponry that we provide Saudi Arabia have made us complicit in all the airstrikes gone wrong and the ensuing carnage among civilians. Complete victory over the Houthi-led and Iranian-supported forces of northern Yemen is not attainable for Saudi Arabia and its mostly southern and Sunni allies. Nor is it necessary. American, and Saudi, and broader regional interests can be adequately protected by continuing targeted strikes against al-Qaeda elements in Yemen, and reaching some kind of power-sharing agreement that would give Houthi factions more autonomy in northern Yemen with more resources for the rebuilding of the country. An ongoing Iranian presence there, while undesirable, is more tolerable than Iran’s foothold in the Levant. Over time, moreover, a more stable Yemen will need and want Iran less; Tehran thrives on chaos and conflict most of all. To ensure that Riyadh takes such a more realistic approach in Yemen, Washington should make its military assistance for the war conditional. The United States has considerable influence. Saudi Arabia depends, in part, on the United States and U.S. contractors for intelligence and logistics. Riyadh also values America’s good opinion (and, if anything, values Trump’s support more than it did Obama’s), so it is sensitive to U.S. criticism. The warring parties could start by declaring a pause in the bombing of Houthi targets and the opening of negotiations, followed by a large-scale infusion of humanitarian aid. The Americans would make it clear to Saudi Arabia that the pace of airstrikes will have to decline (and will reinforce this policy by delivering munitions “just in time” rather than in large batches). American planners should be co-located with Saudis, giving each side veto power over the use of any lethal ordinance.

### AT: Not Credible

#### The CP gives Saudi a significant incentive to change behavior --- it’s credible because Saudi Arabia is desperate in the context of its fragmented coalition

Reisener 18 – program associate at the Center for the National Interest. Matthew, 2/19. “The Dangers of Ignoring Yemen.” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-dangers-ignoring-yemen-24556

In the weeks following President Trump’s first State of the Union speech, much has been written about the topics on which the president chose to speak. However, one topic of concern that noticeably received no mention during the speech was Yemen, a country in which the United States has carried out several military operations yearly since 2010. While the Trump administration criticized Saudi Arabia for blockading Yemeni ports in December 2017, the White House has been otherwise silent regarding the damage inflicted by the Saudis on civilian targets during Yemen’s ongoing civil war. Additionally, the United States has consistently provided assistance enabling Saudi Arabia’s sustained military operations in Yemen. Instead of remaining silently compliant towards the bulk of Saudi Arabia’s mistakes in Yemen, the United States should utilize its considerable sway with the Saudis to convince them to take the necessary precautions to minimize the impact of their bombing campaign on Yemen’s civilian population, which risks further exacerbating the existing civil conflict. While Yemen’s civil war initially began in 2014 as a struggle between the government of Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and the Houthi rebels, the list of combatants quickly grew to include participants outside of Yemen’s borders. The fall of Hadi’s government in Sana'a prompted the entrance of a ten-nation coalition led by Saudi Arabia into the conflict to help Hadi reassert control over the fractured country. Given their desire for stability on their southern border, opposition to the Iranian-backed Houthis, and clear preference for Hadi’s Sunni rule over that of the predominantly Zaydi Shia Houthis, Saudi Arabia’s decision to intervene on behalf of Yemen’s beleaguered president was hardly a surprise to observers of the region’s politics. The United States’ choice to provide support for both the Saudi-led coalition and the Hadi government was equally unsurprising. Saudi Arabia has long been considered among America’s most trusted and important allies in the Middle East due to its significant petroleum exports, strong regional military presence, and willingness to align with America in joint efforts to stymie Iran’s bid for hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, both Saudi Arabia and the United States have a vested interest in preventing a Houthi victory in Yemen, which would allow Iran to exercise undue influence in the Gulf and would allow them to threaten Saudi Arabia from their southern border. Because of these interests, America’s support for the coalition has increased under the Trump administration, as noted by the approval of a $110 billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia and an increase in American efforts to refuel Saudi planes to enable their attacks on Yemeni rebels. While the establishment of peace in Yemen under Hadi’s leadership is in the best interest of the United States, the collateral damage that Saudi Arabia has inflicted on the war-torn country is a serious cause for concern. Nearly three hundred Yemeni civilians were killed by Saudi airstrikes in December 2017 alone, while the recently-ended Saudi blockade of Yemen’s Houthi-controlled ports left seven million Yemenis on the brink of famine. Saudi Arabia killed 140 civilians during a single airstrike in 2016 after it mistook a funeral for a gathering of Houthi leaders. Despite offers by the Obama administration to help Saudi Arabia minimize their civilian casualties by improving the accuracy of strikes and thoroughly investigating the conditions that enabled previous mistakes, the Saudi military leadership showed little willingness to alter its tactics on its own accord. There is also mounting evidence that Saudi Arabia has deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure to manufacture a food insecurity crisis in Yemen’s Houthi-controlled areas. Hundreds of airstrikes have purposefully targeted farms, marketplaces and food-storage facilities, while over two hundred fishing ships have been destroyed in coalition bombings. While Saudi Arabia did lift its blockade in December after receiving significant pressure from the United States and the international community, many ports have been rendered nearly unusable by previous coalition attacks, resulting in significant delays in the delivery of essential food and medical supplies to Yemen’s beleaguered populace. Yemen held the pitiable label of the most impoverished Middle Eastern nation even before the outbreak of civil war, and the Saudi strategy of starving the Houthis into submission has left Yemen among the most food-insecure nations on Earth without bringing the conflict any closer to an end. Unfortunately, the negative ramifications of Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen go beyond the considerable humanitarian concerns. Al Qaeda, which has long had a significant presence in Yemen, has seen its influence grow over the course of the civil war, a period during which Saudi Arabia has focused nearly all its military efforts on attacking the Houthis at the expense of targeting the terrorist organization. Al Qaeda was significantly bolstered by the transfer of weapons from Saudi Arabia to a number of Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni militia groups in Yemen, which naturally resulted in the diffusion of many of those weapons into the hands of the group’s operatives. Furthermore, the aggressive tactics of the Saudi military has led many Yemenis to view the Saudis as a destabilizing colonial force within their country, which has enabled Al Qaeda to bolster its recruitment on the Arabian Peninsula. The longer the conflict drags on and the more damage is inflicted upon civilian populations by the Saudis, the greater the risk of Al Qaeda re-establishing and expanding its foothold on the peninsula becomes. Additionally, for all the destruction it has caused, the Saudi intervention in Yemen has created very little positive momentum towards ending the conflict. Nearly three years into the Saudi campaign, Yemen is more divided now than it was when the coalition entered the conflict, as evidenced by the recent outbreak of violence in the city of Aden between various groups who had ostensibly been allies on the side of the coalition. Even after their break with the supporters of the recently deceased former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the Houthis have shown no signs that they are close to defeat, and the government’s push to reclaim the Houthi-controlled capital of Sana'a has largely been stalled. As the international community rallies in support of the upcoming peace talks to be held in Oman, the Houthis seem to be just as empowered as they have been during previous failed attempts at dialogue between the combatants. In the interest of preventing Yemen’s further descent into chaos, the United States should begin consistently applying both public and private pressure on the government of Saudi Arabia to adjust their military tactics in Yemen. The United States is not likely to convince Saudi Arabia to abandon their campaign entirely, nor is it necessarily in the best interest of either country for them to do so. However, Saudi Arabia has shown some willingness to respond to public pressure on this issue in the past, as evidenced by their acquiescence to sustained public calls by the United States for an end to their blockade in December. Furthermore, the United States has significant leverage over Saudi Arabia that it could use to influence the kingdom’s behavior. American assistance in refueling Saudi planes has allowed them to partake in longer, more ambitious aerial assaults in which the Saudi air force uses American-made missiles to attack their targets. Conditioning the continuation of such support upon a change of tactics meant to minimize the damage to civilian targets would give Saudi Arabia a significant incentive to alter its behavior, as the Saudis would find it substantially more difficult to carry out their coalition’s campaign with diminished American support. Finally, the recent tensions between Saudi Arabia and their leading coalition ally, the UAE, regarding the desired end of the conflict presents the perfect opportunity for the Trump administration to meaningfully engage the Saudis on a change in tactics. Between the Saudi support for Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated al-Islah party to the UAE’s arming of the southern secessionist movement that attacked government forces in Aden in early February, it has become increasingly clear that the coalition’s most prominent members have little in common in regards to Yemen beyond their mutual distaste of the Houthis and fear of creeping Iranian influence. Present circumstances have left Saudi Arabia more desperate than ever for stable allies in the conflict and have forced them to reconsider the efficacy of their overall strategy in Yemen. If ever there was a time for the United States to exert its influence to encourage a change in the kingdom’s military tactics, that time is now. The Trump administration missed the opportunity to use the State of the Union to publicly highlight the coalition’s collective failure in Yemen, and it should not compound that error by continuing to ignore the mistakes being made by Saudi Arabia in Yemen. The targeting of civilian populations and critical infrastructure by the Saudi military has created a humanitarian crisis in Yemen and risks inspiring future generations of extremists dedicated to disrupting the established order in the Arabian Peninsula, all while failing to meaningfully resolve the ongoing conflict. While Saudi Arabia remains a crucial regional ally, the United States must use its significant sway with the Saudis to convince them to change their military tactics in Yemen before the present situation devolves even further into instability and chaos.

### AT: Must Eliminate

#### Pre-existing stocks mean Saudi can continue for years, and reducing alienates our key partner on terror & energy—Only leverage solves,

Knights ‘18 (Michael, Lafer fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy specializing in the Persian Gulf states, U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage, November 5, 2018, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev>)

Washington should continue its selective approach to restricting the delivery of certain offensive weapons, yet leave defensive procurement on track. This PolicyWatch is the first in a two-part series on potential adjustments to the bilateral security relationship. Part 2 examines U.S. operational support to Saudi forces in the Yemen war. The U.S.-Saudi strategic relationship is built on a simple premise: Washington provides physical security for the Saudi state, while Riyadh serves as a cooperative counterterrorism partner and an apolitical, responsive supplier to global energy markets. Arms sales are integral to this relationship: the task of maintaining the large Saudi military binds Washington and Riyadh together, while the kingdom’s massive purchases of U.S. armaments and related services strengthen the American defense industry and general economy. Traditionally, the relationship was also based on the expectation that the United States would take the lead on foreign and security policies to protect Saudi Arabia. Under the Obama administration, however, this formula was replaced by a partner-based approach that encouraged the kingdom to develop more forces capable of providing security on their own. Riyadh subsequently begun to take unforeseen unilateral action on its self-perceived security interests, leading to crises such as the brutal war in Yemen, the isolation of Qatar, the abduction of Lebanese prime minister Saad al-Hariri, and the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. These developments have heightened the sentiment within Congress that U.S. security cooperation with Saudi Arabia should be reviewed—an attitude that will likely grow stronger after the November 6 midterm elections. The push for such scrutiny will become particularly urgent if the parties involved in the Yemen war fail to establish the lasting ceasefire called for by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last week. APPRAISING AMERICA’S BIGGEST ARMS CUSTOMER Since May 2017, President Trump has repeatedly stated that the Saudis intend to buy $110 billion worth of weapons and associated services from the United States, a figure that appears to include both currently active sales and memoranda of intent for future sales. Whatever the exact figure ultimately proves to be, the scope of Riyadh’s planned purchases is undoubtedly gargantuan. In the past ten years, the kingdom has committed to buy more arms, parts, and associated training and maintenance services than any other foreign customer, with Congress receiving notification of $138.9 billion in potential sales: $90.09 billion during the eight-year Obama administration and $48.81 billion in two years under President Trump. Among the purchases reported by Congressional Research Service were: $63 billion on fixed-wing aircraft systems, including combat and non-combat aircraft, munitions, and electronic upgrades $49.2 billion on land warfare systems, including armored vehicles, artillery, and munitions $49.1 billion on helicopter systems, including Apache gunships and utility transports $24.3 billion on missile defense, including Patriot missiles and a proposed $15 billion worth of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems $12 billion on naval systems, including a proposed $11.5 billion worth of littoral combat ship variants. LAND WARFARE PURCHASES AND THE YEMEN WAR Saudi Arabia’s heavy investment in land warfare systems, helicopters, and airpower over the past decade is no coincidence. It began when Houthi rebels inflicted a series of shocking defeats on the kingdom’s border forces in 2009-2010. Since then, the United States has built up the offensive capabilities of the Saudi Arabian National Guard and Royal Saudi Land Forces, the elements that spearheaded the kingdom’s ground campaigns in Yemen once the current war broke out in 2015. These purchases included: Immediate refit after 2010. Initial Saudi investments in 2010-2013 focused on remedying shortfalls witnessed while fighting the Houthis, notably the need for up-armored, mine-resistant troop carriers and armored attack helicopters capable of dishing out—and taking—heavy punishment. Riyadh also purchased air-to-ground weapons, sensors, and training packages with the aim of getting the Royal Saudi Air Force ready to support new ground operations in Yemen. Resupply during the current war. In addition to clearly defensive systems (e.g., border surveillance aerostats, counter-battery radars), the Saudi military sought U.S. resupply of its land forces as they shifted from defending the border to pushing into Houthi-held parts of northern Yemen. A proposed sale of 115 M1A2S main battle tanks and support vehicles failed to obtain congressional approval in September 2016 but is moving forward under the Trump administration. In March-April 2018, Congress was notified of proposed sales involving $2.28 billion worth of munitions and 155 millimeter self-propelled armored artillery systems for the land forces. Although tank and artillery systems can be used defensively, they should probably be viewed as offensive systems given Saudi Arabia’s increase in short-range campaigns extending ten to fifteen miles inside northern Yemen. PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS Sales of air-delivered precision-guided munitions (PGMs) are another lightning rod issue in the bilateral security relationship. Following the 2009-2010 round of hostilities with the Houthis, the kingdom sought to refresh its stock of antipersonnel bombs with a large order of 1,300 U.S.-built CBU-105 sensor-fused weapons (a higher-reliability submunition that manufacturers say does not qualify as a cluster bomb due to its low malfunction rate). Yet by November 2015, eight months into the current war, the Saudis had used up nearly 2,600 PGMs, according to strike metrics compiled by The Washington Institute. In response, the Saudis requested a $1.29 billion package comprising around 19,000 air-delivered PGMs, an order that began delivery in July 2017. In addition to that package, the Senate narrowly approved a new $500 million commercial sale of PGMs to Riyadh in June 2017—the first installment in a mammoth $4.46 billion series of air-launched munition deals that would provide the Saudis with 104,000 U.S. PGMs in the next half decade. Riyadh may be accelerating its purchases in anticipation of a prolonged war in Yemen and the potential loss of U.S. sales down the road. According to Washington Institute data collected in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the kingdom’s forces have used around 14,500 munitions since March 2015, almost all PGMs, with the average rate gradually declining from 333 PGMs per month in 2015 to 270 per month this year. The U.S. munitions currently arriving in Saudi Arabia were ordered in November 2015, when Riyadh recognized it might need new PGMs by 2019, but the intervening years have seen few signs of a PGM shortfall. Based on a rough sense of prewar stocks and a constant dribble of replacements, Riyadh could probably keep bombing at its current rate for several years even if all new U.S. PGM deals were rejected. Thus, while cutting off such sales may be a good way to signal U.S. displeasure or publicly distance Washington from the war, the data indicates that it would not meaningfully slow the air campaign anytime soon. ADJUSTING U.S. SALES With U.S.-provided bombs used in many of the war’s deadliest civilian fatality incidents, Congress has ample rationale to block, delay, or condition future arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Depending on the results of this week’s election, the Senate’s cross-party, forty-seven-seat opposition to such sales could become a majority. Saudi intransigence on the Khashoggi case or Yemen peace talks could also flip more senators into supporting a joint resolution against new weapons packages. In all likelihood, the president would veto any such resolution unless Congress can show that it has carefully weighed the costs—in terms of both neglecting the legitimate security needs of a long-term partner and harming America’s status as a security ally and arms vendor. To address these concerns, the U.S. government should apply some common-sense guidelines: Think ahead and review the details of arms sales. Under the Obama administration’s watch, Saudi Arabia gained far greater military capabilities and was empowered to act in pursuit of its own security. The lack of a detailed, forward-looking, top-to-bottom review of U.S. arms sales to Riyadh concealed this reality. Prior to considering new sales, then, Congress should insist that the State Department and Pentagon provide an in-depth, holistic assessment of the kingdom’s military capabilities, security sector organization, future plans, related purchase needs, and alternative suppliers, outlining the implications that these findings hold for U.S. security. Arms sales should be driven by a clear-eyed, long-term assessment of U.S. strategic interests, not by simple economic opportunism or the self-defined priorities of Saudi leaders. Do not deny systems that are mostly defensive in nature. Some Saudi capabilities represent welcome burden-sharing with U.S. forces in defending the Persian Gulf region and containing Iran. Washington’s desire to hold Saudi leaders accountable for problematic actions is understandable, but it should not be used to craft policies that reward Tehran. The United States has a strong strategic interest in continuing to provide naval systems, missile defenses (including THAAD), and support for border defense and force protection (e.g., counter-mine and counter-indirect fire systems). These systems represent 54 percent (or $26.5 billion) of the $48.81 billion in Saudi arms sales proposed by the Trump administration to date, and a sizable prize for the U.S. economy. Condition and slow the provision of mostly offensive systems. As described above, the kingdom could use certain systems to take the war deeper into Yemen, including M1A2S tanks, self-propelled artillery, and PGMs. Delaying or conditioning their delivery is therefore justifiable, perhaps with a proviso that they not be deployed in Yemen unless the Houthis prove unwilling to engage in peace talks. Washington could also tie sales to a halt in high-risk urban strikes, as Secretary Pompeo suggested on October 30.

### AT: Credibility Add-On

#### Zero chance of spillover – Germany proves. The international community overreacted and exerted pressure on Germany the other way.

Rick Noack 19. Foreign affairs reporter focusing on Europe and international security. 3-27-19. “Germany halted all arms exports to Saudi Arabia. It worked too well, and now Berlin is looking for a way out.” *Washington Post*. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/03/27/germany-halted-all-arms-exports-saudi-arabia-it-worked-too-well-now-they-are-looking-way-out/?utm_term=.b286bc963151>. //RG

There are countries that punch above their weight, and there are countries that punch below their weight. And then, there are countries that aren’t quite sure in which category they want to belong. Germany appears to be one of them. When international outrage mounted over the Saudi-led war in Yemen and the killing of Washington Post contributing columnist Jamal Khashoggi in fall 2018, Germany was the only major country to halt all arms exports to the kingdom. Human rights advocates praised the decision. At the time it was seen as a symbolic move, since other countries exported a great deal more arms to Saudi Arabia. But as it turns out, the intertwined nature of European industry meant that the German export ban had a great deal more effect than expected. Now the debate in Berlin has swung into the opposite direction, as the full repercussions of that exports halt have become apparent. With days to go until the measures are set to expire, Germany’s Security Council, headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel, may partially reverse the weapons halt as early as this week, according to a report by German news association RND. Such a move would be more an acknowledgment of the fact that the halt worked the way human rights advocates had hoped, rather than an admission of the measures’ failure. Whereas analysts had previously dismissed the measures as being of little relevance given that France, Britain and the United States export most weapons to Saudi Arabia, the opposite has ended up being the case — mainly because of the close ties between the European economies. In France and Britain, the fear is that the German weapons ban is disrupting their own supply chains. To assemble planes and ships for Saudi Arabia, those countries’ arms suppliers have so far heavily relied on high-tech components produced in Germany. British arms supplier BAE Systems’ Eurofighter Typhoon planes, for instance, include a number of elements previously imported from Germany. German high-tech products are also needed to meet the company’s contractual obligations to maintain already purchased jets, and to replace faulty components.

#### Refusal to sign the ATT decks US leadership over arms sales.

Howard LaFranchi 5-13-19. Foreign affairs correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor. “When Trump ‘unsigned’ arms treaty, it was about more than guns.”

“Treaties create norms and set the rules of the road, and for many decades the United States has been a leader in that process and considered that overall it benefited from the rules-based order supported by treaties,” says Waheguru Pal Sidhu, a clinical associate professor in New York University’s Center for Global Affairs and an expert in arms control and nonproliferation. “But under the Trump administration, the U.S. is increasingly moving out of treaties, and that is doing two things,” he adds. “It is telling the world, both allies and adversaries, that [the U.S. is] basically checking out. And increasingly, it’s encouraging other groups of countries to come together to work on treaties and arrangements without the leadership of the United States, and they’re finding that it’s not easy.” He cites the ATT as one example. Without the U.S., the mid-size arms-exporting countries of the European Union are basically alone in pressing for high global standards for arms sales, he says. On the other hand, the U.N.’s Mr. Prins notes that more than half of U.N. member states – just over 100 – are now party to the ATT. One attraction for poorer countries is the funding and expertise made available (some of which the U.S. has been providing) to set up databases of weapons transfers, he says. Similarly, some African and Latin American countries already awash in small arms have sought assistance through the ATT in getting a handle on irregular weapons imports. But Dr. Sidhu adds that the Paris Climate Accords and the Iran nuclear deal are also examples of international agreements that are hobbled by a U.S. absence. Indeed, international affairs experts increasingly cite the U.S. retreat from its traditional role as a leader of the international order as a factor in what they see as the international community’s lagging ability to address the world’s most pressing challenges. “The United States under President Donald J. Trump continued to abdicate much of its traditional role of upholding the international order, ceding leadership in some areas to its rivals and eschewing partnering with its allies to bolster the order,” said Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, in issuing an annual report card last week by a group of the world’s top think tanks assessing international cooperation on issues from terrorism to the global economy. In part “as a result” of that abdication, Mr. Haass, said, “the gap between global challenges and responses grew larger” over the last year. For many, that “gap” will continue to widen as the U.S. continues its retreat from global leadership, and as others – allies and adversaries – seek to fill the void. “When the U.S. is participating in something, it bolsters the status of that something – or should I say there was a time when that was very much the case,” says John Cerone, a professor of international law specializing in human rights and international organizations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Mass. Now, “If the U.S. is flouting treaties, it not only makes the U.S. look bad, but it makes it easier for other states to refuse to participate, he says, “and that undermines the system of international cooperation that has been important to so much global progress.” Professor Cerone cites the ATT as an example of a treaty of limited scope “and very deferential to national sovereignty” that seeks to establish and improve international norms of behavior, in this case advancing regulation of international trade “to keep weapons out of the hands of warlords and those who would commit genocide.”

### NB – Alliance DA

#### The CP enables effective pressure without sacrificing the alliance

Frederic WEHREY, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, PhD, International Relations, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, 14 [“A New U.S. Approach to Gulf Security,” March 10, 2014, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/10/new-u.s.-approach-to-gulf-security#]

Meanwhile, in response to the potential for popular mobilization that was sparked by the Arab uprisings in 2011, Gulf states increased internal repression. As a result, their domestic policies are more frequently at odds with the U.S. administration’s call for greater reform and human rights in the region. Often in coordination with each other, the GCC states have muzzled outspoken clerical figures, imprisoned activists, deported expatriates, and enacted draconian censorship laws. The small but encouraging steps toward liberalization that Gulf regimes have taken in the last decade have all but halted—and in many cases regressed. There are disturbing signs of this across the Gulf, but events in the kingdom of Bahrain epitomize the trend. It is in Bahrain where U.S. policy faces the starkest challenge. A worsening cycle of protests and repression has gripped the kingdom since 2011. Both sides in the conflict—the Sunni royal family and a constellation of opposition activists and organizations—have pursued escalatory tactics and a winner-take-all strategy, resulting in mutual recriminations and missed opportunities for compromise. Hardliners within the royal family appear to be comforted by a “new normal” in U.S. policy that absolves them from making substantive gestures to the opposition. The mainstream Shia opposition al-Wefaq has suffered from a maximalist negotiating posture that is the product, in part, of a rejectionist, militant trend in the opposition’s ranks. The Current U.S. Approach Since the fall of 2013, a principal focus of U.S. strategy has been to reaffirm to Gulf states the durability of American support by emphasizing that the United States shares Gulf concerns on regional threats, particularly Iran, and will provide security accordingly. More tangibly, the United States has continued its scheduled arms deliveries to the Gulf (including a recent $11 billion package), announced plans for expanding the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, and increased the tempo of arms sales to the region under its Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program over the past six years. Although the origins of much of this activity predate the current round of Gulf-U.S. discord, the efforts nonetheless serve to reinforce Washington’s message of reassurance. Senior U.S. officials have publicly professed continued support for political reform in the Gulf. But in practice, the reality—at least from the outside—appears quite different. This is especially true in light of the popular perception that the U.S. administration under President Barack Obama is scaling back its democracy promotion programs in the Middle East, many of which, such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), have faced intense GCC opposition since the start of the Arab uprisings. As Obama prepares for a trip to Saudi Arabia at the end of March 2014, Washington should take a strong stance in support of its continued interests in the region and the expectation that Gulf leaders will enact meaningful reforms. The United States needs to revise its reassurance strategy in the Gulf and ensure that it includes an effort to convince its allies that reform—of political institutions, the security sector, and the rights and liberties afforded citizens—will ultimately contribute to the U.S. and Gulf vital interest in long-term stability. Reaffirm Ties, Use More Effective Leverage on Reform The U.S. administration should develop a proactive strategy that urges Gulf states to undertake more substantial internal reforms to complement the efforts already under way to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the external defense of these states. U.S. policymakers should recognize how urging reform and reaffirming security commitments are mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually exclusive objectives. By urging reform, the United States can communicate to its allies that while it cares about state security, it also believes that the political status quo in the region is increasingly unsustainable. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel made this link between top-down reform and greater state strength at the Manama Dialogue on Gulf security in December 2013, asserting that “stability and political reform are necessary partners.” Indeed, in the years since the Arab Spring’s dramatic 2011 debut, the U.S. security establishment has begun to recognize how gradual domestic reform in the GCC states can reduce the risks of political instability that challenge core U.S. interests, such as energy and counterterrorism. To move beyond its public utterances, the United States needs a more holistic strategy that synchronizes different tools of U.S. foreign policy, from security to diplomacy. It should use existing levers in a more integrated way to advance political and institutional reform in the context of strategic reassurances. To do so, the United States must recognize and capitalize on its many forms of leverage, primarily in the area of security. Despite Gulf states’ calls for more military self-sufficiency, GCC military forces remain dependent on the United States for vital support in command and control, logistics, and intelligence. Added to this, political differences and mutual distrust have precluded the GCC from evolving into a real collective defense organization. At the end of the day, the United States is still the only superpower in town; no other external power—Russia, China, NATO, or India—is capable of filling or willing to fill America’s role. This is true even in environments such as Bahrain, where anti-Americanism (in the media and in parliament, for example) is being used by Sunni hardliners to deter Western and U.S. efforts urging more inclusionary policies toward the country’s opposition. Here, Washington has already used its leverage to a degree. The United States paused all foreign military sales to Bahrain after the regime violently suppressed popular protests in March and April 2011. In 2012, the U.S. administration decided to lift the hold on the majority of these sales; most of the remaining items on hold have dual-use capabilities for internal crowd control. Still, with a stalemate between the government and its opponents fueling radical elements within the opposition, there is more to be done. Pressing close allies on issues related to their domestic affairs need not jeopardize simultaneous collaboration on a range of strategic priorities, whether that is finding an end to the Syria conflict, countering terrorism, stabilizing Egypt, or addressing Iran’s nuclear program. State security depends both on a military advantage vis-à-vis foreign threats and on promoting a more inclusive political culture at home. Bahrain again is a case in point. The status quo increasingly threatens Bahraini as well as American interests by enabling the rise of a more radical opposition that may eventually threaten the U.S. presence in Bahrain. The United States must articulate the case to its allies that, for the sake of mutually desirable regional stability, governments have to stay ahead of demands for change by enacting substantive reforms. The United States should recognize its role as the more powerful partner, act accordingly, and feel confident in doing so. In the first instance, this means that U.S. diplomats should risk raising uncomfortable, often contentious issues regarding domestic political reform, knowing that though the action may produce some irritation, it will not undermine or jeopardize the larger strategic relationship. More systematically, U.S. officials should integrate military and diplomatic aspects of the U.S. policy toolkit to promote reform. Security Assistance Initiatives Use foreign military sales (FMS) more deliberatively and selectively to both build the defense capacity of Gulf states and promote domestic reform. U.S. military sales reinforce U.S. security commitments to the Gulf on threats of mutual concern. But withholding military items, particularly those used in internal repression and high-value items that offer prestige to Gulf regimes, can also signal U.S. concern about Gulf domestic policies and potentially compel Gulf regimes to enact specific reforms.

#### The plan’s complete disengagement fails – it creates a power vacuum that destroy American influence and emboldens Saudi aggression.

Fly, 2019 (Jamie Fly is a senior fellow and director of the Future of Geopolitics Program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 1/11/2019, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/trump-administration-should-use-leverage-to-rein-in-saudis-bin-salman>, SHD)

The administration’s national security policy documents embrace a framework of great-power conflict focused on Russia and China, while deprioritizing American engagement in the Middle East. In a late 2017 trip to Israel, the officials and experts I met with spoke openly of an emerging “post-American Middle East.” Obama started the trend, and the Trump administration was accelerating it. Israel has experienced the consequences acutely, with Russia and Iran now on their northern border preparing to fill the void.∂ Yet it was just such a void that led the Saudis to enter into the Yemeni civil war in the first place. The Obama administration withdrew from Iraq, “led from behind” in Libya, and watched while hundreds of thousands of Syrians were slaughtered in a civil war that destabilized the region and eventually threatened Europe and the United States. Despite differing approaches toward Iran, the assumption by both the Obama and Trump administrations was that Arab partners would bear most of the burden in dealing with the consequences of U.S. policy toward Tehran. On the surface, drawing back from the Middle East and handing off to local proxies appeals to Americans tired of fighting a war for over 17 years with no end in sight. But the Obama experiment in “leading from behind” in favor of “nation-building at home” has repeatedly shown that U.S. partners are wholly incapable of addressing the region’s core challenges.∂ Despite this record, soon after U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton took office as Trump's national security adviser, reports surfaced he was phoning the Egyptians and other Arab partners asking them to send troops to Syria. Trump himself occasionally tweets that others needed to step up, but little tangible Arab military support in Syria materialized.∂ The reason is most of the Gulf states remain bogged down in Yemen, but the Arab partners also have a history of pocketing the latest U.S. military weapons and technology with no intention of using them other than the occasional national day parade. There have been reports of Sudanese, Colombian, and even American mercenaries carrying out much of the fighting in Yemen for the Gulf coalition. The coalition has even reportedly hired child soldiers from other conflict zones like Sudan, leaving Saudi and Emirati forces to direct the units from a safe distance away. Before the Khashoggi murder, administration officials touted plans for a Washington summit to announce an “Arab NATO.” Under current circumstances, any such grouping of countries would be an alliance in name only, given the moribund state of most Arab militaries and their proclivity to outsource significant military missions that involve significant risk.∂ These hard facts do little to rein in Gulf leaders’ regional ambitions. Beyond Yemen, the Saudi crown prince and his allies in the UAE picked a fight after Trump’s visit in May 2017 with Qatar, hiring Russian cyber-hackers to target the other side and weaponizing the U.S. media to circulate disinformation about opponents. The crown prince then attempted to insert himself into Lebanese politics, temporarily kidnapping Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and forcing his eventual resignation, which Hariri later rescinded.∂ On my trip to the region in 2015, one of the crown prince's peers in another ruling family bragged to me that the Yemen campaign would be wrapped up in a matter of weeks and that Arab forces would race the Russians to capture Raqqa on behalf of the United States. Raqqa was liberated two years later with little support from the Gulf states’ militaries. Almost four years after the war’s beginning and thousands of deaths later, it’s difficult to point to the strategic progress being made. The actions of the Saudis and their Gulf partners have given the repressive clerical regime in Tehran a public relations bonanza they could have only dreamed of as they slaughtered their citizens in the streets in 2009, just as the Trump administration was attempting to turn up the economic and political pressure on Tehran.∂ What the Trump administration fails to recognize is that its policy toward the Middle East, including its blind support for the Saudis, is undermining its own stated goals. Strategy documents promising “great power competition” ring hollow in Moscow and Beijing if the United States is ceding a key region to proxies unable to pull their weight. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are also watching as the United States abandons its allies in Syria and leaves Israel to fend for itself, leaving a festering mess on Europe’s doorstep. The beneficiaries of this Middle East policy will be Russia, China, and Iran — the very powers the administration claims to be attempting to challenge.∂ Given this, what are America's options for dealing with the Saudis? The crown prince and the other Gulf leaders appear to be going nowhere soon, having weathered the Arab Spring of 2011 better than their secular counterparts. Iran, under the Obama administration's Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, extended its regional aggression, threatening U.S. allies and interests. Even as Trump is trying to disengage from the region, Tehran or renewed terrorist threats may very well pull the United States back in just as the Islamic State foiled Obama’s 2011 pivot away from the Middle East.∂ To be relevant to the future of the region, the United States needs to be willing to accept and support a sustained military footprint, even in Syria. Expanded Russian, Iranian, or Turkish influence in Syria’s future is not in Washington’s (or Israel’s) best interest. Iran’s regional aggression cannot be contested through economic pressure alone.∂ Ironically, given Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’ resignation over Syria, the ISIS-only strategy promoted by the U.S. military was part of the problem. Prior to the president’s withdrawal announcement, U.S. goals in Syria were often unclear. Senior administration officials stated contradictory aims regarding that presence. It’s not clear that the number of forces the president had been convinced to retain were sufficient for anything other than a narrow counterterrorism mission. This undefined and undiscussed deployment also risked undermining tenuous American public support for engagement in the Middle East if significant casualties had been incurred.∂ Yet withdrawal from Syria was not the way to correct these flaws. America’s interests in the region extend well beyond whether the caliphate is destroyed or on life support. Disengagement will only create vacuums exploited by those who threaten our way of life. Even if the administration continues on its trajectory of Middle East disengagement, it must realize that an unrestrained Saudi Arabia, unable to correctly assess its capabilities, is a significant threat to U.S. interests in the region and not a reliable partner to fill the void.∂ Congress is vital here. The legislative branch has been slow to try and rein in the excesses of the Trump administration’s foreign policy. Congress has the tools and authority capable of correcting the U.S. approach toward Riyadh. Much of the legislative debate thus far has been focused on the war in Yemen, which has had horrific humanitarian consequences. However, framing the challenge solely as a war powers issue is not the right approach. No matter how bad the Saudi strategy in Yemen is, Iranian expansionism in the country through Tehran’s proxies, the Houthis, is a threat to America’s interests. We cannot wash our hands of Yemen and assume that disengagement will result in a better outcome.∂ Instead, members of Congress concerned about the Trump administration's approach to Riyadh should tackle the fundamental underpinnings of its strategy. Human rights do matter to U.S. national security. If the Saudi crown prince wants to reform the kingdom, we should demand he does so honestly, not superficially, and with verifiable results. Human rights need to be at the center of U.S. engagement with Riyadh just as administration officials claim it is at the center of our concerns with the Iranian regime.∂ Sanctions should be extended well beyond those involved in the Khashoggi murder to include those involved in the ongoing detention and torture of political dissidents and prisoners like Samar and Raif Badawi. U.S. officials should downgrade contacts with their counterparts until these activists are released, just as the administration did to successfully secure the release of detained American pastor Andrew Brunson from Turkey.∂ U.S. military assistance should also come with conditions, based on Saudi behavior. Trump likes to question the utility of American foreign assistance and talk about countries having to earn that assistance. Why should America’s Arab partners be treated any differently? Members of Congress often instinctively attempt all-or-nothing solutions, attempting to end all U.S. assistance or deciding they don’t have any leverage, so why bother trying? Congressional foreign-policy power is most persuasive when it boxes in the executive branch by setting commonsense boundaries for U.S. policy.∂ The essential tool to do that is through funding. Congress can pass legislation placing conditions on future arms sales and other military assistance. It should state what the United States expects from the Saudi contributions to the partnership and what actions it considers inconsistent with a cooperative relationship. If the president or his successors are unable to certify these requirements are being met, U.S. assistance would be halted. Such a move would likely garner significant bipartisan support.∂ Finally, the United States should be careful about emboldening a reckless Saudi crown prince who has shown a blatant disregard for international norms. One key Saudi ask is for U.S. nuclear technology for a supposedly civilian nuclear program. Discussions regarding granting the kingdom such technology should halt unless Riyadh shows the grown-ups are once again in charge.∂ Key to this approach is a reassertion of leverage in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The administration has overstated the economic benefits of the partnership for the United States. Just as the Trump administration has shrewdly played hardball with other U.S. partners, it should demand more of the Saudis and other Gulf partners and not give away the store for nothing in return. The Saudis, Egyptians, and others always threaten to look elsewhere for strategic support. Such threats became a frequent refrain from Egyptian defense officials to those in Congress trying to reform the U.S.-Egyptian security partnership. For all the high-profile trips to Moscow, few end in significant deals. Buying American maintains an allure that Moscow or China cannot compete against.

### NB – Russia DA

#### The aff causes fill-in --- the CP avoids it

Singh ‘19 (Michael, Managing Director @ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “U.S. Policy in the Arabian Peninsula: An Evaluation,” Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2-6-2019, <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20190206/108861/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-SinghM-20190206.pdf>)

In my view, it would be a serious mistake to jettison our partnership with Saudi Arabia or with our other Gulf allies, for three reasons. First, there is a defensive element to these alliances – the U.S. seeks to maintain close ties in Riyadh and elsewhere in order to maintain influence over these states’ choices, and to ensure they remain stable. Second, as noted above, working through allies is the clearest way to secure our interests in the Middle East while shifting resources to other regions. Third, severing our partnerships in the region would force these states to look elsewhere for arms and other support, and increase the incentives for other external powers to deepen their involvement in the region.12 This is not to say, however, that the U.S. should simply be content with the status quo. Just as walking away from our regional partnerships would undermine our interests, so too would uncritically embracing them or resigning ourselves to the present state of affairs. Instead the U.S. should concentrate its efforts in a number of areas. Improve Allied Military Effectiveness – As noted above, much U.S. military aid in the Middle East has proven to be a poor investment. But not all. With willing partners and a long-term U.S. commitment, such aid can pay significant dividends, as in the cases of Israel, the Palestinian Authority security forces, and the UAE. To be effective, the U.S. should not focus solely on training and equipping, or on modeling regional forces after our own. Rather, as Dr. Mara Karlin has argued13, effective military aid must also address questions of doctrine and organization. And as Dr. Kenneth Pollack has argued, U.S. assistance should focus on enhancing positive qualities partner militaries already possess.14 Congress and the Administration should also consider the allocation of military aid within the region; excluding aid to Israel, the lion’s share currently goes to support the purchase of major weapons systems by Egypt. It is important, in my view, that the U.S. exercise care when imposing conditions on military aid or military sales, such as are now being debated with respect to Saudi Arabia. We should avoid, in my view, tying military assistance to unrelated issues, however compelling. The track record of this sort of conditionality is poor, likely because military assistance offers insufficient leverage to address deeper political and social problems in a partner state, and because our partners bristle at any perception that the U.S. is using assistance to impose our views on other matters. Tying multiple issues together means that progress on all will move at the pace of the most difficult among them; it is better to address our concerns separately and accept that progress will be fast in some areas and slow in others. It is entirely appropriate, however, to tie assistance and sales to the conduct of partner militaries and the manner in which they wage war, as well as on stringent end-use verification. In addition, both Congress and the administration should bear in mind the systemic risks of steadily increasing arms sales to the region.15 Arms sales and other military assistance can fuel interventionism, distort civil-military relations in recipient states, and result in proliferation in cases of instability or poor custody. Policymakers also need to continue to bear in mind the need to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge – despite warming relations between Israel and our Arab allies – as well as the possibility of conflict between U.S. allies more generally. Conditionality need not be explicit or Congressionally-mandated. It should instead be implicit in our security coordination with partners; we should only support military actions that serve our mutual interests, are conducted in accordance with international norms, have clear and realistic objectives and timetables, and have a viable political strategy alongside any military plan. This may produce difficult conversations in which we inform partners that we cannot support a particular operation, but this likely less damaging to our partnerships than initially offering support to a dubious action only to walk away when it begins to falter. This raises the specific case of Yemen. As Congress and the Administration consider U.S. policy options in Yemen, they should bear in mind several points. First, Yemen is not, as it sometimes is portrayed, primarily a Saudi-Iranian conflict. The conflict has its roots in the disintegration of the Saleh regime in 2011 – whose authority beyond Sanaa was already questionable – and the political turmoil which followed. The GCC states intervened only after the Houthi movement ousted the internationally-recognized transitional government and violated several power-sharing agreements, for which the Houthis were condemned by UN Security Council resolution 2216. Iran’s involvement has reportedly remained modest, if pernicious. Iran’s exports of arms and fuel to the Houthis have helped to sustain and escalate the fighting. However, it is not clear that Tehran has the necessary influence to shape Houthi decision-making, and in any event it is unlikely Iran would wish to encourage the Houthis to stand down since its interests are arguably better served if Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain bogged down in the conflict. There is a silver lining to this, as it also implies that the Saudis and Emiratis could influence the Houthis directly, and Iranian influence is not necessarily permanently entrenched in Yemen. Second, the withdrawal of U.S. support to the GCC coalition, or the suspension of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia or the UAE, are unlikely to end the conflict or ease humanitarian conditions in Yemen. Despite the Stockholm Agreement, the path to a political agreement between the Houthis and Yemeni government forces remains difficult, as the Director of National Intelligence recently noted16 and as violations of the ceasefire have so far demonstrated.17 Nor is this the only of Yemen’s conflicts; the country is also experiencing a renewed north-south split which may jeopardize its unity, which dates back only to 1990.18 The best course of action for the U.S. and its partners is to boost our support for UN efforts at mediation between the Houthis and pro-government forces.19 Even if these falter, the U.S. should discourage its partners from pressing an attack on the port city of Hodeida, which could have significant humanitarian consequences. Instead, the U.S. should encourage its partners to remain focused on negotiations and improving humanitarian access, in part by addressing the problems identified in the most recent report of the UN Panel of Experts. 20 The coalition’s military aims going forward should be modest and focused on direct threats, including countering Iranian proliferation to Yemen, deterring Houthi missile and rocket attacks on neighboring countries and international shipping lanes, protecting areas liberated from Houthi control, and continuing to degrade AQAP and ISIS. While continued offensive military assistance to our allies should be contingent on a shared strategy, we should resist the temptation to walk away from our partners while U.S. interests remain at stake.

#### Maintaining ties with authoritarians is key to maintain regional stability and preventing Russian revisionism

Brands ‘18 – Bloomberg Opinion columnist, Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (Hal, “Saudi Crisis Shows the U.S. Needs a New Way to Deal With Dictators,” Bloomberg, October 15 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-15/khashoggi-crisis-shows-u-s-needs-new-way-to-deal-with-dictators)//al>

The disappearance of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi has precipitated a new crisis in U.S.-Saudi relations. Yet that crisis has also revived a much older dilemma in American strategy: How to deal with allies that also happen to morally abhorrent, even murderous, dictatorships. The basic predicament has been around for over a century. As the U.S. established its dominance in the Western Hemisphere in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it often cooperated with local strongmen who could provide some semblance of stability. Throughout the Cold War, containing communism required working with partners that were far from morally pure — dictators who ruled key allies such as South Korea, Turkey, Portugal and Greece at various points, as well as a clutch of Latin American and Middle Eastern despots. The rapid spread of democracy from the 1970s through the early 2000s eased this dilemma, by aligning the frontiers of freedom more closely with the frontiers of America’s European and Asia-Pacific alliances. Yet **the problem has now returned, and not just in the Middle East, because of two factors**. The first is the so-called democratic recession that began around 2006, and which has subsequently weakened democracy in dozens of countries around the world. Illiberal and anti-democratic practices have taken hold in key NATO countries: Turkey, Poland and Hungary. In the Asia-Pacific, one U.S. ally — Thailand — has been under military rule since 2014, while another — the Philippines — has reverted to a bloody form of illiberal democracy under Rodrigo Duterte. In the Middle East, George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda and **the hopes of the Arab Spring have faded**; authoritarianism and instability are again the status quo. The challenge of handling these friendly authoritarians is greater because of the second trend: the resurgence of geopolitical revisionism**. As** hostile authoritarian powers — China, Russia and Iran — challenge existing regional orders across Eurasia, they are putting U.S. power and influence under pressure and sharpening the dilemmas America faces in handling its more autocratic allies. Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines **may be acting in deeply distasteful ways, but they occupy critical geostrategic real estate in today’s most important geopolitical competitions**. There have traditionally been two schools of thought on coping with this problem. One was expressed most forcefully by Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose famous article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” was published in 1979 and vaulted her to the forefront of U.S. policy-making during the Ronald Reagan years. Kirkpatrick argued that insisting that authoritarian allies adhere to U.S. standards of political freedom and individual rights was an invitation to disaster. It would destabilize those regimes internally, **raising the likelihood of a takeover by more radical and hostile forces**. This, Kirkpatrick alleged, was just what had happened in Nicaragua and Iran in 1979, where U.S. pressure to respect human rights had weakened authoritarian allies against the revolutionaries who toppled them. Preserving a stable strategic environment in which the U.S. and its allied democracies could thrive, and aggressive dictatorships such as the Soviet Union could be contained, **meant partnering with some friendly devils along the way**.

### NB – DIB DA

#### The CP avoids the defense base DA --- conditions key to enable sales that are critical to the economy

Michael Knights ‘18, (Michael Knights is a Boston-based senior fellow of The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf states. "U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation (Part 1): Conditioning Arms Sales to Build Leverage," Washington Institute, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/u.s.-saudi-security-cooperation-part-1-conditioning-arms-sales-to-build-lev, accessed 6-19-2019, SM)

ADJUSTING U.S. SALES With U.S.-provided bombs used in many of the war’s deadliest civilian fatality incidents, Congress has ample rationale to block, delay, or condition future arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Depending on the results of this week’s election, the Senate’s cross-party, forty-seven-seat opposition to such sales could become a majority. Saudi intransigence on the Khashoggi case or Yemen peace talks could also flip more senators into supporting a joint resolution against new weapons packages. In all likelihood, the president would veto any such resolution unless Congress can show that it has carefully weighed the costs—in terms of both neglecting the legitimate security needs of a long-term partner and harming America’s status as a security ally and arms vendor. To address these concerns, the U.S. government should apply some common-sense guidelines: Think ahead and review the details of arms sales. Under the Obama administration’s watch, Saudi Arabia gained far greater military capabilities and was empowered to act in pursuit of its own security. The lack of a detailed, forward-looking, top-to-bottom review of U.S. arms sales to Riyadh concealed this reality. Prior to considering new sales, then, Congress should insist that the State Department and Pentagon provide an in-depth, holistic assessment of the kingdom’s military capabilities, security sector organization, future plans, related purchase needs, and alternative suppliers, outlining the implications that these findings hold for U.S. security. Arms sales should be driven by a clear-eyed, long-term assessment of U.S. strategic interests, not by simple economic opportunism or the self-defined priorities of Saudi leaders. Do not deny systems that are mostly defensive in nature. Some Saudi capabilities represent welcome burden-sharing with U.S. forces in defending the Persian Gulf region and containing Iran. Washington’s desire to hold Saudi leaders accountable for problematic actions is understandable, but it should not be used to craft policies that reward Tehran. The United States has a strong strategic interest in continuing to provide naval systems, missile defenses (including THAAD), and support for border defense and force protection (e.g., counter-mine and counter-indirect fire systems). These systems represent 54 percent (or $26.5 billion) of the $48.81 billion in Saudi arms sales proposed by the Trump administration to date, and a sizable prize for the U.S. economy.

## 2NC – CHINA SPECIFIC

### S – China Says Yes

#### China says yes – it’s a sweet deal

Glaser 16 (Charles L. Glaser is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University, “Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Spring 2016), pp. 178–191)

Nevertheless, the grand bargain would provide China with a major achievement at arguably little cost. Current Chinese nationalist claims have blown the importance of the maritime and sovereignty disputes in the South China and East China Seas far out of proportion to their material value. If China’s leaders decide to prioritize other goals, they might be able to deflate these nationalist claims, bringing them back in line with their actual value and selling this new interpretation domestically. At the same time, Chinese leaders should see that the grand bargain would provide large benefits to China, including elimination of the United States as a barrier to bringing Taiwan under its full sovereign control and, closely related, a large reduction in the security threat posed by the United States. The grand bargain, therefore, could be appealing to a Chinese leadership that faces daunting domestic challenges and intensifying regional opposition to its assertive policies and growing military might. Thus, while the probability of China accepting the grand bargain may be low, one should not entirely discount the possibility.

#### China says yes, but leverage is key – solves territorial disputes, US hegemony, and avoids the alliance DA

Glaser 15 (Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 49–90)

Therefore, the question arises whether policies exist that would reduce the risks while preserving the benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. If combining certain concessions by China in an overall package—a grand bargain, for lack of a better term—could achieve this goal, then the United States’ best option might be to make ending its commitment to Taiwan contingent on China making concessions of its own. The preceding analysis suggests that the United States should design such a grand bargain with a variety of purposes in mind: to gain information about the nature and extent of China’s motives; to demonstrate its resolve to retain U.S. security commitments in the region; and, related, to preserve the credibility of its commitments to its allies. Likely the most common way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issue to create a fair deal—that is, one in which both benefit equally—that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue. A different way to envision a grand bargain is as an agreement in which the states trade across multiple issues, making both states better off, but not necessarily equally. A grand bargain in Northeast Asia is likely to take the latter form, partly because the agreement would be in response to a power shift that favors China and partly because China’s interests in the region are greater than those of the United States. The first component of a grand bargain, and probably the most important, would be for China to resolve its maritime disputes on “fair” terms.100 Oddly, there seems to be both a little and a lot at stake in these disputes. Gaining sovereignty over the offshore islands would strengthen China’s claims to the oil and gas reserves, which have increased the importance of the disputes. At the same time, however, the disputes have severely hindered the exploration and extraction of these resources, and joint extraction and sharing agreements could provide all parties with substantial resource benefits. Growing nationalism has given the disputed territorial claims importance far beyond their material and strategic value, and it has damaged the prospects for any type of agreement. An ideal solution would be for China and its neighbors to place the territories under some sort of international control as a maritime preserve and to share the resources.101 Other solutions include joint governance over the use of the islands/islets, agreement not to object to other states’ sovereignty claims, and agreement to end unilateral military patrols near the disputed territories.102 China’s willingness to reach an agreement on the offshore islands and related maritime disputes would provide the United States with valuable information. Most obviously, it would demonstrate that China’s aims are limited (at least for now). Closely related, it would demonstrate a degree of reasonableness in Chinese foreign policy priorities and decisionmaking: given that the value of Taiwan dwarfs the value of these maritime disputes, Chinese unwillingness to reach this type of bargain would indicate deep inflexibility in its emerging foreign policy and possibly overconfidence in its ability to use its growing power to achieve all of its aims. China’s claims in these disputes are also weaker than its claims to Taiwan: for example, China did not claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands until 1970, which suggests that it should be able to moderate this claim if the benefits were sufficiently large. In addition, an agreement would provide the United States with insights into the balance of power within China’s foreign policy decisionmaking. If China’s more assertive policies have rejected the growing influence of the People’s Liberation Army, narrow nationalist pressures, or both, then Chinese concessions would demonstrate that the country’s leaders could control these forces when the stakes are sufficiently large. Taken as a whole, this information about China’s goals would make U.S. accommodation over Taiwan less risky. Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China’s refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China. A second component of a grand bargain would be official Chinese acceptance of the the United States’ long-term security role in East Asia, including its alliances and forward-deployed forces. There have been periods when China viewed the U.S.-Japan alliance relatively favorable. For example, in 1980 China’s leader, Hua Guofeng, stated: “We appreciate Japan’s efforts to strengthen its alliance with the United States.”103 Since then a variety of factors, including the decline of Soviet power and the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance starting in the mid-1990s have reduced, if not eliminated, China’s positive assessment.104 In recent years, some Chinese elites have begun expressing harshly negative views. For example, in 2014 the deputy chief of the general staff of the People’s Liberation Army described the U.S. alliance system as “an antiquated relic of the Cold War that should be replaced by an Asia-centric security architecture.”105 Although open to varying interpretations, President Xi Jinping’s call for an Asian security order managed by Asian countries and his criticism of “alliances as unhelpful for the region’s security” can be viewed as offering a vision of the future in which the United States no longer plays a security role in East Asia. Increasingly, there is support in China for the conclusion that “in Beijing’s eyes, the U.S. led security architecture is outliving the usefulness it once provided by ensuring the regional stability necessary for China’s development. Instead, China views the alliance system as increasingly incapable of providing lasting security and itself a potential source of threat.”106 Especially in light of Beijing’s increasingly negative assessment, official recognition and acceptance of the United States’ continuing alliance commitments would be a valuable signal (not cheap talk). It would indicate the dominance of certain domestic forces over others and the Chinese leadership’s willingness to accept domestic political costs to advance China’s foreign policy. Such action would not guarantee stability in China’s policy, but it would provide greater confidence that China was willing to accept a revised geopolitical status quo. Maybe more important, if China were unwilling (or unable) to provide this official acceptance, the United States would have to be more worried that China’s leaders believe that its role in East Asia requires pushing the United States out of the region.

#### Easley is wrong – China says yes

Glaser ‘16 (Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” *International Security*, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring)

Easley holds that I present a biased theoretical case for accommodation, but each of his theoretical criticisms is flawed. He begins by criticizing my use of defensive realism, stating that I do “not assess competing structural and offensive realist explanations.” Thus [End Page 189] “it is unclear why a defensive realist approach should be assumed rather than tested.” Here Easley accepts a common misunderstanding—the divergence between defensive realism and it structural realist cousins reflects disagreements over what follows logically from their similar assumptions; consequently, disagreements cannot be resolved— tested—by examining states’ historical behavior. I have explored the strength of defensive realism and a more general rational variant at length in my book Rational Theory of International Politics, including comparing the theory to its key alternatives.2

### S – Cooperation Spiral

#### The CP’s reciprocal engagement with China is key cooperation spirals that are a larger internal link to relations than the aff.

Zachary Fredman ’15 is a reviewer on H-Net is an interdisciplinary organization of scholars dedicated to developing the enormous educational potential of the Internet and the World Wide Web, September 2015, “Fredman on Goldstein, 'Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry'” from http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=44359, accessed 7/4/19 || OES-AT

Lyle J. Goldstein’s Meeting China Halfway is essential reading for anyone interested in US foreign relations or contemporary China. A senior China scholar at the Naval War College, Goldstein warns that the potential for US-China military conflict has increased markedly in the past ten years. Influential academics like Aaron Friedberg (A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia [2011]) and John Mearsheimer (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics [2014]) have urged US policymakers to abandon engagement and focus on containment. The Barack Obama administration, Goldstein notes, has largely endorsed the program advocated by those seeking to balance China’s rise. In China, meanwhile, discourse regarding the United States has become more bellicose. Many high-ranking officials in China’s security and defense establishments see the United States as China’s greatest national security threat. If the downward spiral in US-China relations continues, Goldstein argues, the result will likely be a “repetition of the misery caused by the catastrophic wars and wasteful rivalries of the twentieth century” (p. 325). Drawing from a wide array of Chinese and American sources, Goldstein lays out a plan to enable the two powers to step back from rivalry and move toward mutual accommodation. From its position of strength, Washington must take the lead and begin accommodating China’s interests in Asia. For America, Goldstein concludes, “there is no viable alternative to meeting China halfway” (p. 364). ¶ Goldstein makes his case by taking Chinese voices seriously and proposing ten “cooperation spirals” that outline step-by-step approaches for resolving the seemingly intractable problems in US-China relations. Cooperation spirals build trust and confidence over time through incremental and reciprocal steps that gradually lead to larger and more significant compromises. In each chapter, Goldstein explores a particular issue by examining its historical background, analyzing numerous Chinese and American perspectives, and then laying out a cooperation spiral composed of ten concrete policy proposals—five for the United States and five for China. Goldstein’s analysis of Chinese scholarship reveals a wide range of opinion, even on controversial issues like Taiwan. In a field where many writers are quick to dismiss Chinese viewpoints as propaganda—if they bother to examine them at all—Meeting China Halfway stands out as a model of rigorous, even-handed scholarship. ¶ China hawks and believers in American exceptionalism will find many of Goldstein’s ideas hard to swallow, but they would be wise to read his book carefully. Far too much writing on China rests on ideologically tinged assumptions that Beijing must institute American-style political and economic reforms in order to stave off social unrest or collapse. Goldstein has little sympathy for such views, which reveal more about American anxieties than they do about China. Confidence that China will become much stronger over the coming decades, and that its economy will soon surpass that of the United States in size, undergirds his basic arguments. He also points out that China has already moved ahead of the US military in certain domains, such as anti-ship cruise missiles. Yet just because Goldstein believes the United States cannot hope to impose its will on China does not mean he advocates making concessions without asking Beijing to adjust its current and long-held positions in return. Rather, Goldstein urges Washington to demonstrate real leadership and courage in making the first moves. The fact is, as he shows, China’s perspective has been influenced by their view of a “century of humiliation.” While the United States did not take the lead in much of the Western imperialism that undermined Chinese sovereignty in the century leading up to World War II, it still played a large role. Imagine if the Chinese Navy had patrolled the Mississippi River with gunboats from the 1850s to the 1940s, as the US Navy did on China’s Yangtze River, and you can begin to understand why it is imperative that Washington acts first. ¶ The Taiwan problem has long been a key irritant in US-China relations. Goldstein’s cooperation spiral for this issue rests on the assumption that the United States cannot indefinitely maintain close security ties with a claimed island off the coast of a nuclear-armed superpower. He urges Washington to create circumstances that promote the settlement of the Taiwan problem rather than its perpetuation. Taiwan-Mainland integration, Goldstein argues, will actually strengthen US alliances with Japan and South Korea by preventing these countries from being pulled by treaty commitments into a conflict over Taiwan. Goldstein seeks a permanent solution by beginning with smaller moves: reducing US forces on Guam and closing the military office at the American Institute in Taipei while Beijing instigates military exchanges with Taiwan without preconditions and pulls missiles back from East China. The cooperation spiral culminates with Washington halting weapons sales to Taiwan, and Beijing renouncing the use of force and beginning a peace treaty process that joins Taiwan and the Mainland in a confederation. Goldstein concludes that a breakthrough on the Taiwan problem is “imperative to U.S.-China cooperation in the twenty-first century” (p. 72). ¶ In addressing economic relations, Goldstein points out that economic interdependence does not preclude conflict. America was Japan’s leading trade partner in the years before Pearl Harbor, and Europe enjoyed a high degree of economic interdependence leading up to World War I. Despite high levels of trade, economic tensions between Washington and Beijing have increased over the last decade. But success stories like Boeing Corporation’s extraordinary role in improving China’s civil air safety record from the 1990s to the present, while also increasing its market share, have demonstrated how closer collaboration can yield win-win results on a massive scale. Beginning with reciprocal steps to decrease barriers to the purchase of US companies and encourage major investment in the US economy, Goldstein seeks to lay the groundwork for improved economic relations that will eventually lead to Washington easing restrictions on high-technology transfers to China and see Beijing allow free float for the Renminbi. ¶ When it comes to environmental issues and relations with the developing world, Goldstein sees many opportunities for closer cooperation. Public opinion in both countries shows increasing awareness of the dangers of global warming. The November 2014 bilateral climate accord demonstrates that key Chinese and American policymakers recognize the enormous stakes. Goldstein’s cooperation spiral on the environment and climate change lays out ten policy proposals leading toward mutual acceptance of a global climate change treaty. Goldstein also addresses environmental concerns when discussing the developing world and US-China relations, but he is most keen on formulating policy proposals that can prevent Cold War-style geopolitical competition in Africa and Latin America. Chinese thinkers show little appetite for a militarized approach to Africa, and Goldstein argues that Washington should shutter the Pentagon’s Africa Command (AFRICOM). ¶ In the Middle East, meanwhile, Goldstein believes that closer cooperation between the United States and China could facilitate improved ties between Teheran and Washington. The cooperation spiral he outlines in this chapter is particularly ambitious, with its final steps calling for the United States to pressure Israel into giving up its nuclear weapons and China to use its influence to pressure Iran into recognizing Israel and initiating bilateral ties. Goldstein concedes that this cooperation spiral has a low probability of success. Yet both China and the United States have an interest in stabilizing the Middle East, and US ambitions to transform the region with military power have met with repeated failure. China’s rise as a global power, Goldstein concludes, could help to rebalance the structure of power in the region. Acting in concert with other great powers, especially China, could help the United States in building a more stable, just, and prosperous Middle East. ¶ On the Korean Peninsula, Goldstein makes the case for coequal Chinese and American leadership in forging a durable peace. His analysis of Chinese writing on Korea is enlightening. Chinese intellectuals see the South Korean military and defense industries as models to emulate. They do not view Seoul’s evolving military posture as a threat. At the same time, more and more Chinese analysts have called for a reevaluation of Beijing’s stance toward Pyongyang. Goldstein, however, actually encourages Beijing to take steps that would enhance Pyongyang’s security, including a reinvigoration of the 1961 Sino-North Korean Defense Treaty and a symbolic troop presence in North Korea. Given the vast disparity of economic power and conventional military capabilities on the peninsula, Pyongyang’s anxieties are understandable. A token Chinese military presence and stronger commitment to upholding security and stability on the peninsula could preclude the need for North Korea to take radical steps to demonstrate its will to fight. Further steps on the cooperation spiral propose that Washington inaugurate diplomatic relations with North Korea and withdraw a large number of troops from South Korea while still maintaining its alliance with Seoul. China, for its part, should oversee North Korea’s complete and verified nuclear disarmament. The most salient problem on the Korean Peninsula, Goldstein concludes, is North Korea’s stark vulnerability and insecurity. To achieve disarmament, North Korea must first be made more secure, and only “China has the means and incentive to aid in this endeavor” (p. 218). ¶ Goldstein’s approach to Japan is equally bold and creative. To a large extent, he writes, the divisive issues between Tokyo and Beijing are “imagined” (p. 226). Tokyo fears an immensely powerful and militaristic China that could hypothetically threaten Japan’s vital interests in the future. Beijing’s anxieties about a revival of Japanese militarism ignore how cautiously and sparingly Japan has deployed its armed might since 1945. Nevertheless, relations between China and Japan “have been in a virtual death spiral since at least 2010, if not before” (p. 225). China has legitimate historical grievances that Japan must address, and Goldstein states that Washington must push Tokyo toward a “Willy Brandt” solution involving reparations and a prime ministerial visit to the Nanjing Massacre Museum. Other proposals in the cooperation spiral call for a reduced US Marine Corps presence in Okinawa, joint administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and a median line settlement in the East China Sea. Ultimately, Goldstein advocates a restructured US-Japan alliance and Chinese endorsement of a permanent seat for Japan on the United Nations Security Council. ¶ Tensions in the South China Sea have recently overshadowed antagonistic relations between Beijing and Tokyo, and Goldstein’s chapter on the topic is both timely and sobering. Beijing’s official stance and the opinions expressed by leading Chinese academics have become more hawkish. US-China rivalry in the region has also intensified following Chinese construction and land reclamation projects over the past year. Voices of moderation are now rare on both sides of the Pacific. Goldstein reminds readers, however, that Beijing made many compromises in the past to settle its land border disputes. The present situation is undoubtedly dangerous because of misperceptions and disturbing action/reaction patterns, but it need not inevitably become “the ‘Fulda Gap’ of a new Cold War” (p. 291). Creating the conditions for a cooperation spiral will be difficult, and Goldstein proposes modest initial steps. To begin, the United States should invite China to play a major role at the annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training exercises in Thailand. Bangkok enjoys excellent relations with both Washington and Beijing, and the exercises focus on nontraditional security issues like counterterrorism, an issue the Chinese Navy explicitly embraces. China should respond by proposing a regional antipiracy patrol in the Malacca Strait area in cooperation with the US Navy. As the two countries build up greater trust, China must clarify the precise nature of its claims in the South China Sea and make those claims consistent with the Law of the Sea. From there, the United States can begin supporting bilateral negotiations between China and other claimants so that China can operationalize a joint development program for the South China Sea guided by a 50/50 split framework. ¶ In sum, Goldstein argues that China must adjust some of its long-held claims, increase the transparency of its national security apparatus, and press countries like North Korea and Iran to conform to international norms. The United States should reciprocate by drawing back some of its military deployments and military engagement activities, including trimming its force of aircraft carriers. He admits that hardly any of the compromises he suggests will be easy. Leaders in both countries must show bravery and avoid popular China-bashing and America-bashing. Washington needs to also resist pressure from Asian allies to take a more forceful stance against China. Exercising restraint and dealing with China as an equal will not be easy, but as Goldstein concludes, there is no other way. ¶ Meeting China Halfway never calls for unilateral concessions, and none of his policy proposals are set in stone. Gradualism, reciprocity, and mutual compromise are the core principles of his approach. As his painstaking research demonstrates, a very substantial number of Chinese scholars and strategists want to work constructively with the United States. However, if US policymakers opt for containment rather than engagement, then China’s own hawks will carry the day in Beijing. A new cold war will undermine regional stability and decrease the chances for US-China cooperation across the board. Goldstein concedes that Washington must hedge against the worst-case scenario, but to make this hedge the central thrust of US China policy would be a colossal mistake

### AT: Miscalculation Turn

#### China will trade *significant reductions* in military presence – but not without leverage – the counterplan locks in regional stability.

Gross ‘12, senior associate of Pacific Forum CSIS, a non-profit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former director of legislative affairs at the National Security Council in the White House, former counselor of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 2012 (Donald, The China Fallacy, p.161-162)

If China were to permanently eliminate the missiles facing Taiwan, while significantly and verifiably reducing and redeploying the air and naval forces currently threatening the island, Taiwan's security would be markedly improved. This outcome can be achieved through mutual threat reduction measures that reduce, eliminate and redeploy advanced weapons and military equipment that either Taiwan or China could employ in the event of conflict. Such measures would make it far more difficult for either side to threaten or intimidate the other for political purposes, in addition to significantly lowering their capacity to wreak destruction during an actual war. Because Taiwan is now militarily inferior to China with regard to missiles, naval vessels and air force assets, it lacks the diplomatic leverage to eliminate the security threat that China poses. Short of agreeing to reunification—which is currently opposed by a majority of Taiwan's citizens—there are no measures Taiwan can offer as a sufficient quid pro quo to secure significant Chinese arms reductions. And, without reciprocal security measures, China refuses to engage in what it considers “unilateral disarmament.” By contrast, the U.S. is capable of securing a drastic reduction in China's military threat to Taiwan by offering reciprocal military measures that would lead to far greater stability in the region, creating a transformed regional security environment. China is highly likely to reduce, redeploy and eliminate its missile, naval and air forces now threatening the island, in exchange for the U.S. pulling back forces now engaged in surveillance and patrolling of Chinese territory, significantly reducing U.S. military deployments in the Asia Pacific, and scaling down major arms sales to Taiwan. It is also important to recall that Taiwan's prior negotiations with China on long-term political issues reflect the profound difficulty the two sides face in reaching an agreement that could truly stabilize their relations for the foreseeable future. Taiwan understandably fears being absorbed by China, knowing full well that Beijing's foremost objective is national reunification at the earliest possible time. A large majority of Taiwan's people reject Beijing's promise to guarantee the island's autonomy and democratic political system through a so-called “one country, two systems” formula. For its part, China worries that Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), though currently out of power, could strongly re-emerge in the future, and once again lead a drive for political independence which effectively thwarts national reunification. A Framework Agreement would strengthen the security of Taiwan and the preservation of its democratic political system without requiring it to agree to eventual reunification with China. It would be entirely up to the Taiwanese government and people whether to conduct bilateral negotiations on political reunification at some future time. The two sides would be able to carry out their negotiations in a largely non-threatening and stable security environment, which would help support, in and of itself, a successful agreement on difficult political issues. Eliminating the Risk of a U.S.-China military conflict The proposed security measures in a Framework Agreement would end the current military standoff over Taiwan as well as the broader friction arising from aggressive U.S. air and sea surveillance along China's coast. Whenever China-Taiwan relations become acrimonious—as they typically do when the Taiwanese political party favoring independence is in power or when Chinese leaders play to nationalist public opinion and threaten a future attack on the island—it greatly heightens the security risks that the U.S. faces in Asia. In the event of an imminent or actual attack on Taiwan, the U.S. would almost certainly send military forces to the island's aid, with proponents of intervention citing U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. National security strategists would argue that a military response is essential to ensure the credibility of the overall U.S. security posture in Asia, particularly the defense commitments to Japan and South Korea. The current standoff over Taiwan effectively puts the U.S. at the mercy of political elements in China and Taiwan that seek to achieve their goals without regard for U.S. interests. Those interests include both protecting Taiwan and avoiding a war with China that could conceivably escalate to a nuclear exchange. By realizing a Framework Agreement with China that protects Taiwan's democracy, stabilizes the region and eliminates the risk of a U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. would greatly advance its core policy objectives.

### AT: CP Not a Grand Bargain

#### “Grand bargain” is a concept, not a specific policy option. The CP reflects a possible example of a reciprocal, negotiated, and incremental approach.

Charles L Glaser ‘15 is a professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is also a fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Spring 2015, Volume 39 Number 4, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” from muse.jhu.edu/article/580831., accessed 7/3/19 || OES-AT

INTERNATIONAL MODALITIES AND BARGAINING STAGES ¶ Two questions about the process of achieving a grand bargain between the United States and China are relevant to this study. First, would the bargaining be conducted in secret diplomatic negotiations or in negotiations of which the public was aware? Second, would the grand bargain be negotiated and implemented all at once or in stages? For example, stages could include resolution of how to divide maritime resources without resolution of the sovereignty issues; agreement to defer sovereignty issues; arms control agreements that limit China’s conventional ability to threaten Taiwan and Japan and the operation of U.S. forces near China’s shores; and the reduction and eventual termination of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. ¶

### AT: Perm – Do Both

#### China pockets the plan but has rising expectations for future concessions. This makes relations crises and war inevitable

Erikson 14 - ANDREW S. ERICKSON is an Associate Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an Associate-in-Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. ADAM P. LIFF is Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program, and Associate-in-Research at Harvard’s Fairbank Center and Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies (“Not-So-Empty Talk: The Danger of China's “New Type of Great-Power Relations” Slogan” 10/9, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-09/not-so-empty-talk>

In uncritically signing on to the “new type of great-power relations” slogan at the Obama-Xi Sunnylands summit in June 2013, the Obama administration fell into a trap. It has what is most likely its last major chance to dig itself out when Obama visits Beijing next month for a follow-up summit. And he should make use of the opportunity. Although some U.S. officials dismiss rhetoric as insignificant and see this particular formulation as innocuous, Beijing understands things very differently. At best, U.S. acceptance of the “new type of great-power relations” concept offers ammunition for those in Beijing and beyond who promote a false narrative of the United States’ weakness and China’s inevitable rise. After all, the phrasing grants China great-power status without placing any conditions on its behavior -- behavior that has unnerved U.S. security allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific. At worst, the formulation risks setting U.S.-Chinese relations on a dangerous course: implicitly committing Washington to unilateral concessions that are anathema to vital and bipartisan U.S. foreign policy values, principles, and interests. Already troubling, each additional invocation of a “new type of great-power relations” grows more costly. Instead of reactively parroting this Chinese formulation, Washington must proactively shape the narrative. It should explicitly articulate and champion its own positive vision for U.S.-Chinese relations, which should accord China international status conditionally -- in return for Beijing abiding by twenty-first-century international norms, behaving responsibly toward its neighbors, and contributing positively to the very international order that has enabled China’s meteoric rise. THUCYDIDES TRAP The “new type of great-power relations” concept is appealing to so many policymakers and scholars in both countries because of a misplaced belief in the Thucydides Trap. This is a dangerous misconception that the rise of a new power inescapably leads to conflict with the established one. The Chinese side has exploited this oversimplified narrative to great effect: Xi himself has warned of such confrontation as “inevitable,” and leading Chinese international relations scholars claim that it is an “iron law of power transition.” Hillary Clinton, the former U.S. secretary of state, echoed the sentiment at the 2012 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when she said that the United States and China’s efforts to avoid a catastrophic war are “historically unprecedented” and that both sides need to “write a new answer to the age-old question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” A year later, at the Sunnylands summit, Tom Donilon, then the U.S. national security adviser, explained that efforts to reformulate the U.S.-Chinese relationship are “rooted in the observation … that a rising power and an existing power are in some manner destined for conflict.” Such sentiments are puzzling, especially coming from Americans. They deny human agency (and responsibility) for past -- and possibly future -- disasters. And they reject progress. Further, they are based on a selective reading of modern history, one that overlooks the powerful ways in which the norms that great powers have promoted through their own rhetoric and example have shaped the choices of contemporaneous rising powers, for better or for worse. Most problematic, the narrative of needing a “new model” to avoid otherwise inevitable conflict is a negative foundation, a dangerous platform on which to build the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. To be sure, Clinton, Donilon, and their successors might understand all this but are prepared to dismiss rhetoric and focus instead on action. This is surely what U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had in mind at the 2014 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue when he noted that “a new model is not defined in words. It is defined in actions.” Even so, flirting with the Chinese-proposed slogan for bilateral relations, as the administration has done, while dismissing it in private is dangerous. Chinese leaders take such formulations extremely seriously: the phrase “new type of great-power relations” appears repeatedly in their speeches, and permeates Chinese media and public discourse on U.S.-Chinese relations. Uncritical embrace creates an unsustainable situation wherein each side mistakenly expects unrealistic things of the other, worsening the consequences when those expectations are ultimately dashed.

#### China pockets the concession – the CP is a distinct option that leverages sales

Gomez 16 (Eric, policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Masters of Arts in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship,” 9-28, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship>)

The United States should step down from the implicit commitment to use military force to preserve Taiwan’s de facto independence. American credibility is slowly eroding as China becomes more powerful, and the commitment will be more costly to maintain for a relatively minor benefit. Broadly speaking, the United States has two options for how it could implement this policy option: it could try to draw concessions from China to get something in return for stepping down from the commitment, or it could unilaterally drop the commitment. In either scenario, Taiwan would have to take on sole responsibility for deterring Chinese military action. A policy that wins concessions from China would be the more desirable of the two options. Concessions could include resolution of other territorial disputes involving China and American allies or dropping the Chinese threat to use force against Taiwan. This would be characteristic of what Charles Glaser calls a grand bargain, “an agreement in which two actors make concessions across multiple issues to create a fair deal … that would have been impossible in an agreement that dealt with a single issue.”95 Making the end of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan contingent upon Chinese concessions to resolve its other territorial disputes peacefully would benefit both the United States and China.96 The United States would free itself of an increasingly costly and risky commitment to Taiwan’s defense, but only if China compromises in ways that align with U.S. allies’ interests in the South and East China Seas. China would have to limit its objectives in the South and East China Seas, but in return would earn a major policy concession from the United States on a core national interest that has much more importance than the other territorial disputes.

### NB – SCS Conflict

#### Failure to resolves SCS territorial disputes ensures war

Rando 15 (Consultant- Asymmetric Global Solutions DBA, MPH/MS-Biomedical Sciences & US Correspondent-Chemical, Biological, Nuclear Warfare Journal, Fire on the Water: The South China Sea and Nuclear Confrontation, 9/29, http://www.cbrneportal.com/fire-on-the-water-the-south-china-sea-and-nuclear-confrontation/)

Robert Kaplan, one of the world’s foremost experts on China, has stated “The South China Sea will be the 21st Century’s defining battleground.” The obsession with supremacy in the South China Sea is certainly not a new phenomenon in the realms of international security and maritime strategy. In opinionated discussions related to naval warfare, prominent political scientists and military strategists have been addressing the geopolitical and military significance of the region for decades. For example, the enlightening 1997 article “The Chinese Way”, written in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Professor Chalmers Johnson of the University of California-San Diego, noted significantly increased defense budgets and expenditures in the region. In addition, the article eludes to the fact that China had claimed the entire South China Sea and would use its naval forces to counter any encroachment. The argument for an increased U.S. naval presence in East Asia is certainly not without precedent. This contested aquatic region has tremendous geopolitical, strategic and economic significance. While, the Persian Gulf has immense importance and global recognition due to its strategic location in the Middle East, as well its significance to global commerce, industry and sought after oil, the South China Sea is crucially important to nations seeking to obtain their economic riches and geopolitical advantages. The South China Sea is geographically located near the Pacific Ocean and encompasses an area of 1.4 million square miles (3.5 million square kilometers). As a semi-closed area, the South China Sea extends from the Singapore Strait to the Taiwan Strait, with China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan surrounding it. In terms of economic value, fishery stocks and potential fossil fuel reserves are two major commodities that may spark an armed conflict, even to the point of nuclear confrontation. As a rich source of the region’s staple diet, fish, the sea guarantees a steady flow of food to the countries of the region. Control and supremacy of the sea would also assure claiming the much touted hydrocarbon reserves in the seabed, possibly exceeding those of the OPEC nations such as Iraq and Kuwait. The conquest of this vast resource would virtually assure energy independence and high monetary returns for those that would gain supremacy over the South China Sea. Thus, seizing the opportunity to gain dominance will lead to control and manipulation of vital food and energy resources, economic wealth and geopolitical power in the region. A scenario of regional and maritime domination and control could lead to the partial or total exclusion of adjacent nation-states to access any food or natural resources derived from a sea ruled with an iron hand; leading to a massive complex humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions from malnutrition and starvation, limitations in energy production, and economic collapse. These factors make the South China Sea a national security priority for nations in the region, including one of the world’s superpowers, China. The dependence of China and other regional nations surrounding the South China Sea on the Strait of Malacca is analogous in geopolitical and economic terms, to the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. Approximately one -third of all global trade funnels through the strait and also serves as a conduit for raw materials and energy needs for China and other adjacent nation-states. Such potential dominance in any region, leads to a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, and at least the possibility of a regional war which could conceivably escalate to engulf nation-states external to the regional sphere. Tensions and skirmishes have the propensity to evolve into armed conflict and full-scale war, and apprehensive leaders and military planners in such a contested region serve as the facilitators for disaster. China continues to assert sovereignty by constructing man made islands using sand dredged from the sea bottom and these artificial islands could be militarized. China has even affirmed its desire to have a military presence on these islands; however, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also professes the use of these land masses to facilitate commerce via shipping lanes and to protect Chinese fishing and other vessels from piracy. China will never cease its quest for supremacy and its perceived “ownership” of the South China Sea, as the legitimacy and structure of the Chinese government is based on nationalism and achievement of the “Chinese Dream”. The Chinese regime continues to vehemently assert their perceived “right” to the South China Sea, and it forges ahead with plans and operations that could lead to naval warfare and conflict escalation. The knowledge that China possesses formidable naval capacity and capabilities, including nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines, is, indeed, disconcerting at the very least. As we examine and evaluate the “submarine factor”, it is evident that China’s submarines have no practical value in its disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. Essentially, nuclear ballistic missile capable submarines serve as a deterrent against thermonuclear war. Without doubt, the primary reason that China possesses nuclear-capable submarines is to deter an American attack, although India’s nuclear weapons are also a consideration for Beijing. Nuclear capable submarines are capable of deep dive capabilities and shorter launch to target times. While China’s submarine capabilities may appear worrisome to some, sudden deployment from port in a geopolitical crisis would serve as a critical indicator to the US and Western allies, and its submarine fleet still remains somewhat noisy and detectable. China has already demonstrated its aggression at sea in several instances, such as the ramming and sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat in disputed waters claimed by both countries in the region and an ominous presence and military mobilization exercises which have been monitored by military and intelligence assets. A report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, indicates that Chinese SSBNs are able to target portions of the U.S. from strategic operational positions near the Chinese coast. China’s Global Times published an unprecedented report that revealed a nuclear missile strike on the western U.S. with JL-2 missiles could generate up to 12 million American fatalities. The Obama administration and senior U.S. naval officials have not retorted to China’s claims of a potentially devastating nuclear threat, which included graphics showing radiological plumes and collateral damage induced by radiation. The possibilities of China’s anti-satellite strategies to disable communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities must also be taken seriously. Most assuredly, the South China Sea would serve as an obvious arena for the projection of Chinese power, including conventional and, potentially, nuclear scenarios. Rando2China’s South Sea naval facilities have seen significant upgrading and expansion, such as the facilities on Hainan, and the nuclear submarine base at Longpo serves as the first nuclear submarine base in the South China Sea. The base also includes a submarine tunnel that is part of an underwater complex of nuclear facilities on Hainan. Also, Chinese-Russian wargames are worrisome, which adds to the concerns of nuclear confrontation and consequences globally. The Chinese have asserted their right to defend its territories, which in their view, includes the South China Sea, and they have stated verbally, and by their aggressive actions, that they will continue to pursue their strategic goals despite the threat of confrontation and conflict. Many of the issues in contention in the South China Sea will remain unresolved for, probably, several years to come. We must remain balanced, and not overzealous in our approaches to assisting with conflict resolution in the area. We must apply reasonable diplomacy, without stirring up a hornet’s nest that would serve to be counterproductive and enhance animosities. However, the US, its allies, and other concerned nation-states must not refrain from being ever so vigilant and proactive in achieving peaceful resolution, while at the same time maintaining our national defense and security postures.

### NB – Allied Prolif DA

#### The aff appeases China, but the CP still assures allies.

Glaser ‘15, professor of political science at George Washington University and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Spring 2015 (Charles L., "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security Volume 39, Number 4, Project Muse)

Over the past decade, China’s rise has generated much attention, admiration, and concern. Whether China can rise peacefully remains a heavily debated issue, with political scientists worrying about the dangers of power transitions, aspiring regional hegemons, and growing nationalism.1 In response to China’s economic and military growth, the administration of Barack Obama has rebalanced U.S. foreign and security policy toward Asia, a decision that is generating considerable debate over whether the United States is doing too little or too much to confront China. ¶ Despite this intense focus, the United States has yet to confront fully the most challenging question posed by China’s rise: Should the United States pursue a strategy of limited geopolitical accommodation to avoid conflict?2 Instead, U.S. policy continues to focus entirely on preserving the geopolitical status quo in Northeast Asia. ¶ This article argues that a more fundamental revision of U.S. policy is [End Page 49] needed. Specifically, the United States should negotiate a grand bargain that ends its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression. In return, China would peacefully resolve its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas, and officially accept the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia. ¶ U.S. accommodation of China deserves serious analysis for two reasons. First, both intuition and international relations theory suggest that a rising power, especially one that has experienced tremendous growth, can reasonably expect to increase its geopolitical influence and more fully achieve its goals, especially when these goals involve its national security. Bargaining theories maintain that the probability of war is greater when there is a larger disparity between the distribution of benefits in the existing territorial status quo and the balance of power.3 Accommodation that reduces this disparity can, under some conditions, reduce the probability of war and increase the declining state’s security. ¶ Second, the pressures created by the international structure—the combination of material and information conditions that constrain states’ international options—should allow China to rise peacefully, which, somewhat counterintuitively, increases the potential importance of accommodation. If the international structure were driving the United States and China toward a major conflict, the concessions required of the United States would be extremely large and costly. Even then, they might do little to moderate the intense competition. But, because the international structure is not creating such intense pressures, concessions that do not compromise vital U.S. interests may have the potential to greatly diminish growing strains in U.S.-China relations, thereby moderating future military and foreign policy competition between the two powers. ¶ More concretely, regional dangers dwarf international structural dangers. Northeast Asia is plagued by territorial and maritime disputes that are straining political relations both within the region and across the Pacific. Only one of these disputes—China’s opposition to U.S. involvement in protecting Taiwan—seems important enough to possibly bring the United States and China into conflict. Even Taiwan, however, is a secondary, albeit not insignificant, U.S. interest. Other lesser disputes are currently roiling China’s relationships with many of its neighbors, but none appear sufficiently significant [End Page 50] that they should derail China’s peaceful rise. Nevertheless, recent events demonstrate that even these seemingly minor disputes—for example, over the status of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—can have an outsized negative impact on U.S.-China relations. Thus, the question arises whether accommodation on Taiwan and possibly these still less important issues would help keep China’s rise peaceful, while the United States continued to effectively protect its vital interests in the region. ¶ Accommodation could bring risks of its own. For example, it would jeopardize U.S. security if it were to convince China that the United States lacked the resolve to protect its vital national interests, leading China to adopt a more assertive foreign policy. This danger would be especially large if, instead of limited aims, China desired regional hegemony and was determined to force the United States out of East Asia. Accommodation might also raise serious concerns among U.S. allies—most importantly, Japan—about the reliability of U.S. security guarantees, thereby undermining alliances that are widely judged to be essential to the security of the United States. Finally, ending the United States’ commitment to Taiwan could sacrifice important U.S. nonsecurity interests, including support for democracy and individual liberties, with no guarantee of benefits in return. ¶ The grand bargain I propose is designed to capture the benefits of U.S. accommodation with China, while reducing its risks. China’s concessions on its territorial and maritime disputes would communicate information to the United States about the limited extent of its aims, thereby reducing Washington’s concern that its own concessions would encourage China to push the United States out of East Asia. In addition, resolution of these disputes would eliminate flash points that fuel regional military competition and crises that could draw the United States into a war. ¶ This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, to keep the analysis manageable, I bound it with regard to the debate over the pressures for competition that are generated by today’s international structure; the debate over U.S. grand strategy; the constraints posed by U.S. domestic politics; and the modalities and stages for achieving a grand bargain. The second section analyzes the general logic of a policy of territorial accommodation, including the factors that determine the magnitude of its costs, benefits, and risks. The third section addresses the specifics of a U.S. policy of accommodation toward China. The fourth section explores the benefits and risks of ending the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan. The benefits go well beyond removing a dangerous flash point that could draw the United States into a war with China, to include eliminating a deep source of Chinese distrust of U.S. motives and moderating military competition over the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in East Asia that is [End Page 51] straining U.S.-China relations. The fifth section presents my case for a grand bargain between the United States and China. The sixth section addresses counterarguments not covered by my discussion of the costs of accommodation, including doubts about the credibility of commitments made by a rising power and the reduced salience of conflict between Taiwan and China. The final section briefly considers the key policy alternatives to a grand bargain: unilateral U.S. accommodation on Taiwan; a concert of Asian powers; and current U.S. policy—the rebalance. Unilateral accommodation and the rebalance have advantages and make the decision a close call, but all things considered, the grand bargain is currently the United States’ best bet.

### NB – Deterence

#### The CP maintains deterrence, assurance, and US resolve.

Glaser ‘15, professor of political science at George Washington University and director of the Elliott School's Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, Spring 2015 (Charles L., "A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?" International Security Volume 39, Number 4, Project Muse)

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies’ interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China’s refusal to accept a [End Page 80] grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.

#### Extracting concessions in the SCS maintains a hard line toward China

**Ross 16** (Pete Ross is an expert business and policy analyst, 11-1-2016, "Why the West Must Stop China," Observer, https://observer.com/2016/11/why-the-west-must-stop-china/)SEM

Over the past decade, China has become increasingly bold, doing everything it can to act the neighborhood bully. Narcissistic, entitled and unwilling to bear any criticism, China seems to believe it can walk over almost anyone—mostly because no one has given them any reason to think otherwise. Nations have refrained from criticizing China too strongly, or taking any kind of action, because they rely on the trade that has increased so massively from a country of over one billion people. Such reliance, however, is like continually spending on a credit card, ignoring the fact that one day the bill is going to be due. In China’s case, we can see this with their heavy extraction of concessions from anyone with whom they deal. It began with the Dalai Lama, and the fact that the Chinese strongly caution any national leader who dare meet with him or even speak to him. It was always put across as a matter of respect for China’s internal sovereignty and basically not rocking the boat. Is one man really so powerful that the CCP needs to protest people meeting with him? This summer, when Australian swimmer Mack Horton called one of the Chinese swimmers a drug cheat, the response from the state-run Global Times was nothing short of hysterical. They demanded an apology and referred to Australia as being “at the fringes of civilization” and that “no one should be surprised at the uncivilized acts emanating from the country.” Quite a fit to throw over something an athlete said. Allowing of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) was a classic case of putting short-term gains ahead of longer term prosperity. The Chinese have shown that they have next to no respect for the concept of intellectual property rights, AKA the cornerstone of modern business. Cheap knock-offs of everything from designer fashion brands to ambulance stretchers continue to flood the West, with no sign of slowing down. Then there is the cyber army that is paid to steal from Western business, government, military contractors and anyone deemed to have even the most slightly useful information. Other bad behaviors include the fact that China continues to undervalue its currency; that it protects its own companies while putting foreign firms at a competitive disadvantage, and that they are slow to implement WTO rules, while suddenly imposing unwritten laws that are unfavorable to foreigners. And now we have China bullying anyone and everyone in the South China Sea, where they built a number of artificial islands with airstrips for military aircraft. China refutes the international regulations ruling that the islands belong to Japan, just as they refused the recent ruling of the International Court of Arbitration ruling that the “ten dash line,” whereby China claims the entirety of the South China Sea as their territory, is illegal. Any ruling against China is seen by them as losing face, which poses the obvious problem for the West: How do you deal with a country that will disregard the international laws by which everyone else abides? No one has yet stood up to China on this issue, because many of the disputed islands have been deemed too small and insignificant to start a major diplomatic row, or even a minor scuffle over. Yet the lack of action by both China’s neighbors and by the West has allowed China to become increasingly bold in their actions. We are now at the point where anything short of military action—and a hard line against China’s encroachment on the area—is going to continue to cost everyone dearly in the future.

# AFF Answers

## GENERIC

### Perm – Do the CP

#### Permutation: Do the CP

#### The CP is just a specific expression of the affirmative plan text.

#### a. “Resolved” isn’t certain

Merriam Webster No Date Definition of Resolve, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve //AY

1 : to become separated into component parts also : to become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : DETERMINE 3 : CONSULT, DELIBERATE 4 : to progress from dissonance to consonance

#### b. Temporary suspensions and more restrictive eligibility criteria are both “reductions” relative to the hypoethetical continuation of the status quo.

Williams ‘2 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, opinion authored by Judge Anne Claire Williams of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Heinz v. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund, 303 F.3d 802, Decided September 13, 2002

We conclude that plaintiffs' loss of the option of working as construction supervisors was a reduction of their early retirement benefits within the meaning of § 1054(g)(2). HN6 A participant's benefits cannot be understood without reference to the conditions imposed on receiving those benefits, and an amendment placing materially greater restrictions on the receipt of the benefit "reduces" the benefit just as surely as a decrease in the size of the monthly benefit payment. We have not before interpreted the prohibition in the anti-cutback rule as limited to amendments that reduce the amount of the periodic payment, and we find nothing in the language of the rule that suggests such an interpretation. In Ahng, [\*\*10] for example, we held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for violation of § 1054(g) when they alleged that a [\*806] plan amendment changed the deadline by which the employee must retire in order to receive supplemental early retirement benefits. 96 F.3d at 1036-37; see also Bellas v. CBS, Inc., 221 F.3d 517 (3d Cir. 2000) (plan amendment that changed eligibility requirements for early retirement benefits violated § 1054(g)). Similarly, in Michael v. Riverside Cement Co. Pension Plan, 266 F.3d 1023, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit held that an amendment that eliminated the plan's "no-offset rule," which had allowed a participant to receive full early retirement benefits without regard to the amount he already received upon previous retirement, violated § 1054(g) even though the amendment increased the plaintiff's monthly benefit payment. Cf. Hickey, 980 F.2d at 468 (7th Cir. 1992) (plan amendment that eliminated the particiant's right to cost-of-living adjustments violated the anti-cutback rule). The Fund argues that these cases are distinguishable because a change in the eligibility requirements, as in Ahng [\*\*11] for example, differs from a change in the conditions triggering suspension of benefit payments in that the former permanently reduces benefits or eliminates certain participants' rights to benefits, whereas a suspension is temporary. We find the distinction unconvincing. Although with a suspension the interruption in benefit payments is temporary, the retiree never recovers the payments lost during the employment period. The amendment thus "eliminates" monthly benefit payments for participants who take certain jobs after retirement and "reduces" the participant's total early retirement benefits by an amount determined by how long the disqualifying work continues. Plaintiffs lost a valuable right they had earned before the amendment--the right to continue to work in the industry while receiving monthly benefit payments-- and that loss was permanent. 5Link to the text of the note [\*\*12] In our judgment, this was a reduction of early retirement benefits within the plain meaning of § 1054(g)(2). 6Link to the text of the note [\*\*13] [\*807] B. Spacek v. Maritime Association The Fund points out, however, that "suspensions" are not identified along with the prohibitions against decreases, reductions, and elimination of benefits in the anti-cutback rule. The Fund relies on Spacek v. Maritime Ass'n, 134 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1998), in which the Fifth Circuit concluded that an amendment like the one in this case did not violate the anti-cutback rule because it concerned a "suspension" and not a "reduction" in benefits. 7Link to the text of the note The Fifth Circuit supported its conclusion with: (1) an examination of the use of the two terms under the statute and related regulations; (2) the legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act; and (3) a Treasury regulation concerning the effect of suspensions on "accrued benefits." We respectfully conclude, however, that the Fifth Circuit's arguments do not support its conclusion. [\*\*14] 1. Suspensions and reductions under ERISA. In Spacek, the court noted that "throughout the statute and corresponding regulations, the concepts of reduction of benefits and suspension of benefit payments are used in distinct ways, often within a single provision." 134 F.3d at 288-89 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1341a(d) & 1342(d)(1)(A)(v); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-4(a)(1)(iii)). From this the court reasoned that to interpret the prohibition in the anti-cutback rule against amendments that reduce benefits as applying to suspensions would "make the word 'suspension' redundant in all of these statutory provisions and interpretive regulations." Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289. This redundancy, according to Spacek, would violate the canon of statutory construction that every word in a statute must be given meaning. Id. We disagree with the inference that Spacek draws from the various provisions that refer to both reductions and suspensions. Our interpretation of the anti-cutback rule does not suggest that all suspensions are "reductions" (or vice versa), only that if the suspension is pursuant [\*\*15] to an amendment that reduces benefits (attributable to service before the amendment), then it is a reduction within the anti-cutback rule. This interpretation does not render the word "suspension" in the other provisions redundant. For example, Spacek relies on various provisions in Title IV of ERISA (relating to financially troubled and terminated plans) that refer to both "reduction of benefits" and "suspension of benefit payments"; according to Spacek, to avoid redundancy, the former phrase must be construed as excluding the latter. Id. But Spacek's identification of the two relevant phrases is too narrow; to the extent the Title IV provisions identify two separate categories, they are amendments that reduce benefits on the one hand, and suspension [\*808] of benefit payments, on the other. Section 1441, governing plan terminations, is typical: (a) Amendment of plan by plan sponsor to reduce benefits, and suspension of benefit payments Notwithstanding sections 1053 and 1054 of this title, the plan sponsor of a terminated multiemployer plan to which section 1341a(d) of this title applies shall amend the plan to reduce benefits, and shall suspend [\*\*16] benefit payments, as required by this section. 29 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added) 8Link to the text of the note [\*\*17] ;see also 29 U.S.C. § 1425(a)(1) & 26 U.S.C. § 418D(a)(1) (plans in reorganization may amend the plan to reduce benefits); 29 U.S.C. § 1426(a) & 26 U.S.C. § 418E(a) (insolvent plans may suspend benefit payments); 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (a)(3)(E)(ii) & 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3)(F) (exception to forfeiture rule for amendments that reduce benefits under §§ 1441 or 1425, and suspension of benefit payments under §§ 1441 and 1426). Because the latter category (suspension of benefit payments) includes suspensions not according to any amendment, as in the case of insolvent plans, for example, it is not rendered superfluous by interpreting the amendment in this case as falling into the former category (amendments that reduce benefits). 9Link to the text of the note In other words, even crediting the reliability of any inference about the anti-cutback rule that can be drawn from the use of these phrases in various provisions relating to terminated or troubled plans, the most we can infer is that a suspension of benefit payments not falling into the first category--amendments that reduce benefits--should be excluded from the anti-cutback rule. But other than in the case of insolvent or terminated plans, an administrator's authority to suspend benefits must come from the plan. [\*\*18] And as we noted before, no one is disputing that the suspension in this case would be proper if it were contained in the original plan. It is the propriety of the amendment to the plan that is at issue in this case, and not the suspension itself, and therefore we cannot infer from the distinction made in Title IV between suspensions of benefit payments and amendments that reduce benefits that the amendment in this case is beyond the anti-cutback rule. 10Link to the text of the note [\*\*19] [\*809] We do not view the omission of a specific reference to suspensions in the anti-cutback rule as an oversight, but as unnecessary. Adding a reference to suspensions in § 1054(g)(1) (e.g., "The accrued benefit of a participant under a plan may not be decreased [or suspended] by an amendment of the plan") or § 1054(g)(2) (e.g., "a plan amendment which has the effect of …eliminating[,] reducing[, or suspending] an early retirement benefit …"), would be awkward and perhaps overbroad; it is not the suspension of benefit payments that offends the anti-cutback rule, but the change (to the detriment of the participant) in the conditions triggering the suspension, and this concept is adequately captured by the prohibition against amendments that reduce benefits. 2. Legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act. The Fund, again relying on Spacek, also points to the legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, which added paragraph (2)--the provision concerning amendments that reduce or eliminate early retirement benefits--to § 1054(g). See Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289-90. Spacek found instructive the following comment made [\*\*20] by Representative William Clay during the final House debates on the Retirement Equity Act: Nor do those provisions in any way apply to or affect the provisions of ERISA section 203(a)(3)(B) and code section 411(a)(3)(B) relating to the suspension of benefits for post-retirement employment, including the authorization for multiemployer plans to adopt stricter rules for the suspension of subsidized early retirement benefits. Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289 (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. 23,487 (1984)). The Fifth Circuit concluded that Representative Clay's remark means that the anti-cutback rule in § 1054(g) does not limit the power of the plan to amend the plan to expand the restrictions on post-retirement employment. See Spacek, 134 F.3d at 289-90. We find Representative Clay's remark ambiguous at best on the question of whether amendments concerning suspensions for disqualifying employment are outside the coverage of § 1054(g). 11Link to the text of the note [\*\*23] But even if Representative Clay's understanding of the anti-cutback rule were consistent with the Fifth Circuit's--that suspensions upon disqualifying re-employment represent an additional exception to § 1054(g)--we [\*\*21] find nothing in the legislative history to indicate that anyone else in Congress shared the understanding attributed to Representative Clay by the Fifth Circuit. The parties have not identified, [\*810] and we have been unable to find, any further reference in the legislative history of the Retirement Equity Act to the exception for suspensions that the Fifth Circuit infers from Representative Clay's remarks. 12Link to the text of the note The absence of any additional support in the legislative history suggests to us that the Fifth Circuit gave undue weight to the statement of Representative Clay, which (as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit) is at odds with the straightforward language of the statute. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 122 S. Ct. 941, 953-54, 151 L. Ed. 2d 908 (2002) (rejecting interpretation contained in the floor statements of the statute's sponsors); Monterey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 743 F.2d 589, 596 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Alex v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1235, 1239 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Isolated remarks of individual legislators, …[can] not be used to find ambiguity, or contrary intent, in statutory [\*\*22] language that, with respect to a case in hand, is clear on its own terms without rendering nugatory the 'plain meaning' canon of construction."). 13Link to the text of the note Accordingly, we conclude that Representative Clay's remarks cannot be used to support an exception to the anti-cutback rule for amendments that expand disqualifying employment. 3. Treasury Regulation 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c)-1(f). The court in Spacek also found support in 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c)-1(f), a Treasury Department regulation concerning the allocation of accrued benefits between employer and employee contributions. By way of background, the court first noted that the term "accrued benefit" means the employees' benefit as accrued under [\*\*24] the plan, expressed in the form of "an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age," 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23), 14Link to the text of the note or, for early retirement benefits, the actuarial equivalent of the benefit commencing at normal retirement age. See Spacek, 134 F.3d at 290 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1054(c)(3); 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c) -1(e)). 15Link to the text of the note The Treasury regulation relied upon by Spacek, 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(c)-1(f)(1), states that in calculating the actuarial equivalent of an accrued benefit, "no adjustment …is required on account of any suspension of benefits" if the suspension is permitted under ERISA § 203(a)(3)(B)--the section dealing with restrictions on post-retirement employment. 16Link to the text of the note According to the [\*811] Fifth Circuit, "because the reduction in total benefits paid over the lifetime of the plan participant as a result of the suspension need not be accounted for actuarially in computing the participant's accrued benefit," an amendment "authorizing such a suspension does not serve to decrease the participant's accrued benefits, and thus cannot violate § 1054(g)." 134 F.3d at 291. [\*\*25]

#### c. “Should” means conditional—it’s not certain

Blumenthal 16 Cynthia, regulatory engineer at ASQ, Shall vs. Should, American Society for Quality, 6/6/16, http://asq.org/standards-shall-should //AY

SHALL When used as an auxiliary verb, shall, according to Webster's Online Dictionary, “denotes a requirement that is mandatory whenever the criterion for conformance with the specification requires that there be no deviation” (2). This word implies obligation and is traditionally used by laws and regulations. For example, Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), “Drugs and Devices,” begins with the following: “A drug or device shall be deemed to be adulterated –” (3). Similarly, the FDA’s regulations frequently use shall to indicate mandatory requirements. In CFR - Code of Federal Regulations Title 21, Part 803, the regulation for medical device reporting, the English reporting requirement states: “All reports required in this part which are submitted in writing or electronic equivalent shall be submitted to FDA in English” (4). SHOULD On the other hand, should “denotes a guideline or recommendation whenever noncompliance with the specification is permissible.” When used as an auxiliary verb, it expresses “a conditional or contingent act or state … or moral obligation” (5). The statement “Incoming materials shall be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is mandatory. All incoming materials must be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. A deviation causes a noncompliance with the document. In contrast, “Incoming materials should be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is a recommendation by the document writer. It allows the document users to make their own judgment calls. In reality, the incoming materials will most likely be inspected before they are accepted. However, the document users at any time can make a deviation based on the specific situation, as long as the decision making is reasonable and logical. (Recall also that the word should does imply moral obligation.) Such deviation does not violate the document’s requirement. Because of the built-in flexibility of the word, if the document writer intends to mandate a requirement, should is not an appropriate choice.

### Conditions Fail

#### Studies prove that cutting aid spurs reform—BUT conditions and delays undercut the threat because they make us look reluctant

Goodman ‘15 (Colby, Acting Director at Security Assistance Monitor and focuses on a range of U.S. military aid and arms sales policy and research issues, Defense Experts Highlight Effectiveness of Human Rights Conditioning, 12/10/15, <http://securityassistance.org/blog/defense-experts-highlight-effectiveness-human-rights-conditioning>)

Challenging a longtime U.S. military critique of security assistance, some defense experts are saying suspending U.S. military aid to foreign security forces because of their poor human rights record has often caused an improvement in the force’s behavior. This point, which was raised at a House Armed Services Committee hearing in October, appears to contradict military views that suspending aid for such reasons is counterproductive. For years, U.S. defense experts have seen cutting off U.S. military aid to certain repressive foreign security forces as ineffective because it harms U.S. national security imperatives and eliminates opportunities to provide them with human rights training to improve their record. At a meeting in Nigeria this year, former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates indicated that U.S. requirements to suspend military aid to abusive forces in Nigeria have frustrated efforts to address terrorism. Commenting on restricting military aid to Nigeria, U.S. Vice Admiral Charles Leidig said “the conundrum it presents us is that the nations whose militaries have had human rights violations perhaps are the ones that need U.S. engagement the most.” Other U.S. officials have pointed to instances in which human rights training helped. After providing military training to professionalize Croatian security forces with a poor human rights record in the mid-1990s, for instance, U.S. military personnel claimed the training helped improve their actions after a new government took power. Nigeria Security Assistance According to a RAND Corporation study, however, suspending military aid for human rights or other reasons does “not have the devastating consequences” that opponents might expect. The study highlights that, in some cases, U.S. punitive funding cuts of military aid have improved foreign partner behavior. Out of ten cases of punitive funding cuts the study examined over the past 20 years, it determined that three “resulted in significant improvement.” The study did not disclose the names of the countries they reviewed. Research does point to Indonesia in the early 2000s as a potential example of when suspension of security assistance resulted in an improvement of military force behavior. In 1999, the U.S. suspended all aid to the Indonesian armed forces, due to reports of gross human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh, and other regions. Following this suspension, and after the resignation of President Suhatro, basic freedoms in the country proceeded to expand rapidly, contributing “to a vibrant if chaotic democracy.” The suspension of military aid to Egypt is likely an example of when funding cuts didn’t result in improved human rights behavior, perhaps because of the way in which the United States went about it. After the July 2013 military coup, President Obama didn’t formally suspend a portion of U.S. military aid until several months later. This delay was explained by many as an attempt to maintain good relations with the new government while also slowly prodding it towards democratization. It was also relatively clear that the suspension would only be temporary, undercutting the real threat of cutting the funding. The RAND study also found that when the United States cuts military aid to foreign security force, their military capabilities are negatively affected. However, it indicated that the blow to a state’s security capacity is perhaps less damaging than previously thought, for two possible reasons. Firstly, in some cases, it takes time for a government to lose military capability, as donated equipment and weapons can remain fully functional for decades. Secondly, the United States does not always cuts all types of aid to a foreign force. For instance, some military aid to Nigeria was cut in 2014 on account of Nigeria’s abysmal human rights record and rampant corruption. Yet, the Obama Administration still allocated $4.4 million in security assistance to Nigerian forces in FY 2015. This was even before Nigerians elected a new President, Muhammadu Buhari, who pledged investigations into military abuses and a reform of the Nigeria security sector. Human rights groups have also fired back at officials who argue that the United States must sometimes assist repressive security forces in order to address terrorism. Advocates have cited that Nigerian security force abuses against civilians have unintentionally aided Boko Haram’s cause and recruitment efforts. By supporting such forces, U.S. security assistance to Nigeria can in fact prove counterproductive to fighting terrorism. As the RAND Corporation is a widely respected voice in defense analysis, this new study may signal a new openness within the defense community for suspending military aid because of concerns for human rights violations. The findings could also support those within Congress and the Obama Administration who are pushing to maintain the Leahy Law, which restricts U.S. military aid to specific units on the basis of credible evidence of gross human rights violations, in its current form.

#### IF they don’t fiat future implementation of a policy identical to the plan—Then it will inevitably get hollowed out – circumvention links more.

Dalton ‘17 (Melissa G., Senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at CSIS, and Dr. Stephen Tankel, Assistant professor at American University and adjunct senior fellow at CNAS, How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance, August 2017, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-improve-return-investment-security-assistance>

As a result of competing priorities, the United States often chooses not to condition assistance ... or attempts to do so in an ad hoc manner. Some U.S. objectives overlap with one another. Others conflict. And lest we forget, our partners also get a vote. American objectives for security assistance often do not align with theirs, due in large part to differences in how the United States and a recipient prioritize and perceive threats. The number of different objectives at play complicates efforts to condition assistance; enforcing conditions to achieve one set of objectives could hamper efforts to achieve another set. For example, after the Bahraini government’s security forces launched a major crackdown on protesters during the Arab uprisings, the United States temporarily restricted arms sales to the country. Some members of the Obama administration also argued for placing conditions on security assistance. Others worried that this would undermine Bahrain’s support for U.S. basing and access, which is important for Afghanistan, Iran deterrence, and counterterrorism operations. As a result of competing priorities, the United States often chooses not to condition assistance, as was the case with Bahrain, or attempts to do so in an ad hoc manner. Worst of all, the United States sometimes imposes conditions, but then blinks first and backs down when they are not met.

### Pressure Fails

#### Pressure can’t solve the Aff---They’ll never compromise their core interests---MUST eliminate the physical capability

Glaser ‘14 (John, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, America’s Toxic Middle East Allies, 2014, https://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/america%e2%80%99s-toxic-middle-east-allies-11929?nopaging=1)

Attempts to pressure the Arab Gulf states to cut off the flow of support to terrorist groups have proven largely ineffective. A 2002 Council on Foreign Relations report noted that Saudi Arabia responded to pressure from the Bush administration to “tighten controls over the flow of funds in or through the kingdom.” Still, the same report criticized Saudi Arabia’s “failure to punish, in a demonstrable manner, specific and identified leaders of charities found to be funneling money to militant Islamist organizations.” In addition to problems of enforcement, Saudi Arabia appears to revive financing for militant groups when faced with overwhelming national interests. As Biden indicated, the opportunity to take advantage of the Syrian civil war took precedence over concerns about terrorist financing. Qatar has also half-heartedly yielded to U.S. pressure. Foreign Policy recently reported that Qatar responded to Treasury Department accusations of terrorist financing when it “instituted a new law to regulate charities and prevent them from engaging in politics.” Unfortunately, as Foreign Policy went on to note, Doha continues to play “a major role in destabilizing every trouble spot in the region and in accelerating the growth in radical and jihadi factions.” Over the course of several decades, these regimes have shown that they consider it a vital national interest to placate their domestic fundamentalist religious constituencies and to fight for Sunni Arab dominance in the Middle East by proxy, even at the risk of jeopardizing their relationship with the United States.

#### Unilateral conditions fail – no mutual understanding = no follow-through

Dalton et al ’18 – Project Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Melissa, “Oversight and Accountability in US Security Sector Assistance: Seeking Return on Investment,” Feb 2018, date accessed: 6.28.2019, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180207\_Dalton\_OversightAccountability\_Web.pdf)//AP

U.S. policymakers lack a common framework that enables them to assess the various factors at play in a security relationship and make judgments about whether placing conditions on assistance will be effective.49 This deficit has led to the ad hoc use and narrow application of conditions. One of conditionality's greatest weaknesses results from the narrow way policymakers employ it. Different interests between donor and recipient countries often lead to different policy objectives. To bring goals into alignment, donors place conditions on SSA However, U.S. policymakers often fail to consider partner countries' priorities and political contexts when designing conditions, and they rarely work with partner countries to establish mutually beneficial SSA programs and acceptable conditions. Instead, U.S. policymakers often impose unilateral conditions, exacerbating disagreements between partners.

## SAUDI SPECIFIC

### Saudi Say No

#### They’ll say no --- the US has no leverage or credibility --- past efforts prove

Rand 18 – Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor from 2015-2017. She previously served on the staff of the National Security Council and the U.S. Senate Dafna H. [https://www.lawfareblog.com/extricating-united-states-yemen-lessons-strategic-perils-partnered-operations](https://www.lawfareblog.com/extricating-united-states-yemen-lessons-strategic-perils-partnered-operations))

Finally, the Yemen experience exposes how offering security assistance in the name of building partner capacity can, paradoxically, erode U.S. influence with partners over time. The arrangement of limited support for the coalition reached in 2015 was awkward from the beginning. For the first time since the first Gulf War, the United States agreed to support a coalition waging a war in the Middle East, rather than formally joining or leading it. This arrangement meant a priori that the United States would not be driving the big picture decisions. Moreover, U.S. support for the coalition did not earn it enough leverage to sway the coalition’s choice of targets or other operational decisions that would have protected the people of Yemen. Since 2016, the United States has not been able to dissuade its Emirati partners from steadily advancing its troops up the Red Sea coastal region, toward Hodeidah governorate, with significant humanitarian consequences. This past summer and fall, the United Nations and international community warned the UAE and others in the coalition against launching an offensive in Hodeidah in particular, given its population density and the presence of a port through which 70 percent of all humanitarian aid transits into Yemen. Even as the ethical and reputational costs of every errant coalition airstrike have grown since 2015, the United States has failed to persuade the Saudis to improve their abilities to hit dynamic targets—with high profile, deadly results for the people of Yemen, including attacks on weddings, funerals, and school buses full of children. In 2017, just as the Pentagon began formally investing in tactical training efforts to improve non-dynamic targeting, U.S. strategic leverage seemed to decline, particularly when the Trump administration changed the signaling coming from Washington. What had been the tentative yellow light offered by the Obama administration turned into a green light to the coalition war efforts. By the end of 2017, the United States and United Kingdom could not prevent the Saudis from blockading Yemen’s Red Sea ports, choking off key humanitarian access points and deepening the humanitarian crisis. In sum, the limited approach chosen by the United States afforded almost no leverage to shape its allies’ doctrine, strategy, or operations. Meanwhile, the Yemen war has exposed that decades of military hardware sales and training clearly left out key principles on how to fight wars, including how to abide by international humanitarian law. For instance, it is regrettable that despite the decades-long project to build the Gulf states’ capacity, the U.S. military’s own hard-won counterinsurgency lessons, learned in Iraq and Afghanistan during this same time period, were never transmitted to these close U.S. allies. Meanwhile, U.S. support for an ill-fated effort in Yemen has weakened America’s credibility elsewhere in the region, and it undermines the projection of U.S. power worldwide for the U.S. military to have supported a stalemated civil conflict against a small insurgent group. Because of U.S. association with the intervention in Yemen, U.S. diplomats found it more difficult to protest the Russian bombardment of Syrian hospitals and other humanitarian sites in 2015 and 2016. While the current administration may not care, in the future, U.S. policymakers trying to stop what has become an erosion in the norms of warfare worldwide—whether in Syria, Nigeria, or Afghanistan—will find their voices much less credible because of Yemen.

#### Saudi Arabia just ignores the CP

Karlin 17 – associate Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution Mara, 10/16. “Why Military Assistance Programs Disappoint.” Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-10-16/why-military-assistance-programs-disappoint>

At times, however, these recommendations may prove infeasible. A partner state may refuse to discuss those crucial, higher-order questions, motivated by some combination of distrust, a desire to pursue a different agenda, uncertainty about the American commitment, and the belief that it will receive U.S. aid no matter what. For example, officials in Egypt, one of the top recipients of U.S. military aid, appear to believe that Washington will continue to provide assistance in order to maintain the country’s peace treaty with Israel regardless, which explains their reluctance to reform their corrupt military. Nigerian officials, likewise, seem to have calculated that the United States will help with their fight against Boko Haram despite the military’s egregious human rights violations, and so they have refused to discuss changes to the Nigerian military’s outdated defense strategy and inefficient organizational structure. In other cases, improving an assistance program may be unworkable because the United States is unwilling to crack down on external actors, whose support it needs for higher-priority issues. In Syria, for example, where the United States supports a range of Syrian opposition forces, it may make sense for the United States to give up on trying to get Russia to lessen its meddling in the civil war and instead prioritize making progress on broader European security affairs. In such scenarios, policymakers need to make a clear-eyed assessment about the goals and likely outcomes of U.S. military assistance. That will lead them to one of two conclusions. Sometimes, they may decide to move forward, recognizing that the effort to train and equip the foreign military will be just that: light security-sector reform. Limited train-and-equip programs can serve useful purposes, such as providing intelligence, professionalizing the military to make the force more respected, enabling some tactical and operational cooperation on mutually agreed threats, and giving U.S. personnel valuable experience working with foreign forces. But limited U.S. involvement will have a limited impact. Alternatively, policymakers may conclude that the costs outweigh the benefits. In those cases, better to submit to reality and deal with the problem some other way than throw good money after bad.

#### Arms sales don’t generate leverage

Thrall and Dorminey (A. Trevor, associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, and Caroline, research associate at the Cato Institute, “Yemen Shows Why US Needs to Change Its Arms Sales Policy”, 3/21/18, Cato Institute, <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/yemen-shows-why-us-needs-change-its-arms-sales-policy)>

Although advocates argue that the United States can exert greater leverage over the Middle East through arms sales, the evidence of arms for influence is thin at best . A better use of American resources would be to generate diplomatic momentum to resolve the conflict. Yemen’s instability and destruction is not in the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. If nothing else, the past seventeen years of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere should have proved that conflict often fuels downstream problems like terrorism. Armingan aggressor isn’t the best way to broker a peaceful solution.

#### Conditions fail --- Saudi Arabia can’t be trusted

Daniel R. **DePetris,** **12-6**-2018, (Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities, a foreign policy organization focused on promoting a realistic grand strategy to ensure American security and prosperity. "Three Ways to Rethink the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Alliance," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/three-ways-rethink-us-saudi-arabian-alliance-38052, accessed 6-21-2019, SM)

Nothing could be further from reality. Saudi Arabia is not an ally the United States can depend on, nor has it proven to be an especially helpful security partner either. Saudi Arabia, rather, is a nation with its own unique set of national interests, some of which align with America but many of which do not. The sooner the Trump administration sees the U.S.-Saudi relationship for what it is—and equally important, what it is not—the sooner Washington can undertake the strategic reassessment that is urgently required and long past due. For decades, the American people have been sold by their leaders the idea that U.S.-Saudi ties being indispensable to the security of the U.S. homeland and a vital facet of promoting peace in the Middle East. With a few notable exceptions—Harvard University Professor Stephen Walt and former U.S. Ambassador to Riyadh Chas Freeman among them—the foreign policy intelligentsia and commentariat have eagerly served as the messenger of this hypothesis. U.S. administrations across the political divide have reflexively viewed the Saudis as integral to containing Iranian power in the Middle East, stabilizing energy prices during gluts in the energy market, and providing America with instrumental information on terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Most of these arguments, however, are hyped, exaggerated, and inaccurate. Riyadh’s behavior is as clear an indication as any that, far from being the amazing ally the foreign policy establishment frequently claims, the Kingdom is at best a nettlesome, half-hearted partner on very specific issues of common interest.

### Signaling Deficit

#### Saudi won’t believe our threats—Mixed signals overwhelm

Byman ‘18 (Daniel, Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, former Research Director for the Center, Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, vice dean of the Georgetown SFS, former staff member of the 9/11 Commission, former policy analyst and director for research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation and worked for the U.S. government, The U.S. “yellow light” in Yemen, August 2018, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/08/03/the-u-s-yellow-light-in-yemen/#cancel>

When the Saudi and Emirati intervention began in 2015, the Obama administration neither wholeheartedly embraced it nor strongly opposed it, eventually settling into a lukewarm embrace. At the same time, the United States was engaged in its own mini-war in Yemen, where it had been hunting terrorists since 9/11. In 2002, the United States killed al-Qaida terrorist Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a Yemeni national, in the first drone strike outside a designated war zone. U.S. efforts continued fitfully in the years that followed. However, the Obama administration stepped up operations when al-Qaida’s branch in Yemen, known as al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, tried, and almost succeeded in, bombing an airplane over Detroit in 2009. In 2011, the United States launched the first (and only) drone strike that deliberately targeted a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, who operated out of Yemen. Today, U.S. special operations forces work with the UAE to target al-Qaida and Islamic State fighters in Yemen and the also conducts drone attacks. Additionally, they are beginning to help Saudi Arabia locate Houthi missile bases and stockpiles. Under Obama, the United States followed an often-confusing policy in Yemen, attempting to balance humanitarian concerns, a sense that the intervention would fail, and a desire to please Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Those allies see Yemen as a key regional issue because they worry about Iranian influence there, and by tolerating their intervention, the United States does them a favor in a country with historically low U.S. interests. Indeed, U.S. support proved vital for the military intervention to continue. Quietly, the United States—along with France and the United Kingdom—provides intelligence and air refueling along with other logistical support. The International Crisis Group described U.S. policy in Yemen as a “yellow light,” an indication of U.S. ambivalence, that allies blithely ignored, recognizing that U.S. backing would still be forthcoming. At the end of his administration, Obama gave the Saudis a symbolic wrist slap, temporarily halting the sale of smart bombs to the Kingdom because of the war and the repeated Saudi military mistakes that led to the deaths of many Yemeni civilians. In the end, both supporting and opposing the war failed and proved the worst of both worlds, frustrating allies yet doing nothing to stop the intervention or improve the humanitarian situation in Yemen. For the Trump administration, the Saudi relationship is particularly important, and he quickly lifted the Obama smart-bomb ban. Although he cares little about Yemen, Trump responded positively to Saudi and UAE efforts to court him and embraced their view of Yemen. He noted, correctly, that the Saudi-U.S. relationship was “very strained” under Obama, and Saudi Arabia’s leaders seem to be among the few foreigners that Trump likes. However, the Trump administration’s first foray into Yemen was a botched raid by special operations forces seeking terrorists in a Yemeni village , which led to the death of a U.S. Navy SEAL and, according to the villagers, around 25 civilians including nine children—hardly an auspicious beginning. In the end, the Trump administration has not veered too far from Obama, most recently rebuffing a request to join the current UAE-led offensive on the strategic port of Hodeidah. The Hodeidah operation will likely push Yemen’s humanitarian situation from nightmarish to something worse, both because of the fighting and the likely slow (or nonexistent) post-conflict reconstruction. Millions of Yemenis are on the edge of survival, and even temporary disruptions in food supplies would push them over. The Houthis, who torture political opponents and are often indifferent to the misery of many Yemenis, have an incentive to play up the suffering to pressure their enemies. The UAE promised to address the humanitarian crisis that their military operation exacerbates, which shows progress. International actors should press the UAE and Saudi Arabia to make good on that offer. The United States should abandon the “yellow light” policy in Yemen in favor of a “red light” policy. The tally between costs and benefits of supporting the Saudi and Emirati intervention falls decidedly in the costs category. The allies’ approach is self-defeating. Iran is stronger in Yemen than it was prior to the intervention in 2015. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has at times capitalized on the chaos to expand, and the group remains robust despite Emirati and U.S. efforts to fight it. The UAE and Saudi Arabia spent tens of billions of dollars on the war; yet now many Yemenis hate them for the war’s destruction. Even with a victory in Hodeidah, the war will drag on. The “yellow light” policy does not avoid U.S. complicity in the humanitarian disaster in Yemen. Although the Trump administration does not care about humanitarian crises, especially those in the Middle East, U.S. logistical and intelligence support for the Saudi and Emirati intervention ties the U.S.’s reputation to their actions. Even though U.S. leaders claim we are not at war in Yemen and though few Americans know of the U.S. involvement, U.S. support enabled the intervention. As Republican Sen. Mike Lee of Utah noted, “It stretches the imagination, and it stretches the English language beyond its breaking point, to suggest the U.S. military is not engaged in hostility in Yemen.” Further, the “yellow light” policy—coupled with the Trump administration’s strong embrace—empowers Saudi Arabia and the UAE to take self-defeating steps. This ranges from his strong rhetorical support in general, to extensive back channels with these leaders, to taking their side in their dispute with Qatar to his withdrawal from the Iran deal. Together, the Saudis and Emiratis perceive these gestures as indications that he does not care about Yemen and will follow their lead in the region. Ironically, Trump may need the Saudis and the Emiratis less than Obama did. Obama relied on Saudi Arabia and UAE to play a role in the coalition against the Islamic State, but the coalition has been steadily winning since 2015 and drove the caliphate underground. Notionally, Trump needs the Saudis and Emiratis in his Middle East peace plans, but the plans are deeply unrealistic and unformed, lacking buy-in from the Israeli or Palestinian sides. Even on a Yemen-specific level, the United States has influence—it just won’t use it to change the situation in Yemen. As Alex De Waal argues, the in-flight refueling, presence of advisors, and arms sales all offer U.S. leverage. Although the Trump administration will not likely seize it, the Hodeidah operation offers an opportunity to renew negotiations. Negotiations to end the war have failed repeatedly due to the numerous groups fighting in the conflict, which makes it hard to bring everyone to the table; the many divisions within them and the foreign powers’ lack of control over many of their proxies. However, promoting peace is still worthwhile given the grave situation in Yemen. If U.S. allies stop their campaign, the scope and scale of the violence might decrease. Moreover, if they win in Hodeidah, U.S. allies can enter negotiations with a mark in the win column, giving them political cover for reducing their interventions while their Houthi opponents would be more eager for a deal. The United States should support the efforts of Martin Griffiths, the United Nations’ envoy to Yemen and welcome new mediation efforts, perhaps by countries like Oman that can be an honest broker. Yemen will still have a long way to go on the road to peace and stability, but at least it would be heading in the right direction.

#### Only actually ENDING these sales can make threats EFFECTIVE – International SIGNALING is solvency deficit.

Spindel 19 (Jennifer, Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma and the Associate Director of the Cyber Governance and Policy Center, 14 May 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-suspending-american-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/>)

Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect. A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen, and would be an equally important signal to Washington’s allies, who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe. By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important communication role in international politics. Arms Embargos Are Signals and Can Build Coalitions Policymakers and scholars agree that arms embargoes are not effective “sticks” in international politics. Rarely do states cave when faced with punishment in the form of an embargo. But even if an arms embargo isn’t a direct tool of coercion, an embargo would be an important political signal. There are at least two reasons for the United States to seriously consider an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia. First, arms sales are signals that cut through the noise of the international system. Cutting off arms transfers is a common way that states express their dissatisfaction with others and try to influence behavior. As Lawrence Freedman observed in 1978, “refusing to sell arms is a major political act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be recipient.” Yet this crucial point seems to have been lost in the current policy debate about whether or not the United States should continue selling arms to Saudi Arabia. My research shows that stopping arms transfers or denying requests is an effective way to signal dissatisfaction and causes the would-be recipient to re-think their behavior.Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with Israel in the 1960s. The United States sold Israel Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in 1962, M-48 Patton tanks in 1964 and 1965, and A-4E Skyhawk bombers in 1966. Israeli leaders understood that these transfers signaled a close U.S.-Israeli relationship. As diplomat Abba Eban wrote, the arms transfers were “a development of tremendous political value.” Even against this backdrop of close ties and significant arms sales, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to arms transfer denials. In April and May 1967, the United States denied Israeli requests for armored personnel carriers and fighter jets. Approving the transfers would have signaled support, and likely emboldened Israel, as tensions were growing in the region. Israeli leaders believed these transfer denials overruled prior signals and demonstrated that the United States was not willing to be a close political ally for Israel. Eban described Israel as “isolated,” and the head of Israel’s intelligence service said that the arms transfer denials made it clear that “in Israel, there existed certain misperceptions [about the United States].” If arms transfer denials could have such a significant effect on Israeli thinking — keeping in mind that there was a close and significant political relationship between the US and Israel — imagine what a transfer denial would mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia would have to re-think its impression that it has political support and approval from the United States. We can, and should, ask whether or not withdrawal of U.S. support would affect Saudi behavior, but it’s important that this question not get overlooked in the current debate. Because arms transfers (and denials) are powerful signals, they can have an effect even before a transfer is actually completed. This suggests that even the announcement of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect. Take, for example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets. As reports mounted that Trump had given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be. If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, an arms embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the support of the United States. This signal would be an important first step in changing Saudi behavior because it would override other statements and actions the United States has sent that indicate support. And Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive signals: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia. And he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t). With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or Senate, which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? An arms embargo would be a clear and unambiguous signal that the United States disproves of Saudi actions in Yemen. The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect. One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require cooperation among weapons exporting states. A ban on sales from one country will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere. Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the German Green Party explained, “The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi Arabia can get arms elsewhere. According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets. Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in Germany, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of its complete arsenal. A U.S. embargo would send an important signal to the allies who also supply Saudi Arabia, allowing them to explain participation in the embargo to their own domestic constituencies. This is especially important for countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, that need to export arms to keep their own production lines running. While the research shows that sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, embargoes can restrain sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia on its own, an embargo is important for building coalitions for a more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior. The Difficulty of Stopping Atrocities Beyond signaling, we know U.S. arms sales often end up in the wrong hands, and have been used in Yemen. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has led to starvation conditions, caused thousands of civilian casualties, and has led to the displacement of millions of people. The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of Yemen’s population – 24 million people – require some form of humanitarian or protection assistance, and that the severity of the situation is increasing. Would an arms embargo create meaningful change in Yemen? An initial effect of an embargo is that Saudi Arabia would have to work harder to access war materiel. As Jonathan Caverley noted, more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s arms delivered in the past five years came from the United States. Even if this percentage decreases over time, it will be costly for Saudi Arabia to transition to a primarily Russian- or Chinese-supplied military. Though Saudi Arabia might be willing to pay this cost, it would still have to pay, and take the time to transition to its new weapons systems. This would represent a brief break in hostilities that could facilitate the delivery of aid and assistance in Yemen. The United States could, in theory, impose stricter end-user controls on Saudi Arabia. This would have the advantage of keeping Saudi Arabia within the world of U.S. weapons systems, and might prevent it from diversifying its suppliers, which would ultimately weaken any leverage the United States might have. Longer-term, it would not be to America’s advantage if Saudi Arabia takes a lesson from Turkey, and starts courting Russia as a new arms supplier. It is difficult to enforce end-user controls, since, once a weapon is transferred, the recipient can use it however it wishes. It might also be the case that Saudi Arabia would object to stricter end-user controls, and would seek new suppliers as a result. An arms embargo will not be a panacea. But not doing something sets a problematic precedent, and allows the difficulty of coordinating an arms embargo outweigh the potential benefits of one. An embargo is unlikely to have an immediate effect on Saudi behavior, because an embargo would be a political signal, rather than a blunt instrument of coercion. It will take time for a multilateral embargo to emerge and be put into place, and the United States should work with its allies to help support their ability to participate in the embargo. Not acting, however, would continue to implicitly endorse Saudi behavior, and would make it more difficult for U.S. allies to believe that future threats of an embargo are credible.

### Morality Deficit

#### Any continuation of sales demonstrates failure to acknowledge culpability of gross violations

Newton ’17 – Professor @Vanderbilt Law School (Michael, “An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen,” Vanderbilt University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2971208>)//AP

The current sale of arms to Saudi Arabia should be carefully assessed in light of the specific duties embedded in Section 502B. As a threshold issue, we have found no evidence that either President Obama or President Trump notified Congress of any “extraordinary circumstances” warranting assistance despite Saudi Arabia’s consistent pattern of gross human rights violations.68 Thus, the threshold exception to Section 502B likely does not apply. Saudi Arabia presents an apparent prima facie case for the immediate cessation of sales under the FAA. There are consistent and credible reports of clear violations of internationally recognized human rights as defined by the Act. Whether or not the specific assistance provided to Saudi Arabia is used to further violations of human rights is not a statutory factor to this analysis. Instead, the statute only looks to human rights violations—including flagrant denials of the right to life under international humanitarian law—writ large. For the last five years, in the annual reports required by Section 502B for the purpose of informing the President’s determination of whether a country is eligible for security assistance, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) noted multiple violations that clearly fall within the statute’s definition.69 For example, the FAA defines “prolonged detention without trial” as a grave human rights abuse. 70 The 2016 Human Rights Report found that “[a]uthorities held persons for months and sometimes years without charge or trial”.71 The report also notes a number of abuses amounting to the “flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty or security of person” which are also, by the FAA’s definition, gross human rights violations.72 Saudi authorities sentenced to death several individuals for conduct allegedly undertaken while they were minors,73 in clear contravention of Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,74 to which Saudi Arabia is a party.75 Human rights groups reported that the trials failed to meet international standards because inter alia the courts allowed the admission of forced confessions into evidence.76

### Leverage Fails

#### No leverage – Trump is letting MBS off the hook because he needs to maintain Saudi Arabia as a business partner for arms sales

Jackson ’19 – White House correspondent @ USA Today, has been a reporter for three decades (David Jackson, 6-28-2019, "Trump says he asked Saudis about Jamal Khashoggi killing, claims they are angry about it," USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/28/donald-trump-no-comment-khashoggi-killing-meeting-saudis/1592766001/, accessed 6-29-2019)//AP

OSAKA, Japan — After repeatedly refusing to answer the question, President Donald Trump told reporters Saturday that he did bring up the murder of a journalist in his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, and he claimed the Saudi leader is concerned about it. "He's very angry about it," Trump told reporters after his meeting. "He's very unhappy about it." Earlier, as bin Salman sat across the table from him, Trump said the Crown Prince is doing a "spectacular job," and repeatedly refused to answer questions about the death of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, A week after a United Nations report implicated Bin Salman in Khashoggi's death, Trump said it was "a great honor" to meet the crown prince and stressed the business partnership between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Trump did not respond to repeated questions from reporters about the killing of Khashoggi. Speaking with reporters later, Trump again refused to say whether he discussed Khashoggi with the Crown Prince. He did note that the Saudis are prosecuting people for the crime. "I'm very unhappy about that whole thing," Trump said. During their meeting, Trump and the Saudi prince did discuss U.S. weapons sales to the kingdom as well as ideas on how to contain Iran and its threat to renew a program that could be used to make nuclear weapons.

#### Expanded leverage doesn’t solve their impacts—but the constant drive for leverage instead causes conflict—AND Trump is an alt cause

Khong 19 Yuen Foong, Professor of Political Science, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, “Power as prestige in world politics,” International Affairs, 1/1/19, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiy245 //AY

Conclusion: destined for war? Power is shifting from West to East. The most obvious and consequential manifestation of this consists in the geopolitical competition in Asia between the established power, the United States, and the risen power, China. By portraying this competition in terms of the struggle for the top spot in the hierarchy of prestige, I have sought to cut to the chase of what is involved in the contest. If this approach is on the mark, we should expect to hear many future statements such as ‘our prestige is at stake’, ‘we do not want to be a paper tiger’ and ‘this will be an irreparable blow to our status and prestige’ when US and Chinese leaders respond to strategic challenges, especially those posed by one to the other. The prestige narrative will feature in their public debate, but it will be especially prominent in their private deliberations. Prestige—one’s reputation for power or the shadow cast by power—is valued both as an end and as a means. For much of this article, I have focused on the instrumental value of prestige. But prestige is also an end in itself. Daniel Markey’s examination of the role of prestige as a cause of conflict in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau concluded that, for these canonical realists, prestige was ‘an intrinsic end sought by both individuals and stastes’.80 Both the United States and China—and both their leaders and their citizens—derive enormous psychic satisfaction from being at the top of the prestige ladder. The latter validates the success of their respective political–economic systems, as well as the legitimacy of those in charge. The United States has enjoyed being the most prestigious nation on earth since 1945. In the centuries before 1839, China was the most prestigious nation in Asia. Today, most Chinese and many outsiders view China’s ‘century of humiliation’ (1839–1949) as a historical aberration, when China’s reputation for power was squashed by external invaders and its own internal divisions. Mao Zedong’s achievement was to reunite the country and rid it of imperialists; and the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, beginning in the late 1970s, unshackled the entrepreneurial spirit of his people and propelled the economic growth that has put China in the position where it is today. Yan Xuetong captures the Chinese mindset well when he writes that the Chinese ‘regard their rise as regaining China’s lost international status rather than obtaining something new ... [They] consider the rise of China as a restoration of fairness rather than gaining advantage over others.’81 But at the highest levels, the status or prestige game is a zero-sum game: it is about gaining advantage over your competitors. Either you are number one or you are not.82 And if Yong Deng is correct in observing that China ‘may very well be the most status-conscious country in the world’—partly because it assumes that ‘status entails some magical qualities with which core national interests can be secured’83—we should expect the geopolitical competition between China and the United States to intensify in the years ahead. Prestige, status, credibility and avoiding humiliation—the importance of this strategic narrative to America’s and China’s sense of self is manifest. Is Donald Trump an outlier here? In pursuing his ‘America First’ agenda, Trump seems content to undermine the institutions and practices often viewed as the expressions par excellence of US prestige and leadership: the US-led economic institutions and military alliances, and America’s penchant for promoting democracy abroad. Unlike his predecessors, Trump relishes threatening his G7 economic partners with tariffs, calling America’s NATO allies ‘deadbeats’ whom he may leave in the strategic lurch if they do not raise their defence spending to 2 per cent (or even 4 per cent) of GDP and rejecting ‘promotion of US values worldwide’ while cultivating authoritarian rulers. Trump’s starting point seems to be an America already low in prestige—hence the need to make it ‘great’ again; an America that under previous administrations has wittingly or unwittingly been exploited economically and militarily by allies and adversaries alike. Trump’s emphasis on threatening and deploying hard US economic and military power to get his (America First) way is undoubtedly eroding US prestige, but he seems undisturbed by this. It is worth reiterating the pronouncements of E. H. Carr and Robert Gilpin on prestige: respectively, ‘If your strength is recognized, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it’84 and ‘It is for this reason that in the conduct of diplomacy and the resolution of conflicts among states there is actually relatively little use of overt force or, for that matter, explicit threats.’85 By resorting to explicit threats against America’s G7 partners and NATO allies, and by initiating a trade war, Trump is acting on his own resentments: that, far from being the most prestigious nation on earth, the US has been an international sucker, taken for granted and exploited by allies, and ‘raped’ economically by adversaries such as China. That the rest of the world does not see it this way does not matter (to Trump).

### Perm – Do Both

#### Permutation: Do Both

#### The aff’s withdrawal creates pressure

Goodman ’18 – founding co-editor-in-chief of Just Security, the Anne and Joel Ehrenkranz Professor of Law at New York University School of Law (Ryan Goodman, 10-22-2018, "Options for Congress to Respond to Saudi Transgressions: Here's What Works according to Former Senior U.S. Officials," Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/61172/effective-ineffective-congressional-responses-saudi-arabia-arm-sales-sanctions-khashoggi/, accessed 6-25-2019)//AP

Another former senior official supported a clean break from U.S. support for the Yemen war rather than a piecemeal approach. “On Yemen, the best move would be to support the Khanna-Murphy War Powers resolution. A clean end to US military support for the Saudi-UAE war in Yemen is better than more targeted efforts to police that support (like the bar on in-flight refueling). Suspending existing DCS licenses and placing limits on future foreign military sales for things like air-to-ground strike capabilities would be a natural supplement to this approach,” the former official said. Jeffrey Prescott, who served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf States on the National Security Council and now a strategic consultant to the Penn Biden Center expressed a similar perspective, “My view is that the callous murder of Mr. Khashoggi — and the Trump administration’s clear impulse to sweep it under the rug — demonstrates how far the relationship with Saudi Arabia has gotten off track, and the need for serious consequences. As a start, we could use this moment to extricate ourselves from military involvement in the disastrous war in Yemen, a step that is long overdue. Ideally we would simultaneously help push for a diplomatic resolution of the conflict – necessary, not easy, and very unlikely given how little effort the Trump administration has put into serious diplomacy. But washing our hands of involvement in the war, even in the absence of a US diplomatic push, will still put pressure on UAE and Saudi to end the conflict.”

#### The perm would immediately deescalates the war in Yemen and effectively changes Saudi Arabia’s behavior in the region.

Hartung ’19(Willian D. Hartung is the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. “It’s Time to Stop Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia” Common Dreams May 16, 2019. <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2019/05/16/its-time-stop-arms-sales-saudi-arabia>) stowPCB

The Senate’s failure to override President Trump’s veto of its effort to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen is not the end of the story. A way can and must be found to stop U.S. assistance in refueling, targeting, and other activities that bolster the Saudi/United Arab Emirats (UAE) war effort, which has killed [tens of thousands](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.acleddata.com_2018_12_11_press-2Drelease-2Dyemen-2Dwar-2Ddeath-2Dtoll-2Dnow-2Dexceeds-2D60000-2Daccording-2Dto-2Dlatest-2Dacled-2Ddata_&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=WggkS3ki2uurkbKqDLR_8iDr_nbPddJC2Amf-IhTUtE&e=) of civilians and left [millions](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.unocha.org_yemen_crisis-2Doverview&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=0syPOJOCG0aQf-yhGK7uSw_su23sPqwtiH9g-VOODTc&e=) of Yemenis at risk of famine and fatal, war-induced diseases. For starters, Congress should work to close off the other main avenue of U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition—the sale of bombs, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, and other equipment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two primary perpetrators of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. According to statistics from the [Security Assistance Monitor](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__securityassistance.org_&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=OE3mPpjRyhgIzafqkEX7fsPmnEz-zZNvKZhQY7Cryj0&e=), the United States has offered over [$68 billion](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.middleeasteye.net_news_revealed-2Dfull-2Dextent-2Dus-2Darms-2Ddeals-2Dsaudi-2Darabia-2Dand-2Duae&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=-8tRY-dqOjYdgB6jTQnVL00C8sXI-PQr4kleyhy3wPc&e=) in weaponry to those two nations since the start of the current Yemen conflict in March 2015. As Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution has noted, these U.S.-supplied systems are the backbone of the Saudi military, and without those weapons and related maintenance and support they [could not sustain](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__theintercept.com_2018_09_13_meet-2Dthe-2Dsenator-2Dtrying-2Dto-2Dend-2Du-2Ds-2Dsupport-2Dfor-2Dthe-2Dwar-2Din-2Dyemen_&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=OrYvvjOa92boT8r398-SpqvKr77NE-DuF83rXij-zYw&e=) their intervention in Yemen. The Trump administration, the U.S. arms industry, and the Saudi and UAE lobbies have made numerous arguments in favor of keeping U.S. weapons flowing to its Gulf allies, but none of them holds up to scrutiny. With respect to the sales of precision-guided bombs—whose use has been documented in the widespread killings of civilians—the [argument](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.defensenews.com_opinion_commentary_2016_12_22_fallout-2Dof-2Dhalting-2Dweapons-2Dsales-2Dto-2Dsaudi-2Darabia_&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=64kKxWxwUecd1FjL3m41vHhcVBEPgwXupVVjTGvOIqw&e=) of choice has been that even more civilians would die in Saudi/UAE air strikes if the coalition were limited to “dumb” bombs that could not be targeted as accurately. This assertion is premised on the idea that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are making good faith efforts to avoid hitting civilians. The sheer volume of [strikes](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.nytimes.com_interactive_2018_12_27_world_middleeast_saudi-2Darabia-2Dwar-2Dtactics-2Dyemen-2Dhumanitarian-2Dcrisis.html&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=JQ3etpslHcw1ZHh_8cRTessDrPC7knBnFrlDtz3xulU&e=) on targets like hospitals, [a school bus](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.reuters.com_article_us-2Dyemen-2Dsecurity-2DidUSKBN1KU12U&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=Xg-ElGYfEiU9UwZvNI58ct-Bo9XH3EAXJ11D8WxrHys&e=), funerals, factories, water treatment plants, and other civilian infrastructure puts the lie to this argument. Air strikes on civilians are not “mistakes.” They are part and parcel of the Saudi/UAE strategy to bomb Yemenis into submission and end the war on terms favorable to their coalition. Another popular [argument](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.npr.org_2018_10_15_657588534_fact-2Dcheck-2Dhow-2Dmuch-2Ddoes-2Dsaudi-2Darabia-2Dspend-2Don-2Darms-2Ddeals-2Dwith-2Dthe-2Du-2Ds&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=OU9ozZrwZiTAyL2K615GntPmOk_Q5jNfgtiHpsmqyaw&e=) for continuing arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is “if we don’t do it, somebody else will.” But the United States and its European allies supply the Saudi air force and the [majority](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.wixstatic.com_ugd_3ba8a1-5F5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=ZlqGrJ77twlCBp0_WLa-YcGiX5yXiwV_6GtKedmyC0s&e=) of the arsenals of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Saudi and UAE militaries could not turn on a dime and seek Russian or Chinese systems to substitute for any cutoff of U.S. weaponry and support. It would take a decade or more for these nations to end their dependence on U.S. arms. A few deals with Moscow or Beijing would have limited impact on Saudi and UAE military capabilities, if Russia and China were even willing to supply arms to two nations that are responsible for the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, with the international opprobrium that would accompany any decision to do so. President Trump’s favorite argument for keeping the weapons trade going is jobs, jobs, jobs. His [claims](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.washingtonpost.com_politics_2018_10_22_trumps-2Dclaim-2Djobs-2Dsaudi-2Ddeals-2Dgrows-2Dby-2Dleaps-2Dbounds_-3Futm-5Fterm-3D.ac2d077c0d9a&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=biQ_ZXZUNQf5F7qQ7K89cIzP9LG66A8oU8YDS3UhJo0&e=) of U.S. jobs tied to Saudi arms sales and related deals have fluctuated widely, from 40,000 to as many as one million. But an [analysis](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__docs.wixstatic.com_ugd_3ba8a1-5F5e9019d625e84087af647e6cb91ea3e2.pdf&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=ZlqGrJ77twlCBp0_WLa-YcGiX5yXiwV_6GtKedmyC0s&e=) of actual deals concluded over the past two years suggests a figure that is a fraction of the president’s claims. And many of these jobs will be created in Saudi Arabia as part of that nation’s [goal](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__vision2030.gov.sa_en&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=c_hcJBvXUpjn56NnmZgeg2Y5HB9wUnY8754gbEyPKH0&e=) of having 50 percent of the value of its arms purchases produced in the kingdom by 2030. Last but not least is the claim that stopping arms sales to the Saudi/UAE coalition will aid Iran. But the Houthi-led opposition is by no means a [proxy](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.washingtonpost.com_news_monkey-2Dcage_wp_2016_05_16_contrary-2Dto-2Dpopular-2Dbelief-2Dhouthis-2Darent-2Diranian-2Dproxies_-3Futm-5Fterm-3D.8b4600df0242&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=ZX98pqPd8i4H1Ug5UeSYexYEHZcv3lqU7yZvJxObuag&e=) for Tehran. They have longstanding grievances that have nothing to do with Iran’s limited [military support](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.researchgate.net_publication_302064592-5FIran-27s-5Fpolicy-5Ftowards-5Fthe-5FHouthis-5Fin-5FYemen-5FA-5Flimited-5Freturn-5Fon-5Fa-5Fmodest-5Finvestment&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=so1akI-fnwf_PX4MI1huW2FqTEPgq7TWDEjUUaNRNfQ&e=) and would be fighting no matter what posture Iran takes towards the conflict. If anything, the brutal Saudi/UAE intervention is driving the Houthi coalition closer to Tehran. The best way to undercut Iranian influence in Yemen is to support UN efforts to end the war. There are several congressional initiatives to cut off U.S. arms to the Saudi/UAE coalition, including a [bipartisan bill](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.murphy.senate.gov_newsroom_press-2Dreleases_as-2Ddeadline-2Dfor-2Dadmins-2Dkhashoggi-2Dinvestigation-2Dnears-2Dmurphy-2Dbipartisan-2Dgroup-2Dof-2Dsenators-2Dintroduce-2Dsaudi-2Darabia-2Daccountability-2Dand-2Dyemen-2Dbill-2D&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=rz4oN5WSLeQq9veWzO9LvZAr9bK4sqmmNDo8Im869pQ&m=JOV5Glltn0Hfet8T17qvERsBwSGyOqd1Qx2xA7SVNmM&s=F8RVHKr5gRdIimH1J1rYP1UQeGvOOrSpxh8kwHedMd0&e=) co-sponsored by Senators Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Todd Young (R-IN), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Susan Collins (R-ME), Jack Reed (D-RI), and Chris Murphy (D-CT). That measure would, among other things, stop sales of precision-guided bombs to Saudi Arabia and the UAE for two years and condition other sales of offensive weapons on an end to the targeting of civilians and assurances that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will support the free passage of humanitarian aid. And a [bill](https://mcgovern.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=397287) sponsored by Rep Jim McGovern (D-MA) would immediately end all U.S. arms sales and military aid to Saudi Arabia. It’s time for Congress to move on this and other initiatives that would once and for all end U.S. support for the slaughter in Yemen.

### Credibility Add-on

#### a. Any US support for Saudi Arabia exposes US support for I-Law as selective

Shakdam 16 (Catherine is a political analyst ​and Associate Director of the Beirut Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Mint Press News, January 30, 2016, “The US Wraps Saudi Arabia — And Its Human Rights Atrocities — In Its Cloak Of Exceptionalism”, http://www.mintpressnews.com/the-us-wraps-saudi-arabia-and-its-human-rights-atrocities-in-its-cloak-of-exceptionalism/212913/)

Saudi Arabia’s “special friendship” with the U.S., as officials have been keen to highlight over the years, has allowed for U.S. officials to pick and choose when to show outrage and when to denounce human rights violations, manipulating international law to the tune of their own political agendas, rather than objectively defending the rule of law. And, in perhaps the most ironic turn of events in the world looking the other way on Saudi human rights abuses, the kingdom was given a chair on the United Nations Human Rights Council in 2013. Despite Obama’s open rejection of bigotry, it would appear that Washington has blanketed Riyadh under its own exceptionalism — all in the name of economic pragmatism. Indeed, the nations’ interests are so intertwined that Saudi Arabia remains instrumental to U.S. economic stability through the petrodollar system. The petrodollar system that was created in the 1970s has served America well, both economically and politically. What began as a way to drive more demand for the U.S. dollar in the wake of a move away from the international gold standard in 1971, it’s provided benefits that few could have ever imagined, including the solidification of the U.S. dollar as the global currency of choice. This was important, especially following a temporary loss of dollar credibility after President Richard Nixon’s decision to close the gold window. This “dollars for oil” system has greatly enriched the nation. But this national prosperity has come at the expense of other nations and their potential prosperity, notwithstanding America’s moral credibility in the world over its selective blindness to Riyadh’s human rights violations. Such selective blindness was recently highlighted by Washington’s silence over the beheading of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia on Jan. 2. He was among the victims of Saudi Arabia’s campaign to execute 47 “terrorists,” including by beheading and death by firing squad, in the country’s largest mass execution in decades. A pivotal figure for peaceful resistance in Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a man of letters who reinvented himself as a human rights defender in the face of the suffering of his community in the eastern Saudi province of Qatif, was arrested in 2012 for speaking out against the House of Saud. Following a brutal police pursuit and arrest in which he suffered gunshot wounds, Sheikh al-Nimr was sentenced to death on charges of sedition, disobedience and bearing arms. Ali al-Ahmed, founder and director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs, a Washington-based think tank, emphasized that any and all critics of the Saudi monarchy are designated as terrorists. Under Saudi law, any remark made against Riyadh can be construed as treason or domestic terrorism against the king, and is therefore punishable by death. “The kingdom has relied heavily on violence and repression against rights and political activists to prevent its rule from being challenge. Saudi Arabia remains the most violent and abusive of all autocracies,” al-Ahmed told MintPress. Likewise, Amnesty International denounces Saudi Arabia’s systematic attack on freedom of expression in the following terms: “Torture, public execution, discrimination, intolerance for free speech, possible war crimes in Yemen – and the list could go on. Dozens of activists remain behind bars in the Gulf Kingdom, simply for exercising their right to freedom of expression and assembly.”

#### b. Loss of credibility hurts international law and encourages war

Robinson ’18 – editor at Current Affairs, JD, Yale Law School. Nathan. April 14. “WHY DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW EVEN MATTER?” <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2018/04/why-does-international-law-even-matter>

Are international law arguments against Trump similarly secondary? Should we be focusing on whether the strike was wrong rather than whether it was within the scope of the UN charter? Defenders of the strikes called them “illegal but legitimate,” an argument that has also been used to exonerate Israel for clear violations of international law. This leaves us caught between two opposing notions: (1) illegal but legitimate is a reasonable concept, since it’s the foundation of the civil disobedience tradition from Thoreau to MLK but (2) if “illegal but legitimate” becomes an acceptable standard in governing the conduct of nations, we might as well give up on international law altogether, because every country will just violate the law at will and invoke its subjective conception of “legitimacy,” which inevitably always means “the things I want to do” since no country ever thinks its own conduct is illegitimate. One reason I think violations of international law do need to be taken seriously is that international law is very recent and very fragile. It is actually less like “law” than a collective pact, one that is often difficult to enforce and which depends on the good-faith participation of the various parties. It is a bit like engineering cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma. It’s very difficult, because it requires every party to limit their concern for their own self-interest in order to maximize the collective good. And if one of them betrays the others, the whole tentative cooperative system instantly collapses. In 21st century international relations, this could mean utter catastrophe. The great powers have to get along, because their mutual possession of nuclear arms means that the stakes of conflict are incalculably high. A functional cooperative pact among the nations, that holds each of them to a set of humane principles, is essential. People make fun of the United Nations and its impotence, but everyone who cares about the future of the human race should be invested in curing that impotence and making sure UN procedures do mean something. Here, procedure is substance to a certain degree, because when the world adopts a process that achieves consensus, there is peace, and when it doesn’t, there isn’t, regardless of the substantive question being debated. That’s why I think it’s actually incredibly dangerous and irresponsible for the United States (and now France and the UK) to treat international law as a meaningless set of guidelines that can be violated at will. If they don’t feel bound by it, why should any other country? The brazenness with which, for example, Israel has spat upon the international community’s processes endangers all of us, because it slowly erodes the weak bonds that keep the world from collapsing into war. That’s a huge difference with ordinary civil disobedience: Martin Luther King’s actions posed no threat to the country’s survival. The laws he violated had a very stable and brutal enforcement system, and his disobedience served to improve them rather than undermine them. The United States’ refusal to play by the rules set by the international community, on the other hand, seriously threatens to create a world in which nations follow no rules at all. Even high-stakes domestic “rule of law” disputes pale in significance here: perhaps Obama’s implementation of DACA was unconstitutional, and perhaps that set a precedent for expanded executive power that would come back to bite the left under Trump. But I don’t care very much, because it helped a bunch of kids, and it didn’t “erode the constitutional order” in any way that I find too terribly troubling. On the other hand, Obama’s expansion of presidential war powers does seem to me somewhat troubling, because the more unchecked military power presidents have, the more authoritarian the executive branch can potentially be. How much I care about “rule of law” questions depends on what the stakes are in undermining the rule of law. If they’re not particularly high, then I’m not going to fetishize procedure and the Constitution. But if the law does seem like it’s serving a very important function in holding together institutions and preventing anarchy (the bad kind rather than the good kind), then violations of law should be taken very seriously. (This is a major indictment of Democrats who did not hold President Obama accountable for the more serious and threatening expansions of executive power.) International law also has the advantage of being, generally speaking, pretty good substantively. The limits it imposes on nations, and the processes it creates for resolving disputes among them, are sensible. That’s another difference between it and its domestic equivalent: laws in the United States aren’t as worthy of respect, because they don’t embody humane principles nearly as well. When a legal system does embody a respectable set of values, we can begin appreciating it as a legal system. I think international law deserves to be honored not just because it’s “the law” but because it’s worthy of being honored, since it codifies a set of principles that if adhered to will produce peace. (The laws of the United States, on the other hand, codify a set of principles that have led to gross inequalities, environmental destruction, and the creation of a vast military-industrial complex.) Legalistic criticisms of nations is always going to seem rather weak. Surely what matters is whether a thing is just, and if a country had swooped in to stop the Rwandan genocide, few would have chastised them for ignoring proper procedure. But creating a viable and meaningful set of international legal standards is crucial to ensuring a future for the human species, and when countries erode the precious and unstable existing compact, whether Syria, the United States, Britain, France, Russia, or Israel, and embrace the concept of “illegal but legitimate,” they threaten to undo all of the progress that has been made toward ensuring a lasting world peace.

## CHINA SPECIFIC

### China Say No

#### China rejects any bargain – leaders see Taiwan as too important to negotiate over

**Kim 16** (Patricia Kim is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University and a research fellow in the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, in the John F. Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University, "Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan." International Security, vol. 40 no. 4, 2016, pp. 178-191. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/617465)SEM

In “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” Charles Glaser suggests that the United States should strike a grand bargain with China by ending its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for Beijing’s promise to peacefully resolve its maritime disputes and to accept the U.S. security presence in East Asia.1 Although Glaser’s desire to mitigate the chances for future conflict with an increasingly powerful and ambitious China is laudable, his proposed grand bargain is a nonstarter. Glaser acknowledges that territorial accommodation could come at the cost of downgrading China’s assessment of U.S. resolve to protect its interests and allies in Asia, compromising American values, and damaging U.S. credibility in the eyes of its allies. He insists, however, that by demanding China keeps its side of the bargain and by enhancing U.S. military capabilities in the region, the United States would signal its determination to stand by American interests. Glaser’s proposal is unsound for several reasons. First, if the United States did not damage its image by attempting such a bargain in the first place, it would not need to redemonstrate resolve. Second, such a bargain would undercut one of the fundamental reasons why the United States stands with its friends and allies in East Asia—a shared appreciation of democracy and liberty. Third, Glaser emphasizes that regardless of whether the United States and China were able to strike a grand bargain, the very attempt would provide useful information about China’s foreign policy decisionmaking and long-term aims (pp. 79–82). Engaging in such a costly and risky exercise to gauge Chinese motives is imprudent to say the least, especially because motives evolve and are contingent on the behavior of other actors. Fourth, giving any state a concession for doing something it ought to do sets a dangerous precedent. China and other claimant states should solve their maritime disputes peacefully and refrain from unilateral moves. Even if one were to set aside all of the above concerns, history shows that Glaser’s proposal is infeasible, because Chinese leaders do not see the abrogation of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan as an issue over which they must bargain and offer concessions. For example, President Richard Nixon attempted a similar grand bargain while negotiating the opening of Sino-U.S. relations from 1971 to 1972. At the time, one of the Nixon administration’s greatest concerns was ending the Vietnam War. Beijing’s greatest priority was obtaining U.S. recognition of Taiwan as a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and securing the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island.2 Understanding [End Page 185] Beijing’s desires, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger strategized that they would offer to remove U.S. troops in exchange for China’s help in achieving peace with honor in Vietnam. Nixon’s handwritten notes for his historic trip to China demonstrate the bargain he wanted to strike: Taiwan = Vietnam = trade off 1. Your people expect action on Taiwan 2. Our people expect action on VN Neither can act immediately—But both are inevitable—let us not embarrass each other.3 In preparation for Nixon’s official visit, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and proposed the bargain to the Chinese leadership. In a meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Kissinger stated that because two-thirds of the U.S. forces in Taiwan were related to American efforts in the Indochina theater, the withdrawal of those troops would depend on the resolution of the Vietnam War.4 He reasoned that although the United States was sincere in wanting to end the war, several issues— ranging from war reparations to the North Vietnamese government’s refusal to talk with the South Vietnamese government—stood in the way of an “honorable” exit.5 Kissinger implied that China’s help in pressuring its North Vietnamese ally to accept the administration’s peace terms would speed the exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan. Chinese leaders, however, refused to strike such a bargain. In their eyes, Taiwan was a rightful part of the PRC and they did not owe the United States anything in exchange for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from territory they considered theirs. Zhou, for example, told Kissinger during their July 1971 meeting that attempting to attach conditions to the recognition of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan was as absurd as China questioning U.S. sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. He emphasized that the United States should “unreservedly” recognize the PRC’s sovereignty and withdraw all U.S. troops, as this was “the natural logic of the matter.”6 Again when Nixon suggested during his trip to Beijing in February 1972 that ending the war in Vietnam would “help the direction on Taiwan,”7 Zhou replied subtly that China was willing to “wait a little while,” and that because Taiwan was China’s “internal affair,” Beijing could not “place too much hope on the U.S. and Mr. President to achieve this.”8 Moreover, China continued to fund North Vietnam’s war efforts in the name of aiding nationalist revolutions [End Page 186] abroad. Instead of pressuring its ally, Beijing sent unprecedented amounts of military assistance to North Vietnam between 1971 and 1973.9 China today is much more confidant and ambitious than the China Nixon visited in 1972. There is little reason to believe that Beijing would entertain a bargain similar to the one it rejected decades ago.

#### China wont bargain over Taiwan --- even over concessions they want. They believe it’s a sovereignty issue.

Kim ’17 (Patricia, International Security Program research fellow at the Belfer Center and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University, “History Shows Beijing Won’t Budge an Inch on Taiwan,” pg online @ http://sports.yahoo.com/news/history-shows-beijing-won-t-152611565.html //ghs-ef)

Much has been made of President-elect Donald Trump’s phone call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and his statement in a recent interview that he does not understand “why we have to be bound by a One China policy unless we make a deal with China having to do with other things,” Some have criticized Trump for unnecessarily shaking up a delicate understanding on Taiwan that has underpinned decades of U.S.-China relations. Others have expressed a range of cautious optimism for Taiwan’s sake, to outright praise for Trump for refusing to “kowtow” to the Chinese. And some, including the student leaders of the 2014 Sunflower Movement that began in opposition to a Beijing-pushed trade deal, have decried the use of Taiwan as a “tool to score political points.” But the real issue is this: Trump’s gambit won’t work, because Beijing doesn’t believe it owes Washington anything for recognizing Taiwan as a part of China. Trump is not the first president to try to use Taiwan as leverage with Beijing. Richard Nixon, while negotiating the opening of relations with China from 1971 to 1972, tried to link American concessions on Taiwan to Chinese cooperation in Vietnam. Around this time, thousands of U.S. troops were deployed in Taiwan as part of the United States’ mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC). Nixon and Henry Kissinger knew one of Beijing’s greatest priorities was obtaining American recognition of Taiwan as a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and getting U.S. troops off the island. Thus, they decided to link the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan to China’s pledge to help the United States achieve an “honorable exit” from the Vietnam War. The two American leaders suggested to their Chinese counterparts that they should pressure their ally, North Vietnam, to sign a peace agreement with the United States if they wanted a quick exit of U.S. troops from Taiwan. But Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai categorically rejected the quid pro quo. Zhou insisted that because Taiwan was a rightful part of China, Beijing had no reason to reward the United States for leaving the island. In fact, Zhou said, making such a demand was as ridiculous as China taking exception to the United States’ sovereignty over Hawaii or Long Island. While the bargain failed, rapprochement proceeded with a general understanding that the United States would gradually withdraw its troops from Taiwan. Beijing, however, continued to support North Vietnam’s war efforts and provided significant amounts of military assistance to its ally between 1971 and 1973. Ronald Reagan also tried to strike a bargain with Beijing that involved Taiwan when he first arrived in office. Reagan had campaigned on the platform that the Carter administration had conceded too much to the Chinese while normalizing relations with the PRC in 1979, and suggested he would re-establish official relations with the ROC if he were elected. After assuming office with this tough stance, the Reagan administration was immediately obliged to confront the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and especially with the question of whether it would proceed to sell FX fighter jets as had been discussed during the previous administration. Beijing objected not only to the potential sale of the FX, but also to all arms sales to Taiwan as an infringement upon Chinese sovereignty. With the knowledge that Beijing coveted advanced American-made, dual-use technology and weapons, the Reagan administration decided to offer an implicit bargain to their Chinese counterparts. Beijing was told it would be granted the status of a “friendly, non-aligned state,” making it eligible to purchase American arms if it acquiesced to the United States’ arms sales to Taiwan. Even though the reward was very appealing to the Chinese side, they immediately rejected the bargain, because accepting the deal would not only undercut China’s sovereignty, but also damage the Chinese leadership’s standing among their citizens. Furthermore, the Chinese refused to move forward with any other aspects of the bilateral relationship until the issue of Taiwan arms sales was resolved. Finally, after months of negotiations, the two sides agreed to the Aug. 17, 1982, communiqué, which resolved the bilateral impasse with the United States’ declaration that it would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan in light of China’s declaration that it would strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question. China simply will not engage in bargains that call into question its sovereignty over Taiwan. Trump’s attempt to use the One China policy as a bargaining chip rests on the false assumption that Beijing sees the policy as something to be negotiated. This is perhaps one of the few times the routinely hyperbolic Global Times can be taken literally when it states that the notion of “One China” cannot be “bought or sold.” China has stood by this principle consistently, even in the face of enticing deals. Nixon and Reagan attempted their bargains when China was both weaker in the global arena and less vulnerable to domestic criticism. Today, the PRC is a global power that is recognized by the vast majority of states as the official government of China, many of which see Beijing as a critical trade partner they cannot afford to antagonize. At the same time, Chinese leaders are much more vulnerable at home due to the rise of officially encouraged nationalism, a slowing economy, and mounting societal grievances. As a result, Chinese leaders know they cannot afford to look weak in front of their own citizens. All of this makes Taiwan a genuine red-line issue that cannot be manipulated to elicit Chinese cooperation in other areas.

#### No Solvency – China rejects any bargain involving the “One China” policy.

Zweig ‘16 David Zweig, Chair Professor and Director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Adjunct Professor at the National University of Defense Technology, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, quoted by Cary Huang, Senior Writer and former Beijing Bureau Chief at the *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), 2016 (“Are Trump’s America and Xi’s China on a Collision Course?,” *South China Morning Post*, December 17th pg online @ <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2055302/are-trumps-america-and-xis-china-collision-course>)

There have been plenty of flashpoints previously in relation to the one-China issue, notably when Beijing was enraged by a US decision to grant the independence-leaning Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui a visa in 1995. In response, the People’s Liberation Army fired missiles into the waters off Taiwan, prompting Bill Clinton to dispatch two aircraft groups to sail through the Taiwan Strait. Analysts warned similar crises might lie ahead if Trump continued to challenge the status quo. David Zweig, director of the Centre on China’s Transnational Relations at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, described the one-China policy as a core principle of China’s national identity, a fundamental pillar of US-China relations, and a key component of the Communist Party’s legitimacy. Given this, he said, the question of sovereignty over Taiwan could absolutely not be used as a bargaining chip to gain concessions. “Challenges to China’s sovereignty, particularly on Taiwan, are infinitely more sensitive, non-negotiable, and strategically destabilising than other issues,” Zweig said.

#### Stopping defense commitments to Taiwan is insufficient to solve for China

Evelyn Goh ’18 is reader in International Relations and ESRC Mid-Career Development Fellow at Royal Holloway, University of London, 2018, “New Directions in Strategic Thinking 2.0” from Australian National University Press, pages 55-58, accessed 7/3/19 || OES-AT

Strategic bargains in the status quo ante Strategic bargains form the sinews of international order, and while they are most likely to be struck at critical junctures such as following crises or wars, once struck they do not simply disappear but continue to evolve and might be renegotiated. As such, anything we may propose in the contemporary setting would in fact be a new grand bargain between the United States and China. It would not be created from scratch, because the status quo ante is already marked by a series of ‘grand’, regional, trilateral and bilateral bargains. This is a fundamentally important point—it shows that Washington and Beijing (and other East Asian states, for that matter) have been and are capable of striking bargains. But this understanding also presents constraints for any new proposed bargain because it will involve revising or renegotiating previous, disintegrating or continuing bargains between the United States and China, and between them and Taiwan as well as Japan. The most important systemic context for a new bargain is the post–Cold War economic security grand bargain between China and the United States. The economic side of this bargain is crucial but undergoing a difficult transformation. In simple terms, the bargain is based on intensified interdependence underpinned by the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency. Like other supporter states, China has gained access to the US market in exchange for its undervalued currency, which in turn supports massive US state spending. Essentially, this is a bargain that China and other key lenders and exporters keep accumulating US dollars while the United States keeps consuming foreign goods and services.7 As Michael Mastanduno argues, this grand systemic bargain has been fatally undermined by the global financial crisis, which will force the United States to eventually draw down domestic consumption and borrowing, and consequently also reduce its tolerance for China’s exportled growth strategy. In parallel, since the crisis, China has redoubled its focus on developing its domestic consumer market, and tried to diversify its foreign reserves holdings away from overdependence on US dollars. Both these trends are reducing their mutual interdependence, and, as their ‘special economic relationship’ becomes less special, so too will their mutual strategic restraint be dampened and their security relationship further strained.8 Given this trend, China’s incentives to strike a new asymmetrical bargain with the United States, like the one Glaser suggests, are unclear. On the security side, any new US–China grand bargain would have to grapple with another central but disintegrating previous bargain. During the Cold War, the East Asian order was underpinned by the alliance between the United States and Japan in which Washington extended its security umbrella over Tokyo in exchange for Japan’s disarmament, pacification and guaranteed alignment with the ‘free world’. In effect, this bargain saw the United States stepping into the breach between Japan and China as an ‘outside arbiter play[ing] a policing role’. By making Japanese defence dependent on itself, the United States extended a ‘dual reassurance’, simultaneously guaranteeing China and Japan their security against each other, obviating the need for them to engage in direct security competition.9 After 1995, the revitalisation of the US–Japan alliance based on Japan playing a more active regional and global military role seemed to undermine Washington’s ring-holding ability between Japan and China. Beijing began to regard the US–Japan alliance less as a means to constrain than to facilitate Japan’s remilitarisation, a view reinforced by the central role of the alliance in the more recent US ‘rebalance’ to Asia.10 There is also a growing view within China that the United States used the cover of the alliance to ‘illicitly transfer’ sovereignty over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands to Japan during the 1970s.11 Using the lens of these disintegrating existing strategic bargains highlights the major unresolved sticking point of Japan’s increasingly contested role in the regional order. While Glaser does take Japan into account, his main concern is whether ending the US defence commitment to Taiwan will negatively affect the credibility of the US alliance with Japan.12 But the US–Japan alliance has already changed in character—and from China’s point of view to the detriment of a previous bargain. Thus, any proposed new Sino-American bargain that takes the US–Japan alliance as a constant while asking both China and Japan to make concessions in their territorial disputes is unlikely to be acceptable. Many Chinese no doubt would prefer to continue to characterise Japan as a second-rate ‘American lackey’, but increasingly under President Xi Jinping’s ‘striving for achievement’ strategy, these two allies are being differentiated, with the United States viewed as China’s only strategic competitor and Japan as one of its key ‘hostile countries’.13 Against this background, the assumption that Japan’s ‘normalisation’ is an inevitable prerequisite for regional power-sharing is too casual. Arguably, there is now more than an unintentional security dilemma between China and Japan,14 and their growing conflicts of interest and nationalism are likely to create an insecurity spiral that will undermine the prospects for a US–China grand bargain that involves any compromise between China and Japan. Pre-existing and evolving bargains also surround the issue of Taiwan that is central to Glaser’s proposed strategy of territorial accommodation. On Taiwan, China and the United States achieved a limited bargain during the 1979 normalisation based on the principle of ‘one China’. Beijing was accorded diplomatic recognition and authority over all China, and Washington recognised that Taiwan is part of China and relinquished the right to encourage Taiwanese independence (although not its right to sell arms to Taiwan). While they agreed on the peaceful means of resolving the problem, they disagreed on the necessity of reunification as the eventual outcome.15 Since then, China and the United States have each tried to negotiate alternative bargains with Taiwan, partly to stabilize the remaining ambiguities of the status quo ante. The rival models come across clearly in an illuminating exchange between a Chinese and an American scholar, Jia Qingguo and Alan Romberg.16 Beijing’s offer is in the form of the ‘one country, two systems’ track of reunification, whereby Taiwan would trade independence for the preservation of its separate political system (exactly how is unspecified) and even control of its own armed forces.17 The current US bargain with Taiwan aims at preserving the status quo, exchanging the US defence commitment and arms sales for Taiwan’s ‘three nos’ to war, unification or independence. Ceasing US defence for Taiwan as Glaser suggests will mean not only withdrawing the US bargain but also making the Chinese one unnecessary, thus changing the potential terms of reunification. Understanding this context is important because it suggests that while Taiwan is central to China’s security and national identity, Beijing might not place as high a value on potential US accommodation on this issue as Glaser suggests. Within the Chinese discourse, there is grave doubt anyway about whether the ‘Taiwan card’ is really that powerful any more in the relationship with the United States, given that China thinks that time is on its side.18 Thus, while accommodation on Taiwan is essential, it is unlikely to be sufficient to make Glaser’s grand bargain acceptable to the Chinese.19

### Conditional Agreement Fails

#### Glaser and Goldstein are wrong – China will renege on the deal and it greenlights future Chinese aggression

Hal Brands & Zack Cooper ’19 is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. His most recent books are American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump and The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order (co-authored with Charles Edel) & is a research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, an associate at Armitage International, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. He is writing a book on strategic competition that explains how militaries adapt during periods of rise and decline, February 2019, “After the Responsible Stakeholder, What? Debating America’s China Strategy” from https://tnsr.org/2019/02/after-the-responsible-stakeholder-what-debating-americas-china-strategy-2/, accessed 7/6/19 || OES-AT

The Risks of Accommodation ¶ Although the Trump administration has pushed the relationship toward greater competition, some experts believe that the United States and China should manage their differences by striking a “grand bargain.” Charles Glaser suggests that the United States should end its commitment to Taiwan in exchange for China peacefully resolving its maritime disputes and accepting a long-term U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific.8 Lyle Goldstein argues that the two countries should work together to encourage the development of “cooperation spirals.” Chinese leaders, for their part, have touted “win-win” solutions and a new model of great-power relations.9 ¶ The attraction of accommodation is obvious. If successful, it would avoid the costs associated with prolonged political, economic, military, technological, and ideological competition, and it would facilitate compromise on issues such as climate change, where joint U.S.-Chinese action is sorely needed. The logic of this approach is equally straightforward: If the United States has failed to shape Chinese behavior through a combination of engagement and hedging, then it should seek to defuse the emerging confrontation before the balance of power becomes even less favorable. Unfortunately, accommodation is a bad bet for several reasons. ¶ First, the United States cannot simply “make a deal” on many core issues since those issues have to do with the territory and interests of U.S. allies and partners. Washington does not itself claim the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Scarborough Shoal, or Taiwan, so it cannot relinquish those claims. Entering negotiations with Beijing over the heads of leaders in Tokyo, Manila, and Taipei would undermine the U.S. network of alliances and partnerships. U.S. leaders would thus find it difficult to strike a grand bargain unless they are also willing to entertain withdrawing from the Indo-Pacific. ¶ Second, neither U.S. nor Chinese leaders can have much confidence that a bargain struck now would hold in the future. At times of flux in the international hierarchy, established powers often hesitate to conclude grand bargains because they fear that the rising power might simply seek to renegotiate the deal later, when the balance has shifted further in its favor. So even if the United States cut a deal that satisfied China in the short term, there is little guarantee that Beijing would remain satisfied if its influence continued to grow. In fact, accommodation could incentivize greater Chinese revisionism by signaling declining U.S. willingness to defend its interests or by giving Beijing control of valuable territory — such as Taiwan — that could serve as a springboard to future aggression.10 Chinese leaders are also likely to be skeptical of a grand bargain given that the United States has walked away from major agreements signed in recent years — most notably the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate accord. ¶ Finally, perhaps because of the reasons listed previously, leaders in Washington and Beijing appear averse to a grand bargain. Although Trump vaguely floated the idea in the months after his election, and there remains the possibility of a broad economic deal to deescalate the bilateral trade war, his administration recently and publicly dismissed a broader strategy of accommodation aimed at a comprehensive settling of differences.11 Future U.S. administrations are likely to do the same, given that both Republicans and Democrats have strongly criticized China’s security activities, economic practices, and human rights violations. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping has provided few indications that he is willing to make serious compromises in pursuit of a deal. Quite the opposite: His recent speeches on both foreign and domestic policy have been strident and confident.12 Even if a grand bargain is theoretically possible, it is probably not in the cards.

#### No enforcement – China will just cheat.

Lingwall 15 (Noah, Intern to the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College and Student at the Shreyer Honors College of the Pennsylvania State University, "The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It," The Diplomat, 8/8/15, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/opinion-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it)\\BPS

While a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility of the United States’ demands. First, a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific. China’s recent move toward a more “assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the United States’ ambitions to retain its regional power. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of great power relations” presaged China’s turn toward greater assertiveness on the world stage. The proposal, presented to U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, represents China’s first major attempt to set the agenda in U.S.-China relations, reversing China’s historical trend of bowing to U.S. interests and marking a key shift in U.S.-China relations. Tensions between the United States and China over China’s artificial island construction in the South China Sea indicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference in the region. Throughout the past several months, U.S. surveillance planes and warships have patrolled the hotly contested South China Sea in an effort to protect freedom of navigation. Verbal exchanges between the two nations have stoked the conflict’s flames. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by reasserting her nation’s rightful claim to disputed territories and condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.” Hua’s sharp rebuke of U.S. interference in the Asia-Pacific supports China’s commitment to more aggressive diplomacy. These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony. Even if China is willing to accept (in its view) an “invasive” U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific in the present, there is no mechanism to ensure that China does not default on agreements in the future. China’s military power projection capabilities are growing, and Chinese leaders may see fit to act in a fashion commensurate with their nation’s growing abilities. Therefore, the U.S. cannot expect a credible Chinese commitment to accept U.S. regional hegemony in exchange for control of Taiwan. The second condition of a U.S.-China “grand bargain” appears equally insurmountable. Charles Glaser asserts that China would promise to resolve regional land disputes through more peaceful means if the United States were to cede control of Taiwan. As is the case with acceptance of U.S. regional hegemony, this provision of the grand bargain would be difficult to enforce. China currently finds itself besieged by a litany of competing land claims from Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Asian nations. Based on China’s recent aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping’s “assertive diplomacy” manifesto, one can hardly expect that China will capitulate to its smaller, weaker neighbors. Doing so would both undermine its growing reputation as a maritime power and undercut its goal to become an established world power. As China looks to enhance its international prestige, it is hard to believe that its leaders would tolerate the land claims of competing Asian nations. Also, it takes two parties to come to an agreement, so it is not up to China alone to guarantee the peaceful resolution of land disputes. The other disputants involved would have to make the same pledge to avoid territorial conflicts. Moreover, China’s rising national power may induce its leaders to initiate unpredictable, aggressive strategies in the future. The United States cannot orchestrate a grand bargain based on promised concessions.

### Delay Deficit

#### The CP guarantees lengthy delays that further increase the risk conflict

Glaser 15 (Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 49–90)

A grand bargain, in which the United States ends its security commitment to Taiwan and China reaches diplomatic solutions to its sovereignty and maritime disputes in the South China and East China Seas, while officially recognizing a long-term security role for the United States in East Asia, is currently the United States’ best option for dealing with China’s rise. Two alternative strategies have advantages and the choice between them and the grand bargain is not clear-cut. Unilateral accommodation would immediately eliminate the most dangerous flash point in East Asia and potentially improve U.S.- China relations, while avoiding the delay involved in complex negotiations with China that might eventually fail. The rebalance to Asia avoids the risk that U.S. accommodation would mislead China into doubting U.S. resolve and would become the United States’ best option if it becomes clearer that China has regional ambitions that include pushing the United States out of East Asia. A grand bargain strikes a balance between these alternatives and is currently the United States’ best bet. A grand bargain is unlikely to be achieved quickly. In the interim, the United States should seek to develop policies that avoid or at least delay further strains in the U.S.-China relationship, while continuing to protect its interests. Regarding Japan, the United States should continue working to strengthen the alliance, but also continue to make clear its opposition to policies that unnecessarily provoke China. Striking this balance will be especially difficult in the military realm given the crosscutting pressures facing the United States.

### Relations Deficit

#### Can’t solve mistrust or relations --- arms sales key to Chinese perceptions

Lieberthal 12 (Kenneth Lieberthal is Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and in Global Economy and Development and is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, and \*Wang Jisi is Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies and Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” No. 4, March, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf>)

National Security Issues Some high-ranking Chinese officials have openly stated that the United States is China’s greatest national security threat. This perception is especially widely shared in China’s defense and security establishments and in the Communist Party’s ideological organizations. Several recent developments have contributed to China’s deepening distrust of U.S. strategic intentions in the national security arena. First, despite the remarkable improvement of relations between Beijing and Taipei since the KMT returned to power in May 2008, the United States has continued to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons aimed at deterring the Mainland. This is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to the suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiment as long as China’s power position is secondary to America’s.

### Perm – Do Both

#### Permutation: Do Both

#### “Phased” grand bargain’s key – only the plan and permutation can jumpstart negotiations with a unilateral concession

Glaser 15 (Charles, professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs and the Department of Political Science at George Washington University, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 49–90)

U.S. unilateral adoption of less dramatic changes in the government’s Taiwan policy—most importantly, slowing or ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan110—is an option that might provide a better balance of risks and benefit. Even this much smaller change in U.S. policy, however, risks sending China the wrong signal. Another way to balance feasibility and benefits, therefore, could be to look for a path that divides the grand bargain into smaller, more attainable increments. One can imagine a series of steps, including the United States ending its arms sales to Taiwan and China ending its use of force to advance its maritime claims, that could be implemented sequentially to create a phased grand bargain. This approach would enable the United States to revert to its current Taiwan policy if China failed to uphold its side of the phased agreement. Another possibility might include partial resolution of the maritime disputes. An agreement that delayed resolution of the sovereignty disputes far into the future, or indefinitely, while settling the resource disputes would be more feasible to achieve than a full resolution. This type of agreement could be possible because, for the most part, the sovereignty disputes can be separated from the resource disputes. In fact, China and Japan reached this type of arrangement in 2008, although it has yet to be implemented.111 The United States could pursue a variant of this staged approach that would enable it to try to push the diplomatic process forward. In this more proactive model, the United States would make its initial concession unilaterally, while explaining that further concessions would hinge on China’s reciprocation of its initial move.

#### Unilateral concession *jump-starts* Chinese threat reduction and US-Sino relations

Gomez 16 (Eric, policy analyst for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Masters of Arts in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “A Costly Commitment: Options for the Future of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Relationship,” 9-28, <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/costly-commitment-options-future-us-taiwan-defense-relationship>)

One of several ways that Beijing might respond to this U.S. concession on arms sales would be to reduce the number of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) within firing range of Taiwan. Currently there are more than 1,000 conventionally armed SRBMs (with a maximum range of approximately 500 miles) in the PLA arsenal that could strike Taiwan.100 Improvements in guidance technology have transformed these missiles from inaccurate “terror weapons” that would likely target cities to precision munitions better suited for strikes against military airfields and ports.101Stationing the SRBMs out of range of Taiwan would be a low-cost, but symbolically important, action. The missiles are fired from mobile launchers that could be moved back into range of Taiwan. However, the act of moving the missiles out of range would, according to Lyle J. Goldstein, “show goodwill and increasing confidence across the Strait and also between Washington and Beijing.”102 If China agrees to America’s demand to relocate its ballistic missiles, then additional steps could be taken to further reduce the threat China poses to Taiwan.

### Miscalculation Turn

#### Bargaining fails and increases the risk of miscalc – links to deterrence/allies/perception

Swaine 11 – senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, America’s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century, p. 359-363

The feasibility and parameters of such an agreement could be initially explored via an authorized Track II dialogue, given its many obvious sensitivities. Indeed, any such approach would confront three major problems for the United States. First and foremost, some politicians and pundits in both the United States and Taiwan (and perhaps also in Japan) would attempt to label any effort by Washington to negotiate with Beijing, even in consultation with Taipei, as a “sell-out” of Taiwan’s interests that could result in China eventually coercing or seizing the island and, more broadly, in irreparable damage to America’s credibility and strategic position in Asia and perhaps beyond. Second, both the United States and China might face considerable difficulties in defining what constitutes a reasonable exchange of forces, deployments, and arms sales to Taiwan. A third consideration, often voiced by some observers of the Taiwan situation, is that any such U.S. attempt to intervene in the cross-Strait imbroglio could easily expose Washington to manipulation by both Taipei and Beijing while possibly increasing the chances of a miscalculation by all three parties.

#### China will be insulted by the CP and escalates tensions.

Wang ‘17 — Zheng Wang, Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies and Associate Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, Carnegie Fellow at the New America Foundation, Global Fellow at the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Member of the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Senior Visiting Fellow at the China Center for the South China Sea Studies at Nanjing University (China), former Dr. Seaker Chan Endowed Visiting Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University (China), holds a Ph.D. in Conflict Resolution from the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University, 2017 (“Trump and Xi Need a Timeout,” Foreign Policy, January 4th, pg online @ https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/04/trump-and-xi-need-a-time-out/)

Taiwan is not a bargaining chip. The history of U.S.-China relations has repeatedly proven that this is a dangerous and unpredictable game to play, one that has been very costly for both sides in recent decades. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis was one example of how explosive the issue can be. The Clinton administration’s 1995 decision to issue a visa to then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University, his alma mater, ignited a major crisis. China responded with three large-scale military exercises and missile tests near Taiwan, and the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait in March 1996. The danger of the Taiwan question cannot be fully understood only through geopolitical calculations; for China, it is related to nationalism and national identity. It is basically a non-negotiable issue to the Chinese. To play the “Taiwan card” to pressure China to back down in the South and East China Sea, as suggested by John Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, will have precisely the opposite of the intended effect. This kind of suggestion can only come from people — whether they call themselves China experts or not — who don’t appreciate history or reality.

### AT: Cooperation Spiral

#### And, U.S. unilateral actions are critical – starts a cooperation spiral while building trust – Binding QPQ’s fail

Swaine et al ’16 (Michael D. Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations, doctorate in government from Harvard University. WENYAN DENG is a former junior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Asia Program, where her research focused on international relations in the Western Pacifc, Sino-U.S. crisis-management behaviors, Chinese military development, and U.S. military strategy in Asia. She is currently a graduate student in international relations and security studies at the University of Chicago, “Creating a Stable Asia,” pg online @ <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_Swaine_U.S.-Asia_Final.pdf> //um-ef)

Lyle Goldstein of the U.S. Naval War College presents a variant of this (and the previous) technique, in the form of an array of escalating reciprocal Sino-U.S. “cooperation spirals” in all the major areas of bilateral competition. As Goldstein states, through such spirals, “trust and confdence are built over time through incremental and reciprocal steps that gradually lead to larger and more signifcant compromises.”7 Goldstein writes that the endpoints in the cooperation spiral model “only seem utopian in the absence of the accomplishments that result from climbing the earlier steps, and even if the endpoints remain out of reach, each step represents a signifcant advance.”8 Although Goldstein’s specifc suggestions for reciprocal actions in most of his proposed cooperative spirals are either inappropriate or unnecessary for our purposes, the general concept is sound. Te key challenge, however, lies in creating incentives on all sides to initiate the process and sustain it over time, preventing defection and the emergence of a negative echo efect where, Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane explain, “if the other player defects once, [the opposite player] will respond with a defection, and then if the other player does the same in response, the result would be an unending echo of alternating defections.”9 Such reciprocity approaches can also yield to what Goldstein calls “acrimonious and frustrating patterns of bargaining” if rigidly enforced.10 Binding reciprocal commitments are difcult to achieve, especially in a climate of distrust and in the absence of authoritative enforcement mechanisms. Unfortunately, in the absence of a crisis, it can be difcult to bring all sides together to agree on an explicit, binding negotiation (or renegotiation) of the status quo. Hence on many issues, and particularly in the early stages of movement toward a balance of power, tacit nonbinding agreements, involving at times initial unilateral actions by one side, are probably more feasible and effective. According to one analyst, a tacit change can be initiated when one party makes “gapreducing, unilateral changes” and the “other party agrees by not opposing these changes or compensating for them.” As a result of such a “probe,” a tacit understanding is reached.11 Such “reciprocal unilateralism” is aimed at establishing a spiral of trust and conciliatory moves that result in “informal arrangements that can later be codifed into formal agreements.”12

#### And, the QPQ will be too brittle --- its based on an issue that China finds too controversial --- collapses coop

Swaine et al ’16 (Michael D. Swaine is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies. specialist in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-China relations, and East Asian international relations, doctorate in government from Harvard University. WENYAN DENG is a former junior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Asia Program, where her research focused on international relations in the Western Pacifc, Sino-U.S. crisis-management behaviors, Chinese military development, and U.S. military strategy in Asia. She is currently a graduate student in international relations and security studies at the University of Chicago, “Creating a Stable Asia,” pg online @ <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_Swaine_U.S.-Asia_Final.pdf> //um-ef)

However, McGinnis also notes that linkage-based cooperation “is often very brittle, in that attempts to include or delete issues may shatter the existing basis of cooperation.” If one side refuses to accept the new issue, a spiral of defection is likely to dissolve all previous agreements of cooperation. McGinnis concludes that “it is very important for players attempting to expand their range of cooperation to exercise caution, lest their undue insistence on more contentious issues lead to an unraveling of their original basis for cooperation.”18 The difculty in this case, therefore, is in delinking issues discussed in later rounds from any established agreements attained during earlier rounds to avoid a never-ending loop of renegotiations.