# TAIWAN AFF

## \*\*\* FILE NOTES

### Strategy Overview

#### Students could shorten the 1ACs presented. That can mean only reading one advantage or getting rid of some 1AC impact scenarios.

#### In planning 1AC design, students should consider the strategic utility of each advantage.

#### War Advantage

-The war advantage is primarily focused on the sale of technology vital for Taiwan to indigenously (domestically) develop their own diesel submarines. Examples of the specific capabilities transferred are referenced in the 1AC Yeo evidence. It is more broadly about the sale of “high-end” weapons to Taiwan. In this category of arms, Hunzeker and Lanoszka include fighter jets and indigenous diesel submarines.

-The war advantage foundationally questions the strategy of deterrence defended with the deterrence disadvantage, complicates impact uniqueness for the assurance disadvantage, and paints a picture of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan that the soft-balancing counterplan might struggle to solve. It certainly links to the security critique. That said, some students might like defending its hardline approach to China and impact turning some of the critique’s assumptions. Finally, it includes evidence to defeat likely international fill-in arguments.

#### Relations Advantage

-The relations advantage is the broadest of the three advantages. The most powerful irritant to relations is the sale of F-16V fighter jets. However, the evidence is about the existence of US-Taiwan arms sales writ large.

-The relations advantage provides a “US key” warrant, offense that the affirmative can solve even if other countries “fill-in,” and the clearest solvency deficit to the soft-balancing counterplan. It might also be a discussion of international relations that complicates the security critique’s links. After all, it does not paint China as a threat. It attempts to decrease US-led competition in the Pacific. Against future waves of strategies, this advantage’s discussion of arms sales as an irritant generally sets up a solvency deficit to plan-inclusive counterplans. Finally, it is worth noting that many students like relations impacts to solve a lot of the negative’s terminal impacts

### Vocab list for students

#### Relations Advantage:

-One-China Principle

-Nuclear proliferation

-Trump-Xi trade talks

-Protectionism

-Tariffs

#### War Advantage:

-The Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program/SSKs

-Preemptive war

-Deterrence

-Assurance

-Opportunity cost

-High-end weapons

-Grey zone

-Escalation ladder

-Wei Fenghe

-Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council

-Nuclear electromagnetic pulse/EMP

### Thanks

#### These packet materials could not have been possible without a range of individuals. Thank You!

-Tyler Thur

-Kelly Anderson

-Bill Batterman

-David Bernstein

-Maggie Berthiaume

-Jack Scullion

-Margaret Strong

-Jong Hak Won

#### Shout out to the HSS debate camp for providing the material.

<https://debate.msu.edu/debate/sdi/spartan-scholars>

#### Happy debating!

# AFFIRMATIVE

## 1AC CASE

### 1ac – Plan

#### The United States federal government should substantially reduce its Direct Commercial Sales and Foreign Military Sales of arms to the Republic of China.

### 1ac – War Advantage

#### Advantage One: War

#### First, the sale of advanced jets will blur the defensive/offensive grey line, which breaks strategic ambiguity, and makes other threats credible.

Lee 19 ---- John, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, non-resident senior fellow at the United States Studies Center in Sydney, former senior national security adviser to Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, adjunct professor (University of Sydney), masters and doctorate in international relations (University of Oxford), “Why a US Sale of Fighter Jets to Taiwan Matters,” *The Diplomat*, 4/3, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/why-a-us-sale-of-fighter-jets-to-taiwan-matters/>

Even if the F-16V sale goes ahead, Taiwan’s new planes will not alter the military balance between China and Taiwan, nor dissuade the mainland from further provocations such as the median line flyover. That is not Beijing’s primary concern, however. The most important calculation China must make is not the relative capabilities of the Taiwanese armed forces but how the United States will respond in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Every clue with respect to uncovering U.S. intention is vital because U.S. intervention could tip the military balance against China in any such conflict. In any event, it guarantees the end of any “acceptable cost” outcome in the event of conflict for China. Under the United States’ 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, any attempt to forcibly determine Taiwan’s future is considered “a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States.” To prevent that, Washington is obligated to sell “arms of a defensive character” to Taipei to allow the latter to defend itself and dissuade China from launching any military action. Since the Bill Clinton era, administrations have denied Taiwan’s request to purchase new fighter planes on the basis that the grey line from “defense” to “offense” might be crossed. Speaking from Hawaii, Tsai let the cat out of the bag when she said the purchase of advanced fourth generation fighters would “greatly enhance our land and air capabilities, strengthen military moral and show to the world the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense.” It is the last line which sends shivers down the spine of mainland leaders. Since the Taiwan Relations Act came into force, the United States has deliberately embarked on a policy of “strategic ambiguity” with respect to its military commitments to Taiwan in the event the latter is attacked. Whether the United States intervenes is a matter of political judgment and strategic assessment. Under the Barack Obama administration, the decision to only offer Taipei upgrades to its aging F-16 A/B planes suggested to Beijing that de-escalating tensions arising from differences over Taiwan was the predominant mindset. In contrast, the Trump administration has shown unprecedented willingness to escalate tensions with China over political, strategic, and economic differences. The speech by Vice President Mike Pence last October at the Hudson Institute and the 2017 National Security Strategy pulled no punches in identifying China as a comprehensive rival to the United States. If the sale of F-16V planes goes through, then, it is evidence that the mindset in Washington with respect to Taiwan has also changed and is less accepting of mainland sensibilities and demands. Such a sale would be an indication that preserving de facto Taiwanese independence is once more considered critical to U.S. and allied strategy when it comes to keeping the PLA confined to inside the so-called First Island Chain. That would be a significant blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s plans. In a wide-ranging speech on Taiwan in January to mark the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” delivered to the 1978 National People’s Congress, Xi implied that “reunification” with Taiwan was a “historic task” he wanted to achieve during his tenure. A U.S. sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan — and all it implies — makes fulfillment of that task less likely. Finally, the strength of American support for Taiwan will influence how other nations respond to persistent Chinese attempts to reduce international space within which Taiwan can act as a de facto sovereign entity. The most important regional relationship for Taiwan is with Japan, which has emerged under Shinzo Abe as the political, strategic, and economic leader among democratic Asian nations. On issues such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Tokyo has shown initiative when Washington has been found wanting. The Japanese leader has emerged as one of the few regional countries to have established a strong personal relationship with Taiwan’s Tsai and is widely seen as the most pro-Taiwan leaders amongst U.S. allies in the region. Even then, Abe’s room to move is dependent on the extent to which the United States is willing to defend Taipei’s desire to behave as a de facto sovereign entity. If it is confirmed that Washington is moving to a more robust approach with respect to cross-strait relations, Japan, Australia and others will follow. Xi is already under internal pressure from the global pushback against his flagship policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative and “Made in China 2025.” China has lost goodwill with neighboring states over its actions in the East and South China Seas and along the disputed border with India. It is in the middle of an economic war with the United States while the European Union and Japan are openly criticizing China for violations of economic rules and norms, including the systematic theft of intellectual property by Chinese state-owned firms and “national champions.” Xi took a great risk in abandoning the rhetoric and diplomacy of China’s “peaceful rise,” which was promulgated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. Previously admired for his iron determination to achieve China’s great “rejuvenation,” Xi is now being criticized domestically for overreach and miscalculation. It is speculated that the legitimacy of the Communist Party would not survive the “loss” of Taiwan. If the United States goes ahead with the sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan, then the pressure on a president who has embarked on an unprecedented “anti-corruption campaign” to silence political enemies and doubters will be immense.

#### Second, US sale of submarine tech encourages Taiwanese development of domestic diesel subs

AFP 18 ---- *Agence France-Presse* via *The South China Morning Post*, “US Gives Boost to Taiwan’s Plans to Build Submarines,” 4/8, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2140771/us-gives-boost-taiwans-plans-build-submarines>

Washington has agreed to allow US defence contractors help Taiwan build its own submarines, Taipei said, welcoming the breakthrough in long-standing ambitions to build up its fleet to counter the threat from Beijing. Taiwan last year launched a plan to manufacture its own submarines amid deteriorating cross-strait relations after its hopes of buying them from the US came to nothing. The US State Department has approved granting the licence necessary to sell Taiwan the technology needed for its submarine project. The approval was a “breakthrough”, Taiwanese defence ministry spokesman Chen Chung-chi said on Sunday. “It is part of a process. We’ll take it step by step,” he said, declining to give further details. The agreement is likely to anger Beijing, which regards the island as part of its territory even though the two sides have been ruled separately since the end of a civil war in 1949. Washington’s approval comes after US President Donald Trump last month signed new rules allowing top-level US officials to travel to Taiwan. China has protested against the move, saying the US should stop official exchanges with Taiwan to avoid “damaging Sino-US relations”. Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979 but maintains trade relations with the island and is its main arms supplier. Since coming to power in May 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen has pushed for Taiwan to develop and build more of its weapons domestically. Her office expressed thanks to Washington for the licence approval. “The US government’s decision will not only help Taiwan in raising its defence capabilities, it will also greatly benefit security and stability in the region,” it said in a statement on Saturday. Taipei has long struggled to procure submarines from the US. In April 2001 then US president George W Bush approved the sale of eight conventional submarines but there had been no progress on the deal, prompting Taipei’s decision to build its own. The United States has not built conventional submarines for more than 40 years and Germany and Spain reportedly declined to offer their designs for fear of offending China. Taiwan’s navy operates a fleet of four submarines, bought from abroad but only two of them can be deployed in the event of war. The other two were built by the United States in the 1940s and are only used in training as they are too old for combat. The first domestically built submarine is expected to be deployed within 10 years.

#### Indigenous subs don’t have warfighting benefits but risk China/Taiwan war – encourage preemptive Chinese attacks and undercut Taiwanese deterrence by trading off with the acquisition of more effective weapons and incentivizing Chinese advancements in anti-submarine warfare

Montgomery 14 ---- Evan Braden, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, M.A. and Ph.D. in Foreign Affairs (University of Virginia), B.A. in Political Science and Sociology (Villanova University), “Rethinking Taiwan's Submarine Dream,” Real Clear Defense, 10/27, <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/10/28/time_for_taiwan_to_rethink_its_submarine_dream_107516.html>

Taiwan’s submarine saga is back in the news again. For decades, successive governments have been determined to upgrade and expand the nation’s limited undersea warfare capabilities, albeit without much success. The Republic of China Navy (ROCN) currently has two operational submarines, which were acquired from the Netherlands during the late 1980s, along with a pair of U.S.-supplied boats, which date back to the 1940s and are used for training. In 2001, the George W. Bush administration agreed to sell Taipei eight diesel-electric submarines (SSKs) as part of a broader arms package. Because the United States only builds nuclear-powered boats, however, and because potential European partners were reluctant to help in the face of Chinese opposition, that deal never materialized. With the United States unwilling to fulfill its previous commitment, patience appears to be running out in Taipei. According to recent press reports, the government is preparing to embark on an indigenous submarine construction program, although it has not abandoned the option of foreign procurement entirely. Specifically, it plans to build at least four and as many as eight SSKs. Although the details have not been finalized, the boats are likely to displace around 1500 tons each—smaller than its current submarines but comparable to the size of many platforms manufactured in Europe. This would be a major undertaking for a nation with no previous experience in the submarine-building business. Nevertheless, it is hardly surprising that Taiwan wants to improve its submarine force. As a small island nation located just 100 miles from its much larger rival, it occupies an unenviable strategic position. Until as recently as a decade ago, Taiwan enjoyed a military edge over the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and could expect to mount an effective defense against the PRC, especially if it tried to mount an invasion. This is no longer the case, though. Beijing has been steadily modernizing its armed forces and developing a variety of capabilities that could be used to coerce Taipei or counter third-party intervention on its behalf. As a result of this shifting balance of power, Taiwan can no longer count on controlling its surrounding waters or the airspace above them. Instead, the best it can probably hope for in the event of a cross-Strait conflict is to impose heavy costs on the PRC by holding out as long as possible. Given China’s growing military strength, that will require an “innovative and asymmetric” military strategy, in the words of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. At first glance, SSKs seem like exactly the type of asymmetric capability that Taiwan needs to offset China’s military power. For instance, they could help to defend against a seaborne invasion, whether by targeting amphibious assault ships in port or interdicting them en route. They could also be used to threaten enemy surface combatants that attempt to impose a maritime blockade and cut the island off from the global economy. On closer inspection, though, SSKs might not be a good fit, for two reasons. First and foremost, SSKs are expensive—perhaps too expensive for Taiwan. In 2001, when it wanted to purchase eight 2000-ton submarines from the United States, the estimated price tag was $10-12 billion. Building them at home would not be any cheaper. Press reports indicate that the Ministry of Defense plans to spend almost $5 billion on the first four boats alone. To provide some context, Taiwan’s annual defense budget is approximately $10.5 billion, and has remained relatively flat for years. That situation doesn’t appear likely to change any time soon. In fact, it could get worse. Competition for Taiwan’s scarce defense dollars will only become more intense as it shifts to a smaller but more expensive all-volunteer force, and as it attempts to recapitalize its aging destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport ships. This bill might be worth paying if SSKs would provide Taiwan with significant “bang for the buck.” Yet there are reasons to doubt that they would. Quiet, well-armed, diesel-electric submarines can be an extremely effective sea-denial capability when they are under way. But not all of them will be. Even if Taiwan managed to procure eight new boats, only a fraction would be available for service at any given time, and that fraction could be quite small. With only two operational submarines at present, the ROCN would have to increase the size of its undersea warfare community to sustain a significantly larger fleet. If it has trouble filling those billets—and the recruiting challenges it has faced during its shift away from conscription suggest this is a very real possibility—then the availability rate of its submarines would correspondingly suffer. Moreover, submarines in port might be some of the first targets in any Chinese attack. Beijing could even become increasingly willing to escalate without warning if it meant catching Taipei off-guard and preventing it from putting as many boats as possible to sea. Of course, any SSKs roaming the Strait or guarding Taiwan’s eastern coast would pose a major challenge for China. There are significant limits to the amount of damage they could do, however. 1500-ton submarines can only carry a small payload of torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, and the ports where they could reload might very well be damaged, destroyed, or closely monitored by Chinese air and naval forces waiting for Taiwanese boats to return. At the same time, while China’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities might not be very formidable at present, Beijing is likely to place an increased emphasis on this area once Taiwan poses a more serious undersea threat. With Taiwan’s first indigenously produced SSK not expected to be ready until 2025 at the earliest, the PRC would have plenty of time to enhance its proficiency at ASW. Concerns about cost and effectiveness also go hand-in-hand. Because submarines in port are so vulnerable, and because they would represent such a large and important investment, Taiwan might go to great lengths to defend them against a possible attack. It has already devoted considerable effort to protecting its combat aircraft, for instance by constructing a hardened base inside a mountain that can support hundreds of fighters. Notably, when Taiwan was hoping to purchase new submarines from the United States more than a decade ago, there were reports that it wanted to build a similar facility to protect them from a surprise attack, although the price was probably far beyond what it could afford, given the resources projected to be available for defense. In the end, with the military balance in the Strait clearly shifting in China’s favor, Taiwan needs asymmetric capabilities to bolster deterrence and improve its chances if a conflict breaks out. But SSKs may not be part of the equation, whether they are built at home or purchased abroad. In fact, Taipei’s overriding focus on submarine acquisition risks creating tunnel vision that crowds out innovative thinking about other asymmetric options, while purchasing SSKs would impose enormous opportunity costs, particularly for a nation with a defense budget as small as Taiwan’s.

#### More broadly, Taiwan’s reliance on US arms sales of high-end weapons trades-off with viable asymmetric deterrence of a Chinese invasion

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf \*\*\*Modified for language

Some analysts contend Taiwan’s military predicament is not as dire as it seems, but trend lines suggest that Taiwan is unlikely to shift the military balance back in its favor in the future.18 As a result, most recommendations for the future defense of Taiwan emphasize the need for it to focus on using asymmetric capabilities to increase the cost of any attempt by China to either attempt a cross-Strait invasion or coerce its acquiescence through air and missile strikes. Taiwan’s armed forces are aware of the need for asymmetry and acknowledge that they cannot spend their way out of the current military imbalance even with recent pledges to increase the size of the defense budget.19 Yet Taiwan’s military remains focused on purchasing high-end weapons from the United States.20 Instead of focusing on these high-end systems, many U.S. analysts recommend that Taiwan invest in truly asymmetric capabilities that would raise the price of an invasion for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). These analysts typically agree that Taiwan should focus on “flipping” the antiaccess challenge against China by indigenously producing missiles for air and missile defense, ~~midget~~ [miniaturized] submarines, swarms of unmanned systems, and fast attack craft, as well as sabotage and insurgent operations should PLA forces make it ashore. Several analysts have suggested the best option for Taiwan to counter crossStrait aggression by the Chinese is the development of its own antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) capability. Eugene Gholz argues that Taiwan is not as well suited to deploying an A2/AD capability that would create a “no man’s sea” between itself and a Chinese invasion as other powers in the region might be. Taiwan is closer in proximity to China than other countries that fear Chinese aggression, meaning the range of their A2/AD systems would overlap.21 However, Taiwan’s geography offers some advantages. The island’s size means that mobile systems can fire and leave the scene—“shoot and scoot”—finding shelter in parts of Taiwan’s terrain that can provide concealment from Chinese missiles’ surveillance. According to Gholz, Taiwan already produces a mobile antiship cruise missile that can provide the type of capability that he recommends. The problem is that they have not been produced in sufficient numbers.22 Other asymmetric capabilities that could aid in Taiwan’s A2/AD strategy include swarms of fast attack craft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Colin Carroll and Rebecca Friedman Lissner argue that Taiwan should adopt an asymmetric strategy for the Taiwan Strait similar to what Iran has done in the Persian Gulf. This strategy would combine fast attack craft swarms, cheap unarmed UAVs, improved camouflage and concealment, and mobile surface-toair missiles to increase the cost of a PLA attempt to control the sea and air space around Taiwan.23 Some of these capabilities, such as cheap UAVs, may become easier to develop as 3D printing technology advances.24 The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) goes even further. In Hard ROC 2.0: Taiwan and Deterrence Through Protraction, CSBA analysts argue that Taiwan should draw on principles from guerilla warfare to deny the PLA sea and air control around the island. The aim of this strategy would be the “virtual” and actual attrition of PLA forces in the event of Chinese aggression. The analysis assumes air and missile strikes, along with cyberattacks and a blockade, would be used to break Taiwan’s will or as prelude to an invasion.25 The guerrilla sea and air campaign—and preparations for an insurgency should PLA forces make it ashore—are meant to deter Chinese aggression by increasing its cost and ensuring quick conquest of Taiwan would be impossible.26 Procurement priorities for Hard ROC 2.0 would include ~~midget~~ [miniaturized] submarines, antiship cruise missiles, mines, mobile air defenses of the Enhanced Sea Sparrow missile-class, truck-based howitzers, and truck-mounted multi-launch rocket systems.27 Writing in 2014, the authors suggest that such a shift in emphasis would require $3 billion less than modernization efforts proposed at the time.28 Other priorities include preparing in case the PLA does make it ashore. The authors recommend that Taiwan preposition guided rockets, artillery, mortars, and missiles in major cities, with the army engaging in a “Fabian defense” before “melting away” to begin a traditional guerrilla campaign.29 Where the CSBA analysis differs most from the others, though, is in its recommendation for potential strikes on China. These strikes would be part of an effort to disrupt the PLA’s “battle networks”—that is, its command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.30 The CSBA authors suggest that the risks for potential escalation are worthwhile, as the threat of disrupting the PLA’s battle networks could be enough to undermine Chinese war planners’ confidence in a quick victory. Moreover, they contend, concerns about escalation are in reference to a conflict between the United States and China where the existence of the former is not in doubt. In a conflict between Taiwan and China, however, Taiwan has little to lose since its autonomy is already at stake. Taken together, these recommendations suggest a radical departure from Taiwan’s current acquisitions priorities. Each option represents a true shift to asymmetric capabilities that would be more cost effective than relying on highend platforms purchased from the United States. Still, as a number of analysts note, adopting these recommendations will require significant training and doctrinal changes on the part of Taiwan’s armed forces. It will also require Taiwan to become more self-reliant in defense production instead of continuing to wait on purchases of U.S. weapon systems. In many ways, these changes will require Taiwan’s military to rethink how it conceives of its own identity as an institution.31 Our recommendations share several characteristics with these analyses. But they differ in important ways as well. We share the view that Taiwan is best served by focusing on asymmetric capabilities rather than investing in highend platforms. However, we go further than most existing analyses in three important ways. First, we offer a holistic deterrence strategy that brings politics back in. Existing analyses are highly technical and tend to ignore important political and social issues that impact Taiwan’s ability to generate and sustain military power and cope with the entire threat spectrum. Second, our report explicitly acknowledges the tension between deterring grey zone provocations and deterring an invasion. Existing analyses either focus exclusively on one challenge, or presume that grey zone threats are a “lesser included” threat such that a military posture optimized to deal with the invasion threat can also handle subversion in the grey zone. Furthermore, we are the first to explicitly recommend that Taiwan is better off accepting risk in the grey zone to focus on what we see as the truly existential threat. Finally, the force structure recommendations we offer are far more ambitious than those that have been suggested by other American analysts to date. Beyond our suggestions that Taiwan repurpose its Marine Corps to focus on a purely costal defense mission, we also recommend a wholesale transformation of Taiwan’s reserve force. Our suggestion that Taiwan move away from its current pursuit of an operational reserve, and instead create a Territorial Defense Force, also fills an important gap in existing work on Taiwan’s asymmetric options: they tend to overlook the massive collective action problems that Taiwan’s defenders will face. Thus, we offer a logical set of policy recommendations that will allow a Territorial Defense Force to overcome such obstacles.

#### The trade-off is real – Taiwanese investments in flashy capabilities the US is key to crowd-out more effective asymmetric capabilities – prioritize elastic denial-in-defense over traditional deterrence that focuses on the grey zone and into more escalatory postures

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

Taiwan should be one of the most secure places on earth. It is a flourishing liberal democracy that boasts a vibrant, globalized economy, a well-educated population, and a high standard of living. Yet Taiwan’s future is anything but secure. It is an outlier in the international system—sovereign in practice, but not in name. China regards it as a renegade province and systematically seeks to isolate it from the rest of the world. More ominously, China has not renounced the use of military force to resolve the standoff. Thus, instead of being safe and secure, Taiwan’s 23.5 million citizens are forced to live in the shadow of unimaginable potential violence. Whether or not China might someday attack Taiwan is a matter of much debate. Whether or not Taiwan should take steps to convince Chinese leaders that the costs of waging such a war will outweigh any possible benefits is not. The more war becomes unacceptably painful, the more likely both sides will endeavor to resolve their differences peacefully. In short, Taiwan must deter aggression. This monograph suggests a holistic strategy that Taiwan can use to enhance its conventional deterrence posture. Taiwan has thus far followed a traditional approach to conventional deterrence, emphasizing symmetric capabilities and decisive battles for control over air, land, and sea. It still believes such a posture is effective because an attack has yet to materialize. We agree that Taiwan’s deterrence posture may have worked in the past. However, the military balance is shifting, and it is no longer obvious that Taiwan can afford to maintain qualitative or quantitative parity with China. Therefore, we argue that Taiwan should embrace a highly asymmetric, elastic denial-in-depth posture. Instead of planning for decisive, set piece battles, we recommend that Taiwan prepare its military and the nation-at-large to wage a prolonged, asymmetric campaign against an invading force. The goal is to deter by both raising the costs of invasion and reducing the prospects for a quick victory. Chapter 1 introduces what we call Taiwan’s deterrence trilemma. By this term, we mean that given Taiwan’s unique challenges, its conventional deterrence strategy must simultaneously accomplish three goals: • Counter grey zone provocations, which we define as the deliberate, coordinated, and incremental use of provocations, incursions, and other so-called “salami tactics” by conventional and unconventional military forces so as to challenge existing red lines and establish new “facts on the ground” without generating a decisive military response by the target; • Raise the costs of invasion; and • Maintain low defense expenditures. A trilemma exists, because these goals are in tension. A force posture optimized to pursue one goal will likely exacerbate one or both of the other two. • To counter grey zone challenges, Taiwan must project symbolic strength across its airspace and territorial waters. High-capability, high-visibility air and naval platforms such as advanced fighter jets and surface ships are often best at performing such tasks. • To raise the costs of invasion, Taiwan needs forces that can survive long enough—and fight well enough—to impose unacceptable losses on China’s forces. • To avoid crowding out other important forms of government spending—including retirement benefits, healthcare, and education—Taiwan cannot buy enough advanced aircraft and ships, which may be useful in the grey zone, so as to prevent China from destroying most of them in the earliest stages of an invasion, which undercuts its ability to deter China in the first place. Chapter 1 also previews our proposed alternative: elastic denial-in-defense. This approach consists of three core elements: • Accept risk in the grey zone; • Prioritize denial against the invasion threat; and • Invest in popular resistance. Chapter 2 assesses China’s intentions. Scholars and policymakers may debate whether or not China wants to challenge the existing international order, but little disagreement exists about China’s intentions toward Taiwan. Put bluntly, China wants to assert political control over the island. It certainly prefers to use peaceful means to achieve this goal, but it has not taken force “off the table.” Chapter 2 concludes by discussing Taiwan’s perceptions of China’s intentions. Yet despite the unequivocal and nonnegotiable nature of China’s attitude toward Taiwan, the average Taiwan voter seems ambivalent about the risk of war. Chapter 3 examines the cross-Strait military balance. Instead of focusing on comparative statistics, we instead explore China’s ability to carry out an invasion and Taiwan’s ability to defend against one. Specifically, we examine the degree to which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is prepared for the three main tasks it must accomplish to successfully invade: • A missile, aircraft, and cyber-strike to achieve air superiority by destroying Taiwan’s air force, degrading its defenses, disorganizing its government, and potentially even breaking its will to fight; • A naval blockade to isolate Taiwan politically and economically while setting the conditions for invasion; and • An amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait to land large numbers of ground units to establish and maintain political control over the entire island. We conclude that despite investing heavily in modernization, reorganization, training, and doctrine, the PLA still faces a number of important gaps that will complicate its ability to launch an invasion in the near term. Like other experts, we believe that a surprise invasion is virtually impossible. Nonetheless, time is on China’s side. Trend lines unambiguously indicate that Taiwan’s military is falling behind quantitatively and qualitatively. Taiwan’s current force posture and war-fighting doctrine are not well synchronized. Worst of all, despite rhetorically emphasizing asymmetry, Taiwan’s current approach seems more likely to pit strength against strength if war actually breaks out. That is not a fight Taiwan will win. Deterrence may suffer as a result. Chapters 4 and 5 describe our alternative deterrence posture recommendations in detail. Chapter 4 identifies several reasons Taiwan should accept risk in the grey zone. First, threats arising from grey zone operations are not existential. Second, China operates in the grey zone so as to avoid escalation. Completely eliminating the grey zone might well push China toward more aggressive options. Third, Taiwan is well within the range of China’s long-range strike systems. The characteristics that make conventional ships and fighter jets valuable in grey zone contexts—high visibility and technological capability—become liabilities in a war because China will unquestionably target these weapons in the earliest stages of a conflict. Moreover, because advanced conventional platforms are expensive, Taiwan cannot afford large numbers of them. As a result, China will find it relatively easy to locate, target, and destroy most of them before they can “get into action.” Chapter 4 concludes by identifying ways that Taiwan can rebalance its force to maintain “just enough” conventional capability to push back against grey zone operations. Cutting investment in the Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) program, Aegis-like destroyers, and the amphibious shipping force will yield more resources to invest in truly asymmetric capabilities. Ultimately, Taiwan is better off deterring a worst-case invasion—even if it means living with increased grey zone incursions—than the other way around. And a military optimized to counter grey zone threats will be particularly vulnerable to an invasion scenario. Chapter 5 provides a detailed overview of our elastic denial-in-depth concept. This approach is built around an unconventional force posture organized into four denial zones: air, sea, ground, and within society. Denial implies imposing costs on an attacker instead of trying to establish or maintain control of a given space, zone, or piece of ground. Thus, instead of preparing to fight a decisive battle in the air, at sea, or on the ground, Taiwan’s forces should organize, train, and equip to wage a prolonged series of fighting withdrawals. In the air and at sea, Taiwan should complicate the strike campaign China must carry out in order to invade. Taiwan can do so by acquiring large numbers of relatively low-cost, dedicated counter-invasion capabilities, such as surface-to-air missiles, missile boats, mini-submersibles, naval mines, drones, and autonomous weapons. On the ground, active duty army and repurposed marine forces should prepare for longrange coastal defense, counter-attack, and fighting retrograde missions. Finally, we suggest that Taiwan begin serious planning for social denial. In practical terms, Taiwan should restructure its massive reserve force so as to prepare it to conduct a prolonged insurgency campaign in urban, jungle, and mountain settings. To facilitate this end, we recommend transforming Taiwan’s Reserve Command into a Territorial Defense Force.

#### Taiwan is on the brink of nuclear war

Carpenter 19 ---- Ted Galen, senior fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history (University of Texas), “Forget the U.S.-China Trade War: Is a Conflict Over Taiwan the Real Threat?” 6/8, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/forget-us-china-trade-war-conflict-over-taiwan-real-threat-61627

Tensions between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are surging to an alarming extent. The latest indicator is the recent exchange of heated rhetoric between Gen. Wei Fenghe, China’s Minister of National Defense, and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, the Taiwanese government’s chief policymaking body dealing with cross-strait relations. As Taiwan’s self-proclaimed protector, Washington should be extremely worried about these developments. Speaking on June 1 at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual multilateral conference on Pacific security issues, Wei warned against efforts either in Taiwan or foreign countries to thwart China’s goal of reunification. Moreover, “any underestimation of the PLA’s resolve and will is extremely dangerous.” Wei added ominously that, “If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military will have no choice but to fight at all costs, at all costs, (sic.) for national unity. If the PLA cannot even safeguard the unity of our motherland, what do we need it for?” The Mainland Affairs Council responded with equally harsh and uncompromising language. In a statement issued the following day, the council reasserted that Taiwan has never been a part of the PRC and would never accept Beijing’s control or threats. It accused China not only of “challenging international norms and order,” but added the gratuitous slap that Beijing’s claim to seek peaceful development was “a lie of the ages.” Lest anyone not fully grasp the extent of Taipei’s hostility toward the PRC, the statement went on: “We need to remind the public that the Chinese Communist Party is practicing anti-democracy, anti-peace between the two sides of the strait and further resorting to war. This is the main cause of the tension in the Taiwan Strait and the region, and it is the source of danger and provocation against peace and stability.” The vitriolic exchange constituted a worrisome escalation of the animosity between Taipei and Beijing that has been roiling for the past three years. The victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan’s 2016 elections dashed any hopes Chinese leaders had that the burgeoning economic ties with the mainland would translate gradually into increased Taiwanese popular support for political reunification. Anger at that strategy’s failure led Beijing to revive a campaign to increase Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation by poaching the few small nations that still maintain formal relations with Taipei. The PRC’s menacing military activities also increased. Chinese war games in and around the Taiwan Strait have soared since 2016. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 report to Congress also concludes that Beijing is building up its ground, air, and naval forces to achieve a more robust capability to invade Taiwan. Anger at Beijing’s treatment of Taiwan has led to congressional and executive branch measures to strengthen Washington’s backing for Taipei. A major step occurred in March 2018 when President Trump signed into law the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA), which encouraged high-level U.S. officials to meet with their Taiwan counterparts. That legislation, which passed both houses of Congress, ended Washington’s cautious practice under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of holding meetings only with relatively low-level Taiwanese officials. It was especially noticeable that the TTA specifically promoted interaction by “cabinet-level national security officials.” That provision proved to be more than a symbolic gesture when National Security Adviser John Bolton met with Taiwan National Security Council Secretary-General David Lee in May. Bolton’s intention to push for stronger security ties between the United States and Taiwan cannot be overstated. Before his current stint in government service, he pushed for highly dangerous and provocative policies. He urged the United States to establish formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and even advocated moving U.S. military forces from Okinawa to Taiwan. Either measure would cross a bright red line as far as Beijing is concerned and would likely trigger PRC military action to prevent Taiwan’s permanent political separation from the mainland. Having someone with those views holding a crucial policy post and sitting just a few doors down from the Oval Office greatly increases the likelihood of a further boost in U.S. support for Taiwan, despite the risk of war with China. There are multiple signs from various sources of growing U.S. backing for Taiwan’s de facto independence. Congress certainly is stepping up its support. By a unanimous voice vote in early May, the House of Representatives passed the Taiwan Assurance Act, which expresses firm support for Taiwan while urging Taipei to increase its own defense spending. The legislation also recommends that Washington continue “regular sales of defense articles” to Taiwan and back Taipei’s participation in international organizations—something Beijing emphatically resists. The Trump administration doesn’t seem to need much prodding. U.S. warships have transited the Taiwan Strait on several occasions over the past year to demonstrate military support for Taipei. At the Shangri-La Dialogue session, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated that the United States would no longer “tiptoe around” destabilizing Chinese behavior regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea. While Americans are focused on the ongoing trade war between the United States and China, the danger is growing of an actual shooting war that could involve Taiwan. The rhetoric coming out of both Beijing and Taipei is increasingly confrontational and shrill. Taiwan’s governing party is firmly committed to resisting the PRC’s pressure for unification; indeed, incumbent president Tsai Ing-wen is being challenged by an even more hardline, pro-independence faction within the DPP. At the same time, Chinese leaders seem intent on pushing their reunification agenda with greater insistence and urgency. Those are not comforting trends. Washington has a vague but very real commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to protect the island’s security. Both Congress and the Trump administration seem to be drifting toward boosting the traditional level of U.S. support in response to Beijing’s escalating pressure on Taiwan. The danger is growing that the TRA’s paper security commitment may be put to a real-world test. U.S. leaders and the American people need to ask themselves whether they are really willing to risk war with a nuclear-armed power to protect Taiwan. The prudent answer clearly should be “no.”

#### The conflict causes an EMP attack – China will retaliate to just US presence – collapses the grid, powerplants, and US nuclear deterrence

Adelmann 19 ---- Bob, writer for *The New American*, MBA in Finance and Economics (Cornell Johnson Graduate School of Management), “Could U.S. Warships in Taiwan Strait Trigger an EMP Attack?” 1/27, <https://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/31313-could-us-warships-in-taiwan-strait-trigger-an-emp-attack>

When two U.S. Navy warships sailed through the Taiwan Strait on Thursday, a Navy spokesman said it was only “routine.” Besides, added U.S. Pacific Fleet spokesman Lt. Commander Tim Gorman, the operation was “in accordance with international law.” It “demonstrates the US commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific,” he added, explaining that “the US Navy will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows.” China has challenged that assessment for years, claiming that it has sovereignty over the island and that Taiwan’s status as a separate Republic of China isn’t legitimate. Accordingly, China sent several military jets near the southern tip of the island late Thursday to make the point. When the Navy sent two “surface combatants” through the Strait in October and then again in November, China responded by sending multiple warships of its own into the area. The only thing more dangerous than arrogance on the part of the U.S. Navy is the ignorance of just how China could turn off the lights in America if it wanted to retaliate with prejudice. As far back as 1996, the communist Chinese government knew that the United States was vulnerable to a nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) set off in the atmosphere above the country. An article published by the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) — China’s military arm — exposed that vulnerability: Some people might think that things similar to the “Pearl Harbor Incident” are unlikely to take place during the information age. Yet it could be regarded as the “Pearl Harbor Incident” of the 21st century if a surprise attack is conducted against the enemy’s [the United States] crucial information systems of command, control, and communications by such means as electronic warfare, electromagnetic pulse weapons, telecommunications interference and suppression, computer viruses, and if the enemy is deprived of the information it needs as a result. Even a super military power like the United States, which possesses nuclear missiles and powerful armed forces, cannot guarantee its immunity…. In their own words, a highly computerized open society like the United States is extremely vulnerable to electronic attacks from all sides. This is because the U.S. economy, from banks to telephone systems and from power plants to iron and steel works, relies entirely on computer networks…. When a country grows increasingly powerful economically and technologically … it will become increasingly dependent on modern information systems…. The United States is more vulnerable to attacks than any other country in the world.” Dr. Peter Vincent Pry, a former staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, reminded his readers in July 2017 that Russia was also aware of that vulnerability: Russia made a thinly veiled EMP threat against the United States on May 2, 1999, in an apparent effort to blackmail the U.S. to stop the Balkans War. During the spring of 1999, tensions between the United States and Russia rose sharply over Operation ALLIED FORCE, the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) bombing campaign against Yugoslavia. A bipartisan delegation from the House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. Congress met in Vienna with their Russian counterparts on the Duma International Affairs Committee, headed by Chairman Vladimir Lukin. The object of the meeting was to reduce U.S.-Russia tensions and seek Russian help in resolving the Balkans War. On May 2, during the Vienna meeting, Chairman Lukin and Deputy Chairman Alexander Shabanov chastised the United States for military aggression in the Balkans, and warned that Russia was not helpless to oppose Operation ALLIED FORCE. [Said Lukin]: “Hypothetically, if Russia really wanted to hurt the United States in retaliation for NATO’s bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia could fire a submarine launched ballistic missile and detonate a single nuclear warhead at high altitude over the United States. The resulting electromagnetic pulse would massively disrupt U.S. communications and computer systems, shutting down everything. No internet. Nothing.” [Added Shabanov]: “And if that didn’t work, we’d just launch another missile.” Apparently frightened by the potential threat, Congress did what it usually does in the face of a crisis: It created a committee to study the matter and come up with recommendations. Called “The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack,” it was created in 2001 to assess the following: 1. the nature and magnitude of potential high-altitude threats to the United States.... 2. the vulnerability of the United States military and … civilian systems to an EMP attack; 3. the capability … to repair and recover from … an EMP attack; and 4. the feasibility and cost of hardening [those] systems against an EMP attack. The committee studied the threat and made more than a hundred recommendations to Congress, which Congress ignored. Soon thereafter, the committee was shut down. The committee was resurrected in 2015 and its results freshened. It issued a series of reports, the last one in July 2017. That last one didn’t see the light of day until Thursday, January 24. Bill Gertz, national security reporter, editor, and columnist for the Washington Times for 27 years before moving to the Washington Free Beacon, reviewed it and learned that those threats are real: China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran are already building such weapons. It’s been part of their military strategies for years: “Nuclear EMP attack is part of the military doctrines, plans, and exercises of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran for a revolutionary new way of warfare against military forces and civilian critical infrastructures by cyber, sabotage, and EMP,” the report states. This new way of warfare is called many things by many nations: In Russia, China, and Iran it is called Sixth Generation Warfare, Non-Contact Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Total Information Warfare, and Cyber Warfare. Nuclear-electronic warfare also is called “Blackout War” because of its effects on all electronic devices. The report warned that millions of U.S. citizens could die if any of these countries did launch a nuclear weapon to create an EMP: Potential adversaries [i.e., the United States] should understand that millions could die from the long-term collateral effects of EMP and cyber-attacks that cause protracted black-out of national electric grids and other life-sustaining critical infrastructures…. A single nuclear weapon can potentially make an EMP attack against a target the size of North America. Any nuclear weapon detonated at an altitude of 30 kilometers [18.6 miles] or higher will generate a potentially catastrophic EMP…. A super-EMP warhead, in the possession of Russia or North Korea, could put at risk the best protected U.S. assets, even threatening the survival of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. If China, along with Russia, Iran, and other state and non-state actors (i.e., Islamic terrorists) has the capability to send the United States back into the 19th century with a nuclear EMP, a question for the Navy is: Why provoke it by sending warships into the Taiwan Strait?

### 1ac – Relations Advantage

#### Advantage Two: Relations

#### China views arms sales as a violation of the one-China principle – that crushes US/China relations

Chung 19 ---- Lawrence Chung is a correspondent for the *South China Morning Post* with a master’s degree in journalism, “Beijing Says Washington’s US$500 Million Arms Sale to Taiwan ‘Damaged Sino-US Relations,’” 4/24, *South China Morning Post*, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007446/beijing-says-washingtons-us500-million-arms-sale-taiwan

Beijing has accused Washington of violating the one-China principle with its recent sale of a US$500 million military package to Taiwan, saying the act seriously hurt relations between the two countries and jeopardised stability in the Taiwan Strait. “The Chinese side resolutely opposes any countries selling weapons to Taiwan,” the defence ministry said in a statement on Wednesday, while repeating its position that it regards the self-ruled island as an inalienable part of the mainland and its need to uphold its territorial integrity. The latest deal with Taipei, which includes a pilot training programme and maintenance/logistics support for F-16 aircraft in Arizona, is the third since US President Donald Trump approved arms sales to the island in 2017. It was announced by the Defence Security Cooperation Agency, part of the US Department of Defence, on April 15. “What the US side did not only strongly violated the one-China principle and the three communiques prescribing Sino-US relations, but also interfered in China’s internal affairs and damaged the sovereignty and security of China,” the defence ministry statement said. The act also “poisoned bilateral military ties and seriously sabotaged cross-strait relations and stability in the Taiwan Strait”, it said. Beijing demanded that Washington uphold the one-China principle and stop supplying arms to Taiwan and engaging in military contact with it.

#### Arms Sales affect more than just security. They are symbolic enough to threaten broader cooperation on counterterrorism, and disease prevention.

Chung and Zhen 18 ---- Lawrence Chung is a correspondent for the *South China Morning Post* with a master’s degree in journalism, Liu Zhen is a correspondent for the *South China Morning Post*, “Beijing Tells US to Cancel US$330 Million Taiwan Arms Deal,” 9/25, *South China Morning Post*, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2165609/us-announces-new-taiwan-arms-deal-worth-us330-million>

Beijing protested to Washington on Tuesday and demanded it cancel a planned US$330 million arms sale to Taiwan, warning that bilateral cooperation would be affected if it went ahead with the deal. The proposal announced by US defence officials on Monday comes as relations between Beijing and Washington are already strained. Taiwan said the deal would help boost the self-ruled island’s defences, but Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said Beijing had lodged stern representations with the US about the plan. “We urge the US side … to immediately cancel this deal and cut off military ties with Taiwan to avoid doing serious damage to China-US relations, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and cooperation between US and China in important areas,” Geng told a regular press briefing on Tuesday, without elaborating. China’s defence ministry also delivered a similar warning. The proposal will go before the US Congress and covers spare parts for F-16, C-130 and F-5 indigenous defence fighter jets, and other aircraft systems. “This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient, which has been and continues to be an important force for political stability, military balance and economic progress in the region,” the Pentagon’s Defence Security Cooperation Agency said in a statement. Beijing regards Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. It has previously warned Washington against selling weapons to Taiwan and establishing military relations with the island, and remains locked in a trade war with the US. Taiwan’s Presidential Office welcomed the move. “We greatly appreciate that the US government takes note of the national security of Taiwan and its commitments to firmly abide by the Taiwan Relations Act and six assurances [regarding US policy towards the island],” office spokesman Alex Huang said. He said the latest weapons sale could also help boost the island’s confidence in facing security challenges from Beijing, and strengthen its ability to ensure cross-strait and regional peace and stability, thereby improving cross-strait relations. “We will continue to increase our investment in national defence, boost our defence industry and technology development, and closely cooperate and communicate with the US on various security issues and agendas,” Huang said. The six assurances, issued by former US president Ronald Reagan in 1982, include the US pledging not to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan, not to hold prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to Taipei, and not to play a mediation role between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The planned arms deal was announced days after the US State Department imposed sanctions on a key Chinese military unit and its director for buying Russian fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles – a move that inflamed tensions amid the spiralling trade war. Chinese analysts said the latest moves showed all aspects of China-US relations – from trade to security – were under strain, and Beijing was likely to retaliate. “Beijing is much more confident now, and it’s in a better position to take countermeasures than it was before,” said Shen Dingli, director of the Programme on Arms Control and Regional Security at Fudan University in Shanghai. “The US has to work with other countries, including China, in areas like counterterrorism, non-proliferation, anti-money laundering and infectious disease control,” he said. “It can’t expect China to cooperate whenever it makes a demand while it is hurting China’s interests.” This year’s arms deal is relatively small compared with previous years and it involves maintenance and spare parts, which will not make much difference to the power balance across the strait, said Pang Zhongying, a foreign affairs expert at the Ocean University of China. But he said it was the timing of the announcement that had infuriated Beijing, coming so soon after the sanctions were imposed. This will be the second US arms deal to Taiwan under the administration of US President Donald Trump after it agreed to sell a US$1.4 billion weapons package, mainly missiles, to the island last year. Hong Kong-based military commentator Song Zhongping said there was likely to be a much bigger and more sensitive deal announced next year – possibly including the powerful M1A2 tanks that Taiwan has asked for – after the US Congress passed the National Defence Authorisation Act, pledging to sell more weapons to the island. “US arms sales to Taiwan are a long-term matter. The smaller deal this year means they could be building up to challenge Beijing with something bigger in the future,” Song said.

#### Terrorism causes extinction

Nickolas Roth 17 & Matthew Bunn, research associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, professor of practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, 9/28/17, “The effects of a single terrorist nuclear bomb”, <https://thebulletin.org/2017/09/the-effects-of-a-single-terrorist-nuclear-bomb/>

And what standards of international order and law would still hold sway? The country attacked might well lash out militarily at whatever countries it thought might bear a portion of responsibility. (A terrifying description of the kinds of discussions that might occur appeared in Brian Jenkins’ book, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?) With the nuclear threshold already crossed in this scenario—at least by terrorists—it is conceivable that some of the resulting conflicts might escalate to nuclear use. International politics could become more brutish and violent, with powerful states taking unilateral action, by force if necessary, in an effort to ensure their security. After 9/11, the United States led the invasions of two sovereign nations, in wars that have since cost hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, while plunging a region into chaos. Would the reaction after a far more devastating nuclear attack be any less?

In particular, the idea that each state can decide for itself how much security to provide for nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients would likely be seen as totally unacceptable following such an attack. Powerful states would likely demand that others surrender their nuclear material or accept foreign troops (or other imposed security measures) to guard it.

That could well be the first step toward a more profound transformation of the international system. After such a catastrophe, major powers may feel compelled to more freely engage in preventive war, seizing territories they worry might otherwise be terrorist safe havens, and taking other steps they see as brutal but necessary to preserve their security. For this reason, foreign policy analyst Stephen Krasner has argued that “conventional rules of sovereignty would be abandoned overnight.” Confidence in both the national security institutions of the country attacked and international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations, which had so manifestly failed to prevent the devastation, might erode. The effect on nuclear weapons policies is hard to predict: One can imagine new nuclear terror driving a new push for nuclear disarmament, but one could also imagine states feeling more certain than ever before that they needed nuclear weapons.

#### Diseases cause extinction---novel pathogens create anti-genic mutations that undermine exogenous shocks

Pamlin 15 — Dennis Pamlin, Stuart Armstrong, February 2015, “Global Challenges, 12 Risks That Threaten Human Civilization: The Case for a New Risk Category, Global Challenges Foundation, <https://api.globalchallenges.org/static/wp-content/uploads/12-Risks-with-infinite-impact.pdf>

Here only worldwide events are included. A widespread endemic disease that is stable in terms of how many people become sick from it is not a pandemic. 260 3.1.4.1 Expected impact Infectious diseases have been one of the greatest causes of mortality in history. Unlike many other global challenges pandemics have happened recently, as we can see where reasonably good data exist. Plotting historic epidemic fatalities on a log scale reveals that these tend to follow a power law with a small exponent: many plagues have been found to follow a power law with exponent 0.26.261 These kinds of power laws are heavy-tailed262 to a significant degree.263 In consequence most of the fatalities are accounted for by the top few events.264 If this law holds for future pandemics as well,265 then the majority of people who will die from epidemics will likely die from the single largest pandemic. Most epidemic fatalities follow a power law, with some extreme events – such as the Black Death and Spanish Flu – being even more deadly.267 There are other grounds for suspecting that such a high impact epidemic will have a greater probability than usually assumed. All the features of an extremely devastating disease already exist in nature: essentially incurable (Ebola268), nearly always fatal (rabies269), extremely infectious (common cold270), and long incubation periods (HIV271). If a pathogen were to emerge that somehow combined these features (and influenza has demonstrated antigenic shift, the ability to combine features from different viruses272), its death toll would be extreme. Many relevant features of the world have changed considerably, making past comparisons problematic. The modern world has better sanitation and medical research, as well as national and supra-national institutions dedicated to combating diseases. Private insurers are also interested in modelling pandemic risks.273 Set against this is the fact that modern transport and dense human population allow infections to spread much more rapidly274, and there is the potential for urban slums to serve as breeding grounds for disease.275 Unlike events such as nuclear wars, pandemics would not damage the world’s infrastructure, and initial survivors would likely be resistant to the infection. And there would probably be survivors, if only in isolated locations. Hence the risk of a civilisation collapse would come from the ripple effect of the fatalities and the policy responses. These would include political and agricultural disruption as well as economic dislocation and damage to the world’s trade network (including the food trade). Extinction risk is only possible if the aftermath of the epidemic fragments and diminishes human society to the extent that recovery becomes impossible277 before humanity succumbs to other risks (such as climate change or further pandemics).

#### Independently, future arms sales will derail Trump-Xi trade talks that otherwise spur an enforceable trade agreement – this time is different – it would be the first sale of jets since 1992

Rapoza 19 ---- Kenneth, correspondent for *Forbes*, M.A. in communications (Norwich University), “Taiwan Just Became A Huge Variable In The China Trade War,” 4/1, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/04/01/taiwan-just-became-a-huge-variable-in-china-trade-war/#782cbe505948>

Washington knows how to do one thing well: pick a fight. Potential sales of F-16 fighter jets and M-1 Abrams tanks to Taiwan is a sure fire way to tick off Xi Jinping, the Chinese president with whom Donald Trump is trying to sign a “great trade deal” as early as this month. Following another Steve Mnuchin/Robert Lighthizer lackluster showing in Beijing last week, all bets are off that China and the U.S. sign anything should the two presidents meet later this month as discussed. Taiwan is a new sticking point. The U.S. hasn’t sold fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992 in an effort to appease China, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province designed to sow political discord between Beijing and the West. Last week, the Trump administration responded to the Taiwanese president’s request for some of the biggest weapons made in the U.S., saying he was fine with the order. The formal request still needs congressional approval. Beijing will lobby hard against it before Trump and Xi meet. No meeting date has been set. Taiwan’s request is an unwelcome risk for ongoing U.S. China talks, says Chris Rogers, a senior analyst for Panjiva, the trade research division of S&P Global Market Intelligence. Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen seems willing to ruffle feathers and challenge Trump, asking for the F-16 and the M-1 tank in order to “show the world the U.S. is committed to Taiwan’s defense,” Reuters reports. “Should the U.S. approve the orders it would ... jeopardize relations between the U.S. and China just as trade talks are due to reach a conclusion,” Rogers says. Defense contractors will love this order. Those who would like to see the trade war end, won’t love it as much. Lockheed Martin builds the F-16V model that the Taiwan Air Force is after. The M-1 Abrams tank is built by General Dynamics Land Systems and is used in Iraq and Afghanistan. Panjiva analysis of official figures shows that order approvals fell 16.6% year over year in 2018 to $48.1 billion. That was the worst year for heavy defense equipment—namely aircraft—since at least 2015 and was 23.6% below the final year of the Obama administration. The new year has also opened slowly with just $9.2 billion of orders in the first three months of the year from $14.5 billion at the same time in 2018. Given President Trump’s prior focus on promoting the defense industry, there may be pressure to approve the orders and send them to Congress. Worth noting, Taiwan was the third-largest buyer of U.S. military systems, including vehicles and weapons, in 2018 and the ninth-largest buyer of aerospace equipment including jets and helicopters, according to Panjiva. Combined exports reached $436 million in 2018, up 18.5% year over year with aerospace accounted for 82.9%. For context, the tank order, which was first tried by Taiwan back in July 2018, would be worth $990 million, according to Jane’s Defense. Even though China has seen U.S. weapons imported into Taiwan before, this size of the order and its timing could be a huge deal breaker for Trump. China was ranked as the biggest security threat to the U.S. based on January’s World Threat Assessment published by the U.S. intelligence agencies. Trade wars are just part of the escalating crisis between the two sides, with the South China Sea being the newest military flashpoint. Taiwan was always a sleeping giant threatening to rattle China-U.S. relations, but sales of F-16s put an unwelcome spotlight on Taiwan. Last Thursday, China’s defense ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said China “resolutely opposes” any weaponry sales to Taiwan, adding that any words or actions that undermine the one-China policy are “extremely dangerous,” Quartz magazine reported. Foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang also reiterated Beijing’s insistence on peaceful ties between Taiwan, the U.S. and China. “We urge the U.S. to fully realize the high degree of sensitivity and severe impact of this issue, honor its commitment to the one-China principle, and … stop arms sales to Taiwan.” China’s Air Forced buzzed Taiwan on Sunday by allegedly flying across a no-fly zone for Beijing military in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan scrambled fighter planes on Sunday morning to chase away two Chinese made J-11 Flanker B+ fighter jets. Tsai and Xi are not on speaking terms. She has refused to accept China’s goal to eventually absorb Taiwan, and the latest call for U.S. war planes now puts Trump in the middle. Any sale before a trade deal would be a huge stumbling block for Xi within the Communist Party back home, and any sale to Taiwan after a trade deal would be seen as a breach of trust by Xi. If Washington is looking for “enforceable” trade action, they are unlikely to get it if Beijing doesn’t get an enforceable agreement on Taiwan. Taiwan could creep into trade talks, becoming a greater variable than the South China Sea issue ever was.

#### Hurdles remain, but an enforceable agreement can get done – that trade deal prevents serious threats to the economy.

Churchill 19 ---- Owen, correspondent for the *South China Morning Post*, M.A. in Chinese Language and Culture (Fudan University), B.A. in Chinese and Music (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London), course of study in Chinese (Beijing Normal University), “US and China Reach Deal on Enforcement Mechanism for Possible Pact to End Trade War, US Trade Chief Robert Lighthizer Tells Congress,” 2/27, *SCMP*, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2187975/deal-end-trade-war-must-be-enforceable-us-trade-chief-robert>

The US and China have agreed to an enforcement mechanism that ensures Beijing follows through on promised reforms if a deal to end the trade war is reached, US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer told the House Ways and Means Committee on Wednesday. The mechanism would consist of monthly meetings at the office director level, quarterly meetings at the vice-ministerial level and semi-annual gatherings at the ministerial level, with these last meetings convened by Lighthizer and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He, the top US trade negotiator testified. The mechanism appears to answer a US concern that any final agreement brokered by Washington and Beijing would be specific, measurable and enforceable at all levels of Chinese government – a condition Lighthizer made a point of in his testimony. “We have to have the ability to take proportional action unilaterally to make sure that we have a situation where [China is] following the contract,” he said. Enforcement has been one of the stickiest points in the negotiations, with the sides far apart on the issue as recently as last week. Washington had rejected Beijing’s offered solution of “joint task forces”, while Beijing had resisted any mechanism that threatened the country’s sovereignty, sources with knowledge of negotiations previously told the South China Morning Post. Despite a new consensus on enforcement, Lighthizer stressed on Wednesday that major hurdles remained. “Much still needs to be done both before an agreement is reached and, more importantly, after it is reached, if one is reached,” he said. The terms of any deal reached would have to be implemented at all levels of governance in China, including “central”, “sub-central”, and “local”, the trade chief said. “It’s got to be across the board like that.” Lighthizer’s testimony before the committee – the main source of legislation on American customs duties and international trade agreements – came as China and the United States tried to strike a deal to end the months-old trade war. His appearance marked the first time the US House of Representatives – now controlled by the Democratic Party – has formally investigated US President Donald Trump’s China trade policy. Tensions between China and the US have eased somewhat since Trump said on Sunday that he would delay plans to raise tariffs on US$200 billion in Chinese goods if no deal was reached by March 1. Trump cited “substantial progress” in talks in Washington with a team led by Liu. Lighthizer said the deal-enforcement meetings would allow government representatives from both sides to raise concerns and get them addressed. The meetings would be a chance for Washington to air complaints about any systemic problems, and to pass on any specific grievances issued to the US administration from American companies, he said. “In many cases, those [complaints] are going to have to be anonymous because companies are afraid to come forward because they know what will happen if they do. They’ll have real-world effects, it will be negative.” If the problems ended up at the ministerial level and could not be resolved there, then the US “would expect to act unilaterally”, he said. “Proportionally, but unilaterally.” As his testimony got under way, Lighthizer repeated the oft-made US accusation that China’s “unfair trade practices” posed existential threats to the US economy. “Technology transfer issues, a failure to protect intellectual property, large subsidies and the cyber theft of commercial secrets” were among the threatening Chinese practices, he said. Lighthizer and Trump had differed publicly over the use of memorandums of understanding in the negotiations with China. The president denigrated them as “short-term” and a “waste of time”, prompting Lighthizer to announce that the documents would now be called “trade agreements”. Both sides reached an agreement on Friday on currency manipulation as one of several MOUs covering a variety of industries, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said. Trump has said that the nations were getting “very, very close” to a deal and that Chinese negotiators would be returning to Washington for more talks before he and Chinese President Xi Jinping met to sign a pact. Beijing has accepted Washington’s choice of Trump’s Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida for the leaders to finalise a deal. Lighthizer clashed with one lawmaker on Wednesday over whether that final agreement would be submitted to Congress for approval. “We have no intention of submitting it to Congress,” he said, responding to a question from Representative Lloyd Doggett, a Texas Democrat, about when lawmakers would be able to view and approve the deal. “It’s an executive agreement.” Doggett said that any binding trade agreements could be sought only through congressional authority. But Lighthizer said a deal to end the trade war would be “a settlement of the 301 action”, referring to his office’s investigation into China’s trade practices that resulted in the levying of punitive tariffs in July. “It’s an executive agreement, which the Constitution gives the president the right to enter into,” he said. Lighthizer told lawmakers that in assessing the success of the agreement he would factor in the demands and suggestions that industry associations and experts had delivered to the administration over the course of its trade action on China. Addressing those points was “what I have as my objective”, he said. “It’s not just what I think.” Among the yardsticks by which the administration would measure an agreement’s success were provisions to enforce “real rules” around forced technology transfers, restrictions on government subsidies and intellectual property protection, Lighthizer said. The agreement’s section on IP protection alone would be about 27 to 28 pages long, he said.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war – loose nukes, counterbalancing, and regional instability

Mann 14 – Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status.

## 2AC - WAR ADVANTAGE

### AT: Deterrence Now

#### Deterrence low and capabilities not key – US political chaos, low Taiwanese military readiness, public lethargy, low confidence in the military, ineffective Taiwanese leadership, trashed morale, and reductions in training and conscription

Minnick 19 ---- Wendell, contributor for the National Interest, former Senior Asia Correspondent for Shephard Media, former Asia Bureau Chief for Defense News, “How to Save Taiwan from Itself,” 3/19, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-save-taiwan-itself-48122> \*\*Modified for language

Washington policymakers need an entire rethink on the island’s defense posture. Living here for twenty years and having been on every military base on the island too many times to count, paradox and irony have become cliché, if not horrifying. Not to crow, but I have been on Dongyin, Erhtan and Tatan islands; the U.S. signal intelligence antenna farm at Pingtun Li; and inside the underground airbase in Chiashan Mountain in Hualien. So, please hear me out. Washington must concoct a way to convince Taiwan’s idealistic idle chattering political elites to stop believing in the fantasy that American troops will swing-in like Tarzan and save them from the tiger—especially with the current destabilization of American political culture. Taiwan’s military brass are very cognizant of the China threat; it is Taipei’s political leadership that has forced the military to reduce military readiness over the past twenty years. Public lethargy and a lack of confidence in the military has drained the armed forces of [hu]manpower and morale. And it is this lethargy, along with the unwillingness of Taiwan’s political elites to communicate this imminent threat to the public, that must be addressed. Taiwan’s military wants to procure big-ticket items from the United States, but at the same time it has been forced to reduce conscription and training due to funding issues and an apathetic civilian population. Taiwan’s Air Force just announced an official request from the United States for sixty-six F-16V fighter aircraft; the Army has secured the sale of M1 Abrams main battle tanks; and the Navy has gone forward with the initial procurement of the Mark 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) for its upcoming local-build corvettes. The VLS will be fitted with the Tien Hai (Tien Kung variant) surface-to-air missile. Even if Taiwan procures all of its dreams and desires from the U.S. government, then the question becomes: who will fly them, drive them, sail them and fire them.

#### Taiwanese capabilities are shot – insufficient personnel and declining patriotism – plus lacking resources and low funding – reserves cannot fill-in

Minnick 19 ---- Wendell, contributor for the National Interest, former Senior Asia Correspondent for Shephard Media, former Asia Bureau Chief for Defense News, “How to Save Taiwan from Itself,” 3/19, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-save-taiwan-itself-48122>

According to the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the current estimate of personnel officially stands at 215,000. Many critics argue that this is the bare minimum needed to repel the first wave of a Chinese invasion. Now remember, that is the minimum. The reduction to 215,000 was the result of the 2011–2014 Jing-cui streamlining program, which was extended to 2015. Fortunately, the follow-up Yung-gu plan was canceled. It would have further reduced the number from 215,000 to 175,000 and eliminated conscription entirely, opting for an all-volunteer force. Now, recruiters face a real nightmare. Last year the big brains in the presidential office cut pensions 30 percent, with plans to further reduce it 50 percent. Even though Yung-gu is temporarily on hold, the official current number, 215,000, is an outright lie. The actual number of operational active duty personnel is devastating. There are actually only 188,000 in total and if you exclude civilian employees, noncombat personnel, those on leave, and cadets, the actual number of warfighters is 152,280; 81 percent of the authorized strength levels needed for fending off an invasion. Part of the problem is conscription and a decline in patriotism. Those born before 1994 were required to serve one-year conscription, but it dropped to four months in 2016 when that generation turned eighteen. Since the end of year-long conscription service, the military has been relying on personnel from the four-month program to fill in at least 10 percent of the frontline strength. Conscripts now receive five weeks of basic training and eleven weeks of specialized training. This will average about five turnovers per year for individual field units. They are also counted as active duty personnel, despite their lack of real contribution to the overall warfighting capabilities of the island. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs just announced a $100 million gift to Nicaragua; one of the numerous corrupt regimes with which Taiwan trades diplomatic status and recognition for dollars. Yet, at the same time, it continues to cut the number of bullets, all manufactured locally, to be used for infantry training. It’s worth noting that $100 million buys a lot of bullets. During annual exercises, individual companies in the infantry, now down to skeleton crews, must borrow heavily from other companies to fill gaps needed to carry out what have become dog-and-pony shows for the media. To handle anything beyond the first wave of the invasion, the military reasons that it can dip into its 1.5 million reserves, but the effectiveness of such mobilization relies largely on the backbone of a small but elite core of trained personnel. Officially, reservists are required to spend only five days every two years for training, during which time they typically perform simple chores and not weapons training. However, the MND might never contact an individual reservist due to a variety of reasons, including critical missions, budgetary constraints, reservists refusing to comply, failure to simply locate and notify reservists, etc. One MND source told the National Interest that the ill-trained reserves were nothing more than “cannon fodder.”

#### Relying on the US is dangerous – China calculates based on Taiwan

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

The cornerstone of any deterrence posture is its ability to impose unacceptable costs on an adversary if it attempts to attack, either through denial or punishment. To date, Taiwan has largely hedged in a manner that emphasizes high-end, highvisibility platforms, largely on the assumption that the international community in general—and the United States in particular—will intervene in a worst-case invasion scenario. We think this assumption is dangerous for reasons already discussed. Moreover, although China might appear content with maintaining the status quo for now, its strategic calculus is surely based, in part, on its beliefs about Taiwan’s ability to impose unacceptable costs on an invasion force. To the degree that Taiwan continues over-investing in a small number of expensive and exquisite platforms, it will likely continue to find itself at both a qualitative and quantitative disadvantage. The more the gap widens, the more Chinese leaders may be tempted to resolve the “Taiwan problem” by force of arms.

### AT: Tensions Low

#### Trump will sell Taiwan F-16V jets – it’s a big policy shift that China views as counterbalancing

Sputnik 19 ---- citing Paul Huang who is an East Asian columnist for *The Epoch Times* and master’s candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) along with Benjamin Cavender who is the Director of The China Market Research Group and MBA (Columbia University), “How Can Prospect of Taiwanese F-16 Procurement Affect US Trade Talks With China?” 3/26, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201903261073564311-f-16-taiwan/

Various media reports have suggested that the current US administration is interested in striking a deal to supply Taiwan with F-16 jets. Bloomberg reported that, citing its sources, Trump's advisors had urged Taiwan to submit an official request for new F-16 jets, which now needs to be presented by the Defence and State Departments as formal proposals for the Congress to review. The Diplomat Magazine recalled that the US has long been bound by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, obliging Washington to supply the island "with arms of a defensive character". It also noted that with the inauguration of Donald Trump as US president, Washington's policy towards the island has slightly changed, as the American commander-in-chief had agreed to have a telephone talk with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, while many previous administrations had abstained from doing so. Military analyst Paul Huang sees no reason why the US Congress would prevent Taiwan's request for F-16V jets. He pointed out that as opposed to 2011, when a similar request was rejected due to partisan politics and the Obama administration's unwillingness to provoke China, the current Congress has a strong consensus in favour of supporting Taiwan and countering China. Benjamin Cavender was not certain whether the US Congress would give a green light to the deal, but refused to gauge its chances of passing. He noted though that the possible deal with Taiwan could be a sign of a "big policy shift designed to isolate China or counterbalance its military presence in the region".

#### The sale of jets causes China to retaliate with belligerence

Wadhams 19 ---- Nick, foreign policy and national security reporter, “China Protests Possible Trump Move to Sell F-16s to Taiwan,” *Bloomberg*, 3/21, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-21/trump-aides-said-to-back-selling-f-16-fighter-planes-to-taiwan>

The Trump administration has given tacit approval to Taiwan’s request to buy more than 60 F-16 fighter jets, according to people familiar with the matter, prompting a fresh protest from China amid its trade dispute with the U.S. President Donald Trump’s advisers encouraged Taiwan to submit a formal request for the jets, built by Lockheed Martin Corp., which it did this month, according to the people, who asked not be identified discussing internal discussions. Any such request would need to be converted into a formal proposal by the Defense and State Departments, and then Congress would have 30 days to decide whether to block the sale. “China’s position to firmly oppose arms sales to Taiwan is consistent and clear,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang told a regular news briefing Friday in Beijing. “We have made stern representations to the U.S. We have urged the U.S. to fully recognize the sensitivity of this issue and the harm it will cause.” The U.S., wary of antagonizing China, hasn’t sold advanced fighter jets since then-President George H.W. Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 1992. The Obama administration rejected a similar Taiwanese request for new jets, agreeing in 2011 to upgrade the island’s existing fleet. Trump has chosen a more assertive approach at a time when the administration is locked in difficult negotiations with Chinese President Xi Jinping over trade. He’s been prodded on by China hawks in Congress, who have passed legislation urging greater diplomatic and military ties with the democratically run island. It’s unclear whether a potential F-16 sale could become a bargaining chip in those talks or is solely an outgrowth of the administration’s renewed focus on Taiwan, a U.S. ally long seen as a bulwark against Chinese expansion in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. has stepped up naval patrols through the Taiwan Strait and past Chinese military outposts in the disputed South China Sea in recent months, drawing protests from Beijing. Mark Harrison, an adjunct director of Australian National University’s Australian Centre on China in the World, said China would calibrate its response to take account for a range of factors, including trade talks and local politics in Taipei. Xi might decide he needs to draw a firm line against perceived U.S. interference on Taiwan. “The intensity of politics and policy change in the Xi era has been reflected in recent instances of PRC government officials acting with relatively greater belligerence in sensitive policy areas,” Harrison said, referring to China’s formal name. “Taipei and Washington will no doubt be attentive to any unpredictable responses from Beijing to the proposed arms sale.”

### AT: No Tradeoff

#### Yes tradeoff – It’s reverse causal – Taiwan needs five types of tech that only the US can or will provide – the only ones with the tech are the US, Japan and some European countries – everyone but the US has said no to sales

Yeo 17 ---- Mike, Asia reporter for *Defense News*, “Taiwan Struggles to Acquire 5 Types of Submarine Tech for Local Program,” *Defense News*, 4/7, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/04/07/taiwan-struggles-to-acquire-5-types-of-submarine-tech-for-local-program/

MELBOURNE, Australia — Taiwan is short five critical pieces of submarine technology that it needs to achieve its aim of building a new class of indigenous submarines, according to a Taiwanese defense analyst. Speaking to Defense News, Liao Yen-fan, a Taipei-based analyst for the cybersecurity research firm Team T5 that also focuses on air power and the Taiwanese military, said the local defense industry still needs to import the technology for these five items, which include modern torpedo tubes and periscopes. Liao was citing representatives from Taiwan's Ching Fu Shipbuilding, the company in charge of designing the combat system and the largest subcontractor for Taiwan's domestic submarine program. The program currently is in the design phase and is led by the state-run National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, or NCSIST. CSBC Corporation is the main contractor. It's unclear what other critical submarine technology Taiwan requires, although it likely includes air-independent propulsion technology or an equivalent to allow the submarine to be practically silent when operating in a submerged environment. Liao told Defense News that Taiwanese delegations have recently been dispatched around the world to try and secure the needed technology transfer, including to the United States and Japan. However, it is understood that Japan has refused Taiwan's request for assistance, almost certainly out of fear of antagonizing China, which sees Taiwan as a breakaway province and has not ruled out the use of force to reunify the island with the mainland. A budget equivalent to $94.81 million has been allocated from December 2016 to December 2020 for the design of the new boats, according to an earlier report presented by Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. Construction of the boats will follow the design phase, with CSBC expecting the first submarine to be built in eight years and entering service with Taiwan's Navy 10 years after completion of the design. The Navy is in the process of upgrading its two Zwaardvis-class diesel-electric submarines purchased from the Netherlands in the 1980s, with local media reporting that NCSIST will enlist the help of foreign companies for the upgrade. The institute also completed an evaluation of periscope upgrades and is in the process of reviewing a design to upgrade their weapons systems. Submarines will be an important asymmetric capability and will complicate any attempt by China to take Taiwan by force, even though the former has undertaken a massive effort to modernize its armed forces and now outguns Taiwan by a significant margin. In contrast, Taiwan has been compelled to increasingly rely on local industry to meet its defense needs, with China having successfully used its substantial economic and political clout to restrict the sale of advanced weapons to Taiwan. This reluctance could prove to be a serious stumbling block to Taiwan's submarine ambitions. Several Western European countries, most notably Sweden, France and Germany, have established submarine programs and will possess the technology that Taiwan needs. However, like Japan, they would likely loathe to anger China with the sale of such significant weapons technology to Taiwan. Even the United States, which is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan, has severely limited its arms sales to what it deems as "self-defense" weapons. Taiwan is hoping that this will change under the Trump administration — hopes which have been given fresh impetus with reports in March that the administration is planning a new arms package for the east Asian island.

#### Cutting programs like indigenous subs allows re-investment in elastic denial-in-depth – status quo approach fails, but the aff frees up money for a better model of deterrence

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

In practice, accepting risk in the grey zone means that Taiwan’s military should continue to symbolically intercept intrusions and enforce claims. Yet it should do so without investing the time or energy to “eliminate” the grey zone option for China fully. Taiwan’s existing air and naval platforms are therefore “good enough.” Although aging frigates and fourth-generation fighters might not prevail against their Chinese counterparts in a war, they are certainly up to the task of conducting intercept, freedom of navigation, and presence missions. The flip side of this recommendation is that Taiwan should stop investing in developing its own cutting edge air and naval platforms, particularly the Indigenous Diesel Submarine (IDS), an Aegis-like destroyer and the F-35. Such platforms are “overkill” for dealing with the grey zone threat. More important, as we argue below and in Chapters 5 and 6, budget constraints mean Taiwan cannot possibly afford enough of these exquisite, high-end platforms to deter an invasion credibly. Instead, Taiwan should use what it saves from not investing in research, development, and procurement to transition to pursue an elastic denial in-depth concept.

#### No spending hikes – relative stability over time, pension shortfalls, public opposition, expenses of an AVF, and costs of added recruitment strategies

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

Yet a disconnect exists between the goals of a layered defensive scheme and the force structure, both current and planned. Rather than developing a force optimized for layered defense, Taiwan’s force planning remains focused on highend platforms in a manner that is inconsistent with their QDR. Moreover, Taiwan’s Armed Forces are trying to implement their new defense strategies while reacting to the evolving cross-Strait military balance within the difficult resource constraints imposed by a tight defense budget. Taiwan’s defense budget has been relatively stable at roughly $10B U.S. dollars over the past three years, rising negligibly from 319B NT in 2015 to 322B NT in 2017. Taiwan’s annual defense budget is thus less than 2% of GDP, although many Taiwan officials are optimistic that Taiwan will soon increase its defense budget to 2% of GDP.135 Unfortunately, it seems implausible that Taiwan will be able to increase its defense spending levels much higher than that. Current budgetary constraints, largely driven by public pension shortfalls, have already forced Taiwan to reduce its military pension payments for all but junior personnel, which resulted in domestic protests.136 The transition from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force (AVF) also comes with significant manpower costs that will further stress the defense budget. In response to the challenges associated with AVF recruiting, Taiwan is considering several proposals—such as increased education benefits for volunteers—that will further increase the manpower costs for Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense.137 The defense budget will be unlikely to support across-theboard modernization and rapid fielding of high-end platforms.

### AT: No War

#### Taiwan war causes extinction - no checks on escalation

Littlefield 15 (8/11, Alex Littlefield is a professor at Feng Chia University, Dr. Adam Lowther is Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air Force Global Strike Command, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/>)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. [US]To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States. China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood. China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity. Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons. Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate. While the scenario described is certainly not inevitable, the fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur, the United States may be unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe.

#### U.S.-China war causes nuclear extinction

Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” *Huntington News*, November 28th, Available Online at <http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446>)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

### Ext: Asymmetric Deterrence Good

#### China can’t isolate Taiwan – too big, sympathizers break through, planning, and geography

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

Taiwan is an island. China can cut the insurgency off from external support: Although Taiwan is an island, it is a large one. With nearly 14,000 square miles, it is approximately the same size as Massachusetts and New Jersey together. Its size, combined with over 700 miles of coastline, will make it nearly impossible for the PLA to maintain an airtight blockade. Sympathizers—both states and nonstate groups—will be able to use both traditional means, such as blockade running, and nontraditional methods, such as long-range drones, to support the insurgency. Nor will insurgents be exclusively dependent on help from the outside world. Part of organizing a Territorial Defense Force will entail establishing a complex network of weapons and ammunition caches. Insurgents will of course rely heavily on the local population for food, water, medical care, and intelligence. And, Taiwan’s insurgents will rely heavily on guerrilla operations against the PLA to keep themselves supplied. Additionally, Taiwan makes up for its lack of size with its geographic complexity. PLA forces will have to conduct counterinsurgency operations in some of the harshest conditions imaginable: jungles, mountains, and megacities.

#### China can’t crush resistance even if they have general success against insurgencies – Taiwan’s unique, it trades-off with other missions with PAP, and international backlash to PLA forces

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

China knows how to wage counterinsurgency: China has experience putting down insurgencies and suppressing rebellion. It has a People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) consisting of 1.5 million paramilitary troops specifically trained to handle internal security missions. And the PAP has experience maintaining order in China’s restive provinces. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate their ability to effectively neutralize an insurgency in Taiwan. First, the PAP has no experience waging a counterinsurgency under the conditions we describe. Maintaining order in Xinjiang is nothing like fighting guerillas in the midst of a conventional war. The American experience in Vietnam, in which U.S. units had to simultaneously contend with conventional and unconventional forces, is a closer approximation to the challenges that await China’s counterinsurgent units. Furthermore, to a greater degree than even the Viet Cong, Taiwan’s Territorial Defense Forces will have been explicitly organized, trained, and equipped for insurgency operations. Second, an insurgency in Taiwan puts China “on the horns of a dilemma.” Counterinsurgency operations are notoriously manpower intensive. China will need to deploy either large numbers of PLA or PAP units to deal with the insurgency. Both options come at a cost. History suggests that conventional combat units are slow to master counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, if China uses the PLA to deal with the insurgency, it is more likely than not to play into the guerilla’s strategy, relying heavily on firepower, ignoring political dynamics, and overreacting to provocations. Similarly, the more PLA units China sends to Taiwan, the more options the international community (perhaps moved to action by the insurgency) has to coerce China by threatening its interests around the world. Meanwhile, if China relies on PAP units, it will have to draw them from Xinjiang and other restive provinces. Rebel groups that want to pressure China into making concessions will likely take advantage of the reduced internal security presence. The more credibly Taiwan can threaten insurgency, the more China’s leaders will have to decide whether they are willing to trade Xinjiang for Taiwan.

### Ext: Jets Bad

#### Jets are irrelevant for capabilities – China’s too far ahead

Sputnik 19 ---- citing Paul Huang who is an East Asian columnist for *The Epoch Times* and master’s candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) along with Benjamin Cavender who is the Director of The China Market Research Group and MBA (Columbia University), “How Can Prospect of Taiwanese F-16 Procurement Affect US Trade Talks With China?” 3/26, https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201903261073564311-f-16-taiwan/

Huang, in turn, noted that the improved F-16s won't become a "game changing capability" in the region, as China has heavily modernised and expanded its fleet of aircraft over the last decade. China is currently developing a series of new jets and bombers to strengthen its aging fleet to meet modern demands. One of them, the J-20 fifth-generation stealth fighter jet, is regarded as a rival to the American F-22 and F-35. Another upcoming addition, the Hong-20 (H-20) long-range stealth bomber, is yet to be revealed.

#### Purchase of F-35s is worse for deterrence – adds operational risk, forces cuts to other jets, and ability to destroy small number of them on the ground – current jets are fine

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

Do Not Buy F-35Bs The F-35B provides much of what Taiwan’s political and military leaders want: fifth-generation, air-to-air, air-to-ground, and STOVL capabilities. Having the latest fighter aircraft would, in the eyes of many military, political, and academic officials whom we interviewed, achieve the goals of psychologically assuring the population and signaling to China that the United States has the resolve to intervene in any cross-Strait conflict. To be sure, a RAND study concludes that a Taiwan fighter fleet consisting entirely of F-35Bs would be more survivable than other potential force structure options. This conclusion holds even if budget constraints mean Taiwan must eliminate all of its existing fourth-generation aircraft and will be 85% smaller as a result. According to RAND, in a maritime blockade scenario, a small, “pure” F-35B force would suffer little to no attrition in the first 60 days in air-toair combat. Other force mixes (e.g., current mix, F-16 heavy) would endure substantial losses.159 Against current threats, the RAND study also suggests that a small fleet of F-35s would likely survive twice as long in air-to-air combat as the second-best-performing force structure package. Moreover, the F-35 package would likely inflict substantially more losses on Chinese aviation assets than any of the fourth-generation aircraft currently in the inventory. Nevertheless, we contend that the F-35B has more downsides than upsides. The entire option hinges on U.S. willingness to sell the aircraft to Taiwan, which is far from a foregone conclusion.160 More important, moving to a fighter force consisting only of F-35Bs represents substantial operational risk. In order to afford the high per unit cost of the F-35B while maintaining defense spending levels, Taiwan must retire its entire existing fleet of third- and fourth-generation fighter aircraft. That would shrink the force from more than 400 aircraft to just under 60. Such a modestly sized force brings to mind airpower theorist Giulio Douhet’s exhortation to destroy the enemy’s “eggs” (aircraft) and preferably when they are in the “nest” (air base).161 No aircraft, no matter how advanced, is worth the investment if the adversary can destroy it on the ground. This lack of value is especially true when we consider that PLA war-planners will have a far easier time preemptively locating, targeting and neutralizing 60 F-35Bs than they will 400 fourth-generation aircraft. Given that the PLA is likely to make extensive use of sleeper cells and pre-inserted special operations units to assassinate key leaders and sabotage critical infrastructure, even Taiwan’s vaunted caves may not offer sufficient protection to such a small fleet of high value targets.162 Finally, Taiwan’s existing fleet of fourth-generation aircraft are more than sufficient to handle grey zone operations, including intercept, surveillance and presence missions. Even if the F-35B is better at performing such tasks, the associated opportunity costs—in terms of both financial expense and the number of fourth-generation fighters Taiwan must give up to buy a meaningful number of F-35Bs—are prohibitive.

### Ext: Subs Bad

#### Subs won’t save Taiwan – shipbuilding challenges, failed deployment, and Chinese countermeasures

Wu 19 ---- Shang-Su, Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore), former teacher at the National Defense University in Taiwan, PhD (University of New South Wales, Australia), master’s degree of international relations (National Taiwan University), “Why New Submarines Alone Won't Save Taiwan from China,” 5/18, *The National Interest*, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-new-submarines-alone-wont-save-taiwan-china-57992> \*\*\*Modified for ableist language

Between this terrific picture of deterrence and the reality, shipbuilding is a major obstacle, but the deployment of submarines could also be grave. Due to the lack of public information, such as whether the design is really from scratch or based on a matured model, it would not be realistic to estimate the feasibility of the relatively short schedule; the first boat is planned to be launched in 2024, commissioned in another two years, followed by seven or more vessels. No matter how soon or how many of those submarines will be commissioned, their movement from their bases to tactical and operational locations is not only critical but also perilous. For most countries with certain strategic depth from their potential enemies, sailing submarines out of home bases would be plainly simple, but Taiwan resides in the PLAN’s operational sphere, and the Chinese may not take such a deployment for granted. If Taipei will not build new submarine bases, the current Zuoying naval base facing the Taiwan Strait could be directly attacked from Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as other munitions. Furthermore, since the Zuoying base is close to the Kaohsiung Port, a hub of sea lines of communication (SLOCs), numerous merchants passing nearby the base could present a means for the PLAN to take irregular operations. For instance, the covered PLAN personnel could create one or more “accidents” of sinking one or more ships into the underwater routes or use cargo ships as platforms of launching surprise strikes from missiles hidden in containers or other coverages, leaving less time for Zuoying to respond. To build one or more submarine bases in the East Coast of Taiwan would be better for less exposure and dispersing naval assets, in addition to close access to the deep Pacific Ocean, but such bases would not be trouble-free either. The deep water may also allow the PLAN to deploy one or a few submarines as “gatekeepers” to monitor the bases, and then follow any departing Taiwanese counterparts. According to the planned fleet size, and ratios of submarines in maintenance, training and duty, a maximal number of Taiwan’s submarines ready for operation could be six or seven, and it is not impossible for the PLAN to carry out this gatekeeping tactic. Moreover, Beijing’s espionage may pave ways for several irregular measures of neutralizing Taipei’s submarine capability, such as cyber-attack, sabotage of key facilities, the assassination of key crews or ~~paralyzing~~ [blocking] the command chain. As a submarine force is intensive regarding technologies and human capital, such internal attacks could be more destructive. Owing to the limited durability of diesel-electric submarines, loss of logistical support could crucially erode Taiwan’s underwater capability regardless of base locations. The various espionage cases exposed in Taiwan also signify the danger and feasibility of such internal threats. Undeniably, each kind of threat to Taiwan’s submarines corresponds to respective countermeasures. Since the era of U-boats, fortified bases, such as submarine pens covered with heavy concrete, have had their toughness proven under massive bombardment and are still utilized by many submarine operators, including China, to date. To extend restricted zones in the front of the Zuoying and other naval bases would prevent or at least reduce the obstruction of sunk ships and other tactics using civilian vessels as platforms. Tightening internal security measures, such as border control and base defense, would constrain the space for Chinese spies and special forces to operate. Improvement of maritime surveillance and other anti-submarine capabilities would thwart the gatekeeping tactic. In other words, Taipei has a range of works to prepare in parallel with the undergoing shipbuilding. In addition, despite the relatively independent nature of submarines, they are neither really isolated from other security factors nor a strategic panacea. If Taiwan does not comprehensively beef up its general conditions for defense, submarines alone would not make a major change to the island’s difficult security circumstance.

#### Subs get targeted, are maintenance-intensive, are too few, and can’t respond to grey zone provocations

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

The other problem is operational. Even if Taiwan manages to develop and produce eight submarines, such a force is unlikely to enhance Taiwan’s conventional deterrence capabilities significantly. China will place a high priority on locating and destroying all eight submarines. Any of Taiwan’s submarines anchored in port will be vulnerable to sabotage and preemptive missile strikes. Submarines are also maintenance-intensive. The length of maintenance cycles mean that Taiwan will have a hard time getting most of its eight submarines to sea at one time despite having early warning. Submarines that receive early warning and sortie, as well as those already at sea, will be the targets of a sustained PLAN antisubmarine campaign. Taiwan will therefore have too few operational platforms to threaten seriously an invasion force. This constraint limits their IDS program’s ability to achieve the desired deterrent effect. Nor are submarines useful for responding to grey zone provocations. After all, their ostensible purpose is to remain undetected until called upon to carry out a combat mission. Thus, the IDS program comes at a significant expense without clearly enhancing Taiwan’s deterrence-bydenial capability.

#### Indigenous Taiwanese subs provoke China and risk cross-strait war

Martina 18 ---- Michael, senior correspondent for *Reuters*, M.A. in international relations and China studies (University of Washington), “China Demands Halt of U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan,” World News, 4/9, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa-submarines/china-demands-halt-of-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan-idUSKBN1HG1QJ>

China said on Monday that it opposed the United States selling weapons to Taiwan, after the Trump administration approved the marketing license required for American manufacturers to sell technology to Taiwan that would allow for building submarines. Taiwan’s Central News Agency said on Saturday that Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence confirmed the U.S. Department of State had agreed to grant the license needed to sell the technology to Taiwan so the self-ruled island could build its own submarines. China’s Defence Ministry, responding to a journalist’s question in an online statement about the issue, demanded that the United States “halt all forms of military links between the United States and Taiwan, as well as all forms of weapon sales to Taiwan”. “China’s military has the ability and determination to defeat all attempts to separate our country, and will adopt all necessary measures to resolutely defend national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity,” ministry spokesman Wu Qian said. He did not elaborate. Taiwan is one of China’s most sensitive issues. The island is claimed by Beijing as its sacred territory, part of “one China”, and Beijing has never renounced the use of force to bring under Chinese control what it considers to be a wayward province. The U.S. State Department over the weekend declined to confirm the details of the Taiwan news report. A State Department official had said the agency continued to review Taiwan’s defense needs and referred questions about specific procurement plans to Taiwanese authorities. China’s hostility to Taiwan has grown since Tsai Ing-wen from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party was elected Taiwanese president in 2016. China fears she wants to push for formal independence, though Tsai says she wants to maintain the status quo and is committed to peace.

### Ext: Grey Zone Defense Fails

#### Bolstering Taiwan’s deterrence of Chinese grey zone intrusions causes more escalatory approaches – risks war

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

At the same time, the ability to counter grey zone challenges should not drive Taiwan’s force posture or deterrent strategy. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, as much as grey zone provocations might erode public and international confidence, establish “new facts on the ground,” or provide China with better intelligence on Taiwan’s military capabilities, they do not represent an existential threat. Put another way, China could invade Taiwan without first conducting grey zone operations. But no matter how successful or effective China becomes at operating “in the grey zone,” such operations will never compel Taiwan to acquiesce to China’s ultimate demands on their own. If Taiwan’s government and people were to submit themselves to China based on grey zone challenges alone, then Taiwan would have far more profound sources of vulnerability than any military strategy can solve. Second, and relatedly, we believe that Taiwan is better off leaving the door to grey zone provocations open. Counterintuitively, states choose to operate in the grey zone precisely because they want to avoid escalation. Completely blocking their ability to operate in the grey zone leaves them with only two options: do nothing or accept escalation. Given that Taiwan remains a core national interest to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), “doing nothing” is not an option. Since Taiwan lacks the resources to fully counter both grey zone and invasion threats, eliminating the grey zone may well convince China’s leaders to attempt something far worse. In essence, if Taiwan must choose between focusing on the grey zone threat or the invasion threat, then it is much better off “closing the door” to invasion than it is “closing the door” to the grey zone.

### AT: Offensive Realism

#### Defensive realism best explains Chinese foreign policy.

Tang 8 — Tang Shiping, Professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University (Shanghai), Adjunct Professor at the Center for Regional Security Studies and former Associate Professor at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science (Beijing), former Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), former Co-Director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue, holds a Ph.D. in Molecular Biology and Genetics from Wayne State University School of Medicine and an M. A. in International Studies from the University of California-Berkeley, 2008 (“From Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of China’s Security Strategy,” *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, Edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, Published by Cornell University Press, ISBN 9780801446917, p. 152-156)

China’s Security Strategy: From Offensive to Defensive Realism There is little doubt that China’s security strategy is still firmly rooted in realism.37 In seeking to overcome the memory of “a century of national [end page 152] humiliation” (bainian guochi) at the hands of the West and Japan, generations of Chinese have strived to build a strong and prosperous China. Many Chinese elites believe that because of its size, population, civilization, history and, more recently, its growing wealth, China should be regarded as a great power (da guo). This strong belief in the utility of power and the motivation to accumulate power firmly anchors China’s security strategy within the realist camp. The more important question is whether China is an offensive realist or a defensive realist state.38 Mao: Offensive Realism China’s security strategy under Mao was largely offensive realist in nature.39 China under Mao expounded an intolerant ideology of overthrowing all imperialist or reactionary regimes in Asia and the world at large. More importantly, China under Mao (together with the former Soviet Union) actively supported revolutions (or insurgencies) in many developing countries, thus intentionally threatening those countries that it had identified as imperialists or their lackeys (zougou) and proxies (dailiren). This sense of being threatened was perhaps most severe among China’s neighboring states that were allies of the United States and its Western allies (e.g., Southeast Asian countries).40 Second, as a staunch Marxist- Leninist, Mao believed that conflicts in international politics were necessary and inevitable. To transform the world into a socialist world, struggles—including armed struggles—against imperialists and their proxies were necessary. As a result, despite having settled some major disputes with several neighboring states (e.g., Burma, Mongolia, Pakistan), seeking security through cooperation was never high on the agenda of China’s strategy at that time. [end page 153] Third, China under Mao largely believed that all of the People’s Republic’s security problems were due to other countries’ evil policies,41 rather than the interactions between China and other states. In essence, China under Mao had little understanding of the dynamics of the security dilemma.42 As a result, other than the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co- existence,”43 China under Mao initiated few measures to assure regional states of China’s benign intentions. Deng: The Transition to Defensive Realism Among China hands, there is little disagreement over the largely defensive realist nature of China’s security strategy today, whether China is labeled an “integrationist” power, a “globalist” power, a nonrevisionist and nonimperial power, or simply a state embracing “defensive realism and beyond”; or whether China’s grand strategy and diplomacy is characterized as neo- Bismarckian, “New Diplomacy,” or “engaging Asia.”44 At the very least, most analysts reject the notion that China is an offensive-realist state (i.e., an expansionist, revisionist, or imperialist one) today. There are at least four strands of evidence supporting the argument that post- Mao China has gradually transformed itself into a state embracing defensive realism. The first is perhaps the most obvious. China has toned down its revolutionary rhetoric and has backed up its words with deeds. Most clearly, it has stopped supporting insurgencies in other countries, even if they were initiated by communist elements. [end page 154] The second is that China has now clearly recognized some of the most critical aspects of the security dilemma and its implications.45 Touring several Southeast Asian countries in 1978, Deng Xiaoping was given his first lesson on the security dilemma. He was surprised to find that China’s earlier policies of exporting revolution and its unwillingness to resolve the issue of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had made many Southeast Asian countries suspicious of China’s intentions.46 As a result, Deng realized that China’s security conundrum in the 1960s and 1970s had not been the work of external forces alone but was rather an outcome of the interaction between China’s behavior and the outside world. This interdependent and interactive nature of security is, of course, one of the major aspects of the security dilemma. The third strand of evidence is that China has demonstrated self-restraint and willingness to be constrained by others. This aspect is perhaps most prominently demonstrated in China’s memberships in international organizations and institutions as well as its increased presence in treaties since 1980s.47 Because international organizations, institutions, and treaties are all rule-based, China’s increasing membership in them and its compliance with the rules there were in place before its entry (i.e., that were made by others) unambiguously signals its willingness to be restrained by others.48 Finally, security through cooperation, the hallmark of defensive realism, has become a pillar of China’s security strategy under Deng. Two aspects of this dimension are worth noting. The first is that China has pursued a strategy of maintaining amicable relationships with its neighbors (mulin youhao, wending zhoubian) since Deng, mostly through reassurance and building [end page 155] cooperation.49 While such a strategy certainly has a dose of hedging against the bad times of U.S.- China relations embedded in it, the strategy still reduces the anxiety among neighboring countries about China’s rise, thus helping to alleviate the security dilemma between China and regional states. The second is that China has also ventured into multilateral security cooperation organizations and institutions, mostly prominently the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Shanghai Cooperative Organizations. While these security cooperation institutions may or may not have changed states’ choice of goals, they have institutionalized a degree of (security) cooperation among states, thus changing states’ preferences for strategies. As a result, the security dilemma between China and regional states has not been exacerbated but rather alleviated.50 Overall, there is ample evidence to support the interpretation that China’s current security strategy is firmly rooted in defensive realism, with a dose of instrumentalist institutionalism.

#### No expansionism impact — China’s not Nazi Germany.

White 13 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2013 (“Dealing With China,” *The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power*, Published by Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199684717, p. 163-165)

Appeasement and the Lesson of Munich

In 1938, Neville Chamberlain of Britain believed he could do a deal with Hitler, satisfying Nazi ambitions for power in Europe while avoiding war, by conceding to Hitler what he was threatening to take by force. Chamberlain called his policy ‘appeasement,’ and he did his deal with Hitler in Munich. Hitler wasn’t satisfied, and war came the next year. Many people today will see the idea of accommodating China’s ambitions for more power and influence in Asia as making the same mistake. It is a potent charge. A great deal of debate about foreign policy is conducted through historical analogies, and Munich is the most potent historical analogy there is. That makes ‘appeasement’ the most powerful word in the foreign policy lexicon – a one-word refutation that can kill off any proposal without further analysis. No wonder it is so often used. Indeed, there has hardly been a major foreign policy question since 1939 in which Munich has not been invoked, including Korea, Berlin, Taiwan, Suez, Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (twice). In few of these crises, if any, did the lesson of Munich do much to help make good policy. More often it proved disastrously misleading. Nonetheless, the lesson of Munich remains potent, and its application to America’s choices today deserves to be addressed seriously. First, we need to be clear just what Munich’s lesson is supposed to be. The popular view – popular with experts as well as with the public – is simply that it is always wrong to accommodate, to any degree at all, any ambitious power seeking [end page 163] more authority and influence, no matter what the cost of such intransigence. This assumes that every future ambitious power will be as insatiable as Nazi Germany proved to be, and therefore is certain to challenge our most vital interests eventually. It therefore also assumes that war against it is inevitable if its ambitions are not resisted absolutely, and that if it is resisted absolutely it will back down and accept the status quo. The Munich metaphor thus embodies a curious mix of pessimism and optimism. It pessimistically assumes that China’s ambitions are as insatiable as Hitler’s were, but at the same time it optimistically assumes those ambitions will disappear if we simply stand firm and refuse to accommodate them. Both assumptions are quite likely to be wrong, and if we accept them uncritically we run a terrible risk of fighting a great power with whom we might have been able to live in peace. So simply falling back on Munich is no substitute for serious analysis. Before applying the Munich metaphor to our present situation, we have to consider how far China today resembles Nazi Germany in 1938. There are two questions here. First, how sure are we that China is as insatiable as Nazi Germany was? For some people, the fact that China wants any changes at all in the Asian order is sufficient to prove that it is determined to overthrow it completely, as Hitler was in Europe. If China is not willing to accept US primacy, so the argument goes, it must be determined to dominate Asia itself, at any cost. There is no basis for this assumption. No doubt there are some people in China who nurse such ambitions, and in future they could become more influential. But nothing in China’s conduct in recent decades provides a strong reason to believe that these are its ambitions today, or that they are likely to become so in future. [end page 164] Indeed, the evidence points the other way. China is ambitious, but it is also cautious and conservative. It seems willing to balance its desire for increased influence with its need to maintain order, and to avoid too direct a conflict with the United States. Some would cite Chinese policy towards Taiwan as a counter-example. But it is a very big stretch to conclude that Beijing is committed to the subjugation of Asia on the basis of its policy towards what all acknowledge to be part of its territory. Second, how sure are we that if America stands up to China, the challenge it poses to the regional order will disappear? Part of the Munich folklore is that had Chamberlain stood up to him in 1938, Hitler’s authority in Germany would have been destroyed, he would have been deposed by the Generals, and Germany’s challenge to the European order would have evaporated. Whether this was true is highly contestable. But in any case it is certainly not much use in helping to shape policy towards China today. It is a matter of power. China today is much more powerful relative to its potential adversaries than Germany was in 1938. It is naive to think that if we just say no to China today, it will back off and become reconciled to the status quo indefinitely. All this suggests we should be careful about applying the lessons of Munich to America’s choices in Asia today. The simple fact is that China is nothing like Nazi Germany. It is both a lot more powerful and a lot less reckless. We will get China wrong if we lazily assume that what might have worked in Europe seventy-five years ago will now work in Asia.

### AT: US Commitment Signal

#### US commitment weak and poorly signaled because of its commitment to strategic ambiguity

Hunzeker and Lanoszka 18 ---- Michael A. Hunzeker is an assistant professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), former postdoctoral research associate and lecturer in public affairs (Princeton University), Ph.D. in Public Affairs (Princeton University), Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (Princeton University), B.A. in political science (University of California, Berkeley), Alexander Lanoszka is an assistant professor (University of Waterloo)*,* former US Foreign Policy and International Security Fellow (Dartmouth University), former Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics (Princeton University), and B.A. in IR (University of Windsor), *A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture*, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government (George Mason University), November, http://csps.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/A-Question-of-Time.pdf

A second assumption is two-fold: that the United States will intervene and that receipt of the latest U.S. weaponry signals U.S. resolve to China. This assumption is perhaps even more dangerous because determining exactly how the United States might respond to an invasion scenario is difficult. The United States has long maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity.” Although some scholars point to a historically robust amount of weapons sales to Taiwan since 2008 as evidence of deterrence, others suggest that the United States strives to avoid direct military intervention.172 The fact of the matter is that it is anyone’s guess whether the United States would risk nuclear conflict with China over Taiwan. At a minimum, enough uncertainty surrounds how the United States might react that Taiwan’s defense planners should not build Taiwan’s deterrence posture on the assumption that the United States can— or will—intervene.

### AT: Hegemony Impact

#### Hegemony is resilient – geography, tech, innovation, economic power, political cohesiveness, military, strategic depth, infrastructure, commodity production, lack of threats, and low trade exposure

Stratfor 16 ---- “The Decline of the Dollar Is Not the Decline of the United States,” 5/2, <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/decline-dollar-not-decline-united-states>

The United States' strength as a superpower rests on several pillars, including its geography, technological prowess, culture of innovation, financial and economic flexibility, relative political cohesiveness and military dominance. While any single pillar might weaken at one time, collectively, they give the United States a well-rounded foundation and lend it far more flexibility in dealing with its problems than any other nation. At the heart of U.S. power is its geography and the strategic depth that this geography provides. The nation's vast internal infrastructure is buoyed by a robust national highway system, as well as the globe's largest rail system and longest internal waterway network. Moreover, the United States is self-sufficient in almost all major industrial and agricultural commodities, with the exception of petroleum. Even then, it is the world's largest petroleum producer. The United States has no strategic threats on its immediate borders, with even further depth supported, for now, by its military and aerospace power. This geographical productivity and external security allow it to take a hands-off economic approach unmatched by most other economies. Its free economic environment cultivates a strong entrepreneurial culture and allows venture capital platforms to flourish; gives it leadership roles in innovation and research and development in all areas of technology and academia; enables a robust financial center; and creates a flexible labor market. In total, U.S. economic power is far from just a consequence of the dollar's hegemony in global finance and makes it a magnet for capital and investment accumulation. A few countries have replicated aspects of those strengths, but no single country has done so on the scale of the United States. For example, the United States sits at or near the top in every category of technological development, while other countries can only lead in some areas. On the whole, the United States can satisfy most of its economic needs, making it one of the world's few heavily industrialized countries with little trade exposure. This gives it more resilience than others to withstand downturns in global trade. No other country can take solace in this fact. Modern China emerged from a bitter internal civil war in the aftermath of Japanese occupation, compelling it to overcome its internal tension by employing a centralized economic system with strong government oversight of its corporate structure. The same is true of Japan's keiretsu and South Korea's chaebol, both closely linked corporate systems. This type of economy is also prevalent in Europe, where a high level of regulation has quashed any chance of developing an entrepreneurial tech hub on the scale of California's Silicon Valley.

#### Heg fails to solve war

Fettweis 11 **(**Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

## 2AC - RELATIONS ADVANTAGE

### AT: Alt Causes

#### No alt causes – arms sales are the most sensitive issue in relations

Li 19 ---- Li Xia, editor for *Xinhua*, “US Arms Sales to Taiwan A Dangerous Move,” 4/17, <http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/17/c_137985601.htm>

The U.S. arms sale plan unveiled Monday is a dangerous move that will only aggravate the already complex and grim situation across the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. government has approved a possible 500-million-U.S. dollar military sale to Taiwan, claiming that the move will help to improve the security and defensive capability of the recipient. Subsequently, Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen expressed "gratitude," saying that the arms sale was "timely." The situation across the Taiwan Strait, which is already complicated and grim, is worsening as the United States has been using Taiwan to contain China while the Taiwan administration kept seeking foreign intervention. The Taiwan question concerns China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and is the most important and sensitive issue in China-U.S. relations. The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan constitutes a serious violation of international law, the basic norms governing international relations, the one-China principle and the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques and undermine China's sovereignty and security interests. China's firm opposition to such arms sales is consistent and firm. Since the current U.S. administration took office, it has constantly played the "Taiwan card" to contain China, especially in arms sales to Taiwan and military exchanges between the United States and Taiwan. This has seriously damaged China-U.S. relations and jeopardized peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan question, which concerns China's core interests and the national bond of the Chinese people, brooks no external interference. The U.S. administration has once again stirred up sensitive nerves in the Taiwan Strait. Its gross interference in China's internal affairs has aroused the strong indignation of the Chinese people on both sides of the Strait. Some Taiwan organizations and people protested outside the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in Taipei, condemning U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and demanding "no war, only peace," and "Taiwan is not a pawn for the United States." Therefore, we would like to advise the U.S. side to clearly recognize the high sensitivity and serious harm of arms sales to Taiwan, correct mistakes, honor its commitments and handle Taiwan-related issues in a prudent and proper manner in accordance with the one-China principle and the provisions of the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques. Taiwan's current Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, which is teetering on the brink of collapse, was overjoyed at the U.S. arms sales as if it had been given a "straw to save its life." Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP administration have escalated provocations against the Chinese mainland, created disturbances recently and cooperated with the United States in vigorously clamoring the so-called "military threat" from the mainland. In the face of next year's general election on the island, Tsai and the DPP will not hesitate to let Taiwan serve as a pawn for forces of external interference in order to protect their power, regardless of the safety and well-being of the Taiwanese people. This party has not only misjudged the situation but also deviated from the people's heart. U.S. weapons cannot guarantee Taiwan's security. Tsai and the DPP cannot secure their power and position by seeking foreign interference or threatening the people. Tsai, the DPP and "Taiwan independence" separatist elements should not play with fire or even think about it. They are doomed to be alone in the face of the pressure of their own actions. On April 17, 124 years ago, the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, securing foreigner's occupation of Taiwan for half a century. It left lasting, painful memories for all Chinese. Today's China will never allow the historical tragedy of national division to repeat itself. No one and no force should underestimate the determination and capability of the Chinese in safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

### AT: Empirically Denied

#### Past sales don’t disprove the advantage – F-16s are a unique shift

Japan Times 19 ---- “Trump's Sale of F-16 Fighters to Taiwan Seen Making China Nervous Politically,” *Bloomberg* via *The Japan Times*, 4/1, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/01/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/trumps-sale-f-16-fighters-taiwan-seen-making-china-nervous-politically/#.XOWPushKist

Still, the F-16 sale would represent a shift by the U.S., which is obligated to sell “arms of a defensive character” to Taipei under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. Presidents since Bill Clinton have repeatedly rebuffed Taiwan’s requests for new fighter jets and other advanced weapons systems that could provoke Beijing, with Barack Obama agreeing in 2011 to merely upgrade its aging F-16 fleet. Tsai said during her visit to Hawaii on Wednesday that a fighter jet deal would “greatly enhance our land and air capabilities, strengthen military morale and show to the world the U.S.’s commitment to Taiwan’s defense.” The F-16Vs requested by Taiwan are promoted as the world’s most advanced fourth-generation jet, including the latest radar and avionics, even though the original F16 model has been in service for more than 40 years. The aircraft would help the island respond day-to-day incidents such as air space incursions that fall short of open war and mop up data during routine patrols. China, which suspended military exchanges with the U.S. in response to previous sales, protested the F-16 move. The foreign ministry said the country lodged “stern representations” with U.S. while the defense ministry warned against moves that undercut the contention that the mainland and Taiwan are part of “one China.” “Any words or actions that undermine the one-China policy are tantamount to shaking the foundation of China-U.S. relations, are inconsistent with the fundamental interests of China and the United States and are also extremely dangerous,” Senior Col. Wu Qian said at a briefing Thursday in Beijing.

#### Sale of jets at this time would be a particularly powerful strain on US-China relations – it’s different than previous sales back to 1992

Panda 19 ---- Ankit, Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists, Senior Editor at *The Diplomat*, Columnist for *the South China Morning Post*, B.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs (Princeton University), former Researcher and Research Specialist in the Department of Political Science at Princeton University, former online editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, “Are the US and China About to Face off Over American Fighter Sales to Taiwan?” *The Diplomat*, 3/25, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/are-the-us-and-china-about-to-face-off-over-american-fighter-sales-to-taiwan/

The United States and China appear to be heading toward a major confrontation over the possible sale of American fighters to Taiwan. Last week, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen confirmed that the country’s Ministry of Defense had submitted a formal request to Washington, D.C., to purchase F-16V Viper fighters. Tsai said the decision to make the request was supported by a review of Taiwan’s defense needs. Days later, Bloomberg News reported that the White House was poised to approve the Taiwanese request. If that report is true, the United States would be turning course on what has been a longstanding reluctance to sell fighters to Taiwan, even as it has authorized other arms sales in line with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the U.S. government to support Taiwan “with arms of a defensive character.” Even as the Obama administration and the Trump administration have approved weapons and spare parts for sale to Taiwan, fighters have long been seen as a bridge too far given Beijing serious reservations. The United States authorized the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in 1992. The Obama administration, after receiving a request from Taipei, turned it down, initiating a set of upgrades instead to Taipei’s existing fleet. The issue hasn’t gone unnoticed in China, where Taiwan is seen as an inherent part of the country. Relations across the Taiwan Strait have been particularly strained since Tsai’s inauguration in 2016. The Taiwanese president hails from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), though she herself has not explicitly supported independence — long a red-line for Beijing — Tsai, however, has refused to endorse the so-called “1992 consensus,” which her predecessor had supported and which forms what Beijing sees as the baseline for cordial cross-strait relations. “China’s position to firmly oppose arms sales to Taiwan is consistent and clear,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang said during a press briefing on Friday. “We have made stern representations to the U.S. We have urged the U.S. to fully recognize the sensitivity of this issue and the harm it will cause.” The prospect of a fighter sale to Taiwan this time comes at a time of particularly heightened U.S.-China tensions. The Trump administration has been known to seek leverage with Beijing across issues and it is possible that this may turn into the latest case of Taiwan being used a possible bargaining chip as Trump seeks to clinch a favorable trade deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump, however, has been unconventional on Taiwan policy in the past. As president-elect, he broke expectations by receiving a telephone call from Tsai. That call occurred at a time when Trump had yet to endorse the United States’ one-China policy as president — something that he did for the first time in February 2017. Either way, Tsai’s fighter request and the Trump administration’s reported acceptance could set up another major area of turbulence between the United States and China.

### AT: No Backlash

#### Status quo causes serious tensions – it’s a redline that threatens relations

Wong 19 ---- Catherine, Beijing correspondent with *the South China Morning Post*, former China news reporter for *Global Times*, B.A. in contemporary English studies (Lingnan University), “US Playing A Dangerous Game by Supporting Taiwan, China’s Defence Ministry Says,” *SCMP*, 3/28, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3003621/us-responding-positively-taiwans-request-tanks-and-jets-says

Beijing on Thursday warned that it would be “very dangerous” for Washington to continue its support for Taiwan and that it would “take all necessary measures” against “external forces” and parties in the self-ruled island that promote its independence. The comments were made at a press conference by defence ministry spokesman Wu Qian who said that Beijing was also firmly opposed to the US selling arms and having military contact with Taiwan, and that political reunification across the Taiwan Strait was inevitable. The warning comes amid rising tensions between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan. Even as the two countries near a deal on trade, Washington has become increasingly active in challenging Beijing on the geopolitical front, with the Taiwan issue being one of Beijing’s red lines. At the weekend, the US sent navy and coastguard ships through the Taiwan Strait in a sign of its increasingly frequent and robust presence in the strategic waterway, and an apparent show of support for Taipei. The US is also likely to sell Taiwan a new batch of advanced weaponry, including F-16 fighters and M1 tanks, the island’s President Tsai Ing-wen said on Wednesday during a stopover in Hawaii at the end of her Pacific tour. “Fortunately … Taiwan does not stand alone,” Tsai said. “The United States’ commitment to Taiwan is stronger than ever.” The president said also that she felt the process of US arms sales to Taiwan had become less politicised. “We are able to have frank discussions with the US on the right equipment for Taiwan’s defence and the US is responding positively to our request,” she said. Last week, US China hawk Peter Navarro, the director of the White House’s Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, wrote in The New York Times that Taiwan might soon buy 108 M-1 tanks. Separately, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told a congressional hearing on Wednesday that the US would take more action in line with the Taiwan Travel Act, which aims to promote high-level exchanges between government officials from the two sides. Wu, however, warned that such moves could be damaging to relations between China and the US. “We are firmly opposed to US arms sales to Taiwan and US military contact with Taiwan,” he said. “The Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair, concerns China’s core interests and the national bond of the Chinese people – it allows no outside interference.”

#### It thrashes relations – sale of jets is irrelevant militarily but says “we don’t care what China thinks”

Japan Times 19 ---- “Trump's Sale of F-16 Fighters to Taiwan Seen Making China Nervous Politically,” *Bloomberg* via *The Japan Times*, 4/1, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/04/01/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/trumps-sale-f-16-fighters-taiwan-seen-making-china-nervous-politically/#.XOWPushKist

The U.S. may finally sell Taiwan the warplanes it has sought for more than a decade to defend against China. Their arrival would deal more of a political shock than a military blow to Beijing.

Trump administration officials have given tacit approval to Taipei’s request to buy more than 60 Lockheed Martin Corp. F-16s, according to people familiar with the matter, setting the stage for the first such deal since 1992. While a few dozen fighter jets would hardly tip the military balance against the increasing powerful Chinese military, it would signal a new American willingness to back the democratically run island.

“For Beijing, it would be a huge shock,” said Wu Shang-su, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.”

### Ext: Disease Impact

#### Extinction---defense is wrong

Piers Millett 17, Consultant for the World Health Organization, PhD in International Relations and Affairs, University of Bradford, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, “Existential Risk and Cost-Effective Biosecurity”, Health Security, Vol 15(4), <http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/hs.2017.0028>

Historically, disease events have been responsible for the greatest death tolls on humanity. The 1918 flu was responsible for more than 50 million deaths,1 while smallpox killed perhaps 10 times that many in the 20th century alone.2 The Black Death was responsible for killing over 25% of the European population,3 while other pandemics, such as the plague of Justinian, are thought to have killed 25 million in the 6th century—constituting over 10% of the world’s population at the time.4 It is an open question whether a future pandemic could result in outright human extinction or the irreversible collapse of civilization. A skeptic would have many good reasons to think that existential risk from disease is unlikely. Such a disease would need to spread worldwide to remote populations, overcome rare genetic resistances, and evade detection, cures, and countermeasures. Even evolution itself may work in humanity’s favor: Virulence and transmission is often a trade-off, and so evolutionary pressures could push against maximally lethal wild-type pathogens.5,6 While these arguments point to a very small risk of human extinction, they do not rule the possibility out entirely. Although rare, there are recorded instances of species going extinct due to disease—primarily in amphibians, but also in 1 mammalian species of rat on Christmas Island.7,8 There are also historical examples of large human populations being almost entirely wiped out by disease, especially when multiple diseases were simultaneously introduced into a population without immunity. The most striking examples of total population collapse include native American tribes exposed to European diseases, such as the Massachusett (86% loss of population), Quiripi-Unquachog (95% loss of population), and theWestern Abenaki (which suffered a staggering 98% loss of population). In the modern context, no single disease currently exists that combines the worst-case levels of transmissibility, lethality, resistance to countermeasures, and global reach. But many diseases are proof of principle that each worst-case attribute can be realized independently. For example, some diseases exhibit nearly a 100% case fatality ratio in the absence of treatment, such as rabies or septicemic plague. Other diseases have a track record of spreading to virtually every human community worldwide, such as the 1918 flu,10 and seroprevalence studies indicate that other pathogens, such as chickenpox and HSV-1, can successfully reach over 95% of a population.11,12 Under optimal virulence theory, natural evolution would be an unlikely source for pathogens with the highest possible levels of transmissibility, virulence, and global reach. But advances in biotechnology might allow the creation of diseases that combine such traits. Recent controversy has already emerged over a number of scientific experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility, lethality, and/or the ability to overcome therapeutics.13-17 Other experiments demonstrated that mousepox could be modified to have a 100% case fatality rate and render a vaccine ineffective.18 In addition to transmissibility and lethality, studies have shown that other disease traits, such as incubation time, environmental survival, and available vectors, could be modified as well.19-2

#### Burnout wrong because of mutations and transfer – independent, huge ABR crisis looming

Tyson 12 ---- Greg, syndicated science columnist, PhD student in microbiology (Northwestern), “Tipping Point: The Threat of Antibiotic Resistance,” Helix, 8/17, <http://helix.northwestern.edu/article/tipping-point-threat-antibiotic-resistance>

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nearly 90,000 people die each year in the United States from antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections. That is more deaths than breast and prostate cancer combined. While MRSA (methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus) is the most publicized of the antibiotic-resistant bacteria, it is just one of many. In fact, other bacteria that kill thousands of people each year include Pseudomonas aeruginosa, Klebsiella pneumoniae, and Acinetobacter baumannii. These bacteria are all resistant to at least some antibiotics, giving them the name “superbugs”, and the number of infections resistant even to antibiotics of last resort is increasing. How did this happen? We did it to ourselves. Antibiotics are omnipresent in the Western world, overprescribed for patients who demand them even when they have viral infections. Then these same patients fail to take the prescription to completion, allowing some bacteria to survive. As a result, bacterial resistance can develop by mutations of genes that antibiotics target, or even from transfer of antibiotic-resistant genes between bacteria. This makes bacterial infections difficult to treat. Resistant bacteria multiply and spread, since they are able to survive the constant antibiotic onslaught. When a serious bacterial infection develops, it is likely that the infection is due to antibiotic-resistant bacteria, which limits treatment options. This is especially a problem in hospitals, which are breeding grounds for resistant organisms. Hospitals have a large number of susceptible people with compromised immune systems, making a haven for sick people into a dangerous place. Similarly, antibiotics are overused on cattle, often using them as prophylaxis, preventative medicine, on animals that are not sick, instead of only treating infected animals. All of these situations select for the bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics. We’ve reached a tipping point. For a while we had many antibiotics in our arsenal to treat bacterial infections, so even if treatment with one antibiotic failed, there were other options. Unfortunately that is often no longer true, with resistance emerging faster than new therapies. The problem is that drug companies prefer to make medication for chronic conditions, such as cancer or heart disease, since their long-term treatment is much more profitable. In fact, according to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 21 new drugs have been approved for cancer treatment since the beginning of last year. In the same time frame, just one new bacterial treatment has been approved. As a result, we are left with too few antibiotic options and patients have to be put on antibiotics of last resort. These have worse side effects and require long-term treatments. And even these drugs sometimes fail. This leaves us unable to treat infections we once were able to cure.

### Ext: Terror Impact

#### The risk has never been higher – a single-attack kills millions and escalates global conflict – goes nuclear

Arguello 18 (Irma, founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network, degree in physics, a Master’s in business administration, and completed graduate studies in defense and security, “The global impacts of a terrorist nuclear attack: What would happen? What should we do?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2-21, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1436812>)

Though hard to accept, the detonation of a nuclear device – by states or non-state actors – is today a plausible scenario. And while much of the world’s focus has been on the current nuclear weapons arsenals possessed by states – about 14,550 warheads, all of which carry the risk of intentional or unintentional use – the threat of nuclear terrorism is here and increasing. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda, Aum Shinrikyo, and other terrorist groups have expressed their desire to acquire fissile material to build and detonate an improvised nuclear bomb. None of them could fulfill that goal – so far. But that does not mean that they will not succeed in the future. Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-first use, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

### Ext: Trade Deal

#### Economic decline causes global nuclear war

Tønnesson 15 – Stein Tønnesson, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace Program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

#### Turns every impact

Kemp 10 – Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-234

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.