# Human Rights AFF

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## 1AC CASE

### 1ac – Human Rights Advantage

#### Our First Contention is “Human Rights”

#### Trump’s new arms sales policy is rooted in a transactional approach that signals to the world that human rights don’t matter.

Abramson, 18 --- nonresident senior fellow for arms control and conventional arms transfers at the Arms Control Association (8/8/18, Jeff, “U.S. Arms Transfer Policy: Shaping the Way Ahead,” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-arms-transfer-policy-shaping-way-ahead>, accessed on 6/5/19, JMP)

Now, every Conventional Arms Transfer Policy is kind of a word soup. You can find almost anything you want in there. And as mentioned, the priorities there are not weighted, they’re just listed. I’m concerned that the optics and the reality of how this policy might be implemented are looking at the wrong problem. So I just want to frame a few things so that I can explain how I see this differently, and then talk about how I think this matters to the world. There are some assumptions I’m hearing that I sort of reject as a frame. One, that if others do it, if others are going to fill the gap, we have to fill it. I don’t think that’s ever a rationale for transferring what is not a trade commodity. These are weapons. These are killing machines. And it’s easy to talk about them in the abstract, but that is their purpose. And in our economy, they aren’t that huge a piece of our economy. But for those of us who care about it, they have an outweighing impact on our world, our country and the world. And we never need to forget that. And we can’t talk about the arms trade as sort of an anodized, clean system. It is dangerous. And I don’t think we’ve figured out exactly how to do it right over time. And we can easily go through the litany of past arms transfers that seemed to make sense that no longer do. And that’s the problem, I think, that every conventional arms transfer policy should take at its root, which is, how do we make sure we do it responsibly? And I appreciated Ambassador Kaidanow’s message that we do want to continue to do this responsibly. And I do believe that is what is in people’s hearts. But as she said, each delivery sends a message. And my concerns here are, when we stress the economic side of this, that is what is seen. And when President Trump meets with the Saudis and holds up posters of weapons and the amounts of sales, the message being perceived in the world is that the human rights, the other concerns, the security, they don’t matter, it’s a transactional approach, it’s about faster and more. And faster and more could be a recipe for disaster. These are some of the concerns that are in – that need to be taken into account. There is this idea that the higher-technology weapons are the only ones that matter, and so there’s an export control reform process on categories one to three of the USML, which was briefly mentioned, which I find really alarming, the prospect that we’ll be actually making it much easier for semiautomatic weapons to go around the world. These are often the weapons used in conflict. These are often the weapons that are driving human rights abuses. The rationale that, well, these aren’t high-sophistication weapons so we don’t need to pay as much attention is driven from this idea that our approach needs to be more and faster and we need to protect only the crown jewels, which is a continuation of the Obama administration, but never got to these pieces. So there’s all these parts that are going on that I think are the wrong message. And one of the other portions of this is, if we do want to create responsibility – and this is where I’ll be interested and as we have the panel to discuss this – where there might be some overlaps. There’s a lot of discussion in here about timelines and milestones, right? I mean, I understand industry is wont for that. I understand the idea that you want to move faster. A number of us have met with the people working on the policy and I think most of us are disappointed that none of our suggestions about a little bit more transparency in those timelines and milestones would be helpful. I think industry would probably also support that. I think also, if we’re going to move faster and more, we need to have at the tail end a better sense of how we’re going to use end-use restrictions and end-use monitoring. And we need to have better transparency afterwards so we can test. And I appreciated Melissa talking about there is a much greater push today to assess whether our security assistance, our efforts are actually achieving the goals. My concern is we’re going to move faster and we’re going to not improve our transparency or our processes along the way such that we can assess later whether this was an experiment that was worth taking. I think it’s also critical, as we mentioned, that along the process, if there are these milestones, that those are insertion points where you can reevaluate whether the deal that was made, however many months or years ago, still makes sense. And a small piece of this could be Congress gave itself the power to get a predelivery notification. It’s only used its power once in a Middle East sale, but this could be a standard process. And it could be public similar to direct commercial sales which get notified to Congress, but don’t have the same website as foreign military sales. Those could be made public at the same time. My thinking here is that if we’re going to do this, if this is the drive for the administration to faster and more, that we need to have at the same time a more transparent process and one that the public can engage in a little bit more frequently. Because I think we are seeing, interestingly in this new, first two years of the Trump administration, Congress is paying a bit more attention. You have some holds right now on some sales that have been really concerning that I thought were going through on weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE on precision-guided munitions. You have some holds on appointments and so on and so forth. But Congress needs to step up its game, but it needs to be helped by the public. And I don’t think that can be inconsistent, I think it could be worked into the policy. But I think the message of the policy is not one that promotes international responsibility, but instead one that promotes transactions and sales, not human rights. And that is very alarming.

#### This transactionalism and disregard for human rights emboldens autocrats globally.

Hamid, 18 --- senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (11/5/18, Shadi, “Deconstructing Trump’s foreign policy,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/11/05/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/>, accessed on 6/8/19, JMP)

It is possible to think two things at once: that U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been “bad,” which many think it has been, and that it has offered a somewhat coherent alternative for how the United States should conduct itself beyond its borders. This suggests that the casual and smug dismissals of Trump, on domestic and foreign policy alike, are missing something important. An Ostentatious Approach As someone who believes that American ideals matter abroad—particularly that support for human rights and democracy abroad is the only way to advance our interests in the long run—I would not be able, under almost any conceivable scenario, to support Trump’s foreign policy. I have a different worldview with different starting assumptions. From a nationalist perspective, however, the Trump doctrine offers considerable appeal. It emphasizes, even idealizes, American “sovereignty,” based around a narrow conception of U.S. economic and security interests. This results in a more obviously transactional foreign policy, with the president pursuing those interests with little regard for international norms or institutions. Non-citizens are given little consideration, and values and ideals are perceived as luxuries at best and obstacles to the pursuit of the national interest at worst. Stylistically, the Trump doctrine is spare, unsentimental, and confrontational—almost ostentatiously so. As with most doctrines, the policy doesn’t quite match the rhetoric. But Trump’s stamp on American foreign policy will continue to matter in its clear and ambitious attempt to put forward a set of guidelines for those who wish to carry the “America First” mantle into the future. In other words, Trump has managed to introduce a set of ideas that have their own inherent power, even if his administration does not always reflect these ideas in day-to-day foreign policy. This, along with profound shifts in domestic politics, could ensure that Trump is remembered as one of the more consequential presidents of the modern era. For example, Trump’s Sept. 25 address to the U.N. General Assembly was aggressively outside Washington’s bipartisan consensus emphasizing the importance of U.S. leadership in preserving the “ liberal international order” and, at the very least, paying lip service to the promotion of democracy abroad. Except where Washington can use human rights as a cudgel against its enemies, Trump has displayed practically no interest in other countries’ internal conduct. This is in keeping with what I call “ cultural sovereignty,” which the president expounded on in his address: “Each of us here today is the emissary of a distinct culture, a rich history, and a people bound together by ties of memory, tradition, and the values that make our homelands like nowhere else on Earth … I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions. The United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship.” The rest of the speech tended toward the dark and confrontational, avoiding even the pretense of foreign policy idealism. It was chilling in its straightforward aversion to the spirit of compromise and cooperation. Of course, some of this is posturing, but some of it is quite real. In the Middle East, Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama hoped for less conflict but showed little interest in investing the resources needed to achieve that outcome. (The one initiative it did expend notable energy on, the Iran deal, was founded on misplaced premises, as I’ve argued elsewhere). Trump couldn’t be more different from Obama in both instincts and intentions. Yet he has taken Obama’s studied disengagement to a different—perhaps logical —level: unapologetic indifference. Indifference in Action A telling encapsulation of this is Trump’s early remarks on the repercussions Saudi Arabia could face for the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He first thought about the transactional nature of Washington’s relationship with Riyadh: “I don’t like stopping massive amounts of money that are being poured into our country on—I know they’re talking about different kinds of sanctions, but they’re spending $110 billion on military equipment and on things that create jobs, like jobs and others, for this country.” Trump also pointed out that Khashoggi wasn’t a U.S. citizen (he was a resident of Virginia), implying a sharp distinction between citizens and non-citizens that anchors Trump’s stark and hyper-realist worldview. In this reading, if Khashoggi were an American citizen, then it would fall under American sovereignty; that he isn’t a citizen places it outside the domain of “America First.” Trump has since threatened “severe punishment” but has resisted taking any action that might affect arms sales. The perception, whether fair or unfair, that Trump will generally have very little response to human rights abuses determines the risks allies are willing to take. Emboldened autocrats acting with more impunity than before are a logical and tragic result of “America First.” By any reasonable standard—and in actual measurable outcomes—betting big on Saudi Arabia’s young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been a terrible misstep, but it does not undermine the coherence of a worldview that sees little room for moral outrage directed toward friends as long those friends serve a narrowly defined understanding of U.S. national interests. (I purposely use “friends” rather than “allies,” since Canada, in the Trump worldview, is more ally than a friend). There is, then, a method to what appears to so many as either madness or stupidity, or both. But to have a method and to display more, rather than less, coherence is not necessarily a good thing.

#### And, expanded arms sales fuel the war machines of oppressive governments and makes the U.S. complicit in human rights abuses.

Thrall & Dorminey, 18 ---\*professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, AND \*\*policy analyst at CATO (3/21/18, A. Trevor & Caroline, “Yemen Shows Why US Needs to Change Its Arms Sales Policy,” <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/03/yemen-shows-why-us-needs-change-its-arms-sales-policy/146845/>, accessed on 5/13/19, JMP)

A Senate resolution to reduce U.S. participation in Yemen's war failed, but policymakers seeking to reduce complicity in the humanitarian crisis have another option. Congress voted Tuesday on a resolution offered to end U.S. complicity in the Saudi-led war on Yemen. The sponsors, including senators from opposite ends of the political spectrum—Sen. Bernie Sanders, Ind-Vt., Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., and Sen. Mike Lee, R-Utah — called for the removal of American troops from hostilities in Yemen. The resolution was a failure, but senators and policymakers seeking to make America less complicit in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis still have another option: they can curtail the arms deals the U.S. makes with Saudi Arabia, starving the war machine currently ravaging Yemen and its people. And it’s not just about Yemen; lawmakers should reevaluate the overall practice of selling arms to foreign nations. In 2017 the Trump administration doubled down on arms sales, not only selling more arms abroad than any of his most recent predecessors, but also promising policy changes to enable a dramatic increase in the number of weapons sold abroad. This approach to arms sales invites negative downstream consequences. Shockingly, in most recent military interventions, U.S. troops have faced adversaries armed with American-made weapons. Indeed, U.S. arms exports tend to fuel conflicts abroad. This is particularly true in the Middle East, where almost every nation has been directly involved in a conflict in the last five years, and whose nations account for 49 percent of total American exports over that same period. Yemen illustrates how arms sales can make a conflict worse. In 2015, the Obama administration made the decision to provide support to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen’s civil war. The Saudis, backed by U.S. logistical aid, arms sales, and intelligence support, have conducted thousands of airstrikes against civilian targets including hospitals, schools, and food production facilities in violation of the rules of war. The war has also generated what United Nations agencies have called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, displacing more than two million Yemenis and killing more than 10,000. Instead of working to convince the Saudis to end their horrific campaign, the administration has continued providing military support and expanded arms sales to Saudi Arabia despite several members of Congress raising grave concerns. Weapons sold to Saudi Arabia after the start of hostilities include $500 million worth of precision-guided munitions used in the kingdom’s air campaign, along with aircraft, helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles. Not only does this make the United States complicit in war crimes in Yemen, selling major conventional weapons to states actively engaged in a conflict prolong those conflicts. Few nations have large enough arsenals to fight conflicts for extended periods of time without resupply. This is particularly true of nations without large domestic defense industries that rely heavily on arms imports to sustain combat operations. Saudi Arabia was the second-largest arms importer worldwide from 2013-17, and increased its imports 225 percent over the previous five years, partly in order to fight its war on Yemen. Risks of entanglement and public opinion blowback on supplier countries have prompted serious debate among European countries about the wisdom of arms sales to the Middle East. In several cases, the debate led to a halt in sales to Saudi Arabia and its partners such as the United Arab Emirates. The debate in Europe began soon after it became clear that the Saudis were targeting civilians in their air campaign. Opposed to the idea that European weapons would be used to carry out humanitarian abuses, the European Parliament passed a nonbinding resolution in February 2016 calling on EU member states to enforce an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners. Soon thereafter, the Netherlands became the first state to take action, banning weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in March 2016. After a second EU parliament resolution in December 2017, Norway, Germany, and the Walloon region of Belgium banned arms sales to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Egypt. Several other countries have had or continue to have significant debates over arms sales policy. Sweden, for example, is actively considering whether it should limit arms sales to democratic nations. Canada has also decided to rethink arms sales. After receiving criticism for agreeing to honor a contract with Saudi Arabia for the purchase of 16 armored vehicles, the Canadian government announced in February 2018 that moving forward it would halt sales of a weapon system “if there were a substantial risk that it could be used to commit human rights violations.” Although advocates argue that the United States can exert greater leverage over the Middle East through arms sales, the evidence of arms for influence is thin at best. A better use of American resources would be to generate diplomatic momentum to resolve the conflict. Yemen’s instability and destruction is not in the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. If nothing else, the past seventeen years of conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere should have proved that conflict often fuels downstream problems like terrorism. Arming an aggressor isn’t the best way to broker a peaceful solution.

#### We’ll identify two specific examples:

#### 1. Philippines – Arms sales fuel humanitarian abuses in the form of extrajudicial killings, forced displacement, and state-sanctioned violence under the guise of Duterte’s war on drugs.

Ramiro and Shahshahani 18 (Rhonda Ramiro and Azadeh Shahshahani, Guest Writers, 2-23-2018, " America’s Indefensible Alliance With The Philippines," HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/opinion-ramiro-duterte-philippines\_n\_5a8f3c57e4b01e9e56b9cae1, Accessed: 7-2-2019, MWM)

The burgeoning alliance between President Donald Trump and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte appears destined to become the 21st century version of the Ronald Reagan-Ferdinand Marcos alliance. That union in the 1980s allowed the Marcos dictatorship to last 14 years, despite Marcos’ notoriety for murdering over 3,000 people as well as jailing 70,000 and torturing 34,000 of his political rivals and other innocent people. Reagan stood by his Filipino ally to the bitter end, even granting Marcos asylum in Hawaii when it became clear that “people power” would soon topple the unsustainable dictatorship. According to Reagan, granting a haven to Marcos and 90 of his family members and close associates was “in the best interests” of U.S.-Filipino relations. Those interests included a network of some of the largest U.S. military bases in the world at the time. Such die-hard support for a brutal dictator was immoral back then. Knowing the legacy of trauma that the Marcos dictatorship inflicted on the Filipino people and the country as a whole makes supporting the admittedly fascist upstart dictator Duterte completely unjustifiable today. When Reagan took power in 1980, Marcos had already been ruling the Philippines under martial law for eight years, with the full support of former Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter. Reagan’s support for an additional six years meant Marcos and his military could rack up more human rights abuses with impunity. Today, Duterte is well on track to surpass the body count of his self-proclaimed idol. An estimated 13,000 people have been killed in the war on drugs; 113 activists have been killed under the U.S.-designed counterinsurgency program of the Philippine government; and more than 400,000 people have been forcibly displaced due to the Philippine military’s aerial bombing of Marawi City and nearby communities of indigenous people throughout the southern island of Mindanao, under the guise of the war on terrorism. At the rate Duterte is going, this could mean the murder of 52,000 more people over the remainder of his six-year term. The Philippines is home to 100 million people, the majority of whom are dirt poor, largely due to 119 years of U.S. policy toward the country. For his part, Trump has bluntly stated his interest in the Philippines. “It is a strategic location ― the most strategic location. And, if you look at it, it’s called the most prime piece of real estate from a military standpoint,” Trump said during his visit to the Philippines in November. No need to mince words: for the U.S., the Philippines remains, as it has always been, an essential cog in the U.S. war machine. Never mind that today the Philippines is home to 100 million people, the majority of whom are dirt poor, largely due to 119 years of U.S. policy toward the country. With no sustainable domestic industry to speak of and an economy grossly dependent on exports in large part because of the colonial legacy left behind by first Spain and then the U.S., the Philippines under Marcos began to systematically export its people to work in foreign countries — and send remittances home to keep the Philippine economy afloat. Today, poverty is so severe that nearly 6,000 Filipinos leave the country every single day in search of work; the Philippine economy would collapse were it not for $27 billion in remittances these migrant workers send home annually. At the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. acquired the Philippines as a colony and relinquished the country only after World War II, when dependable local puppet leaders could be installed and economic and military treaties cementing the Philippines to U.S. interests could be imposed. These include patently unequal military agreements that tie the Philippines to the whims of U.S. imperial ambitions: the Mutual Defense Treaty, Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, Visiting Forces Agreement and, most recently, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. These agreements grant the U.S. military expansive access to military facilities, land, water and airspace in the Philippines for an indeterminate length of time under the guise of “mutual benefit.” Conveniently, the U.S. military presence has been focused in resource-rich regions of the Philippines, facilitating land-grabbing and extraction of the country’s natural wealth by multinational corporations. Challenges to the constitutionality of the agreements have been brought to the Philippine Supreme Court repeatedly as the Filipino masses have staunchly protested U.S. military presence and operations on Philippine territory for decades. After all, they have experienced the brunt of the violence against women and children, toxic waste, forced displacement from land and other crimes committed by the U.S. military. For the U.S. in the 1970s and ’80s, propping up the Marcos regime served the purpose of securing its military stronghold in the Pacific as the Cold War approached its climax. Neighboring Vietnam had resoundingly defeated the imperialist American invaders just a few years earlier. The U.S. and Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race. Today, Trump needs Duterte and the Philippines to remain a dependable ally for U.S. imperial interests in the Asia Pacific region. Trump’s current brinkmanship with North Korea means that the threat of nuclear war looms large. Trump has named China repeatedly as one of the biggest rivals to U.S. economic superiority in not only the region but the world. China, the Philippines and neighboring countries dispute territorial control of the waters and islands in the South China/West Philippine Sea, which contains vast petrochemical and gas deposits, rich marine biodiversity, and sea lanes that facilitate much of the global trade and shipping for the entire region. In January, the U.S. Defense Department announced it had launched the counterterrorism mission “Pacific Eagle: Philippines,” which is designated as an Overseas Contingency Operation, thereby making it eligible for exemptions from spending limits. The operation will only strengthen the Duterte regime as it continues to crack down on vulnerable minority populations. The 1 percent may agree with Trump that it is in the best interests of their America to continue supporting Duterte. The rest of us should not be complicit in the slaughter. Last week, the International Criminal Court officially opened a preliminary investigation into allegations of state-sanctioned killings and other human rights violations committed by the Philippine National Police under the direction of Duterte. Now, U.S. lawmakers should join others in the international community and stop enabling Trump’s agenda in the Asia Pacific to be propped up by the rising body count of Filipinos killed under Duterte’s war on drugs and war on terrorism. Funding for Duterte’s death squads in the form of U.S. Foreign Military Financing aid to the Philippine military and police should be struck altogether from future U.S. budget allocations. Congress should go a step further and study the effect of such agreements between the U.S. and the Philippines, such as the Mutual Defense Treaty, Visiting Forces Agreement and Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. These provide the basis for continued support to the Philippine military in the first place, even when these same state security forces are implicated in the majority of extrajudicial killings and other human rights violations. Moreover, these agreements have been used to shield the U.S. military and its personnel from accountability for crimes committed in Philippine territory, essentially subordinating Philippine sovereignty to U.S. military interests. Is that really any different from Reagan’s justification for his granting of asylum to a murderous dictator? Can the U.S. depart from over 100 years of colonial treatment of the Philippines and instead deploy a framework of mutual respect, mutual benefit and respect for national sovereignty? Absent this, we should expect to birth more puppet presidents and dictators in the Philippines.

#### 2. Nigeria – Arms sales greenlight HR abuses and trade-off with the government’s commitment to eradicate poverty and food insecurity.

Page ‘16 – formerly the State Department’s top expert on Nigeria, worked on Nigeria at the Department of Defense and for the U.S. Marine Corps  ( Matthew "Five Reasons Washington Should Rethink Selling Warplanes to Nigeria," War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/five-reasons-washington-should-rethink-selling-warplanes-to-nigeria/> 11-8-2016)

The Department of Defense will soon notify Congress [it plans to sell](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-arms-idUSKCN0XX09M) 12 A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft to Nigeria. Both countries hope that the propeller-driven warplanes — [tailored for counterinsurgency operations](http://motherboard.vice.com/read/low-and-slow) — will bolster Nigerian efforts to combat Boko Haram, one of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups. U.S. policymakers also want the sale to be a visible symbol of their strong desire to do more to help Nigeria combat terrorism. Unfortunately, the sale will be a Pyrrhic victory for five reasons: It is way too expensive, it undermines U.S. corruption policy, it overlooks recent human rights abuses, it won’t help Nigeria fight the Boko Haram of tomorrow, and it won’t foster closer defense cooperation. Nigeria can’t afford it. For Nigeria, the cost of the planes is staggering, given that its economy is in deep recession and its currency, the naira, [lost 50 percent of its value against the dollar](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-06/free-float-flounders-as-nigeria-s-naira-hits-black-market-record) over the last year. Based on [similar deal with Lebanon](http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2015-09-08/lebanon-may-get-armed-super-tucanos-despite-instability), the sale — which probably includes munitions, spare parts, and a maintenance package — may total over $500 million: roughly half of Nigeria’s [2016 defense budget](http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/pdfs/2016pro/DEFENCE.pdf) and over twice as much as the Nigerian Army’s entire annual salary bill. U.S. policymakers should recognize that the government of President Muhammadu Buhari —even if it wants to buy the planes — has many other more pressing humanitarian and socioeconomic needs. In northeast Nigeria, for example, [over two million internally displaced people](http://www.voanews.com/a/humanitarian-crisis-grips-northeast-nigeria-united-nations-agency-says/3472418.html) are threatened by famine and disease. Acknowledging the country’s fiscal constraints, Nigeria’s Senate President, in August 2016, [called for more international financial and logistical help](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/aug/23/nigeria-gathering-humanitarian-crisis-food-insecurity-boko-haram-bukola-saraki) to address crisis and to reconstruct the region so it is no longer the “perfect breeding ground for Boko Haram.” In lieu of costly warplanes, Nigeria would be wise to invest half of a billion dollars in its marginalized northeast to address long-term drivers of conflict like chronic underdevelopment, poverty, and food insecurity. Beyond the northeast, Nigeria could use $500 million to help remedy a litany of other problems. It could begin resuscitating its failing universities, fixing its dilapidated public hospitals, or constructing solar-powered mini-grids in thousands of rural communities. Nigeria — a country of over 170 million people that [generates as much power as the city of Edinburgh](http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21693971-nigeria-has-about-much-electricity-edinburgh-problem-powerless) — desperately needs dozens of new power plants. It sends mixed messages on corruption. Sticker shock aside, the sale undermines statements by [President Barack Obama](https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/20/remarks-president-obama-and-president-buhari-nigeria-bilateral-meeting), [Secretary of State John Kerry](http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/08/261212.htm), [Attorney General Loretta Lynch](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/readout-attorney-general-s-meeting-president-muhammadu-buhari-nigeria), and [Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew](https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0125.aspx) that helping Nigeria fight corruption is a top U.S. policy priority. The U.S. effort to sell weapons to the Nigerian Air Force — whose last three chiefs, along with several other of its top officers, [are currently on trial](http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/05/efcc-to-arraign-ex-chief-of-air-staff-md-umar-wednesday/) for embezzlement and procurement fraud — is incongruous with U.S. rhetoric. Nigerian Air Force corruption is not ancient history: The senior air force officer who the U.S. Defense Attaché brought to Washington in July 2015 to discuss the Super Tucano sale [has since been charged with corruption](https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/index.php/news/1999-efcc-docks-avm-ojuawo-for-n40m-bribe). Furthermore, it is not clear that the Nigerian Air Force become any more transparent about its finances, procurement, or contracting processes over the last year. Washington’s other partner in the deal — Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer — just last month [agreed to pay $205 million in fines](http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/10/24/embraer-pays-205-million-to-settle-fcpa-charges.html) to resolve criminal violations of the [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act](https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act). [Embraer admitted](https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/embraer-agrees-pay-more-107-million-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-charges) that it bribed officials to sell Super Tucanos to the Dominican Republic and other aircraft to Saudi Arabia, Mozambique, and India. Brazilian authorities, meanwhile, [have charged several former top executives](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-embraer-corruption-idUSKCN0WJ20Z) at Embraer with corruption and money laundering in connection with the sale of Super Tucanos to the Dominican Republic. It overlooks Nigerian military human rights abuses. U.S. policymakers have repeatedly voiced their concerns about the Nigerian military’s human rights record. In September 2013, a [State Department spokesperson said](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/10/215414.htm#NIGERIA): “We continue to emphasize…that abuses by the [Nigerian] security forces undermine our security goals,” noting that President Obama had discussed the issue with then-President Goodluck Jonathan. In May 2014, Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights [Sarah Sewall told Congress](https://www.c-span.org/video/?319459-1/threat-boko-haram) that “some fifty percent of the Nigerian military, at this point in time, are not eligible” for training and materiel support because of the [Leahy Amendment](http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process.html). In 2015, the United States declared Nigeria in violation of the [Child Soldiers Prevention Act](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135981.pdf), citing the [use of underage boys by a government-sponsored militia](http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2111-Watchlist-Nigeria_LR.pdf). Even though the Nigerian air force has a better human rights record than the army, policymakers have long debated whether the Nigerian Air Force is doing enough to minimize civilian deaths. As recently as May 2016, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield specifically mentioned U.S. concerns over Nigeria’s use of airpower [in her testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee](https://www.c-span.org/video/?409337-1/federal-officials-testify-terrorism-subsaharan-africa): Last year you will know that we turned them [the Nigerian government] down for Cobras [attack helicopters] because we were concerned about their ability to use those and not have them have an impact on their communities… The [decision to block the sale](http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/169264-why-nigerian-military-has-difficulty-getting-arms-from-america-u-s-govt.html) angered Nigerians and some U.S. officials, but it took place only a few months after Nigerian warplanes [bombed and strafed](http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-nigeria-military-abuses-20150603-story.html) residential areas during a joint operation that [killed several hundred military detainees](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26819965) that escaped in a March 2014 jailbreak. Yet, the Super Tucano sale suggests that Washington’s concerns about Nigerian military abuses have waned over the last year, despite the Buhari government’s own mixed record. In December 2015, soldiers reportedly perpetrated gross human rights violations during in two separate military crackdowns in [Zaria](http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/195620-zaria-massacre-human-rights-watch-says-over-300-killed-buried-by-soldiers.html)and [Onitsha](http://www.premiumtimesng.com/investigationspecial-reports/204902-special-report-inside-massive-extrajudicial-killings-nigerias-south-east.html). The Buhari government also has not prosecuted anyone involved in the [grisly deaths, between 2011 and 2014, of thousands of detainees](https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/1657/2015/en/) from starvation, torture, and disease at the Giwa Barracks military prison. Such deaths continue to occur at there, albeit at a slower pace, [according to human rights groups](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-36259126). Just last month, the United Nations Children’s Fund revealed that the military was [detaining hundreds of children at Giwa Barracks](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-has-negotiated-release-of-876-children-detained-by-nigerian-military-this-year/2016/10/28/50a07e90-9d43-11e6-9980-50913d68eacb_story.html). Boko Haram isn’t especially vulnerable to airpower. The Super Tucano, [seen here conducting live fire exercises](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LkgeladdlaI), is devastatingly effective in the right operational context. In Brazil, the government [used it to destroy drug smugglers’ hideouts](https://warisboring.com/the-best-little-air-force-youre-barely-aware-of-9eea17dedf55) deep in the jungle. The Colombian Air Force used the Super Tucano over the last decade to [strike targets across large parts of the country](https://warisboring.com/the-deadly-super-tucanos-of-south-america-32934b879627) controlled by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) insurgent group. Afghanistan’s fledgling air force is [using its 20 new Super Tucanos to provide close air support to its troops](http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/05/10/a29-ground-attack-planes-tally-more-260-sorties-afghanistan.html) and to strike concentrations of Taliban in the country’s restive south. Boko Haram, however, is a more slippery target than the Taliban, FARC, or narcotraffickers’ Amazonian airstrips. The Super Tucano’s unique capabilities might have been handy two years ago, when Boko Haram [controlled large parts of three northeastern states](http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/09/19/boko-haram-control-in-northeast-nigeria/). Even then, however, terrorist-held towns and villages housed many civilians. [Experts agree](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-arms-idUSKCN0XX09M) that new warplanes will be less effective now that the group has dispersed and is once again operating clandestinely and conducting [asymmetric attacks](http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/29/africa/nigeria-bomb-blasts-maiduguri/index.html). Boko Haram fighters no longer operate en masse and many have taken refuge in remote communities in the [Mandara Mountains or on the islands of Lake Chad](https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/03/boko-haram-nigeria-lake-chad-mandara/). Even the [Sambisa Forest](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/29/nigeria-sambisa-forest-boko-haram-hideout-kidnapped-school-girls-believed-to-be-held) — the group’s traditional stronghold — is not well suited to aerial bombardment. [As this footage from a Nigerian air strike shows](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oQmbqaLtFMo), hundreds of camp followers — mostly women and children — live among the terrorists sheltering there. Past arms transfers to Nigeria haven’t fostered closer bilateral defense cooperation. The United States and Nigeria have a long but rocky history of bilateral military engagement, which [increased markedly after Nigeria’s 1999 return to civilian rule](http://us-foreign-aid.insidegov.com/l/127/Nigeria). There is little evidence to suggest that U.S. arms transfers have been valued by the Nigerian military and some have become albatrosses in the relationship. Washington’s sale of C-130 military transport planes to Nigeria in the 1970s is a prime example, having been more a source of irritation than goodwill over the years. Despite being relied upon to ferry troops around Nigeria and to regional peacekeeping deployments, the Nigerian air force [neglected to properly maintain](http://www.panapress.com/Nigeria-to-spend-150b-naira-to-refurbish-military-planes--13-508952-18-lang1-index.html) the aircraft for years. [One C-130 crashed in 1992](http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/28/world/163-nigerians-dead-as-a-military-plane-crashes-near-lagos.html), killing 163 and others were cannibalized for parts. Washington [has repeatedly provided funds](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/04/29/us-to-help-nigeria-revamp-its-armed-forces/eab2413a-3264-4812-8375-ca1c54fa6d29/)and [technical assistance](http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/6845/us-air-forces-africa-help-nigerian-c-130-fly-again) to ensure Nigeria’s C-130s have the spare parts and routine maintenance they need to stay airborne. Likewise, [Washington’s 2015 gift](http://www.africom.mil/media-room/article/27874/u-s-donates-24-armored-personnel-carriers-to-nigeria) of 24 hand-me-down Mine Resistant Armored-Protected (MRAP) vehicles did not seem well received. The Nigerian press quoted anonymous military sources who called the MRAPs [“carcasses” and “Greek gifts”](http://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/03/27/boko-haram-military-insiders-dhq-wrangle-over-us-mrap-donations/). U.S. officials admitted the vehicles needed some work, [reportedly saying](https://www.naij.com/690216-shocking-half-11m-armed-vehicles-sent-nigeria-us-govt-fight-bharam-faulty.html): “The repairs of the vehicles are up to the Nigerian government…We have not done the estimate of what it will cost the Nigerian government to fix the vehicles.”

#### These harms outweighs on scope and severity – unregulated arms sales magnify atrocities like genocide and crimes against humanity and directly contribute to famine, disease, lack of education, and refugees.

Musa, Lecturer in International Law at The University of Manchester, 17 (Winter 2017, Shavana, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, “The Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen, Arms Exports and Human Rights: Prevention Is Better Than Cure,” doi:10.1093/jcsl/krx013, JMP) **\*\*\*CAAT = Campaign Against the Arms Trade**

Despite the impact of arms transfers, as shown by the Saudi-led Coalition’s actions in Yemen, there is a drought in the number of international lawyers contending with issues on the regulation of the arms trade and thus, on the prevention of violations. It has become apparent that international lawyers have a general preoccupation to deal with the international applicability of laws after the fact, usually after a violation has occurred and how it can be remedied. The judicial review case brought by CAAT concerning UK arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, which the High Court subsequently rejected, is a prime example of legal work (including critical scholarship) taking effect after mass atrocity. Much more international legal work to properly assist governments in the application of international laws on the arms trade is needed. If the arms trade is regulated properly, it could potentially prevent, or at least reduce the exponential rises in human rights and humanitarian law violations and the commission of crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This is because the global arms trade is the substrate for these violations and crimes. There is a causal link between strict international law considerations preexport and levels of deaths and casualties post-export. There is also an indirect socio-economic impact from armed conflicts and international crimes, as fuelled by poorly regulated arms, including famine, family segregation, disease, lack of education, refugee levels and even a decline in foreign investment—the list is not exhaustive.1 It is also believed that conventional weapons, such as small arms, cause far more deaths than any other weapon.2 These links affirm the greater obligations that must be placed upon States and suppliers to effectively control arms transfers and provide a basis to reinforce the evolving norm against these specific actors, rather than merely those pulling the trigger.3 While the Yemen case has perhaps placed a more magnified spotlight on the responsibility of States with regard to authorized transfers, there have been endless examples of authorized transfers that were utilized for the purposes of infringing human rights and humanitarian law. Belgium, has in the past, approved the transfer of arms to Nepal, even though its government had been involved in violations such as summary executions, as well as the torture and abduction of civilians.4 Past transfers to Rwanda, the DRC and Sri Lanka5 have also caused the shift towards a stronger link between arms transfers and the responsibility of States, not just the end-user. While international law has come a long way in terms of content, legal developments on the arms trade has been somewhat lacking. Perhaps the most significant of developments is the entering into force of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).6 While the Arms Trade Secretariat in Geneva is the main organ responsible for the Treaty’s implementation, there is still a long road ahead before standardized human rights-adhering arms export processes can be integrated within national frameworks, as per the Treaty text. This was apparent from discussions between states during the preparatory process for the Third Conference of States Parties (CSP3), which took place in September 2017. A number of issues on effective treaty implementation, transparency and reporting and treaty universalization came to the fore and were the basis of working groups for the ATT’s application in national states.7 This article pays specific attention to the importance of integrating human rights and humanitarian laws within arms exporting processes. It will analyse the development of international law on arms transfers, but do so within the context of the Yemen conflict, and thus the involvement of the British and the USA in their supply of weapons to the Saudi-led Coalition. This article, however, will not deal with the political context of the conflict itself, only as it relates to UK and US sales to Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, it is national governments that authorize licences for the sale of arms to importers. Therefore, States must apply arms control laws strictly to prevent human rights abuses. The difficulty surrounding that implementation is no better exemplified than the Yemen case. In addition, there is the need for exporting states to recognize that their duty to abide by international law is not relinquished upon the completion of an arms transaction and additional measures must be undertaken to also ensure the prevention of human rights and humanitarian law violations, as will be dealt with later on in the article. Given the involvement of the UK and USA, the article will focus on these national frameworks and then broadly assess how all states can in general strengthen their arms trade national processes to conform to international law—particularly the ATT—and prevent the diversion of arms to countries in precarious or fragile situations, which results in the commission of extensive human rights and humanitarian law violations.

#### You have a moral obligation – American arms manufacturers profit from death --- they’re helping oppressive governments wage World War 3 on vulnerable populations

Benjamin & Davies, 18 --- \*co-founder of CODEPINK: Women for Peace (9/26/18, Medea & Nicolas J.S., “In Yemen and Beyond, U.S. Arms Manufacturers Are Abetting Crimes against Humanity; Our leading weapons dealers have developed a business model that feeds on war, terrorism, chaos, political instability, and human rights violations,” <https://fpif.org/in-yemen-and-beyond-u-s-arms-manufacturers-are-abetting-crimes-against-humanity/>, accessed on 5/10/19, JMP)

The Saudi bombing of a school bus in Yemen on August 9, 2018 killed 44 children and wounded many more. The attack struck a nerve in the U.S., confronting the American public with the wanton brutality of the Saudi-led war on Yemen. When CNN revealed that the bomb used in the airstrike was made by U.S. weapons manufacturer Lockheed Martin, the horror of the atrocity hit even closer to home for many Americans. But the killing and maiming of civilians with U.S.-made weapons in war zones around the world is an all too regular occurrence. U.S. forces are directly responsible for largely uncounted civilian casualties in all America’s wars, and the United States is also the world’s leading arms exporter. Pope Francis has publicly blamed the “industry of death” for fueling a “piecemeal World War III.” The U.S. military-industrial complex wields precisely the “unwarranted influence” over U.S. foreign policy that President Eisenhower warned Americans against in his farewell address in 1961. The U.S. wars on Afghanistan and Iraq and the “global war on terror” served as cover for a huge increase in U.S. military spending. Between 1998 and 2010, the U.S. spent $1.3 trillion on its wars, but even more, $1.8 trillion, to buy new warplanes, warships, and weapons, most of which were unrelated to the wars it was fighting. Five U.S. companies — Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and General Dynamics — dominate the global arms business, raking in $140 billion in weapons sales in 2017, and export sales make up a growing share of their business, about $35 billion in 2017. In a new report for Code Pink and the Divest from the War Machine campaign, we have documented how Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt have systematically used weapons produced by these five U.S. companies to massacre civilians, destroy civilian infrastructure, and commit other war crimes. The bombing of the school bus was only the latest in a consistent pattern of Saudi massacres and air strikes on civilian targets, from hospitals to marketplaces, and U.S. arms sales to Israel and Egypt follow a similar pattern. U.S. laws require the suspension of arms sales to countries that use them in such illegal ways, but the U.S. State Department has an appalling record on enforcing these laws. Under the influence of Acting Assistant Secretary of State Charles Faulkner, a former lobbyist for Raytheon, Secretary Pompeo falsely certified to Congress that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are complying with U.S. law in their use of American weapons. The U.S. sells weapons to Saudi Arabia and other allies to project U.S. military power by proxy without the U.S. military casualties, domestic political backlash, and international resistance that result from direct uses of U.S. military force, while U.S. military-industrial interests are well-served by ever-growing arms sales to allied governments. These policies are driven by the very combination of military-industrial interests that Eisenhower warned Americans against, now represented by Secretary Pompeo, Acting Assistant Secretary Faulkner, and a cabal of hawkish Democrats who consistently vote with Republicans on war and peace issues. They ensure that the “war party” always wins its battles in Congress no matter how catastrophically its policies fail in the real world. Republicans derided President Obama’s doctrine of covert and proxy war as “leading from behind.” But the Trump administration has doubled down on Obama’s failed strategy, surrendering even more power over U.S. policy to foreign clients like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt, and to the “unwarranted influence” of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Lockheed Martin is earning $29.1 billion in sales from the $110 billion Saudi arms package announced in May 2017, a deal struck as the war on Yemen was already killing thousands of civilians. Yet no conflict of interest is too glaring for Lockheed executives like Ronald Perrilloux Jr., who has taken part in public events to promote the war and defend Saudi Arabia and its allies, arguing that the U.S. should “help them finish the job” in Yemen. Not to be outdone, Boeing, the second largest arms producer in the U.S. and the world after Lockheed Martin, has also been linked to the deaths of hundreds of civilians in Yemen. Fragments of Boeing JDAM bombs were found in the debris of a 2016 attack on a marketplace near the Yemeni capital of Sana’a that killed 107 civilians, including 25 children. Human Rights Watch found that the airstrike caused predictably indiscriminate and disproportionate civilian deaths, in violation of the laws of war, and called for a suspension of arms sales to Saudi Arabia. To profit from wars on some of the poorest, most vulnerable people in the world, from Yemen to Gaza to Afghanistan, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and General Dynamics have developed a business model that feeds on war, terrorism, chaos, political instability, human rights violations, disregard for international law, and the triumph of militarism over diplomacy. Real diplomacy to bring peace and disarmament to our war-torn world poses the most serious “threat” to their profits. But the American people have never voted to funnel the largest share of our taxes into endless war and ever-growing profits for the “industry of death.” It is time for the sleeping giant, what President Eisenhower called “an alert and knowledgeable citizenry,” to wake from its slumber, take responsibility for our country’s foreign policies and act decisively for peace.

### 1ac – Plan

#### The United States federal government should suspend Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales of arms to military corps that violate human rights.

### 1ac – Solvency

#### The Next Contention is “Solvency”

#### Trump’s morally devoid foreign policy emboldens autocrats --- the president or congress could reverse the signal

McFaul, 18 --- Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and former U.S. Ambassador to Russia (10/23/18, Michael, “Enabling Autocrats Is Not in the American National Interest,” <https://medium.com/freeman-spogli-institute-for-international-studies/enabling-autocrats-is-not-in-the-american-national-interest-536c99fb847a>, accessed on 6/22/19, JMP)

Since the beginning of our republic, all American presidents have had to balance the dueling goals of advancing democratic values with the pursuit of security and economic interests. The tension first arose in response to the French Revolution. Should the United States support our most important ally at the time, the French monarchy, or those espousing the same values of our revolution? This tension became more pronounced in the twentieth century when the United States had the power to influence the domestic politics of other countries, including at times through the use of force. Some presidents embraced the mission of democracy promotion as a central tenant of American foreign policy. Others gravitated to more so-called “realist” strategies, placing more emphasis on the pursuit of conventionally defined security goals. But all presidents since World War II pursued both objectives to varying degrees — defending our values and pursuing our interests. Great champions of freedom such as Ronald Reagan or George W. Bush also worked with autocrats, be it in Latin America or South Africa for Reagan or Saudi Arabia for Bush. Likewise, self-described realists such as Richard Nixon or George H. W. Bush also made aspirational statements about America as a defender of righteous values. And most presidents who had to engage autocrats in the pursuit of American economic or security interests did so with a conscience, knowing and feeling the hypocrisy of the act. President Trump marks a radical departure from all of these presidents, Democrat or Republican, realist or liberal. Trump does not even pretend to wrestle with the contradictions between our values and interests. Instead, he embraces dictators and chastises democratic leaders. He has devoted more critical words to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau than to Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. Unlike previous presidents, Trump appears to feel no shame whatsoever in appeasing these autocrats. In making clear his distaste for any discussion of morality, ethics, or values in the conduct of his foreign policy, Trump has emboldened the world’s autocrats to undertake increasingly outlandish acts. Remarkably, Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong Un, and now apparently Mohammad Bin Salman all now have ordered gruesome assassinations against people living outside of their countries during Trump’s time in office; two of these attempts succeeded. Yet, to date, none of these autocrats have received any rebuke from Trump personally, even when his own foreign policy administration rebuffed their actions. After Kim Jong Un appeared to have killed his half-brother in Kuala Lumpur in February 2017, Trump announced that he and the North Korean dictator had fallen in love. After the Putin regime ordered the assassination of Sergey Skripal in the United Kingdom in March 2018, the Trump administration responded, but Trump himself stood next to the Russian autocrat in Helsinki in July 2018 and professed his deep admiration for the Russian leader. Now in October 2018, the Saudi regime has assassinated journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and thus far Trump has only blamed the cover up as poorly handled, but not yet underscored the inhumanity of the operation. His administration has revoked the visas of those involved in the assassination, but not yet committed to any more serious punishment of Riyadh. There is a pattern here. In the past, American presidents who engaged with dictators justified their diplomacy by securing vital national interests, be it defeating Hitler in World War II, expanding American economic opportunities in China, or defeating terrorists in the Middle East. What is striking about Trump’s embrace of dictators so far is that he has achieved few if any outcomes in the American national interest. His bromance with Kim Jung Un has yielded only pledges about future denuclearization, not any actual reductions in North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. Trump champions the economic benefits of multi-billion-dollar arms sales to Saudi Arabia, but these big numbers are again mostly promises about future sales, and would have happened (and did happen before Trump’s time in office) without lavishing praise on Mohammad Bin Salman. Trump’s bearhug of Putin has yielded nothing — no Russian withdrawal from Ukraine, no new arms controls agreements, and not even a reversal of the ban on adoptions of Russian children for American families. The horrific murder of Jamal Khashoggi adds a tragic, emphatic exclamation point to the bankruptcy of Trump’s present course. Hopefully, Trump might now see the wisdom of promoting our values and advancing our interests at the same time. But if he does not pivot, then his administration, the U.S. Congress, the private sector, and the American people must step up and fill the void. Invoking the Global Magnitsky Act, members of Congress should press for new sanctions against those Saudi officials involved in Khashoggi’s murder when they return from recess, and not just those who murdered Khashoggi, but those who ordered the assassination. Modeled after the Leahy Law, which prohibits financial assistance in purchasing arms for human rights abusers, the U.S. Congress could adopt new legislation prohibiting the sale of American arms to countries that grossly violate human rights. Politicians, administration officials, journalists and academics should question the false assumption of American dependence on Saudi Arabia for anything — be it oil, finance, or deterrence against Iran — and realize Saudi Arabia’s deep reliance on us for security and prosperity. Companies — especially lobbying firms — could interrupt or cancel their contracts with the Saudi government. And American citizens should vote for candidates committed to inserting morality as an element on American diplomacy.

#### Specifically, the plan would strengthen existing programs like the “Leahy Law” – this ensures human rights protections.

Miller ‘12 - J.D. from Cornell Law (Fall 2012, Nathanial Tenorio Miller, Cornell International Law Journal, “NOTE: The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, and the Consequences,” 45 Cornell Int'l L.J. 667, Lexis-Nexis Scholastic)//hecht

Conclusion Foreign Military Financing is an important foreign policy tool. It provides military strength to allies and gives the United States additional leverage in dealing with foreign governments. Similarly, training soldiers of other nations provides significant benefits to the United States. Such training sharpens the military capacity of allies and improves relationships between U.S. and foreign troops. If coupled with effective human rights training, U.S. support is likely to prevent some human rights abuses. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how U.S. aid and training has helped curtail human rights abuses committed by the militaries receiving the funds. Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Colombia are just three examples of nations that receive enormous sums in military aid but disburse these sums in ways that may aggravate, rather than prevent, human rights abuses. Sometimes, as with the Afghan Local Police in Afghanistan and the paramilitaries in Colombia, those abuses border on state policy. At other times, including the extrajudicial killings in the Philippines, the human rights abuses are compounded by a systemic failure to prosecute the perpetrators. The United States often claims to be a beacon of freedom and democratic government. n263 Much of its moral legitimacy in foreign affairs is [\*695] based upon its efforts to ensure freedom and democracy around the world. When its allies are found to commit human rights violations - with the acquiescence or encouragement of U.S. officials - it undermines this moral legitimacy. And, where the human rights violations are enabled even in part by U.S. funding and training, the United States limits its own access to the moral high ground. The Leahy Law is an attempt to enhance U.S. moral legitimacy in foreign affairs. As the law stands, however, it does a poor job. Without considerable changes in the language of the legislation, the Leahy Law will still be vulnerable to executive pushback against congressional influence. Since history suggests that pushback is inevitable, it is up to Congress to create a stronger law. One way for Congress to strengthen the Leahy Law would be to make larger segments of the recipient military ineligible for military aid. While this would deprive the Executive of some operational flexibility, it sends a much stronger message in favor of human rights. To deny a recipient country all military aid would greatly improve the deterrence effect of the Leahy Law. It would also effectively counter the problem of arms being a fungible commodity. Even if the law were to define unit at the division or corps level, it would more effectively secure compliance with human rights norms. Congress should also eliminate the disparity in language between the Defense and Foreign Aid Appropriations Bills. Without violating the Leahy Law, the Executive can arm questionable units if Congress approves the funding under the Defense Appropriations Bill. If the law is not changed, the United States will continue to claim that it cannot arm those who have committed human rights violations while doing just that. The Judiciary needs a defined role in enforcing the Leahy Law, and without congressional action this is impossible. Given the courts' reluctance to become involved in foreign affairs, Congress should clearly articulate the boundaries of any potential cause of action. If those who have been victimized by units receiving U.S. funding can sue in federal court, it is much less likely that units will commit human rights violations or that the Executive will fund units that could commit human rights violations. Lastly, foreign military financing should be more transparent. In addition to seeing which country receives funding, the public should see how and on whom that money is spent. End-use monitoring should be required [\*696] and publicized. After all, if the goal of the legislation is to prevent U.S. tax dollars from funding those who commit human rights violations, U.S. taxpayers should be able to see that the objective is accomplished. And if the goal of the Leahy Law is to show the world that the United States pays more than lip services to human rights, the world should be able to see that the United States is willing to stand by that commitment. The Leahy Law is a well-intentioned piece of legislation that could be drastically improved. Instead of being the latest casualty in the long-running dispute between the Executive and Congress in foreign policy decision-making, or a sop to the consciences of concerned citizens, it should be strengthened and enforced. It could be an important tool to enforce human rights, direct congressional influence in foreign policy, and increase U.S. moral legitimacy. And it might save a few lives.

#### And, the plan would also clarify existing codes of conduct by prioritizing human rights values – this checks presidential circumvention

Day ’18 (Joel - professor of peace studies at the University of San Diego and security fellow with the Truman National Security Project, “Congress can stop Trump from selling weapons to dictators,” 10/26/18, <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-day-arms-sale-code-of-conduct-20181026-story.html>, accessed on 5/12/19, JMP)

President Trump forcefully argued last week that selling weapons to a dictator — the king of Saudi Arabia — is more important for our national security than upholding human rights norms. This is terribly wrong. Selling weapons to dictators and violators of human rights standards helps to fuel civil war, instability and terrorism around the world. When we embolden dictators, we encourage rogue regimes to act with impunity, jail dissidents and kill those who might hold such regimes accountable. Saudi Arabia, for one, is using American weapons in its war in Yemen. This means the United States is fueling one of the worst humanitarian disasters in a generation. Trump has argued for the economic benefit of arms deals, but the reality is that U.S. taxpayers subsidize these sales to the tune of billions of dollars. This is in addition to the $59 billion in weapons we’ve given out for free, including last month’s $1.2 billion in aid to the military dictatorship in Egypt. And although Trump claims that the weapons industry is an indispensable job creator, this too is untrue. Data show that government investment in education, healthcare and clean energy create more jobs than investment in the defense industry. The question is not economic, but moral: Who should the United States provide arms to? What conditions must be met before a country gets access to the most deadly arsenal in history? The American government needs a litmus test. As it turns out, members of Congress already have such a litmus test in place: The U.S. Arms Transfer Code of Conduct. They’re just not enforcing it. The code lays out criteria, including human rights standards, that states must meet in order to engage in arms deals with the United States. It was passed in 1999 amid concerns that dictators, thugs and terrorist cells were getting American weapons, only to turn them on our soldiers. This was the case in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia. The problem is that the code remains entirely optional, unenforced and largely meaningless if the president bypasses it with a national security exemption waiver. Trump has not only waived restrictions on selling massive amounts of weapons, he has also reversed Obama-era limitations on arms sales to human rights violators and rewarded the gun lobby with blanket deregulation of gun dealers selling weapons abroad. Congress should enact a new code of conduct to make compliance mandatory, not voluntary, in four key areas. The United States needs to ban arms deals to dictators and rogue regimes. It is utterly wrong for the blood of political prisoners and dissidents to be on the hands of American taxpayers. Arms deals should be restricted to countries that respect human rights. Equal rights for LGBTQ people, strong protections for political dissent, laws against human trafficking and robust religious freedoms should all be requisites. States that don’t respect such rights are worthy of neither our trust nor our support. We shouldn’t be in business with state sponsors of terrorism. Giving weapons to countries such as Saudi Arabia, known for exporting extremism and fostering insurgency across the Middle East, will haunt the United States for years to come. Arming terrorists, however indirectly, has resulted in a boomerang effect in which our weapons are used to kill our own service members. Finally, American weapons should not go to countries that foment war in their own neighboring countries, as Saudi Arabia is doing now in Yemen. Pouring weapons into regional conflicts destroys our international legitimacy and, as the war in Yemen shows, exacerbates some of the bloodiest conflicts on the planet. A mandatory code of conduct would be incredibly sensible legislation for Congress to pass. Congress could, for instance, change existing laws to allow it to repeal presidential exemptions and forbid the Departments of Defense and State from authorizing arms sales to any country that violates the code. Contrary to Trump’s statements, limiting his ability to sell weapons makes good economic sense. It is also a moral necessity.

### 1ac – Framing

#### Our Final Contention is “Framing”

#### First, reducing structural violence should be prioritized over the contrived geopolitical and business interests of the military industrial complex.

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It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you've been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is **one big con** designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the **poverty**, inequality and **structural** violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons - among others. The **facts are** simple and **irrefutable**: you're far more likely to die from **lack of health care** provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the **nuclear programmes** of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called 'national security issues', the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually **no impact on the actual risk** of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of **'security theatre'** designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats - such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious. And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won't notice that increasing social and **economic inequality** in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that **domestic violence** kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that **you won't notice** how much **structural violence** there is in the world. More than this, they are hoping that you won't notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even **minimal support** for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate. Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don't want to change it. For them, all the **insecurity, death and ill-health** caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic **social structures as they are**. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be **extremely difficult** and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint **immigrants as a threat** to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence. Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one **massive confidence trick** - misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to **distract you** from the structures and inequalities in society **which are the real threat** to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along. Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don't want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don't believe the hype: you're much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

#### Second, prefer probability – long internal link chains are entirely improbable – the margin of error for each component make predictions unlikely.

Yudkowsky 06 – cites Bruce Schneier, a security expert – Eliezer Yudkowsky, 8/31/2006, Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story **less probable**. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. **Security expert** Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create **false perceptions** of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." **Vivid, specific scenarios** can **inflate our probability estimates of security**, as well as **misdirecting** defensive **investments** into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to **overestimate** conjunctive probabilities and **underestimate** disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. **Rationally**, of course, **disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions**.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### Third, we must reverse our complicity – Fill-in arguments ignore our ability to resolve individual acts of systemic violence.

Sanchez 19 (W. Alejandro, a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere, April 2, Should the US Sell Weapons to States That Commit Human Rights Violations?, Providence, https://providencemag.com/2019/04/should-us-sell-weapons-states-human-rights-violations/)CN

New legislation has been introduced to the US Congress that seeks to stop US weapons from being sold to states that are known human rights abusers or have ties to violent movements. At a time when US sales of military equipment are increasingly under scrutiny (e.g., Saudi Arabia or Turkey), bipartisan initiatives like S.854, the “Enhancing Human Rights Protections in Arms Sales Act of 2019,” are particularly noteworthy. The bill was introduced by Senators Ben Cardin (D-Md.) and Dick Durbin (D-Ill.); its co-sponsors include Senators Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Edward Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.). S.854 has several initiatives and statements worth mentioning. For example, the legislation stresses that human rights should be respected and promoted by US foreign policy as “the human rights standards that the United States sets on arms transfers has global ramifications, influencing standards set by other nations around the world.” The bill also explains how it will scrutinize governments that aim at obtaining US weaponry. For instance, during the fiscal year in which the equipment will be transferred and in the preceding three years, the recipient nation must have “not ordered or directed ethnic cleansing of civilians,” “not recruited and used child soldiers,” “not tortured, falsely imprisoned, or engaged in the targeted killing of political opponents, human rights defenders, or journalists,” and so on. It is also important to note how, according to S.854, Washington can check whether potential recipient nations are committing the aforementioned abuses. The bill explains that Washington can rely on information, “including from credible nongovernmental investigations,” to check whether “war crimes, crimes against humanity, gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, or atrocities have been committed by the government of the recipient country.” In other words, the bill openly calls for nongovernmental organizations to have a direct role in ensuring that US weapons are not utilized to commit atrocities. In an interview with the author, Kate Kizer, policy director at Win Without War, explained that “civil society should be involved in determining whether US weapon sales will do more harm and/or be misused by recipient nations,” and that it is a positive development that there is a growing awareness in the US Congress about the useful role of NGOs in this issue. Analyzing US weapons sales in 1,000 words is a Herculean task, so we will provide some basic facts and recent developments to understand the purpose of this bill. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), for the period 2013–17, the US was the largest exporter of weapons in the world, with a 34 percent share of the global market—the main importers of US weaponry were Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Australia, in that order. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency keeps a list of major arms transfers authorized by the US State Department, which provides a good idea of the amounts of money some of these deals involve. For example, the DSCA announced on March 25 the approval of a sale of military technology to Morocco (to upgrade the country’s 23 F-16 warplanes)—the deal is worth an estimated $985 million. Weapons sales to Saudi Arabia have been particularly criticized due to Riyadh’s campaign in Yemen, in which countless civilians have lost their lives. Moreover, Riyadh was also involved in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey last year. Furthermore, even non-lethal equipment can be utilized to commit human rights abuses. For example, the US has donated J8 jeeps (among other equipment) to the Guatemalan military to improve internal security operations. Unfortunately, President Jimmy Morales has deployed his troops to harass the CICIG (International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala), and US diplomats have been reportedly intimated, too. In response, several members of the US Congress wrote a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in December 2018 to “urge the Department to take effective steps to ensure that this situation be rectified.” Critics of S.854 can argue that such sales are important for the US weapons industry, which encompasses tens of thousands of jobs, and that if Washington does not sell them, someone else will. Indeed, SIPRI explains that the major weapons exporters after the US are Russia, France, Germany, China, and the UK, in that descending order. However, the fact that other states are willing to sell their military technology to a government known for committing human rights abuses and other atrocities may be a financial argument, but it is not a moral one. There are already precedents regarding this issue: Germany has suspended sales to Saudi Arabia over Yemen, though Berlin reportedly wants to restart them. S.854 is an attempt to improve the monitoring of US weapons transfers to states that are proven human rights abusers or that support violent criminal movements. As Win Without War’s Kizer argues, “providing weapons to countries that violate human rights, perpetrate war crimes, and other violations of the rule of law is not in US national security interests. S.854 recognizes this reality and ensures that there are clear moral and national security considerations upheld in US arms exports.” The realm of the global arms trade is very complex as it converges morality, national interests, financial interests, and geopolitics. It will be important to monitor the future of S.854 and what this means for the future of US weapons exports.

#### Finally, be skeptical of negative arguments. Defenses of arms sales rely on academically disproven statements --- lobbyists do everything in their power to distort the truth so public debates about arms sales are critical to pierce the secrecy that shrouds the military-industrial-complex

Castagno, MA in International Conflict Resolution, 19 (2/20/19, Peter, “The Arms Trade Is Intensifying Under Trump,” https://truthout.org/articles/the-arms-trade-is-intensifying-under-trump/; Accessed: 6-24-2019 //GBS Rudolph)

The revolving door between public officials and defense contractors has long distorted U.S. foreign policy to serve war profiteers at the expense of the public interest and basic humanitarian norms. From U.S. weaponry ending up in the hands of ISIS, to supplying arms fueling civil conflict and therefore contributing to the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, the lack of oversight on arms deals has enabled human rights atrocities. The global arms trade is experiencing its greatest boom since the Cold War, fueled by horrific wars in the Middle East and revitalized power rivalries among China, Russia and the United States. In their most recent report, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute revealed a 44 percent increase in arms sales from 2002 to 2017. The United States is the world’s biggest arms exporter by far, holding 34 percent of total market share — a 58 percent lead on Russia, its closest competitor. From 2017 to 2018, U.S. arms sales to foreign governments increased 33 percent, in part due to the Trump administration’s diminished legal restraints on supplying foreign militias. “[T]he people that are making these deals for the government, they should never be allowed to go to work for these companies,” President Trump said during an interview with “Fox News Sunday” in December 2016. “You, know, they make a deal like that and then a year later, or two years later, or three years later you see them working for these big companies that made the deal.” Before entering the White House, Trump asserted his belief in a “lifetime restriction” on top defense officials working for private defense contractors after their public service. Two years later, the Project on Government Oversight released a detailed analysis of the defense sector, revealing 645 instances of federal employees working for the 20 largest Pentagon contractors in fiscal year 2016, the latest year with complete data. Of the 645 instances of former public servants transitioning to work for private defense corporations, 90 percent were hired to work as lobbyists, where they seek to influence public policy to benefit their private employers. Trump Cabinet Conflicts After the resignation of Gen. James Mattis, Deputy Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan filled the post as interim head of the Defense Department. Before joining the Trump administration, Shanahan spent three decades working for Boeing — a blatant conflict of interest for the person responsible for overseeing federal contracts with private defense contractors. Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, called Shanahan “a living, breathing product of the military-industrial complex,” and asserted that “this revolving door keeps the national security elite very small, and very wealthy, and increasing its wealth as it goes up the chain.” One egregious example of that revolving door is Heather Wilson, who has been secretary of the Air Force since 2017. In 2015, Lockheed Martin paid a $4.7 million settlement to the Department of Justice after the revelation it had used taxpayer funds to hire lobbyists for a $2.4 billion contract. One of the lobbyists was former New Mexico Representative Wilson, ranked as one of the “most corrupt members of Congress” by the nonprofit government watchdog group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington. Wilson was later confirmed as Air Force secretary in the Senate by a 76-22 vote. Mark T. Esper, the secretary of the Army, worked as vice president of government relations for Raytheon before joining the Trump administration in 2017. The Hill recognized Esper as one of Washington’s most powerful corporate lobbyists in 2015 and 2016, where he fought to influence acquisition policy and other areas of defense bills. Esper’s undersecretary, Ryan McCarthy, is a former Lockheed executive. Armament Industry’s Influence on Foreign Policy The Trump administration’s commitment to advancing arms sales is not only apparent in the legion of officials with severe conflicts of interests occupying the cabinet, but also through directives in official arms export policy. The State Department’s updated Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy Implementation Plan was released in November 2018 and detailed loosened restrictions on the sale of drones and other weapons, new financing options for countries who can’t afford U.S. weaponry, and aims to put pressure on diplomats to put arms deals at the forefront of their mission. Rachel Stohl, an arms trade expert with the Stimson Center, described the updated policy, saying, “If you read between the lines, it could be a green light for the U.S. to sell more with less restraint.” A glaring example of the arms industry’s influence on State Department policy is demonstrated by a September 20, 2018, report from The Wall Street Journal. According to the report, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was convinced to continue support for the Saudi campaign in Yemen for the sake of a $2 billion arms deal with U.S.-based defense contractor Raytheon. The State Department’s legislative affairs staff, who influenced Pompeo’s decision, is led by Assistant Secretary of State Charles Faulkner, a former Raytheon lobbyist. Recent developments by the Trump administration have clarified the nature of the relationship between defense contractors and the federal government, but it would be erroneous to place the majority of the blame on him for the greater trend in global arms sales. Under President Barack Obama, arms exports doubled compared to President George W. Bush, reaching more than $200 billion in total approved deals (approved deals don’t represent actualized contracts, as deals can take years to be ordered and completed). The rapid increase in exports was part of a broader strategy to replace U.S. soldiers with surrogates in allied countries, as well as to placate allies in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — countries incensed by the administration’s nuclear deal with Iran. Despite brokering more arms deals than any administration since World War II, President Obama did enforce holds on arms exports to some countries deemed guilty of human rights abuses, including Bahrain, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia. All of these holds were lifted shortly after the Trump administration took power. The Trump administration’s priorities on arms sales were further demonstrated after the CIA confirmed Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman’s role in ordering the savage execution of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. President Trump resisted calls to punish the Saudi prince on the grounds that punitive action would jeopardize lucrative arms deals with the kingdom. President Trump’s claims vastly overstated the amount of jobs and money to be lost if the U.S. withdrew support for Saudi military adventurism. Realigning US Priorities Research from Brown University shows domestic investment in education and health care creates more than twice as many jobs as military spending. Trump’s argument that we have to provide Saudi Arabia or the UAE with bombs that land on school buses, hospitals and weddings in order to preserve jobs is unconscionable and demonstrates a warped sense of priorities. We don’t have to contribute to what a United Nations Children’s Fund official has labeled a “war on children” to maintain what accumulates to a total of less than 0.5 percent of U.S. jobs. We can invest in productive sectors of the economy like renewable energy and create jobs that truly serve our society. A real debate on the arms trade is nearly absent from public conversation because the industry can only thrive in secrecy and duplicity. Consider former House Speaker Paul Ryan’s final move as a public official, in which he snuck a provision to curtail debate on Saudi support in Yemen into the U.S. farm bill in December. Fortunately, Ryan’s manipulative tactics would fail to prevent the House from finally passing a resolution to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen on February 13. Trump has indicated the Yemen resolution will be his first veto, as it represents a major check to executive power and a direct rebuke to his arms export-based style of diplomacy. After Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, defense companies enjoyed an immediate boost to their stock. This is because demand in the arms trade surges alongside geopolitical instability. Heightened volatility encourages higher arms sales, and the dissemination of weapons to despotic regimes increases volatility, creating a vicious cycle further entrenched by a revolving door of defense contractors who influence public policy to benefit private weapons manufacturers. In his famous farewell speech, President Dwight Eisenhower warned the U.S. public of this exact predicament, what he called the “military-industrial complex.” President Eisenhower’s warning remains prescient nearly 60 years later, as the failure to regulate the defense sector has led the U.S. to arm its enemies, enable humanitarian crises and desecrate its values. While the historic House resolution to end U.S. support for the war in Yemen is proof we can take concrete action to confront the military industrial complex, greater public awareness is needed to transform U.S. foreign policy in a profound manner. Just as President Eisenhower suggested, it is time for an alert and knowledgeable citizenry to challenge the reasoning behind the U.S.’s endless wars and fight for a more peaceful future.

## HUMAN RIGHTS

### Inherency

#### Trump is reversing human rights-based suspensions on arms sales

Hartung, 18 --- director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy (4/19/18, William D., “Trump’s arms sales policy puts contractors above common sense,” <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/384014-trumps-arms-sales-policy-puts-contractors-above-common-sense>, accessed on 5/17/19, JMP)

In a move that poses grave risks to U.S. security, the Trump administration’s newly released conventional arms transfer policy will put jobs and the interests of arms manufacturers ahead of safety, security, and human rights in its decisions on who the United States should arm. This bias should come as no surprise given President Trump’s penchant for promoting U.S. weapons sales and touting the jobs that they create. From calling foreign leaders to urge them to speed up purchases of U.S. combat aircraft to using a White House meeting with the Saudi crown prince to brag about which states would gain jobs from specific sales to Riyadh, President Trump seems to be obsessed with the alleged economic benefits of the weapons trade. Given its numerous mentions of creating jobs, making life easier for weapons contractors, and bolstering the U.S. defense industrial base, one might think the Trump administration’s new directive is a statement of economic policy rather than a carefully crafted expression of national security concerns. It’s not that human rights considerations are completely absent in the new policy statement, but the document sets an extremely low bar. The directive calls for observing existing law regarding human rights and arms transfers, without pointing to specific sections of the law or how they will be interpreted. Thankfully, the Trump policy statement indicates that the U.S. will not sell weapons to nations that may use them to commit genocide or otherwise violate the laws of war. But this is hardly a ringing endorsement of making human rights a major factor in arms sales decisions, and it is a far cry from the multiple mentions of human rights in the Obama administration directive that it will replace. The Trump administration’s arms export approach doesn’t just differ from the Obama administration’s in the way it is described. There is already concrete evidence that human rights are taking a back seat to commercial concerns and a desire to curry favor with questionable allies. Early on, the Trump administration reversed human rights-based suspensions of sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that had been imposed during the Obama era. The Saudi case is a litmus test of whether human rights and broader security concerns will have any role at all in the Trump administration’s approach to arms trading. The United States has long been a top supplier of weaponry to Saudi Arabia, and it has continued to do so during that nation’s brutal intervention in Yemen. Fighting in Yemen has gone on for over three years and resulted in thousands of civilian casualties through air strikes, not to mention putting millions of Yemenis at risk of famine and fatal disease. Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.) has rightly pointed out that Saudi actions in Yemen “look like war crimes,” which should be reason enough for the Trump administration to stop selling arms that can be used to prosecute the war in Yemen, even by the standards of its own, watered-down policy statement. Arms sales decisions should be about security, not jobs. But if jobs are going to be introduced as a reason to trade in weapons, we should at least have a little truth in advertising. As economists at the University of Massachusetts have demonstrated, weapons manufacturing is the least effective way to create jobs. Exporting virtually any other product would have a greater economic payoff. In addition, most new arms deals involve so-called “offsets” — agreements to steer business to the recipient nation in exchange for their purchase of U.S. weapons. For example, F-35 combat aircraft being sold in Japan will be assembled there, not in the United States. Under Saudi Arabia’s new long-term economic plan, the goal is for 50 percent of the content of arms purchased by Riyadh to be built in Saudi Arabia. U.S. firms have already pledged allegiance to this goal by setting up coproduction agreements and joint ventures that, if successful, will help Saudi Arabia build its very own arms industry. So much for “American jobs.” It will be up to Congress and the public to restrain the president’s appetite for runaway arms trading. A good place to start would be by blocking any new deals for bombs or other combat equipment that Saudi Arabia can put to work in its shameful intervention in Yemen. And all new sales should be scrutinized for their potential role in enabling human rights abuses, fueling conflict, or inadvertently putting U.S. weapons in the hands of potential adversaries. Rather than buy into Trump’s claims about arms sales generating U.S. jobs, Congress should do its job by making sure that the commercial interests don’t override the national interest when it comes to arms exports.

#### Trump is approving new deals that were previously blocked based on human rights concerns

Thrall, 17 --- associate professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government (4/20/17, A. Trevor Thrall, “Moving Backwards on Middle East Arms Sales,” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/moving-backwards-middle-east-arms-sales>, accessed on 5/13/19, JMP)

The Trump administration is charting a new direction on arms sales. Unfortunately that direction is backward. The administration recently notified Congress that it wants to sell a dozen attack aircraft to Nigeria, intends to sell 19 fighter jets to Bahrain, and will likely greenlight the sale of $300 million worth of precision-guided munitions kits to Saudi Arabia. In each case the Trump administration is approving deals the Obama administration blocked based on human rights concerns. The Trump administration’s primary rationale for the deals is to step up the fight against terrorism in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the sales won’t do much, if anything, to make Americans safer from terrorism. What selling arms will do is exacerbate existing problems, especially in the Middle East, and lead to unintended consequences down the road. The Saudi deal, for example, is part of the United States’ ongoing support of the Kingdom’s bloody intervention in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition has waged war for the past two years in support of the besieged government as it seeks to fight off the Houthi rebels. But an additional justification is that Yemen is home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an Al Qaeda affiliate that both the Saudis and the Americans have been trying to destroy since it first emerged in 2009. The proposed $350 million deal with Saudi Arabia involves 16,000 precision-guided munitions kits that would convert “dumb” bombs into “smart” bombs. In theory these kits will allow for more accurate targeting, but as Obama administration officials remarked last December, in practice they probably won’t. The proposed sale to Bahrain, a member of the Saudi coalition attacking Yemen, includes 19 F-16 fighter jets and improvements to Bahrain’s existing air fleet that would translate directly into greater firepower in current and future air campaigns. The sales will certainly enable the Saudi coalition to pursue its goals in Yemen more aggressively. The problem is that giving more firepower to the coalition will just pour gas on an already burning fire. The Saudi coalition’s air campaign has already killed thousands of civilians and pushed the nation to the brink of famine. The war has killed more than 10,000 civilians, displaced over 3 million people, and left over 14 million civilians struggling with food insecurity. The outcry over Saudi Arabia’s conduct of the war has become so loud that Britain’s Scotland Yard is now investigating whether the Saudi-led coalition is guilty of war crimes. And right or wrong, there is little evidence that the campaign has brought the conflict nearer to an end. Nor is there any sign that the intervention has hurt Al Qaeda. AQAP is thriving on the chaos in Yemen and appears stronger than ever. In the long run, however, even if the Trump administration is comfortable taking extreme steps to combat terror today, there is no way to ensure that U.S. weapons won’t eventually be used in ways that are detrimental to American interests. A recent case in point is the Saudi’s use in Yemen of British-manufactured cluster bombs purchased decades ago, which have since been banned under international humanitarian law. One can also look at ISIS to see dangerous downstream trends. Nearly 20 percent of ISIS’ bullets can be tracked to batches manufactured in the U.S. from the 2000s. Given how much is at stake, one might expect more debate in Washington about Trump’s arms deals. Unfortunately, Trump is far from alone in his zeal. Despite a few qualms, the Obama administration approved $278 billion in arms sales, the most of any administration since World War II, including $115 billion to Saudi Arabia alone. And the closest Congress comes to debating arms sales is to call for more of them. Just this week a group of 20 members of Congress, many of whom serve on the House Armed Services Committee responsible for oversight on arms deals, called on Trump to repeal the decision not to sell MQ-9 Reaper drones to nations like Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. In the end, arms sales to the Middle East are a symptom of the deeper disease at the heart of U.S. foreign policy. The misguided belief that American intervention can create favorable political outcomes abroad has led to sixteen years of chaos and destruction, with no clear benefit to American security. In approving these deals the Trump administration will ensure that the United States remains firmly stuck in the quagmire.

#### Human rights based restrictions like the Leahy Law aren’t being enforced --- ensuring thorough vetting and removing exemptions is critical to its effectiveness

Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 19 (6/10/19, The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “TIMEP Brief: Accountability in U.S. Arms Transfers,” <https://timep.org/reports-briefings/accountability-in-arms-transfers/>, accessed on 6/24/19, JMP)

Summary: Every year, the United States Congress appropriates billions of dollars to support foreign security forces by supplying training and equipment in an effort to maintain foreign policy and national security objectives. However, few avenues exist to hold foreign governments and militaries accountable for misusing the equipment, raising concerns about American complicity in human rights abuses across the globe. Several laws place restrictions on weapons provision to countries who commit human rights abuses, but the process for implementing these restrictions is often politicized, placing short-term priorities over long-term stability. For major arms buyers such as Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—where evidence exists that U.S.-manufactured equipment has been used in human rights abuses—this tradeoff threatens both domestic and regional stability in an already volatile region. Political Context: In the U.S. government, political motivations to maintain bilateral relationships often outweigh the enforcement of accountability mechanisms to enforce human rights conditions related to U.S. security assistance. Even when verifiable information of human rights abuses by specific foreign security units exists, accountability mechanisms have been sidelined. For example, Congress annually appropriates around $3.3 billion in security assistance to Israel, making it the largest security assistance package the U.S. gives to a single country. Despite reports by international rights organizations detailing human rights abuses at the hands of Israeli security forces, including the use of U.S.-manufactured weapons to harm civilian populations, accountability mechanisms have not been enforced to ensure the annual security assistance package to Israel does not contribute to violations. Similarly, growing awareness of violations by Saudi Arabia has raised questions about U.S. adherence to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) and Leahy Law (further details provided later in this brief), given that as of March 2019, Saudi Arabia had over $129 billion in active arms sales agreements with the U.S. A 2017 report by the American Bar Association (ABA) analyzed U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia under the AECA in light of growing evidence of gross human rights violations (GHRVs) at the hands of the Saudi regime. U.S. weapons sold to the Saudi regime have been used in Yemen, contributing to high civilian casualties as the result of indiscriminate bombing campaigns. There is evidence that U.S. arms shipments have been funneled to militias and extremist groups in Yemen, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, by Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners. The ABA report concluded that all arms sales to Saudi Arabia should stop until measures have been taken to ensure compliance with U.S. export laws and international law. Although the assessment found that the U.S. government was in violation of its statutory obligations, arms sales to Saudi Arabia are still a point of contention among policymakers. In March 2019, a group of bipartisan lawmakers passed legislation that called on President Donald Trump to end U.S. support to Saudi Arabia; Trump vetoed the bill. In May 2019, Trump announced that he would be invoking an obscure clause in the AECA in order to bypass congressional review of new arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The clause requires that he certify the sales are necessary in the case of a national security “emergency;” this action has drawn harsh criticism from members of Congress. Each year, the U.S. appropriates $1.3 billion in foreign military financing (FMF) to Egypt. Although human rights abuses in Egypt have been detailed in the State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights, a national security waiver has been issued to ensure Egypt receives U.S. security assistance in successive Democratic and Republican administrations. In 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo issued a four-page waiver that outlined a myriad of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, censorship, and coerced confessions. However, the waiver noted that Egypt’s control of the Suez Canal and overflight approvals in support of counter-terror operations benefit the U.S., and that the FMF is required under the Camp David Accords. Legal Context: In the United States, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) are the guiding statutes for U.S. security assistance to foreign countries. Together, the two laws regulate arms transfers, arms sales, security training, and the transfer of nuclear technology. The laws also dictate conditions in which the U.S. should not provide security assistance. Among such conditions is the human rights situation of the foreign country slated to receive U.S. security assistance. Specifically, Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) stipulates that the U.S. is prohibited from providing military assistance to “any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” However, policymakers often view[7] Section 502B as overly restrictive due to the broad language that any country whose gFovernment engages in human rights abuses will be denied U.S. assistance. If a country was blacklisted by Section 502B, the law did not provide any steps by which the country in question could regain security assistance. As a result, many lawmakers have complained the law has been a hindrance to achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives in some areas, and Section 502B has seldom been enforced. In an effort to make Section 502B more flexible to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, congressional officials, led by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), introduced the “Leahy Law” into annual appropriations bills in 1997, and was made permanent in 2008 by adding similar language to the Foreign Assistance Act in 2008. Added to Section 502B, the Leahy Law includes two amendments that govern security assistance provided by the State Department and Department of Defense. Although separate amendments, both include language that states “no assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if there is credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.” The law also provides a remediation process for foreign security units that have been blacklisted, allowing them to regain the privilege of U.S. security assistance. By narrowing the scope to the unit level of foreign security forces, many policymakers feel the Leahy Law provides the necessary flexibility to uphold U.S. morals while prioritizing national security and foreign policy. Despite its best intentions, however, the Leahy Law is rarely utilized. Aside from security assistance, the AECA also governs export licensing. Typically, the president, in coordination with the secretary of state, must notify Congress of any sale of defense articles or services under for $50 million or more, any design and construction services for $200 million or more, or any major defense equipment for $14 million or more, and allow Congress 30 days to review the sale and register concern. However, the law also includes a clause[8] allowing the president to override congressional oversight of a sale if the president “states in the certification that an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States.” Process: The agencies in charge of enforcing Leahy Law are the State Department and occasionally the Department of Defense. As previously mentioned, the text of the Leahy Law is intended[9] to ensure human rights vetting for all assistance and training, including that which falls under the Arms Export Control Act. This includes foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), and direct commercial sales (DCS). However, in practice, the State Department has only applied the law to most training programs and some equipment furnished through assistance programs, but not direct arms sales. Although the State Department does review licensing that falls under DCS, they do not weigh in matters pertaining to Leahy Law. Gaps also exist during the implementation and vetting process. When foreign security units are slated to receive U.S. security assistance, in-country embassy personnel conduct initial vetting using open-source data and information provided by officials from the foreign security apparatus. The information is subsequently passed to personnel at the State Department in Washington in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and taken into consideration along with classified information collected by DRL staff. Although straightforward, the process has been known to be marred by a lack of transparency and obstacles to thorough vetting, as exemplified in a 2016 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report[10] on U.S. security assistance to Egypt. The report found that Egyptian officials were uncooperative with security checks and end-use monitoring. The report also found that the State Department did not conduct Leahy Law vetting for human rights abuses in all cases of arms transfers and training to Egyptian military forces. It is unclear what actions, if any, have been taken to remedy the concerns outlined in the report. Trend Analysis: The politicization of the Leahy Law is best evidenced by looking at the history of its enforcement. However, the State Department seldom publicizes cases when Leahy Law has been implemented. According to open-source information, the Leahy Law has been enforced in Colombia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Nigeria. There is no evidence that the Leahy Law has been implemented in the Middle East, in countries that receive weapons and have a history of human rights abuses such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel. Implications: In their current form, legal mechanisms for accountability in arms transfers (namely the AECA, FAA and Leahy Law) are weakened by policies that regularly place human rights, application of the law, and long-term stability aside in favor of short-term national security objectives. As mentioned above, this tradeoff is best exemplified by the continual use of national security waivers to continue providing arms to foreign security forces despite human rights abuses. While the waiver of human rights conditions stipulates that aid may be restored if the “provision of assistance is vital to the national security interests of the United States,” the term “national security” is left undefined, allowing for a broad interpretation. For countries that receive U.S. security assistance, the implications for the civilian population and overall stability of the country are most concerning. Aside from the direct human cost of the use of deadly force against civilians, scholarly research [11] has demonstrated that security assistance to “fragile states” may encourage the government to rely on repressive means in response to dissent and threats to domestic security, thereby closing off channels of peaceful expression of popular will, risking further insecurity. Additionally, the inability to document end use, and (as is the case in Yemen) the turnover of American-made materiel to armed nonstate actors, further risks U.S. national security interests.

### Ext: Transactionalism Bad

#### Trump’s transactionalism wrecks democracy—legitimizes autocrats.

Carothers, JD, 17 (Thomas Carothers is a leading authority on international support for democracy, human rights, governance, the rule of law, and civil society, JD, Harvard Law School, 1-5-2017, Prospects for U.S. Democracy Promotion Under Trump, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/01/05/prospects-for-u.s.-democracy-promotion-under-trump-pub-66588, 6-24-2019, Dhruv)

It is impossible to know for certain what approach President-elect Donald Trump will take to supporting democracy and human rights abroad. So far, he has offered only scattered hints—expressions of instincts and impulses that largely point toward a disinclination to engage in democracy promotion but remain far from being elaborated into concrete policy plans. In addition, Trump’s leadership style and the overall troubled state of U.S. democracy will clearly hurt U.S. efforts to advance democracy’s global fortunes in the years ahead. While all of this points almost uniformly in a negative direction, it is likely that as Trump and his team move to actual policymaking, their actions in this domain will prove less consistently negative than their initial signals might indicate. NEGATIVE SIGNALS Throughout his campaign, Trump emphasized his intention to take a purely transactional approach to other international powers. Underlying this approach is the idea that the United States will define its interests narrowly and thereby focus on U.S. economic interests and core security concerns (above all, counterterrorism). Democracy and human rights in other countries, and other “soft” interests, are to be put aside in the pursuit of a get-tough, America-first foreign policy. According to Trump and his advisers, their [counterterrorism strategy will rest on stepped-up military efforts](http://www.time.com/4309786/read-donald-trumps-america-first-foreign-policy-speech/) and possibly harsher treatment of suspected terrorists who are detained or imprisoned. They have shown no interest in longer-term political approaches to undercutting the roots of state fragility: for example, [Trump declared at a public event](http://www.readingeagle.com/news/article/in-his-own-words-donald-trump-in-hershey) in December that “we’re going to stop trying to build new nations in far-off lands” that “you’ve never even heard of.” In line with his promise of transactionalism, Trump has taken a strikingly friendly approach toward various foreign strongmen. His favorable statements about Russian President Vladimir Putin have attracted the most attention but are only one part of a larger pattern that includes a recent sympathetic statement about [Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s brutal crackdown](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/03/world/asia/philippines-rodrigo-duterte-donald-trump.html) on undocumented immigrants and drug traffickers, a backslapping meeting with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in New York in September, and an effusive postelection telephone call with Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has made it clear that in pursuing warmer relationships with such leaders, he does not intend to raise unpleasant truths about their democratic shortcomings. Of course, the United States has long maintained cozy ties with various nondemocratic governments for the sake of security and economic interests; but Trump has been offering a kind of lavish praise that generally does not characterize such relationships and that extends to strongmen leaders who are not even strategically important to the United States (like Orbán). Another serious negative signal related to democracy policy is Trump’s deep-seated doubts about the value of core U.S. alliances—both with NATO partners and other crucial longtime [allies such as Japan and South Korea](http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-foreign-policy.html). He has exhibited a lack of appreciation of these alliances, which are foundational elements of a broader international order that the United States helped establish and has led for more than a half century—an order rooted in liberal political values. Without anchoring specific democracy policies and programs in a larger strategy to preserve this international order, such efforts will lack real weight.

#### The perception of Trump’s transactionalism emboldens autocrats to act with impunity

Hamid, 18 --- senior fellow in the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (11/5/18, Shadi, “Deconstructing Trump’s foreign policy,” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/11/05/deconstructing-trumps-foreign-policy/>, accessed on 6/8/19, JMP)

It is possible to think two things at once: that U.S. President Donald Trump’s foreign policy has been “bad,” which many think it has been, and that it has offered a somewhat coherent alternative for how the United States should conduct itself beyond its borders. This suggests that the casual and smug dismissals of Trump, on domestic and foreign policy alike, are missing something important. An Ostentatious Approach As someone who believes that American ideals matter abroad—particularly that support for human rights and democracy abroad is the only way to advance our interests in the long run—I would not be able, under almost any conceivable scenario, to support Trump’s foreign policy. I have a different worldview with different starting assumptions. From a nationalist perspective, however, the Trump doctrine offers considerable appeal. It emphasizes, even idealizes, American “sovereignty,” based around a narrow conception of U.S. economic and security interests. This results in a more obviously transactional foreign policy, with the president pursuing those interests with little regard for international norms or institutions. Non-citizens are given little consideration, and values and ideals are perceived as luxuries at best and obstacles to the pursuit of the national interest at worst. Stylistically, the Trump doctrine is spare, unsentimental, and confrontational—almost ostentatiously so. As with most doctrines, the policy doesn’t quite match the rhetoric. But Trump’s stamp on American foreign policy will continue to matter in its clear and ambitious attempt to put forward a set of guidelines for those who wish to carry the “America First” mantle into the future. In other words, Trump has managed to introduce a set of ideas that have their own inherent power, even if his administration does not always reflect these ideas in day-to-day foreign policy. This, along with profound shifts in domestic politics, could ensure that Trump is remembered as one of the more consequential presidents of the modern era. For example, Trump’s Sept. 25 address to the U.N. General Assembly was aggressively outside Washington’s bipartisan consensus emphasizing the importance of U.S. leadership in preserving the “ liberal international order” and, at the very least, paying lip service to the promotion of democracy abroad. Except where Washington can use human rights as a cudgel against its enemies, Trump has displayed practically no interest in other countries’ internal conduct. This is in keeping with what I call “ cultural sovereignty,” which the president expounded on in his address: “Each of us here today is the emissary of a distinct culture, a rich history, and a people bound together by ties of memory, tradition, and the values that make our homelands like nowhere else on Earth … I honor the right of every nation in this room to pursue its own customs, beliefs, and traditions. The United States will not tell you how to live or work or worship.” The rest of the speech tended toward the dark and confrontational, avoiding even the pretense of foreign policy idealism. It was chilling in its straightforward aversion to the spirit of compromise and cooperation. Of course, some of this is posturing, but some of it is quite real. In the Middle East, Trump’s predecessor Barack Obama hoped for less conflict but showed little interest in investing the resources needed to achieve that outcome. (The one initiative it did expend notable energy on, the Iran deal, was founded on misplaced premises, as I’ve argued elsewhere). Trump couldn’t be more different from Obama in both instincts and intentions. Yet he has taken Obama’s studied disengagement to a different—perhaps logical —level: unapologetic indifference. Indifference in Action A telling encapsulation of this is Trump’s early remarks on the repercussions Saudi Arabia could face for the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He first thought about the transactional nature of Washington’s relationship with Riyadh: “I don’t like stopping massive amounts of money that are being poured into our country on—I know they’re talking about different kinds of sanctions, but they’re spending $110 billion on military equipment and on things that create jobs, like jobs and others, for this country.” Trump also pointed out that Khashoggi wasn’t a U.S. citizen (he was a resident of Virginia), implying a sharp distinction between citizens and non-citizens that anchors Trump’s stark and hyper-realist worldview. In this reading, if Khashoggi were an American citizen, then it would fall under American sovereignty; that he isn’t a citizen places it outside the domain of “America First.” Trump has since threatened “severe punishment” but has resisted taking any action that might affect arms sales. The perception, whether fair or unfair, that Trump will generally have very little response to human rights abuses determines the risks allies are willing to take. Emboldened autocrats acting with more impunity than before are a logical and tragic result of “America First.” By any reasonable standard—and in actual measurable outcomes—betting big on Saudi Arabia’s young crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has been a terrible misstep, but it does not undermine the coherence of a worldview that sees little room for moral outrage directed toward friends as long those friends serve a narrowly defined understanding of U.S. national interests. (I purposely use “friends” rather than “allies,” since Canada, in the Trump worldview, is more ally than a friend). There is, then, a method to what appears to so many as either madness or stupidity, or both. But to have a method and to display more, rather than less, coherence is not necessarily a good thing.

### Ext: Arms Sales = Human Right Abuses

#### Arms sales fuels conflict escalation --- default to scholarly literature

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Do arms sales cause war? Or do wars cause arms sales? Critics of arms sales often argue that selling weapons abroad fuels conflict. And indeed, one can point to one or more sides using American weapons in many recent conflicts including Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. Skeptics argue, on the other hand, that weapons don’t start the fire and that conflicts would arise whether or arms exporters like the United States sell weapons abroad. The debate has important implications for foreign policy. If selling or transferring weapons abroad makes conflict more likely, or intensifies conflicts already in process, then the United States should rethink its long-held policy of selling weapons to pretty much any nation that wants them. If, on the other hand, arms sales have no impact on conflict or make conflict less likely, then the Trump administration’s intention of expanding arms sales should be seen as a positive move. As it turns out, several academic studies have looked at this question. The primary conclusion of these works is that although arms sales do not create conflicts out of thin air, they do make conflict more likely when the conditions for conflict are already present. The basic logic behind this conclusion is fairly straightforward and has been noted in the academic literature for some time. In a 1998 article, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” David Kinsella argues that states that enjoy a steady flow of arms – especially from multiple countries – tend to pursue more aggressive foreign policies. The increase in the recipient’s military capability makes victory in a potential conflict more likely, which in turn raises the likelihood that the state will start disputes, demand concessions from its neighbors in those disputes, and to escalate to conflict if negotiations fail to produce the desired outcome. Using case studies from Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and Somalia Kinsella finds that, when a country has more than one weapons supplier, arms sales drastically increase the chances of conflict. In their 2002 article, “The Arms Trade and the Incidence of Political Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1967-97,” Cassady Craft and Joseph Smaldone identify another mechanism by which arms sales can fuel conflict. They find that autocratic governments importing weapons are more likely to use those weapons to oppress/mistreat/kill their own citizens since they now have a greater coercive capability. But despite the straightforward logic behind the arms sales/conflict connection, most work on the topic to date has relied on case studies, which are wonderful for highlighting potential causal mechanisms but not much use for establishing whether those mechanisms hold across the time and space. Until recently there had not been any work using statistical methods that would allow scholars to state with confidence which direction the causal mechanism actually flows – that is, do arms sales precede conflict or do impending conflicts lead to increased arms sales? Happily, the most recent article on arms sales by Oliver Pamp and his colleagues in the January 2018 issue of the Journal of Peace Research entitled, “The Build-Up of Coercive Capacities: Arms Imports and the Outbreak of Violent Intrastate Conflict,” uses a simultaneous equations model to overcome this problem. Looking at the relationship between arms sales and the outbreak of civil conflicts, the authors confirm the general thrust of previous research, concluding that: “…while arms imports are not a genuine cause of intrastate conflicts, they significantly increase the probability of an onset in countries where conditions are notoriously conducive to conflict. In such situations, arms are not an effective deterrent but rather spark conflict escalation.” This new confidence in the arms sales/conflict connection should compel serious revision to American arms sales policies. Since 2002 the United States has sold over $286 billion dollars of weapons to 167 countries. These exports have gone to numerous countries where the conditions were or remain ripe for conflict. U.S. arms transfers to an unstable Iraq preceded the emergence of the Islamic State, but wound up helping amplify the Islamic State’s military capability when it took vast quantities of American weapons from defeated Iraqi army units. U.S. arms sales over the past decade also helped prepare Saudi Arabia to launch its disastrous intervention in Yemen and enabled the Nigerian government to unleash more effective violence on its own citizens, just to list a few examples. Academic research often gets a bad rap in policy making circles. In the case of arms sales and arms transfers, however, the scholarly literature has correctly pointed out the serious risks involved. If the United States is serious about preventing conflict and managing regional stability in trouble spots around the globe, it would do well to stop pouring gas on the fire.

#### U.S. weapons allow governments to engage in war crimes and perpetuate civil wars

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Three important observations immediately emerge from the analysis. First, there are a large number of risky customers in the world, and the United States sells weapons to most of them. Thirty-five nations (21 percent) scored in the highest-risk category on at least two metrics, and 72 (43 percent) were in the highest-risk category on at least one of the five measures. There simply are not that many safe bets when it comes to the arms trade. Second, the data provide compelling evidence that the United States does not discriminate between high- and low-risk customers. The average sales to the riskiest nations are higher than those to the least risky nations. Considering discrete components of the index, for example, the 22 countries coded as “highest risk” on the Global Terrorism Index bought an average of $1.91 billion worth of American weapons. The 28 countries in active, high-level conflicts bought an average of $2.94 billion worth of arms. Applying our risk assessment framework to the list of 16 nations currently banned from buying American weapons helps illustrate the validity of our approach. The average score of banned nations is 11.6, with 12 nations scoring 10 or higher. The highest-scoring nations were Syria, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with Iran, Eritrea, and the Central African Republic not far behind. Clearly these are nations to which the United States should not be selling weapons. What is especially troubling is that the United States sold weapons to several of these countries in the years right before sales were banned, when most of the risks were readily apparent. Moreover, America’s customer list includes 32 countries with a risk score above the average of those on the banned list. This reinforces our concern that the U.S. government does not block sales to countries that clearly pose a risk of negative consequences. The third major observation is that this lack of discrimination is dangerous. As simple as it is, our risk assessment is a useful guide to forecasting negative consequences. The five countries that scored as high risk on all five measures provide a clear illustration of the risks of arms sales. This group, which purchased an average of $1.8 billion in U.S. weapons since 9/11, includes Libya, Iraq, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan. These five countries, recall, are classified by the various metrics as: “terror everywhere,” “not free,” “most fragile,” “large impact from terrorism,” and as being involved in high-level conflicts. These governments have used their American weapons to promote oppression, commit human rights abuses, and perpetuate bloody civil wars. Within the Very Risky category, each country rated as “highest risk” on at least one measure, and 30 scored as “highest risk” on at least two measures. This group also represents the full range of unintended consequences from arms sales. Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia, and Ukraine fall into this category. This group collectively spent an average of $1.38 billion over the time period. Since 9/11, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (which scored a 12) invaded Yemen, intervened in Tunisia and Syria, and provoked a crisis with Qatar, while cementing a track record of human rights abuses and government oppression. Other states in this category, such as Afghanistan (score of 14), have entangled the United States in counterproductive conflicts since 9/11 and continue to do so today. Even arms sales to the less risky nations do not come without risk. For example, the Somewhat Risky category includes the United Arab Emirates, which is involved in an active conflict in Yemen, as well as Georgia, which has dangerous neighbors. Finally, the Lowest Risk category includes most of the NATO nations, Taiwan, South Korea, and a range of other, mostly smaller nations with stable governments, such as Barbados and Grenada, located in friendly neighborhoods. These countries pose little risk for problems like dispersion, destabilization, or misuse of weapons for oppression. In some cases, however, arms sales could alter regional balances of power in ways that increase tensions and the chance of conflict. U.S. arms sales to NATO allies, as part of the European Reassurance Initiative, for example, have upset Russian leaders.14 Similarly, arms sales to Taiwan, itself not a risky customer, have nonetheless raised tensions between China and the United States.15 In short, even a relatively simple risk assessment makes it clear that the policy of the United States is to sell weapons to just about any nation that can afford them without much concern for the consequences. Though the United States does limit its most advanced weapons to allies and maintains a ban on the sale of materials related to weapons of mass destruction,17 the United States has sold just about everything else, in many cases to countries embroiled in interstate and civil conflicts, to countries with horrendous human rights records, and to countries that represent a risk for entangling the United States in unwanted conflicts.

### Ext: Philippines

#### American arms sales to the Philippines are purposed for Duterte’s anti-drug campaign.

Jennings ’19(Ralph Jennings is a Taiwan correspondent covering news in China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia for the past 14 years. “Why the US Might Reject Selling Arms to the Philippines” VoA March 6, 2019. <https://www.voanews.com/usa/why-us-might-reject-selling-arms-philippines>) stowPCB

TAIPEI - The Philippine foreign secretary says his country wants to buy American weaponry to shore up defense. But although the two countries have worked closely together on security over the past 70 years, costs and broader security worries will make any arms hard to get, experts in Asia caution. Secretary Teodoro Locsin told a news conference in Manila that he and visiting U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo had discussed the “vital support” of the United States for Philippine military modernization. Mutual defense, he said, “should cover a partner’s back as well as its front.” Locsin later tweeted that he hopes the U.S. government will sell weapons to “re-arm our military” for self-defense. But the Philippines may not be able to afford complex new weapons systems, while U.S. officials would worry that Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte might use them in his deadly anti-drug campaign, experts believe. Duterte for his part might not want any new U.S. hardware to upset a 3-year friendship with China, which has its own differences with the United States. “The geopolitical issue, that’s one, second is the limited funding as well as security concerns when it comes to sourcing equipment,” said Collin Koh, a maritime security research fellow at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. “So, in a way it limits the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines).” Political complexity The U.S. Arms Export Control Act governing foreign sales is what one political consultant called for this report “a minefield of intricacies and legalities.” For that reason, scholars say, the U.S. government sells its new, high-end arms such as aircraft largely to long-term partners such as Australia, Singapore and Taiwan. Those partners know the Act, can pay the billions of dollars for new equipment and do not turn the weapons on their own people. Sales sometimes irk China as its navy expands onto the high seas, but Chinese leaders are used to the repeat customers. The anti-drug campaign may raise questions in the United States about “human rights” issues, said Eduardo Araral, associate professor at the National University of Singapore’s public policy school. Human rights groups say anti-drug police have killed thousands of people without due process. China hopes the Philippines, a rival claimant to sovereignty in the sea between them, will ease away from the United States as part of a Sino-Philippine friendship that included China’s pledge in 2016 for $24 billion in aid and investment. “If you sell one or two ships to the Philippines and the Philippines buys it, what signal does that send to China, that the Philippines is an un-loyal and unreliable neighbor and partner?” Araral said. “For the Philippines, you don’t want to send the wrong signal to China.” In Southeast Asia, only Singapore has the formula down for getting U.S.-made weaponry, said Carl Thayer, emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia. Singapore buys American fighters, helicopters and drones. Officials in Vietnam, he noted, have looked into buying American-made arms but fear they might get turned down, he said. American lawmakers may worry Manila would use weapons “recklessly,” Thayer said. “There’s no one there, leaving Singapore out, where you have a well-established relationship that would run smoothly, and where there is none it hits the bumps in the road," he said. Smaller, used and donated arms Manila and Washington have lived by a mutual defense treaty since 1951, followed by a visiting forces agreement in 1991 and ongoing joint naval exercises. U.S. officials count the Philippines as an Asian ally useful for containing China’s maritime expansion – also a reason Manila wants to upgrade its navy in case its relations with Beijing someday sour. Washington also has sold the Philippines pistols, assault rifles, ammunition and rocket launchers since 1980, according to a Federation of American Scientists research paper. Small arms used for anti-terrorism work or coast guard patrols normally cause little political concern, scholars note. The database GlobalFirePower.com ranks the Philippine military strength No. 63 out of 137 countries. Ex-president Benigno Aquino kicked off a military modernization program that called for two new frigates or warships, but domestic media said last year a special assistant to Duterte had “intervened” in the deal to acquire those from a builder in South Korea. Philippine officials may need to keep depending on small, donated, refurbished arms for low-key use, and not just from the United States, Koh said. Foreign sellers are already obliging. In 2017 South Korea donated a corvette warship to the Philippine navy, and last year an Australian shipbuilder said it would deliver six offshore patrol vessels.

#### Philippines is experiencing a modern-day genocide.

Simangan 17 [Dahlia Simangan, Center for Policy Research, United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, “Is the Philippine “War on Drugs” an Act of Genocide?” Taylor & Francis 7-17-2017 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2017.1379939] //AT

This article has analysed Duterte’s “war on drugs” by scoping existing news articles, government briefings, public speeches and available drug-related statistics. Duterte’s “war on drugs” is a textbook case of what the processes of genocide look like. Drug suspects in the Philippines are classified as “bad” and labelled as criminals through symbolisms. Duterte, his administration and his supporters believe that drug suspects are not human, or less human than them. As it is a state-sanctioned policy, the “war on drugs” is highly organized with both state and non-state actors participating in anti-drug operations. This drug war is also polarizing, with one side of the debate wanting to get rid of drug suspects by whatever means possible and the other side wanting to protect their human rights. Duterte’s administration has created enforcement programmes, mobilized police and military apparatuses, and silenced or threatened political critics in order to efficiently exterminate drug suspects. He has also encouraged civilians to participate not just in reporting drug suspects but also in shooting them. Duterte is happy to slaughter millions of drug suspects, likening himself to Hitler. He has ordered “shoot-to-kill” operations and assured officers involved in these operations of his support and protection. Duterte justifies his policies using a rhetoric of fear, hatred and paranoia in order to deny accountability for the deaths from his “war on drugs.” Police officers in anti-drug operations eliminate evidence that drug suspects were unarmed and compliant. Due to this state-sponsored violence, witnesses and family members are intimidated out of speaking for the victims. Duterte and his administration continue to block independent investigations and threaten critics of his policies while putting into positions of power people Duterte feels indebted to despite their lack of qualifications and experience. Considering all these factors, Duterte’s “war on drugs” satisfies the stages of genocide as Stanton describes them. It may not fully satisfy the legal definition of genocide but it has the characteristics found in stages of classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination and denial. This approach departs from limiting genocide to its legalistic definition and considers a more contextual analysis of what constitutes an act of genocide. The analysis in this article also reveals that stages of genocide can be overlapping, interconnected and non-linear. First, in Duterte’s “war on drugs,” symbolization happens simultaneously with extermination when drug suspects are killed and labelled with cardboard signs. Second, the dehumanization stage traverses other stages. Drug suspects are dehumanized in the classification, symbolization and extermination stages. Third, these stages can also be non-linear. After the deaths of drug suspects, Duterte and his administration propagate rhetoric that polarizes the public in their opinions of human rights, crime and public policy on drugs. Inquiring whether the Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide produces two opposing but not mutually exclusive answers. The answer is no if the inquiry is kept within the confines of the legalistic definition of genocide. The answer is yes based on Stanton’s stages of genocide and other broader definitions of genocide. Applying Stanton’s stages of genocide is an alternative approach to explaining genocidal events that may not fall under the traditional or conventional conceptualization of genocide. The problem with this approach, as Moses warns, is that “it may identify situations as at least ‘pre-genocidal’ that it does not intend to highlight.” 148 However, in the case of the Philippine “war on drugs,” the stages of genocide have already all been fulfilled. Some may also argue that Duterte may be responsible for crimes against humanity but not genocide. While this may be true, how does one reconcile the fact that the Philippine “war on drugs” fulfils all the stages of genocide? Perhaps it is at this point that it is more rational to depart from definitionalism and instead focus on what must be done to avert this humanitarian crisis, whatever name one prefers to give it. As Stanton laments, “debating whether mass killing fits the conventional definition of genocide is most often an excuse for non-action.” 149 Even if one does not accept that the Philippine “war on drugs” is an act of genocide, using Stanton’s stages adds to existing discussions and measures on genocide prevention. It sheds light on events related to and hopes to set an alarm for the state-sponsored humanitarian crisis in the Philippines. It is also a particularly useful analytical lens for explaining how perpetrators of genocide operate and a confirmation that genocide is a process,150 a progression of events, and a series of planned methods operated by organized actors and agencies. Calling the mass murder of drug suspects in the Philippines a “war on drugs” removes its human toll. It must be called what it is—a mass murder of unarmed, often poor civilians suspected of using drugs. At his command, Duterte’s administration has successfully incited, if not wholly organized, the killings of more than 7,000 Filipinos out of fear and a hatred of heinous crimes previously committed by either suspected or proven drug users. They have justified the killing of drug suspects by claiming that if they were not killed, they would kill. It is murdering the “murderer” before the murder happens.

#### Anti-drug militarism spills over and gets modelled across Asia which causes widespread violence.

Coca 6/27 (Nithin, a journalist who focuses on social and economic issues with expertise in South-east Asia, 6-27-2019, "From Indonesia to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the Philippines' deadly drug war is spreading across the region," <https://www.equaltimes.org/from-indonesia-to-bangladesh-and#.XRzwopNKgWo)> AG

In Asia, anti-drug rhetoric and action is **gaining traction** amongst democratically-elected leaders who are ignoring, perhaps willfully, the **human rights implications**. First it was south-east Asia, and now south Asia is joining the trend. Last year, ahead of national elections, **Bangladesh**’s prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, launched a ‘war on drugs’, empowering authorities to use force against suspected narcotics dealers. In less than a month [86 people were killed](https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-bangladesh-drugs/bangladesh-kills-86-arrests-7000-in-anti-drugs-campaign-idUKKCN1IT1DA), and the death toll is now estimated at over 400 with over 25,000 arrested according to [Al-Jazeera](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/drug-dealers-surrender-bangladesh-crackdown-190216165728814.html). Then earlier this year, Sri Lanka decided to reintroduce the death penalty with the expressed reason stated as the ability to execute drug criminals. This week [Amnesty International](https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/sri-lanka-halt-plans-for-executions-once-and-for-all/) called on the government not to execute a number of death row prisoners as part of a grim National Drug Eradication Week (21 June – 1 July) initiative. “This is lazy governance and an effort to convince people that the political leadership is in charge,” says Meenakshi Ganguly, the south Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Instead of doing the hard work – **reforming** the criminal justice system, enabling police to identify criminals and protecting victims – political leaders somehow believe that threatening criminals with hangings will deter them.” **The inspiration** for both countries? **The Philippines**, which, since President Rodrigo Duterte was elected in 2016, has embarked on [an incredibly violent war on drugs](https://www.equaltimes.org/the-international-people-s#.XRM7zvZFw2x) that has resulted in an estimated 20,000 deaths. The first sign that other countries would **mimic his tactics** came in neighbouring Indonesia, which saw two rounds of drug-executions followed by a stark rise in extrajudicial killings by narcotics police in 2017 after President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo called drugs [Indonesia’s “number one problem”](https://en.antaranews.com/news/103320/drug-abuse-is-number-one-problem-in-indonesia-president). Recent events in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have raised fears that the use of state-sanctioned violence against alleged drug criminals could be **spreading to south Asia** where it would have a **hugely detrimental** impact on **human rights** and the **rule of law**. “It’s horrifying to see that some governments have **chosen to emulate** Duterte’s actions,” says Omar Waraich, deputy south Asia director at Amnesty International. “**Like him**, they are desperately trying to appear tough to the public, claiming that they have a **quick solution** to establish law and order.” The Duterte factor There is evidence that the use and availability of addictive narcotics is increasing across Asia. In southern Thailand, the use of crystal methamphetamine has been rising, making addiction the top cause of divorce in the region. In China, the official number of drug users has risen from 150,000 in 1991 to 2.5 million in 2017. And seizures of meth tablets and crystal meth have risen dramatically in south-east Asia over the past decade, according to the [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).](https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2019/2019_The_Challenge_of_Synthetic_Drugs_in_East_and_SEA.pdf) This increase is driving the sudden interest in populist, anti-drug policies. “Communities are often upset that the wide availability of illegal recreational drugs has led to addiction problems and they want the state to take action,” says Ganguly. The Philippines was also dealing with this challenge, and there were reports of growing meth usage in parts of major cities such as Manila and Cebu. Duterte’s 2016 presidential campaign hinged on his success in reducing crime and drug usage while mayor of Davao City, where he debuted his now-infamous tactics, such as [ordering the use of death squads.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/02/philippines-president-duterte-drugs-war-death-squads) There is a **direct connection** between Duterte’s rise and the spread of violent anti-drugs tactics in Asia. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lankan authorities have **expressed admiration** for Duterte’s methods. In fact, Sri Lankan president Maithripala Sirisena announced his desire to resume use of the death penalty after visiting the Philippines and calling what he saw there [“**an example to the world**”](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/18/example-to-the-world-sri-lanka-president-plans-to-copy-dutertes-war-on-drugs). In Bangladesh, there are clear parallels between the rhetoric of Prime Minister Hasina and Duterte. Ignorance about drugs, and how to address their social impacts, allows this rhetoric to take hold. “It has been easy for political leaders to simplify the ills of their society by blaming them on drugs, due largely to the fact that understanding about drugs is not based on evidence and science but on morality, ideology and fallacies,” says Gloria Lai, regional director for Asia at the International Drug Policy Consortium. In fact, [the effectiveness of Duterte’s contentious efforts](https://www.equaltimes.org/the-war-on-drugs-is-ineffective#.XRM_9_ZFw2x) to reduce drug usage or availability is yet to be proven. The price of meth remains similar to what it was before Duterte took power, and reliable figures on drug usage are inconclusive; meanwhile evidence of police brutality and abuse of power is plentiful. “Duterte’s murderous ways have **not** rid the Philippines of drugs,” Waraich tells Equal Times. “In their own operations, the police have planted evidence in people’s homes, faked official incident reports and stolen possessions from people’s homes.” A war on the poor and marginalised Thailand provides another worrying example. While not as deadly as the Philippines, Thailand embarked on a war on drugs in the early 2000s, putting tens of thousands of people in jail. Today, more about [70 percent of the country’s prison population](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-drugs-thailand-prisons/soaring-prison-population-prompts-thailand-to-re-think-lost-drug-war-idUSKCN0ZX01J) has been interned on drug offenses, yet drug use and availability remains high. This falls in line with data from the United States, where narcotics use remains high despite years of harsh anti-drug tactics. Moreover, [several studies](https://theconversation.com/theres-no-evidence-that-death-penalty-is-a-deterrent-against-crime-43227) have shown that the use of the death penalty as a deterrent against the trade and usage of narcotics in fact does very little to reduce crime. “The death penalty is a simplistic measure to deceive people into thinking that the government is taking serious action,” says Lai. Also, incredibly worrying to human rights observers is evidence that the victims of both extrajudicial killings and the death penalty tend to be those from **poor** and/or **marginalised** communities, not necessarily the people who run criminal networks. The **lack of accountability** for police means that the dead can include victims unconnected to drug use, such as the 2017 killing of 17-year old [Kian Loyd de los Santos](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/world/asia/philippines-teenager-killing-funeral-duterte.html), or political opponents, as more than 10 of the victims in Bangladesh are activists for the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party. “Breaking the very laws they are supposed to uphold, the authorities have acted on the flimsiest evidence to target people suspected of buying or selling drugs, often in poor neighborhoods,” says Waraich. Despite all the evidence, there is little momentum to switch from tactics rooted in violence and force to one more rooted in public health: “It’s **political symbolism** at the expense of not just individuals but also communities and societies, because instead of investing in effectively tackling social problems, such governments have simply chosen to distract voters,” says Lai. If the goal is political, then the war on drugs has been successful, at least for its leaders. In the Philippines Duterte remains one of the most popular politicians in Asia. Similarly, in Indonesia, Jokowi has seen a jump in his popularity ratings after each round of drug executions, and has seen no blowback from the rise in extrajudicial killings. “Jokowi has been using, as much as possible, public issues that could be exploited on a populist platform, and one of those is drugs,” says Ricky Gunawan, an Indonesian human rights lawyer and director of the Community Legal Aid Institute (LBH Masyarakat), based in Jakarta, Indonesia. In Bangladesh, the same trick has also worked well. Prime Minister Hasina’s Awami League party won elections in December 2018 convincingly, taking 288 out of 300 seats in Parliament, despite numerous allegations of fraud. In the Philippines, Duterte’s allies won a majority in mid-term elections for 12 seats in the Senate. As long as voters keep supporting politicians who put populist policies ahead of human rights, it is likely that the war on drugs will **continue** to claim **more victims** across Asia.

#### The US is complicit in massive human rights violations in the Philippines by selling arms for a violent war on drugs – applying Leahy law is necessary to uphold human rights

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Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s bloody “War on Drugs” has now claimed [over](https://drugarchive.ph/post/26-the-drug-killings-who-wha) [27,000](https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/12/05/18/chr-chief-drug-war-deaths-could-be-as-high-as-27000%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%2227%2C000) lives— almost all poor and indigent people, including children, summarily executed by police or vigilantes. Over [140,000](https://theaseanpost.com/article/packed-prisons-philippines%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22140%2C000) pre-trial detainees are being held in overcrowded Philippine prisons,many ontrumped up [drug charges](https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/210516-charts-n);75 percent of the total prison population still awaits their day in court, let alone conviction. On top of this, assassinations of human rights lawyers, journalists, labor and peasant organizers, indigenous leaders, clergy, teachers, and activists are spiraling out of control. Duterte has systematically silenced voices of political dissent, jailing Senator Leila DeLima, an early drug war critic; ousting Supreme Court Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, who opposed the imposition of martial law in Mindanao; and now arresting Maria Ressa, internationally renowned journalist and executive editor of the indy outlet [Rappler](https://www.rappler.com/). Meanwhile, less known to U.S. audiences, Duterte has repeatedly dropped bombs on Philippine soil, impacting over [368,000](https://www.karapatan.org/2018-Karapatan-HR-Report) people — and some [450,000](https://www.karapatan.org/2018-Karapatan-HR-Report%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22450%2C000) civilians have been displaced by militarization. After scuttling peace talks with the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), Duterte has jailed internationally protected peace consultants. And in January, consultant Randy Malayao was [murdered](https://www.rappler.com/nation/222301-human-rights-groups-statements-death-ndf-consultant-randy-m) in cold blood by armed hit men. Ever since the Philippines attained formal independence in 1946, the U.S. has maintained a military presence on its former colony, guiding and supporting “counter-insurgency” operationsto put down constant rebellions against an oligarchic government. Today, the Philippine armed forces overwhelmingly direct violence not against outside invaders, but at poor and marginalized people within its borders. U.S. military aid is only making internal conflict worse. U.S. taxpayer funds are bankrolling the worsening human rights crisis in the Philippines. Duterte’s repressive regime is the [largest](http://philippineslifestyle.com/military-aid-usa-philippines/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22largest) [recipient](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/0) of U.S. military [aid](https://explorer.usaid.gov/agencies/?agency=7&year=2017&measure=Obl) in East and Southeast Asia. In 2016, the U.S. helped inaugurate Duterte’s drug war by giving [$32 million](http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/07/27/1607298/us-pledges-32m-philippine-law-enforcement) to the Philippine police (supposedly for “[training and services](http://www.rappler.com/nation/147196-us-funding-philippines-law-enforcement%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22training%20and%20services)” in “policing standards” and “rule of law,” besides [equipment](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/de)). In July 2018, the United States announced an additional [$26.5 million](https://ph.usembassy.gov/united-states-to-b) in U.S. tax dollars to beef up support for Philippine police, in the name of “counter-terrorism.” In FY2018, the Defense Department provided [roughly $100 million](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/OPEP_Q119_Dec2018_final.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22roughly%20%24100%20million) in military aid, including equipment, weapons, and aerial surveillance systems, to the Philippine military and police, though Operation Pacific Eagle — a so-called “overseas contingency operation” that is [exempt](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22exempt) from congressional limits on spending. The amount demanded for this program will increase to [$108.2 million](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/OPEP_Q119_Dec2018_final.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22%24108.2%20million) for FY2019 — even asthe Defense Department has [admitted](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/defa) it lost track of transactions for 76 of 77 arms sales conducted under bilateral agreementswith the Philippines. In 2018, on top of the above, the U.S. sold the Philippine [police](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/OPEP_Q119_Dec2018_final.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22police) and [military](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/lig-oco-op) over $63 million worth of arms. Italso donated [2,253 machine guns](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/OPEP_Q119_Dec2018_final.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%222%2C253%20machine%20guns), over [5 million](https://ph.usembassy.gov/us-government-provide) rounds of ammunition, surveillance equipment, and other weapons. Military aid totaled at least $193.5 million last year, not including arms sales, and donated equipment of unreported worth. At least $145.6 million is already pledged for 2019. In January, Trump authorized $1.5 billion annually for the Asian Pacific region, including the Philippines, from 2019 to 2023. Although this authorization includes a [stipulation](https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2736/text%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22stipulation) that counter-narcotics funds will not go to the Philippines (“except for drug demand reduction,” a potential loophole), it’s too little, too late. The set-aside has no restrictions on weapons funding for the Philippine military. And separately, the State Department already plans to deliver [$5.3 million](https://www.state) this year to the Philippine police for anti-narcotics activities. Worse, rampant corruption together with a total lack of transparency means it’s hard to ensure where military aid could actually end up. U.S. military equipment forms the backbone of Duterte’s “military modernization” program. Although the above aid is tiny compared to the U.S.’s own bloated military budget, this tremendous transfer of weapons and surveillance technology is significant in propping up the Philippine armed forces’ capacity. Duterte has embarked on an ambitious program to “modernize” the Philippine military, massively increasing funding and pouring more money towards this than spent in [the last 15 years](https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2018/10/21/1861787/). (Meanwhile, he’s [doubled](https://news.abs-cbn) the salaries of military and police.) He could not do so without U.S. aid and arms. For its part, the U.S. is particularly interested in [expanding](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/) aerial “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” missions over Mindanao, the largest island in the Southern Philippines, rich in untapped mineral resources. Without U.S. aid, the Philippine military would lack the airplanes and technology to perform this surveillance. What’s more, this year’s Operation Pacific Eagle budget sets aside an extra [$3.5 million](https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2019-02/OPEP_Q119_Dec20) for U.S. military efforts to collect and analyze “local media in native languages” — underscoring that the U.S. is striving for an upper hand in directing Philippine military operations. And in winning an information war over public opinion. In recent years, the U.S. has had up to [5,000](https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2018/08/09/pentagon-tripl) troops deployed in the Philippines at any one time. Officially, U.S. troops are limited to “joint exercises” and war games. But questions have been raised over [possible U.S. personnel](https://www.ma) involvement in secretive missions, resulting in killings of civilians and human rights abuses. In the case of the 2015 [Mamasapano](https://www) [massacre](https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/669237/moro-group-7-civilians-killed-3-wounded-in-mamasapano-clash), supposedly under the jurisdiction of Philippine police and military only, hearings later [uncovered](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2015/03/17/1434648/senate-report-confirms-us-involvement-mamasapano-operation%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22uncovered) U.S. guidance and surveillance support, despite U.S. denials. Meanwhile, U.S. troops who themselves commit human rights abuses, murder, or sexual assault, are insulated from being held accountable by the U.S.-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement. What are the consequences of the bonanza of military aid for Duterte? The bottom line is, the U.S. government is complicit in — and actively supporting — the deepening human rights crisis in the Philippines. [Police are](https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2017-04/ASA3555172017ENGLISH.PDF?9_73DdFTpveG_iJgeK0U13KUVFHKSL_X%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22Police%20are) linked to the killings carried out by unidentified vigilantes in the War on Drugs, and their [corruption](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/philippines0317_web_1.pdf) [abounds](https://www.amnesty.o). Besides tagging the unarmed people they have murdered as “fighting back,” police have [planted](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/re) evidence; [sexually](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/673124/center-for-women-s-resources-polic) [assaulted](https://globalvoices.org/2018/11/02/a-15-year-old-rape-victim-is-the-latest-collateral-damage-of-dutertes-drug-war/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22assaulted) [women](https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/646615/pregnant-mother-) [and](https://ph.theasianparent.com/pregnant-woman-raped-by-police%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22and) children, in [exchange](http://nine.cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/11/08/pnp-charged-with-rape.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22exchange) for release or dropping drug charges; and detained people without charges and tortured them to extract bribes, including through the use of [secret](https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/27/philippine-drug-war-spawns-unlawful-secret-jail%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22secret) holding cells. In addition to the drug war, repression is unfolding on other fronts, as well. [Twelve journalists](https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1013357/22-journalists-killed-in-ph-under-duterte-administration-nujp%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22Twelve%20journalists) were killed in the first two years under Duterte — the highest number of murdered journalists in the first two years in office of any Philippine president. At least [34 lawyers](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/philippines-human-rights-l) have been assassinated, including Benjamin Ramos of the National Union of People’s Lawyers, an attorney representing the Sagay 9 — peasants, including women and minors, massacred for trying to claim land they were legally awarded. At least [48](https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/25/18/under-duterte-philippines-ranked-asias-most-dangerous-country-for-environment-defenders%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%2248) environmental campaigners were murdered in 2017 alone, making the Philippines the second most dangerous country for environmentalists, after Brazil. By 2018, [14 massacres](https://www.karapatan.org/2018-Karapatan-HR-Report%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%2214%20massacres), killings mostly of farmers who were fighting for land reform, were perpetrated by police, military, or paramilitaries. Labor leaders are being slaughtered using tactics similar to those in the drug war. Edilberto Miralles, president of R&E Taxi Transport union,was [shotin broad daylight](https://www.philstar.com/metro/2016/09/24/1626784/union-leader-gunned-down%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22shot%20in%20broad%20daylight) in front of the National Labor Relations Commission in 2016. Linus Cubol, chair of Kilusang Mayo Uno in Caraga, was [murdered](https://www.rappler.com/nation/217768-labor-leader-agusan-del-norte-killed-november-27-2018%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22murdered) in Novemberby vigilantes riding in tandem. Police [brutally beat](https://www.rappler.com/na) peacefully picketing NutriAsia workers on strike and their supporters, [wounding](https://www.bulatlat.com/2018/08/06/nanay-leti-grandm) [scores](https://www.bulatlat.com/2018/06/14/20-arrested-scores-wounded-violent-dispersal-nutriasia-strike/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22scores); then they charged the picketers with assault, [planted weapons](https://news.abs-cbn.com/video/news/08/02/18/man-with-gun-drugs-allegedly-planted-among-nutriasia-protesters%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22planted%20weapons), and attempted to suppress journalists’ coverage of the dispersal. Under Duterte, over [134](https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/222796-human-rights-defenders-killed-under-duterte-administration%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22134) human rights defenders have been killed. In just one case, in 2017, Elisa Badayos and Eleuterio Moises were [murdered](https://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/11/29/1763667/2-members-fact-finding-mission-negros-killed-1-injured%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22murdered) while serving on a fact-finding team investigating human rights violations due to militarization in Negros Oriental. Since 2017, Duterte has imposed martial law on Mindanao. Increasing militarization is resulting in rampant abuses against indigenous and Moro people. Aerial “surveillance” missions already make up the bulk of U.S. aid to the Philippine military. Most likely in direct relation, bombings in Mindanao have escalated — particularly over indigenous lands, causing mass evacuations. Simultaneously, reminiscent of U.S.-sponsored tactics in Latin America resulting in indigenous genocide, the Philippine military, together with [paramilitary groups](https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/23/philippines-paramilitaries-attack-tribal-villages-schools%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22paramilitary%20groups) it [arms](https://www.icj.org/th) and [guides](https://www.karapatan.org/AFP%2C%2BDND%2Basks%2Bfor%2Bbigger%2Bbudget%2Bto%2Bfund%2Bits%2Bparamilitaries%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22guides), are terrorizing indigenous communities. The military has recruited and even forced indigenous people to become paramilitaries as a means of divide-and-conquer. Indigenous groups’ resistance is at the forefront of the struggle against climate change, both in the Philippines and globally. Now, their lands, such as those in Mindanao’s Pantaron Range, are some of the [few remaining](https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzc5SdETrPEAQjBkOXNLaXIzSEk/view%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22few%20remaining) to be opened up to extractive logging and mining by multinational corporations. The militarization of indigenous lands, purportedly in the name of counterinsurgency, seeks to quell this organized community [opposition](https://intercontinentalcry.org/thousands-march-killings-indigenous-peoples-philippine-mining-c) to corporate land-grabbing and environmental degradation. Education is a [center](https://www.bulatlat.com/2014/12/01/the-lumad-school-on-pantaron-range/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22center) of community [resistance](https://www.bulatlat.com/2018/12/01/context-of-talaingod-incident-the-decades-old-struggle-of-lumad-in-pantaron-) — and [now](http://ibon.org/2017/03/lumad-schools-under-attack-in-mineral-rich-mindanao/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22now) [repression](https://www.al) as well. The military and paramilitaries are targeting indigenous [community](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/20) [schools](http://ibon.org/2017/03/lumad-schools-under-attack-in-mineral-rich-mindanao/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22schools) — turning their grounds into military encampments, shooting teachers and students, bombing the schools – to force their closure. Indigenous children and their teachers are the victims of this campaign. In September 2017, Obello Bay-ao, a student at Salugpongan’s school in Dulyan, Talaingod, was [killed](https://www.karapatan.org/Two%2Bmembers%2Bof%2Bparamilitary%2Bgroup%2Bcharged%2Bwith%2Bmurder%2Bof%2BLumad%2Bstudent%2B%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22killed)by Alamara paramilitaries while walking home from farming. He was shot 24 times in the back. In the same community, another 15-year-old student was [gunned down](https://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/regions/01/19/16/lumad-student-allegedly-killed-by-paramilitary-member%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22gunned%20down) by Alamara in 2016, while a 14-year-old girl reported being [gang raped](https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/719073/3-soldiers-tagged-in-rape-of-manobo-girl%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22gang%20raped) by soldiers in 2015. In May 2018, Beverly Geronimo, a teacher of indigenous children, was gunned [down](http://davaotoday.com/main/human-rights/lumad-school-student-wounded-mother-shot-dead-in-agusan-del-sur/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co) in Trento, Agusan del Sur while buying school supplies. In November 2018, four teachers, Tema Namatidong, Julius Torregosa, Ariel Barluado, and Giovanni Solomon, were [abducted](http://www.chrp.org.uk/2018/two-weeks-in-mindanao-two-farmers-s) by the military in Lanao del Sur. The [list](https://www.karapatan.org/2018-Karapatan-HR-Report%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22list) of atrocities continues. In June 2018, [72](https://www.philstar.com/headli) schools were unable to hold classes because of military harassment. [Over](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/scary-indigenous-schools-feel-heat-restive-mi) [2,000](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/11/1831716/lumad-schools-even-holding-class-struggle%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%222%2C000) indigenous students could not attend school because of nearby military encampments. The schools under attack are part of a [movement](https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/11/1831716/lumad-schools-even-holding-class-struggle%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22movement) led by indigenous groups, together with NGOs and church partners, to provide relevant education for their youth, a service largely neglected by the government. [Ninety percent](https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2017/03/18/1679995/lumads-sustain-fight-save-their-schools%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22Ninety%20percent) of indigenous children lack access to formal education. In the 2000s, indigenous communities [established](https://www.bulatlat.com/2014/12/01/the-lumad-school-on-pantaron-range/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22established) schools in [conjunction](https://www.bulatlat.com/2018/12/01/context-of-talaingod-incident-the-decades-old-struggle-of-lumad-in-pantaron-mountain) with their struggles for self-determination, in hopes that education would help protect them from land-grabbing. The military has sought to brand community schools as “training camps” for communist insurgents, recently launching Facebook campaigns towards this purpose. U.S. military aid is intensifying the conflict in Mindanao, exacerbating its impact on civilians.U.S. investment in aerial surveillance will escalate an air war that has a brutal and indiscriminate effect on people as well as the environment. The integration of “intelligence” activity in counter-terrorism is dangerous. It will likely worsen repression against anyone organizing for indigenous, labor, and human rights — feeding a growing bloodbath as paramilitaries are employed to undermine these local struggles, while providing cover for government troops to escape accountability. Today’s violence is inseparable from the U.S.’s imperial shadow. The drug war is a purge of humans deemed worthless in a society where social safety nets were never allowed to be developed, where the failure of neoliberal economic reforms now plays into the hands of despotism, and where U.S.-backed elites regularly employ state-paid goons to undermine democracy. Placed in historical context, Mindanao, and those lands of indigenous communities under attack, were some of the last outposts resisting Spanish and U.S. rule. The islands — dubbed by Trump “a prime piece of real estate from a military standpoint” — have long served as a stepping stone towards U.S. aspirations of dominance in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. military aid continues a long process of “pacification” — and colonial conquest, now unfolding in neocolonial forms. People’s movements in the Philippines are calling for international solidarity, to end the U.S.-backed militarization of their communities. They demand also peace with justice — a peace process that adopts structural reforms like those outlined in [CASER](https://www.ndfp.org/sayt/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/NDFP-CASER-2017-Web-version-Ver2.0.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22CASER), a program the NDFP sought to reach agreement on implementing via peace talks, that includes land reform, rescinding neoliberal economic policies, and respecting indigenous land and self-determination. In 2016, [Sandugo](http://sandugo.org/), a historic alliance of indigenous and Moro groups from across the Philippines, formed, uniting for self-determination and a just peace. Three thousand delegates met in Manila, and protesters converged on the U.S. embassy, under a banner calling for an end to U.S. intervention and militarization. At the gates of the U.S. embassy, the Philippine police responded by beating people indiscriminately, and a [police van ran over the crowd](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/19/philippines-police-van-rams-protesters-outside-us-embassy-in-manila%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22police%20van%20ran%20over%20the%20crowd), injuring dozens. Three years later, the call to end U.S. military aid and lift martial law continues. In terms of the drug war, one of the first groups to come out in vocal opposition was [Kadamay](https://www.facebook.com), a mass-based organization of urban poor people. Instead of killings, Kadamay has called for addressing poverty and the root causes of the drug problem — in short, for drug addiction to be treated as a health, not criminal, issue. More recently, an organization of family members of those killed in the drug war has formed, [Rise Up For Life and Rights](https://www.facebook.com/Rise-Up-for-Life-and-for-Rights-363258137385786/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22Rise%20Up%20For%20Life%20and%20Rights). When the Philippine Senate tried to [restrict funding](https://www.rappler.com/nation/189915-philippine-senate-approves-2018-national-budget%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22restrict%20funding) for Duterte’s drug war in late 2017, the U.S. stepped in to provide funds that filled the shortfall. To evade accountability, Duterte has [shifted](http://cnnphilipp) drug war operations from under the Philippine National Police (PNP) to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and back to the PNP’s general operation funds. Recently, he [eliminated](http://nine.cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/08/30/PN) keeping a separate budget item for the drug war — obscuring how much money is being expended on it. The Philippine Congress has not been able to provide effective oversight. The continuing drug war killings and rampant human rights abuses only underscore that there is no way to ensure U.S. military aid to the Duterte regime does not enable human rights violations. For its part, U.S. military spending is not only overblown, but also often untraceable, secretive, and unaccountable. From Central America to Palestine to the Philippines,U.S. military aid has a sordid legacy of fueling atrocities. A growing movement is calling on Congress to cut military aid, arms gifts, and arm sales to the Philippines — as well as to end support for the Duterte regime. **Congress must exercise its powers to ensure the Leahy Law,** which stipulates no funding shall be furnished to foreign security forces if the U.S. knows they have committed “a gross violation of human rights,” is upheld with regard to the Philippines.(For more information on this campaign, please visit: [ichrpus.org.](https://ichrpus.org/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co%20%22ichrpus.org.)) In [2007](https://www.govinfo.gov/conte), due to movement pressure, Congress held a hearing on [rising](https://www.thenation.com/article/how-us-aid-fosters-human-rights-violations-philippines/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank%22%20%5Co) extrajudicial killings in the Philippines under Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s regime. Legislation was passed placing restrictions on military aid. The next year, killings decreased significantly. Our time to act is now.

### Ext: Nigeria

#### Arms sales to Nigeria fail- cause indiscriminate bombing of civilians and aren’t suited to the local geography --- they destroy the Nigerian defense sector and trade of with resolving insecurity.

CIC, 18—a worldwide NGO that is a go-to source for effective civilian protection policy and practice and is a leading voice for civilians living in conflict throughout the world. (“‘With Great Power’: Modifying US Arms Sales to Reduce Civilian Harm,” <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/ArmsSales_WithGreatPower_FINAL.pdf> 1-10-18)

On August 3, 2017, DoD issued a press release 1 announcing the approval of the sale to Nigeria of twelve Embraer A-29 Super Tucano aircraft and weapons, valued at an estimated $593 million.2 Super Tucanos are armed with two wing-mounted machine guns and can carry up to 1,550 kg (3,417 pounds) of munitions and ordnance.3 The public announcement was made 198 days after the Nigerian Air Force killed an estimated 115 civilians in the errant bombing of a refugee camp in Rann, Borno State on January 17, 2017.4 The Nigerian Air Force insisted that the strike was an accident and set up two boards of inquiry to investigate after the event, at least partly in response to international criticism. Nigerian Air Commodore Adesanya, Director of Public Relations and Information for the Nigerian Air Force, released a statement on July 24, 2017 acknowledging military responsibility for the incident;5 however, no investigation results have been made public at the time of writing, and concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability for those involved persist.6 Three months prior to the announcement of the sale, several prominent human rights organizations expressed concerns about the sale in a letter to Congress, citing the “lack of adequate safeguards and accountability mechanisms to ensure that the Tucano aircraft would be used consistently with international human rights and humanitarian law by the Nigerian military”.7 The Rann bombing was one of a succession of similar incidents that led to civilian casualties, and the letter echoed concerns the organizations had raised in a separate letter a year prior. According to Human Rights Watch, bombings conducted on two prior occasions by the Nigerian Air Force killed up to 30 civilians in two separate villages.8 On June 8, Senators Corey Booker and Rand Paul sent a letter to Secretary of State Rex Tillerson in which they too expressed concerns over the possible sale, warning that the “decision to proceed with this sale will empower the government to backtrack even further on its commitments to human rights, accountability, and upholding international humanitarian law, which in turn could spur greater unrest and violence, particularly in the northeastern part of the country”.9 To address the concerns raised by Congress and NGOs, as well as many in the US government itself regarding the Nigerian armed forces’ competence and willingness to reduce the risk of future accidents and civilian casualties, DSCA noted in its release that the sale would be accompanied by “special training on the law of armed conflict and human rights, and air-to-ground integration to minimize civilian harm in air operations.”10 This public commitment to customize training on the basis of risk may signal a welcome change to the status quo of arms sales. The sale of the Super Tucanos raises additional questions given the real counterterrorism needs of the Nigerian military. As observed by Matthew Page, until recently the State Department’s top expert on Nigeria: [The Super Tucano] is devastatingly effective in the right operational context [....] Boko Haram, however, is a more slippery target than the Taliban, FARC, or narcotraffickers’ Amazonian airstrips. The Super Tucano’s unique capabilities might have been handy two years ago, when Boko Haram controlled large parts of three northeastern states. Even then, however, terrorist-held towns and villages housed many civilians. Experts agree that new warplanes will be less effective now that the group has dispersed and is once again operating clandestinely and conducting asymmetric attacks. Boko Haram fighters no longer operate en masse and many have taken refuge in remote communities in the Mandara Mountains or on the islands of Lake Chad. Even the Sambisa Forest—the group’s traditional stronghold— is not well suited to aerial bombardment…. hundreds of camp followers—mostly women and children—live among the terrorists sheltering there.11 Page also noted the staggering cost of the aircraft relative to Nigeria’s resources, which amounts to “roughly half of Nigeria’s 2016 defense budget and over twice as much as the Nigerian Army’s entire annual salary bill,” funds that could “address long-term drivers of conflict like chronic underdevelopment, poverty, and food insecurity.”12 While allocating Nigeria’s budget is not the responsibility of the US government, US officials are responsible for working with partner governments tomatch desired items with legitimate defense needs and real capabilities, as described in the Pre-Case Development and Evaluation phases of the FMS process. The sale therefore calls into question how the Departments of State and Defense arrived at the conclusion that the Super Tucanos corresponded strongly enough with a legitimate security need to warrant approval of the sale in light of the risks involved.

#### Arms sales to Nigeria undermine the US stance against human rights abuses and encourage more corruption

Dick and Stohl, 2017 – research associate and director of the Conventional Defense program at the Stimson Center [Shannon and Rachel, April 25, Forum on the Arms Trade, “Trump on Arms Sales”, <https://www.forumarmstrade.org/blog/trump-on-arms-sales>, accessed on 7/10/19]

Three months into the Trump administration and President Trump has used arms sales to support security priorities and demonstrate a commitment to industry. Yet it remains unclear how and to what extent arms sales will be used as a tool of Trump’s foreign and defense policies. Recent actions, however, appear to suggest that human rights will no longer be a priority for advancing or withholding U.S. arms sales and thereby supporting larger U.S. foreign policy interests. Indeed, since taking office, the Trump administration has pushed forward (but Congress has yet to fully review) arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Nigeria that were previously put on hold by the Obama administration due to human rights concerns. The rationale behind these decisions to provide U.S. weapons to consistent human rights violators is largely based on counterterrorism priorities and the view that these arms transfers will significantly support campaigns against terrorist groups. But there is scant evidence that allowing these arms sales will contribute to U.S. strategic goals and objectives and will not result in further human rights abuses and civilian suffering. For example, the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen has resulted in devastating impacts on the Yemeni civilian population. The campaign, undertaken with U.S. supplied weapons, has consistently struck civilian targets and could help fuel anti-American sentiment and play into terrorist groups’ narrative, ultimately working against larger interests in working to stabilize the country and end the conflict. The Trump administration is also trying to change the bureaucratic process surrounding arms sales to foreign governments. Reportedly, the Trump administration is considering replacing foreign military financing (FMF) grants with loans. The Trump administration seems to believe that having governments pay back their weapons purchases will save the United States money in the long run. However, such thinking fundamentally misunderstands the intent of the FMF program. FMF enables foreign governments to use U.S. government grants to purchase U.S. weapons primarily through the Foreign Military Sales program. The program is often used to support foreign militaries that would otherwise be unable to purchase U.S. systems and is often cited as a crucial means to promote national security interests. Indeed, FMF allows foreign partners and allies to acquire U.S. equipment – which is often more expensive than systems from other countries – and thus augment their own military capabilities while fostering stronger security relations with the United States. Additionally, because FMF funds are almost exclusively reserved for the procurement of U.S. weapons and equipment, the program supports U.S. industry. As Andrew Shapiro, former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs under the Obama administration, aptly noted in commentary for [Defense News](http://www.defensenews.com/articles/white-house-plan-to-gut-foreign-military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn), the FMF program “helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base, it helps lower the cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and communities.” Should the administration follow through with converting grants to loans, it could harm U.S. industry and lead business into other markets that offer less expensive alternatives, such as those maintained by Russia and China. In its [budget blueprint](https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf), the administration stated that the shift to loans would “potentially [allow] recipients to purchase more American-made weaponry with U.S. assistance, but on a repayable basis.” But why would buyers pay for systems they used to get for free, and in fact pay more than if they were to seek military equipment from other suppliers? The Trump administration’s initial arms sales efforts may work to weaken long-standing U.S. policy priorities regarding conventional arms transfers. In the short term, Trump’s policy decisions are minimizing the extent to which human rights concerns are taken into consideration. In the long-term, these arms sales may result in continued sales to a wider scope of actors with poor records of good governance. Additionally, in seeking changes to grant programs, Trump’s policies may undercut U.S. industry. Such decisions could ultimately backfire on U.S. interests, both economically and politically, and leave an arms trade legacy that risks negative consequences for years to come.

#### Nigerian military abuses are rampant – they are more violent and destructive than the terrorists whom they are fighting.

Matfess, 2017—doctoral candidate at Yale University [Hilary, 10/24/17, “In Partnering With Nigeria’s Abusive Military, the U.S. is giving Boko Haram a Lifeline,” World Politics Review, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/23447/in-partnering-with-nigeria-s-abusive-military-the-u-s-is-giving-boko-haram-a-lifeline> acc 7/11/19]

As Destructive as Boko Haram The Nigerian military’s abuses in the fight against Boko Haram are so extensive that they are the subject of an ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court. Extrajudicial killings and illegal detention practices have been documented at length by several nongovernmental organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Among the most comprehensive and distressing accounts was a 2015 report by Amnesty International titled “Stars on Their Shoulders, Blood on Their Hands,” which tallied more than 7,000 deaths in Nigerian government detention centers, 1,200 additional extrajudicial killings and the arbitrary arrest of more than 20,000 people in counterterrorism operations. According to Amnesty, the military “extrajudicially executed people after they had been captured and when they presented no danger.” The victims included people who “were shot dead inside detention facilities, while others were either shot or had their throats cut after being captured during cordon-and-search operations.” In one especially gruesome incident, soldiers responding to a Boko Haram attack in the northeastern town of Baga in April 2013 carried out a “mop-up” operation that killed nearly 200 people. More recent accounts from activist groups and people living in the Lake Chad basin suggest these abusive practices have continued. A woman I interviewed in December 2015 in the Fufore refugee camp, located in the northeastern state of Adamawa, survived attacks by both Boko Haram and the army. She said that of the two, the army left more destruction in its wake. “My town was along the Boko Haram route, so they attacked us regularly but never ruled over us,” said the woman, who is from Borno and who spoke on condition of anonymity for her safety. “We were just trapped in our town.” But when the soldiers came, the woman said, they “burned all of our houses and our fields.” She said she had no time to collect her possessions before the inferno began. Another woman from the town of Walasah, also in Borno, similarly reported that when the Nigerian army entered her community, “They did not stop to ask who was Boko Haram; they just burned down the whole village.” For civilians, it makes little difference if a village is burned by Boko Haram insurgents or by soldiers. They are left without their livelihoods and property, facing an uncertain future. The Nigerian military often claims that such fires are set by Boko Haram. However, this contradicts the testimony of displaced people, journalists and even some military personnel. While there is arguably a strategic justification for burning villages—namely, to deprive Boko Haram of resources to loot—the same cannot be said for other abuses carried out during village raids, which seem to be the result not of strategic logic, but rather a lack of professionalism. A UNICEF employee who has worked on protection issues throughout northern Nigeria reported that, in March 2016, when Nigerian soldiers entered communities in Adamawa to liberate them from Boko Haram’s rule, the soldiers announced they would “kill local men and take their wives.” Some Nigerians who have survived attacks by both Boko Haram and the army say the army is more destructive.

#### Leahy Law doesn’t currently block FMS and DCS to Nigeria --- applying the law would help the government effectively combat Boko Haram

* helps ensure that Nigerian forces operate as professional soldiers and law officers and that they are seen as accountable to the law

**Lumpe & Pray, 15** --- Senior Policy staff at Open Society Foundations (7/25/15, Lora & Sarah, AllAfrica.com, “How the Leahy Law Can Help Nigeria,” proquest database)

The Leahy Law does not apply to arms sales financed with Nigeria's own funds. It only applies to assistance being drawn from the U.S. Treasury. Decisions by the Obama Administration to refrain from selling U.S. weapons or technologies to Nigeria in the recent past may have been due to concerns about the human rights (or corruption) record of Nigerian forces, but those decisions were not based on the Leahy Law. In a speech at the U.S. Institute of Peace that largely focused on his desire to address impunity and corruption in his country, President Muhammadu Buhari mischaracterised the U.S. law known as the "Leahy Law." He asserted that application of this law by the U.S. Government "has aided and abetted Boko Haram" by denying the Nigerian government sophisticated weaponry. However, the unwillingness of the United States to sell arms to Nigeria has nothing to do with the Leahy Law, which only applies to military assistance that is funded by the United States. The Nigerian government has had challenges procuring weapons with its own resources. Most importantly, the law supports President Buhari's previously stated objective of Nigerian forces that are accountable to rule of law. As he has noted, disciplined, accountable armed forces will do more to end the reign of Boko Haram's predations than will undisciplined forces. The Leahy Law supports this conviction and seeks to incentivise internal accountability. What does this law actually mandate, and why? Named after Senator Patrick Leahy, who authored it in 1997, the Leahy Law originally focused only on U.S. assistance to Colombian armed forces. He wrote the law after finding out that several Colombian army units that massacred poor civilians had been receiving assistance and training from the United States. Instead of cutting off all U.S. aid to Colombian police and military, then engaged in fighting two insurgencies and narco-traffickers, he prohibited assistance to any particular Colombian security force units (battalions or brigades) that the U.S. State Department believed had committed gross violations of basic human rights until the Colombian government investigated the crimes and held the responsible members of the units accountable. The law has been expanded over the years and now prevents the U.S. government from providing U.S. taxpayer-funds to any foreign military or police units anywhere in the world, if the U.S. government believes those particular units have engaged in the worst human rights violations: murder, torture, rape, and forced disappearances with impunity. In his speech, President Buhari said that the law "has denied us access to appropriate strategic weapons to prosecute the war against the insurgents. In the face of abduction of innocent school girls from their hostels, indiscriminate bombings of civilians in markets and places of worship, our forces have remained largely impotent because they do not possess the appropriate weapons and technology which they could have had, had the so-called human rights violations not been an obstacle." The Leahy Law does not apply to arms sales financed with Nigeria's own funds. It only applies to assistance being drawn from the U.S. Treasury. Decisions by the Obama Administration to refrain from selling U.S. weapons or technologies to Nigeria in the recent past may have been due to concerns about the human rights (or corruption) record of Nigerian forces, but those decisions were not based on the Leahy Law. Moreover, in 2014 the United States provided Nigeria with at least $5 million in military assistance grants, all of which were subject to Leahy Law screening. In this process, the U.S. State Department relies on their own information and that of Nigerian and international rights groups and the media to determine whether particular units (battalions or brigades) have credibly been implicated in rape, prison shootings, executions, and razing villages to the ground. If so, those units could not receive the U.S. taxpayer funds until the Nigerian government investigates and brings the responsible parties to book. Even with the Leahy Law, many requests to arm and train Nigerian units have been approved. In 2013, 187 Nigerian military units and 173 Nigerian police units - including those most likely to conduct a rescue operation - were vetted and cleared to receive U.S. assistance. The U.S. was also helping stand up a new counterterrorism unit until the Nigerian government put an end to the effort. Testifying before the Senate in February 2015, Secretary of State Kerry said that the limiting factors on U.S. assistance to the Nigerian military "have to do with governance itself, choices in the military, leadership, absence of and other problems... not the Leahy Law." President Buhari appealed directly to the Obama Administration and Congress "to examine how the U.S. Government can provide us with far more substantial counter-terrorism assistance with minimal strings. The longer we delay, the deadlier the Boko Haram gets." As Senator Leahy notes on his website, the Leahy Law "provides the necessary flexibility to allow the U.S. to advance its foreign policy objectives in these countries (with human rights violations). In addition, it gives foreign governments an incentive to correct the problem: U.S. aid can resume if they bring to justice people who commit such crimes." This law should help President Buhari in his effort to combat Boko Haram by helping ensure that Nigerian forces operate as professional soldiers and law officers and that they are seen as accountable to the law.

### AT: Imperialism Turn

#### Democracy and human rights discourse aren’t examples of Western colonialism – the neg oversimplifies

El Amine 16 — Loubana, assistant professor of political theory in the department of government at Georgetown University, 2016 ("Are ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ Western colonial exports? No. Here’s why.," *The Washington Post*, April 2nd, Available Online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/02/are-democracy-andhuman-rights-western-colonial-exports-no-heres-why/)

In September 2014, students in Hong Kong gathered in a public square to protest some of the Beijing government’s legislative initiatives. One of their slogans was, “When dictatorship becomes a reality, revolution is a duty,” a declaration attributed to Victor Hugo. During the Arab Spring, protesters in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria raised such slogans as: “The people want the overthrow of the regime,” “Bread, freedom, social justice” and “The revolution of dignity and freedom.” Some academics and public intellectuals who study non-Western societies, worried about imposing Western values, have expressed concern about the use of categories such as human rights and liberal democracy. They have instead favored drawing on non-Western societies’ own intellectual traditions and lived experiences. Thus, the academic debate about the form of government that China should adopt has focused on drawing from the ideals of Confucianism. Yet the slogans raised by the protesters are eminently familiar; they might well have been deployed in any other country, whether Greece, France, Ukraine or indeed the United States. Protesters in Hong Kong did not mention Confucianism at all, prompting one commentator on a prominent Chinese and comparative-philosophy blog to ask, “Where are all the Confucians … tonight?” If Western categories ought to be rejected in favor of non-Western ones, as these academics tell us, what should we make of the fact that protesters on the ground continue to cling to the former in a very familiar way, explicitly demanding rights, including women’s rights, equality, elections and the rule of law? The familiarity of the protesters’ slogans is important and telling. The slogans are familiar not because of superficial resemblances between modes of activism across the world that somehow mask deep intellectual disagreements. Rather, they are familiar because the situation to which they are a response is familiar: a state using extensive and arbitrary power. It would have been odd for protesters in Hong Kong to advocate for the Chinese government’s return to Confucian rituals, or for crowds in Cairo’s the streets to demand a return to the Islamic dhimmi system, which left minorities free to pursue private religious practices while being otherwise excluded from political life. These scenarios are implausible, if not impossible, not because Confucian rituals and the dhimmi system are ineffective in themselves but because they don’t match modern realities. To fight a modern state, to constrain rulers and protect minorities, one needs more appropriate tools. In a new article, I argue that these tools are precisely the so-called Western ideals of which some academics are skeptical: democracy, rights and the rule of law. These should be understood not as Western, but as modern: normative tools particularly suited to the realities of political life under the sovereign state, the central institution of modern politics. Sovereign states centralize politics and impose a monopoly on the use of force in a way that pre-modern empires could not, and did not. The only protection against the risk that states will abuse their power is to make the government accountable to its people and protect the inviolability of human life. In other words, demand democracy and rights. Non-Western states now have the same essential features of sovereignty as Western ones. And so their citizens can protect themselves only by fighting for these ideals, and their intellectuals can support these citizens’ efforts only by advocating for these ideals. This is not to deny that many critics around the world denounce human rights and democracy as Western impositions. Their proposals, whether building on Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, Asian or various Western traditions, typically contend that the state should intervene more, rather than less, in society. They argue that the state should provide for social welfare, defend a particular view of the good life or act on religious maxims. However, to justify themselves to the public, these arguments also inevitably build in guarantees against abuse, legally limiting the use of state power and requiring states to consult with the people, usually through elections. These guarantees dominate the debate between advocates and opponents of these proposals. Even when there is a desire to get away from democracy and human rights, the conversation ends up centering on them and whether to accept them, to what extent and in what form. Efforts to provide Islamic variants on democracy or Confucian variants on rights thus should be understood not as alternatives to modern ideals, but as variants on them. This is just as it should be. Just as there are differences between the democratic systems of Germany and the United States, so too would a democratic China and a democratic Yemen be different, both from each other and from the U.S. and German models. Crucially, these differences are not between East and West but among different countries with different material realities. For a non-Western conception of government to completely avoid generating appeals to democracy and rights, it would need to reject these without simply calling for the extension of the power of the sovereign state. The Islamic State, by rejecting state borders and harking back to a pre-modern caliphate system, is trying to do precisely this. But as the group conquers territory and rules people, it will have to start acting like a state. In fact, it already is. And once the Islamic State does act like a state, we can expect its subjects to start demanding rights, laws and other limits on state action. Their demands might be couched in religious language, but the debate will become more and more recognizable as a debate about the limits of state power, rather than as a debate internal to Islam. In short, when citizens in non-Western countries clamor for democracy, there is no reason to suspect elitism or Western manipulation or false consciousness. Not everything familiar is a sign of cultural imperialism. This is not to deny that power differentials continue to structure the relationship between the West and the East, but rather to suggest that overcoming the discourse of “us” and “them” will open up more promising avenues for responding to domination.

#### Their argument is an essentialist shield for atrocity — we should challenge human rights violations

Ahmari 11 — Sohrab Ahmari, Robert L. Bartley fellow at *The Wall Street Journal*, J.D. from Northeastern University, 2011 (“Beware those who sneer at 'human rights imperialism',” *Comment is Free*  — a blog by *The Guardian,* January 4th, Accessible Online at <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/jan/04/human-rights-imperialism>, Accessed On 07-29-2016)

Today – with a century of catastrophic lapses in judgment in hindsight – too many western progressives are still trapped by the same "systematic relativism" that, in Camus's time as in ours, threatens no less than the "death of intelligence". Take historian and journalist Stephen Kinzer's recent intervention against what he calls "human rights imperialism". Restaging one of the illiberal left's favourite shibboleths, he argues that the modern human rights movement has become "the vanguard of a new form of imperialism". Human rights groups, Kinzer sneers, are "spear-carrier[s] for the 'exceptionalist' belief that the west has a providential right to intervene wherever in the world it wishes". Because it wields tremendous influence on the world stage, the human rights community should be closely examined to ensure compliance with its noble founding ideals. For example, the movement is reproached by many – and rightly so – for often subjecting free societies constitutionally committed to protecting citizens' rights to more exacting scrutiny than states genetically engineered for repression. But Kinzer's critique of groups such as Human Rights Watch is of an altogether different variety. Although couched in the rhetoric of a world-weary pragmatism, Kinzer's challenge to human rights groups comes from a place of fundamental, philosophical hostility. The community, Kinzer claims, is mistakenly "promot[ing] an absolutist view of human rights permeated by modern western ideas that westerners mistakenly call 'universal'." And worse, instead of focusing on "group rights", the human rights imperialists fetishise certain "secondary rights" such as free speech and political liberty. (Kinzer cleverly frames these as "the right to form a radical newspaper or an extremist political party".) When it comes to human rights in developing countries, Kinzer seems to be saying, individual rights are irrelevant. "The question should not be whether a particular leader or regime violates western-conceived standards of human rights," he says. "Instead, it should be whether a leader or regime, in totality, is making life better or worse for ordinary people." At first sight, Kinzer's argument might strike some as eminently reasonable. After all, who would want to promote extremist political parties at the expense of economic development benefiting impoverished nations? But recall the unassailable fact that in the long term, those nations that have denied their citizens individual liberty in the name of collective prosperity have far more often than not failed miserably at delivering the latter. (The North Korean, Cuban and Zimbabwean economic miracles are not just around the corner.) But it is Kinzer's extreme cultural relativism that makes his argument against the human rights community particularly troubling. For he is effectively implying that some people deserve fewer individual rights than others. There is no universal standard. And how dare the poor in underdeveloped and developing countries expect to speak their minds or fulfil their political aspirations – how egocentric of them to abdicate their historical destinies in favour of such narrow ends as reproductive rights and religious liberty. Kinzer is clearly aware of the fact he is treading on dangerous ground and playing with ideas with toxic pedigrees. Perhaps it is for this reason that he is compelled to attach the predicate "western" to every individual right. Yet one wonders how he accounts for the myriad indigenous movements from the heart of the "east" (whatever that means) calling for freedom of speech and assembly, gender equity, LGBT rights, and so on. Are Iran's Green and Sudan's Girifna movements human rights imperialists? And pro-democracy Bahraini bloggers and Tunisian cyberactivists too? Imagine what Kinzer's proposals would mean in practical terms. Can human rights activists be expected to ignore the plight of a woman being stoned in Iran for adultery or a journalist tortured in Mubarak's jails? ("Terribly sorry, but we wouldn't want to judge your oppressors by the meter of our culturally determined, imperialistic standards – tough!") And consider, too, the impact of this brand of relativism on the moral imagination of the left, which, at its very best, stood firm on the principle that people divided by geography, culture and language can empathise with and express solidarity with each other. If the isolationist, provincial left manages to convince us that the blessing of liberty is to be allocated randomly – along geographic lines and according to the accident of birth – will the heart still beat on the left?

### AT: Limited Examples

#### Conflict in arms sales goes beyond the Yemen War

Hanna and Cambanis 18 (Thanassis Cambanis and Michael Wahid Hanna; Thanassis Cambanis is a journalist specializing in the Middle East and American foreign policy. Michael Wahid Hanna is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Reiss Center on Law and Security at New York University School of Law. Hanna works on issues of international security, international law, and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and South Asia; 10-24-2018; "The War in Yemen Is a Tragedy—and America Can End Its Complicity"; Century Foundation; https://tcf.org/content/commentary/war-yemen-tragedy-america-can-end-complicity/?agreed=1&amp;session=1; Accessed: 6-25-2019 //GBS Rudolph)

The problem of weapons sales transcends the Yemen War and has contaminated a growing swathe of U.S. policy. Weapons sales have acquired a pernicious logic of their own, as if funding the U.S. weapons industry were a jobs creation program and national security policy simply a means to promote domestic economic growth. U.S. weapons sales can be a major driver of conflict and have routinely complicated foreign policy in regions where the imperative to maintain market shares conflicts with core U.S. interests. In specific cases like the Yemen War, where weapons sales run so thoroughly against U.S. policy goals, they should end conclusively. To date, the United States has been almost entirely unwilling to give up any weapons contract, no matter how noxious, because of the adverse impact to the U.S. economy. This type of path dependency is counterproductive. The United States must be willing to forego profitable contracts that harm our interests or bind us to ineffective allies or specific misguided policies.

#### Arms sales to dictatorships is not limited to just Saudi Arabia and Egypt – it’s the rule rather than the exception

Whitney, 17 (9/23/17, Rich - attorney, actor, radio commentator and disk jockey, Illinois Green Party activist and former Green Party candidate for governor, “US Provides Military Assistance to 73 Percent of World’s Dictatorships,” <https://truthout.org/articles/us-provides-military-assistance-to-73-percent-of-world-s-dictatorships/>, accessed on 6/11/19)

For decades, the American people have been repeatedly told by their government and corporate-run media that acts of war ordered by their president have been largely motivated by the need to counter acts of aggression or oppression by “evil dictators.” We were told we had to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator. We had to bomb Libya because Muammar Gaddafi was an evil dictator, bent on unleashing a “bloodbath” on his own people. Today, of course, we are told that we should support insurgents in Syria because Bashar al-Assad is an evil dictator, and we must repeatedly rattle our sabers at North Korea’s Kim Jong-un and Russia’s Vladimir Putin because they, too, are evil dictators. This is part of the larger, usually unquestioned mainstream corporate media narrative that the US leads the “Western democracies” in a global struggle to combat terrorism and totalitarianism and promote democracy. I set out to answer a simple question: Is it true? Does the US government actually oppose dictatorships and champion democracy around the world, as we are repeatedly told? The truth is not easy to find, but federal sources do provide an answer: No. According to Freedom House‘s rating system of political rights around the world, there were 49 nations in the world, as of 2015, that can be fairly categorized as “dictatorships.” As of fiscal year 2015, the last year for which we have publicly available data, the federal government of the United States had been providing military assistance to 36 of them, courtesy of your tax dollars. The United States currently supports over 73 percent of the world’s dictatorships! Most politically aware people know of some of the more highly publicized instances of this, such as the tens of billions of dollars’ worth of US military assistance provided to the beheading capital of the world, the misogynistic monarchy of Saudi Arabia, and the repressive military dictatorship now in power in Egypt. But apologists for our nation’s imperialistic foreign policy may try to rationalize such support, arguing that Saudi Arabia and Egypt are exceptions to the rule. They may argue that our broader national interests in the Middle East require temporarily overlooking the oppressive nature of those particular states, in order to serve a broader, pro-democratic endgame. Such hogwash could be critiqued on many counts, of course, beginning with its class-biased presumptions about what constitutes US “national interests.” But my survey of US support for dictatorships around the world demonstrates that our government’s support for Saudi Arabia and Egypt are not exceptions to the rule at all. They are the rule.

### AT: Alternatives are Worse

#### Arms still aren’t justified and situations like this are rare

Christensen, 18 --- Lecturer in Political Theory, Department of Government, University of Essex (2/28/18, James, “Can selling weapons to oppressive and violent states ever be justified?” <http://theconversation.com/can-selling-weapons-to-oppressive-and-violent-states-ever-be-justified-91348>, accessed on 6/3/19, JMP)

The enemy’s enemy As I’ve tried to demonstrate in recent work, while many of the arguments that governments employ to defend the sale of weapons to outlaw states are weak and self-serving there is one that, when applicable, has potentially greater force. Sometimes, arms transfers to an oppressive regime can reasonably be expected to actually reduce the degree of oppression that is inflicted. Arms transfers can do this when they help a regime to repel an even more oppressive rival that threatens to overthrow it. Consider the US Lend-Lease programme, which sanctioned arms transfers to the Soviet Union during World War II. This policy could be defended on the plausible grounds that arms transfers enabled the Red Army to resist the greater oppression that would otherwise have been imposed by the Nazis. Of course, situations like this don’t arise often – and even when they do, arms transfers are not necessarily justifiable. Evaluation of a proposed arms transfer to an outlaw state must take a comparative form. Whether the transfer can be justified depends on how it fares compared to other actions that could be taken instead. If the transfer is expected to produce worse outcomes than alternative available options, then it isn’t morally acceptable. Different kinds of intervention or assistance have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but arms transfers always come with serious problems. Most obviously, they provide outlaw states with tools that can be used for oppressive and aggressive ends (in addition to any legitimate defensive ends): other types of support lack this feature. Then there’s the problem of “leakage”. Outlaw states may pass on weapons to third parties, or be unable to ensure the security of stockpiles. The risk of stockpiles being looted is especially high in times of crisis. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states is difficult to justify even under the most favourable circumstances. If democratic politicians care about the ethical status of their acts, and aspire to conduct themselves in a manner that can be justified to others, then they should take this fact seriously, and end their casual, callous promotion of trade with tyrants.

#### Coddling dictators fails --- they are only out for themselves and they fuel instability

Nakhleh, 4-4-2017---Senior Intelligence Service officer and Director of the Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Research Professor and Director of the Global and National Security Policy Institute at the University of New Mexico (Emilie, "Bahrain Arms Sales Belie US Commitment to Human Rights", LobeLog, 4-4-2017, https://lobelog.com/bahrain-arms-sales-belie-us-commitment-to-human-rights/)---RKM

Arab regimes that pretend to serve the interests of the United States are in fact pursuing their own interests first and foremost. Egypt has used its peace agreement with Israel as a bargaining chip to get more military aid from Washington. It has also threatened to make it more difficult for American military vessels to go through the Suez Canal and for American military aircraft to fly in Egyptian airspace if the United States halts its aid or military sales to the Sisi regime. The reality is that Egypt benefits—economically, politically, and militarily—from its peace treaty with Israel. Nor can the Sisi regime afford to go to war with Israel. Despite nearly 40 years of peaceful relations with Israel, Egypt has failed to convince other Arab states to make peace with Israel or to minimize the terrorist threat in the region. As the treaty primarily serves Egypt’s interests, the United States should no longer pay for it. If Egypt abrogates the treaty or closes the Suez Canal or its airspace to American ships or aircraft, it will do so at its own peril. Saudi Arabia frequently asserts that it supports American anti-terrorism policies in the region. And yet the radical ideology that underpins al-Qaeda and IS comes primarily from Saudi Arabia. Washington has been too timid to challenge the Saudis on this issue. If the Trump travel ban were designed to keep terrorists and radicalization out of the United States, why was Saudi Arabia excluded from the list of countries under the ban? And why were the Saudi ruling cousins given such a royal treatment on their recent visit to Washington? Bahrain has used the presence of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet in that country as a sign of the regime’s support for American policy. But Bahrain, not the United States, is the main beneficiary of the US Navy’s home-porting agreement. The United States should seriously consider moving the Fifth Fleet to another location inside or outside the Persian Gulf. Wherever it’s relocated, the Fleet will continue to ensure the free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the unhindered flow of oil to the outside world. By removing it from Bahrain, Washington would send a clear message to the Al-Khalifa regime that it does not tolerate its continued oppression of the Shia majority. The Trump administration should learn from previous administrations that a military approach to foreign policy at the expense of diplomatic engagement grounded in American values does not work in the long run. The recent history of the region has taught us that coddling dictators and alienating their populations do not serve American interests. On the contrary, such an approach usually creates more unrest and, ultimately, more terrorists, which of course puts American interests and personnel at risk in those countries.

### AT: Terrorism Turn

#### Terrorism can’t justify arms sales – the arms aren’t even effective.

Thrall and Dorminey 18 (A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey; A. Trevor Thrall is an associate professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Caroline Dorminey is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute; 3-13-2018; "Risky Business: The Role of Arms Sales in U.S. Foreign Policy"; Cato Institute; https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/risky-business-role-arms-sales-us-foreign-policy; Accessed: 6-24-2019 //GBS Rudolph)

Nor does the threat of transnational terrorism justify most arms sales. Most fundamentally, the actual threat from Islamist-inspired terrorism to Americans is extraordinarily low. Since 9/11, neither al Qaeda nor the Islamic State has managed an attack on the American homeland. Lone wolf terrorists inspired by those groups have done so, but since 9/11 those attacks have killed fewer than 100 Americans, an average of about 6 people per year. There is simply very little risk reduction to be gained from any strategy. The idea that the United States should be willing to accept the significant negative effects of arms sales for minimal counterterrorism gains is seriously misguided.49 Moreover, even if one believed that the benefits would outweigh the potential costs, arms sales still have almost no value as a tool in the war on terror for several reasons. First, the bulk of arms sales (and those we considered in our risk assessment) involve major conventional weapons, which are ill suited to combatting terrorism. Many U.S. arms deals since 9/11 have involved major conventional weapons systems such as fighter jets, missiles, and artillery, useful for traditional military operations, but of little use in fighting terrorists. Insurgencies that hold territory, like the Islamic State, are one thing, but most terrorist groups do not advertise their location, nor do they assemble in large groups. Second, there is little evidence from the past 16 years that direct military intervention is the right way to combat terrorism. Research reveals that military force alone “seldom ends terrorism.”50 This comports with the American experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the war on terror to date. Despite regime change, thousands of air strikes, and efforts to upgrade the military capabilities of friendly governments, the United States has not only failed to destroy the threat of Islamist-inspired terrorism, it has also spawned chaos, greater resentment, and a sharp increase in the level of terrorism afflicting the nations involved.51 Given the experience of the United States since 2001, there is little reason to expect that additional arms sales to countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates will reduce terrorism, much less anti-American terrorism specifically. Relatedly, many arms deals since 9/11, made in the name of counterterrorism, were irrelevant to U.S. goals in the global war on terror because they provided weapons to governments fighting terrorist groups only vaguely (if at all) linked to al Qaeda or ISIS. Although selling weapons to the governments of Nigeria or Morocco or Tunisia might help them combat violent resistance in their countries, terrorist groups in those countries have never targeted the United States. As a result, such arms deals cannot be justified by arguing that they advance the goals of the United States in its own war on terror in any serious way. Finally, arms sales are completely useless to combat the largest terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland — lone wolf attackers already living in the United States. As noted, none of the successful attacks in the United States since 9/11 resulted from operations directed by al Qaeda or ISIS. And in fact only two foiled attempts since then — the underwear bomber and the printer-bomb plot — can be ascribed to al Qaeda.52 Instead, in almost all cases, persons already living in the United States, inspired by Islamist groups, decided to carry out attacks on their own. Clearly, arms sales to foreign nations won’t help with that problem; rather, as many analysts have suggested, amplifying conflicts abroad may well make the problem worse. In sum, the strategic value of arms sales for the United States is very low given today’s security environment. Different circumstances would produce a different analysis. Although today there is little reason for the United States to worry about the Russian threat to Europe, during the Cold War foreign policy experts agreed that preventing the Soviet Union from dominating the European continent was critical to American security. As a result, the United States sensibly provided NATO allies with advanced weapons. This strategy greatly enhanced the fighting capability of NATO, thereby bolstering deterrence and ensuring European security. Today, happily, the United States faces no such threats. For this reason, the argument in favor of arms sales cannot rest on national security grounds but must rest instead on “national interest” grounds, that is, on the benefits gained from helping other nations improve their own security, and from maintaining conditions generally believed to be in the national interest, such as regional stability or the prevention of war. This is already a much weaker position than the conventional wisdom acknowledges. Even worse for such sales’ advocates, however, is the fact that arms sales are notoriously uncertain tools for achieving those objectives.

#### Turn: Arms sales also fuel anti-U.S. terrorism

Hartung, 19 --- director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy and a senior adviser to the Center’s Security Assistance Monitor (3/26/19, William, “ Arms Sales Decisions Shouldn’t Be About Jobs,” <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/03/arms-sales-decisions-shouldnt-be-about-jobs/146939/>, accessed on 5/9/19, JMP)

Basic foreign policy principles should drive potential weapons exports, not pork-barrel politics. Last week, even as the Senate was debating whether to end U.S. support for Saudi Arabia’s brutal war in Yemen, Donald Trump was meeting in the White House with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, engaging in one of his favorite activities – bragging about the U.S. jobs generated by foreign arms deals. As he sang the praises of tens of billions of Saudi purchases of U.S. weaponry, Trump brandished a map of the United States with the legend “KSA Arms Deals Pending” above a red oval that said “40,000 U.S. jobs.” Outside the boundaries of the map were four examples of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia: C-130 Hercules transport planes, P-8 Poseidon anti-submarine warfare planes, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile systems. Lest one think they were the result of Trump’s superior dealmaking, three of the four deals cited on his chart were made during the Obama administration, as long ago as 2012. To drive home the real point of the exercise, Trump’s handy little map marked in red the U.S. states most likely to benefit from the arms deals with Saudi Arabia. Not surprisingly, they included Midwestern states that gave Trump his margin of victory in the 2016 election; Florida, a key swing state; and the large, electoral-vote-rich states of Texas and California. If Trump’s presentation at the White House sparks a debate about the role of jobs considerations in U.S arms sales policy, it may actually do some good. The bottom line is that creating U.S. jobs should play no role in deciding which countries to lavish with U.S. weaponry, for several reasons. Potential arms deals should be driven by basic foreign policy questions, not pork-barrel politics. Security and human rights should be the main criteria used by the executive branch and the Congress in deciding which nations should be eligible to receive U.S. weapons, which Trump has described as “the finest military equipment anywhere in the world.” Respecting human rights has value in its own right, but it is also good security policy. Nations that systematically abuse human rights are not only less stable, but their repressive activities too often generate internal conflict, and can even create an environment in which terrorist groups are more likely to thrive. The Yemen war is a case in point. Not only has Saudi Arabia used weapons supplied by the United States and the United Kingdom to carry out an indiscriminate bombing campaign, but it has destroyed vital civilian infrastructure and imposed a blockade on the import of basic supplies. The result has been a humanitarian catastrophe of the highest order, including the largest cholera outbreak in history, the internal displacement of millions of people, and situation where 8 million Yemenis are at risk of famine. In addition to being a moral outrage, the Saudi-led war in Yemen has serious security consequences. As Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn., has noted, the majority of Yemenis know where Saudi Arabia gets its weapons, and view the United States as being responsible for the devastation in their country. As Murphy further indicated, over time uncritical U.S. support for the Saudi war effort could create fertile ground for anti-U.S. terrorism. And even if it doesn’t, the war between the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi rebels has opened up space for Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand its role in Yemen. A secondary reason not to use the “jobs card” as a reason to sell U.S. weapons abroad is that the claims of jobs linked to foreign arms sales are greatly exaggerated. As a study from the University of Massachusetts has documented, weapons spending is virtually the least effective way to create jobs. Almost any other U.S. export could create more domestic employment. In addition, most major U.S. sales now involve offsets or licensed production – processes in which recipients of U.S. arms and technology produce all or part of U.S.-supplied weapons in their own countries. The above-mentioned arrangements diminish the U.S. job benefits of major foreign arms deals. And as research by my colleagues at the Security Assistance Monitor has revealed, licenses to produce U.S. weapons overseas have been a regular practice during Donald Trump’s time in office. One of the more embarrassing examples of this phenomenon was when President Trump bragged about the jobs impact of F-35 sales during last year’s trip to Japan, apparently unaware that F-35s sold to Japan and other regional players would be produced at a U.S.-licensed facility in Japan. Downplaying human rights and security in favor of narrowly focused economic concerns poses high risks while offering fewer benefits than advertised. Perhaps someone needs to supply President Trump with a map of the world highlighting U.S. sales that enable human rights abuses and sustain conflicts, and then explain to him why these results are too high a price to pay for the chance to boast about the limited jobs benefits these deals supply to the United States.

#### No impact: nuclear terrorism is unlikely.

Mueller ’18 (John Mueller – PhD in Political Science @ UCLA, Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter,” 15 October 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter?fa\_package=1123220)

As for nuclear terrorism, ever since al Qaeda operatives used box cutters so effectively to hijack commercial airplanes, alarmists have warned that radical Islamist terrorists would soon apply equal talents in science and engineering to make and deliver nuclear weapons so as to destroy various so-called infidels. In practice, however, terrorist groups have exhibited only a limited desire to go nuclear and even less progress in doing so. Why? Probably because developing one’s own bomb from scratch requires a series of risky actions, all of which have to go right for the scheme to work. This includes trusting foreign collaborators and other criminals; acquiring and transporting highly guarded fissile material; establishing a sophisticated, professional machine shop; and moving a cumbersome, untested weapon into position for detonation. And all of this has to be done while hiding from a vast global surveillance net looking for and trying to disrupt such activities. Terrorists are unlikely to get a bomb from a generous, like-minded nuclear patron, because no country wants to run the risk of being blamed (and punished) for a terrorist’s nuclear crimes. Nor are they likely to be able to steal one. Notes Stephen Younger, the former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory: “All nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously.” The grand mistake of the Cold War was to infer desperate intent from apparent capacity. For the war on terrorism, it has been to infer desperate capacity from apparent intent.

#### U.S. uses terrorism as a pretext to justify military actions

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Winding Back the Forever War The line between the Yemen War and America’s global war on terror is not a long one. Congress authorized the president to use military force against the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks. Since then, military action has become a reflex rather than a rarity. U.S. foreign policy since 2001 has been dominated by direct and indirect intervention, ranging from outright invasion and occupation, as in Iraq in 2003, to dozens of undeclared and unmonitored actions that might not meet the legal definition of direct military action. Trump’s excesses are an expansion of, rather than a departure from, the practices of his predecessors. Congress and public opinion have tended to applaud military adventurism when they like its results and have avoided confrontation with the executive branch even in cases where they disapprove. Endless war has successfully been sold as a public necessity in a campaign against terrorism, even when U.S. military action makes the world, and Americans, less safe. There are, of course, real security threats, and counter-terrorism deservedly is a high priority for American officials—including in Yemen. An effective counter-terrorism policy would move away from a military paradigm toward a policing framework, in which the military supports a policy that pursues terrorist networks much the same way that it pursues organized crime syndicates. As the practice stands, the forever war it has produced and perpetuates has corroded American values and behavior. Malpractice abroad has bred contempt for our democratic values and a hopelessness about the rule of law at home. Ideological frameworks used to justify foreign intervention and mistreatment of civilians in conflict zones have also been invoked at home. Threat inflation and demagoguery have helped fuel bigotry and xenophobia at home. Elected officials now risk their careers if they try to openly address the tradeoff between security and rights. Ending the United States’ part in the Yemen campaign won’t suddenly bring an end to the American forever war. But it would mark a turning point—a decisive rejection of the reflex to sign onto any military conflict with even the slightest connection to terrorism. The United States has a great many tools at its disposal beyond weapons sales and direct engagement in hostilities. We can pursue our interests in Yemen while avoiding extremes; and American self-interest does not require it to fully reject its traditional allies in the Gulf nor to actively join them in their worst excesses. A rational assessment of that self-interest might now be possible.

## SOLVENCY

### Ext: Signaling

#### Arms suspensions are powerful signaling mechanisms --- they change countries’ behavior by conveying U.S. dissatisfaction and building a coalition for a more expansive embargo

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Arms embargos are often dismissed as symbolic, and therefore ineffective. But just because something is symbolic, doesn’t mean that it won’t have an effect. A U.S. arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a clear signal of American disproval of Saudi actions in Yemen, and would be an equally important signal to Washington’s allies, who are left wondering if the United States is ambivalent or uninterested in the growing Yemeni humanitarian catastrophe. By continuing to provide weapons, President Donald Trump tacitly endorses Saudi policies. This signal is strengthened by Trump’s recent veto of the resolution that called for an end to U.S. support for the war in Yemen. While Trump justified the veto by saying that the resolution was a “dangerous attempt to weaken my constitutional authorities,” statements from Congressional representatives show they are aware of the powerful signals sent by arms sales. Sen. Tim Kaine said that the veto “shows the world [Trump] is determined to keep aiding a Saudi-backed war that has killed thousands of civilians and pushed millions more to the brink of starvation.” An arms embargo against Saudi Arabia would be a signal both to leaders of that country, and other states, that the United States does not endorse Saudi actions. Those arguing against a ban are correct on one point: Embargos as blunt force instruments of coercion are rarely effective. But arms embargos are effective as signals of political dissatisfaction, and serve an important communication role in international politics. Arms Embargos Are Signals and Can Build Coalitions Policymakers and scholars agree that arms embargoes are not effective “sticks” in international politics. Rarely do states cave when faced with punishment in the form of an embargo. But even if an arms embargo isn’t a direct tool of coercion, an embargo would be an important political signal. There are at least two reasons for the United States to seriously consider an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia. First, arms sales are signals that cut through the noise of the international system. Cutting off arms transfers is a common way that states express their dissatisfaction with others and try to influence behavior. As Lawrence Freedman observed in 1978, “refusing to sell arms is a major political act. It appears as a calculated insult, reflecting on the stability, trust, and credit-worthiness, or technical competence of the would-be recipient.” Yet this crucial point seems to have been lost in the current policy debate about whether or not the United States should continue selling arms to Saudi Arabia. My research shows that stopping arms transfers or denying requests is an effective way to signal dissatisfaction and causes the would-be recipient to re-think their behavior. Take, for example, the U.S. relationship with Israel in the 1960s. The United States sold Israel Hawk surface-to-surface missiles in 1962, M-48 Patton tanks in 1964 and 1965, and A-4E Skyhawk bombers in 1966. Israeli leaders understood that these transfers signaled a close U.S.-Israeli relationship. As diplomat Abba Eban wrote, the arms transfers were “a development of tremendous political value.” Even against this backdrop of close ties and significant arms sales, Israeli leaders were extremely sensitive to arms transfer denials. In April and May 1967, the United States denied Israeli requests for armored personnel carriers and fighter jets. Approving the transfers would have signaled support, and likely emboldened Israel, as tensions were growing in the region. Israeli leaders believed these transfer denials overruled prior signals and demonstrated that the United States was not willing to be a close political ally for Israel. Eban described Israel as “isolated,” and the head of Israel’s intelligence service said that the arms transfer denials made it clear that “in Israel, there existed certain misperceptions [about the United States].” If arms transfer denials could have such a significant effect on Israeli thinking — keeping in mind that there was a close and significant political relationship between the US and Israel — imagine what a transfer denial would mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Like Israel, Saudi Arabia would have to re-think its impression that it has political support and approval from the United States. We can, and should, ask whether or not withdrawal of U.S. support would affect Saudi behavior, but it’s important that this question not get overlooked in the current debate. Because arms transfers (and denials) are powerful signals, they can have an effect even before a transfer is actually completed. This suggests that even the announcement of an embargo against Saudi Arabia could have an effect. Take, for example, Taiwan’s recent request for a fleet of new fighter jets. As reports mounted that Trump had given “tacit approval” to a deal for F-16 jets, China’s protests increased. The United States has not sold advanced fighter jets to Taiwan since 1992, partially out of fear of angering China, which views Taiwan as a renegade province. Even if the deal for F-16s is formally approved, Taiwan is unlikely to see the jets until at least 2021, and the balance of power between China and Taiwan would not change. As one researcher observed, the sale would be a “huge shock” for Beijing, “But it would be more of a political shock than a military shock. It would be, ‘Oh, the U.S. doesn’t care how we feel.’ It would be more of a symbolic or emotional issue.” Yet China’s immediate, negative reaction to even the announcement of a potential deal shows how powerful arms transfer signals can be. If this same logic is applied to an arms embargo against Saudi Arabia, an arms embargo would signal that Saudi Arabia does not have the support of the United States. This signal would be an important first step in changing Saudi behavior because it would override other statements and actions the United States has sent that indicate support. And Trump has given Saudi Arabia a number of positive signals: He called Saudi Arabia a “great ally” and dismissed reports that that the Saudi government was involved in the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has expressed interested in selling nuclear power plants and technology to Saudi Arabia. And he has repeatedly claimed that he has made a $110 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia (he hasn’t). With these clear signals of support, why should Saudi Arabia alter its behavior based on resolutions that come out of the House or Senate, which are likely to be vetoed by Trump, anyway? An arms embargo would be a clear and unambiguous signal that the United States disproves of Saudi actions in Yemen. The second reason for supporting an embargo concerns U.S. allies and the logistical difficulties of making an embargo have an effect. One of the reasons embargoes have little material impact is because they require cooperation among weapons exporting states. A ban on sales from one country will have little effect if the target of the embargo can seek arms elsewhere. Germany, instituted an arms ban against Riyadh in November 2018, and German leaders have pressured other European states to stop selling arms to the Saudis. Germany understands the importance of the embargo as a political signal: as a representative of the German Green Party explained, “The re-start of arms exports to Saudi Arabia would be a fatal foreign policy signal and would contribute to the continued destabilization of the Middle East.” But the German embargo has had minimal effect because Saudi Arabia can get arms elsewhere. According to the 2019 Military Balance, most of Saudi Arabia’s equipment is American or French in origin, such as the M1A2 Abrams and AMX-30 tanks, Apache and Dauphin helicopters, and F-15C/D fighter jets. Saudi Arabia has some equipment manufactured wholly or in part in Germany, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Tornado ground attack craft, but these weapons are a small portion of its complete arsenal. A U.S. embargo would send an important signal to the allies who also supply Saudi Arabia, allowing them to explain participation in the embargo to their own domestic constituencies. This is especially important for countries like France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, that need to export arms to keep their own production lines running. While the research shows that sustaining an arms embargo is often the most difficult step, embargoes can restrain sending states’ arms exports. Even if a U.S. embargo won’t have a direct effect on Saudi Arabia on its own, an embargo is important for building coalitions for a more expansive embargo that could affect Saudi behavior. The Difficulty of Stopping Atrocities Beyond signaling, we know U.S. arms sales often end up in the wrong hands, and have been used in Yemen. The Saudi-led war in Yemen has led to starvation conditions, caused thousands of civilian casualties, and has led to the displacement of millions of people. The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of Yemen’s population – 24 million people – require some form of humanitarian or protection assistance, and that the severity of the situation is increasing. Would an arms embargo create meaningful change in Yemen? An initial effect of an embargo is that Saudi Arabia would have to work harder to access war materiel. As Jonathan Caverley noted, more than 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s arms delivered in the past five years came from the United States. Even if this percentage decreases over time, it will be costly for Saudi Arabia to transition to a primarily Russian- or Chinese-supplied military. Though Saudi Arabia might be willing to pay this cost, it would still have to pay, and take the time to transition to its new weapons systems. This would represent a brief break in hostilities that could facilitate the delivery of aid and assistance in Yemen. The United States could, in theory, impose stricter end-user controls on Saudi Arabia. This would have the advantage of keeping Saudi Arabia within the world of U.S. weapons systems, and might prevent it from diversifying its suppliers, which would ultimately weaken any leverage the United States might have. Longer-term, it would not be to America’s advantage if Saudi Arabia takes a lesson from Turkey, and starts courting Russia as a new arms supplier. It is difficult to enforce end-user controls, since, once a weapon is transferred, the recipient can use it however it wishes. It might also be the case that Saudi Arabia would object to stricter end-user controls, and would seek new suppliers as a result. An arms embargo will not be a panacea. But not doing something sets a problematic precedent, and allows the difficulty of coordinating an arms embargo outweigh the potential benefits of one. An embargo is unlikely to have an immediate effect on Saudi behavior, because an embargo would be a political signal, rather than a blunt instrument of coercion. It will take time for a multilateral embargo to emerge and be put into place, and the United States should work with its allies to help support their ability to participate in the embargo. Not acting, however, would continue to implicitly endorse Saudi behavior, and would make it more difficult for U.S. allies to believe that future threats of an embargo are credible.

#### Unconditional reductions will increase U.S. leverage and credibility to spur larger global efforts

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The Case for a New Approach So far we have argued that arms sales lack a compelling strategic justification, amplify risks, and generate a host of unintended negative consequences. These factors alone argue for significantly curtailing the arms trade. But the case for doing so is made even stronger by the fact that greatly reducing arms sales would also produce two significant benefits for the United States that cannot otherwise be enjoyed. The first benefit from reducing arms sales would be greater diplomatic flexibility and leverage. Critics might argue that even if arms sales are an imperfect tool, forgoing arms sales will eliminate a potential source of leverage. We argue that, on the contrary, the diplomatic gains from forgoing arms sales will outweigh the potential leverage or other benefits from arms sales. Most importantly, by refraining from arming nations engaged in conflict, the United States will have the diplomatic flexibility to engage with all parties as an honest broker. The inherent difficulty of negotiating while arming one side is obvious today with respect to North and South Korea. After decades of U.S. support for South Korea, North Korea clearly does not trust the United States. Similarly, U.S. attempts to help negotiate a peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians have long been complicated by American support for Israel. To stop arming one side of a contentious relationship is not to suggest that the United States does not have a preferred outcome in such cases. Rather, by staying out of the military domain the United States can more readily encourage dialogue and diplomacy. Forgoing arms sales is likely to be a superior strategy even in cases where the United States has an entrenched interest. In the case of Taiwan, for example, though it is clear that Taiwan needs to purchase weapons from other countries to provide for its defense, those weapons do not have to be made in the United States. Having Taiwan buy from other suppliers would help defuse U.S.-China tensions. Even if Taiwan’s defenses remained robust, China would clearly prefer a situation in which American arms no longer signal an implicit promise to fight on Taiwan’s behalf. This could also promote more productive U.S.-China diplomacy in general, as well as greater stability in the Pacific region. Most important, breaking off arms sales would also reduce the likelihood of the United States becoming entangled in a future conflict between Taiwan and China. The second major benefit of reducing arms sales is that it would imbue the United States with greater moral authority. Today, as the leading arms-dealing nation in the world, the United States lacks credibility in discussions of arms control and nonproliferation, especially in light of its military interventionism since 2001. By showing the world that it is ready to choose diplomacy over the arms trade, the United States would provide a huge boost to international efforts to curtail proliferation and its negative consequences. This is important because the United States has pursued and will continue to pursue a wide range of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. The United States is a signatory of treaties dealing with weapons of mass destruction, missile technology, land mines, and cluster munitions, not to mention the flow of conventional weapons of all kinds. The effectiveness of these treaties, and the ability to create more effective and enduring arms control and nonproliferation frameworks, however, depends on how the United States behaves. This is not to say that unilateral American action will put an end to the problems of the global arms trade. States would still seek to ensure their security and survival through deterrence and military strength. Other weapons suppliers would, in the short run, certainly race to meet the demand. But history shows that global nonproliferation treaties and weapons bans typically require great-power support. In 1969, for example, Richard Nixon decided to shutter the American offensive-biological-weapons program and seek an international ban on such weapons. By 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention passed and has since been signed by 178 nations.98 In 1991 President George H. W. Bush unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons. By 1993 the United States had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, which now has 192 signatories.99 Both of these efforts succeeded in part because the United States took decisive early action in the absence of any promises about how others would respond.100 Without U.S. leadership, any effort to limit proliferation of major conventional weapons and dangerous emerging technologies is likely to fail.

### Ext: Congress Key

#### A clear signal from Congress will rein in Trump’s arms sales policy and end U.S. complicity in human rights abuses.

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The new Congress can show allies and adversaries that while Trump may embrace cruel foreign leaders and policies, US voters still respect human rights. The new 116th Congress, with its diverse pool of new members ushered in by a record number of voters, has an opportunity to demonstrate that human rights remain a priority for the American people. For years, the U.S. has promoted respect for these rights, even if it has not always abided by the laws and treaties that protect them. This has advanced the long-term strategic interests of the U.S., as well as peace and security in the rest of the world. After all, these rights — to be free from discrimination, to have due process, to have an adequate standard of living and to participate in free and fair elections — benefit not just Americans but everyone, everywhere. President Donald Trump, with his “America First” agenda, has all but scrapped this approach. To varying degrees, all U.S. presidents have downplayed or overlooked human rights concerns when other interests were in play. But Trump has gutted support for them by embracing abusive foreign leaders who are jailing, torturing and killing dissidents, by selling weapons to militaries committing massive war crimes, and by undermining international institutions and courts that seek justice for some of the world’s worst atrocities. At home, Trump has turned his back on refugees, detained immigrant children, and rolled back regulations that protect women’s health, LGBT rights, and the water we drink. Members of this new Congress have an opportunity to reverse course, reiterate the importance of respect for human rights, and make clear that the current path is not acceptable. They can do this by protecting gains made under the Affordable Care Act, which has expanded access to health care for millions of Americans, and ensuring that coverage includes the full range of sexual and reproductive health care services. They can pass even stronger criminal justice reform that eliminates mandatory minimum sentencing and the racial disparities that permeate the criminal justice, education and health systems. They should also protect Dreamers, and hold oversight hearings into family separation and dangerous detention conditions. To help protect and restore the right to vote in the federal elections, they should pass the Democracy Restoration Act, and hold oversight hearings on voter suppression tactics. Bipartisan legislation has been proposed to reverse the transgender military ban — a discriminatory policy that met with immediate opposition from military leadership, lawmakers in both parties, the public, and federal courts. They should pass this legislation, as well as the Equality Act, which would curb the administration’s wider efforts to roll back federal protections of transgender rights. Use power of the purse to shape foreign policy On foreign policy, although the executive branch has predominant power, Congress can be a vital check while also vigorously promoting a foreign policy that not only defends but also safeguards basic rights. Congress can let both allies and adversaries know that even if the White House isn’t invested in human rights promotion overseas, the rest of America is. Congress can also aggressively influence U.S. foreign policy by using the power of the purse to ensure that U.S. programs and policies overseas align more explicitly with the promotion of basic rights. And building on bipartisan support in the current Senate, Congress should permanently repeal the “Global Gag rule,” which restricts the use of U.S. funds for programs critical for women’s health care abroad. It should also take up legislation in other areas on which the administration has failed to engage constructively, including forced political re-education camps in China’s Xinjiang region and the need to make human rights a key element of US relations with Saudi Arabia. Systematically blocking weapons sales to repressive leaders would rein in President Trump’s commercially centered approach to arms transfers while also sending a clear message: the US will not be complicit in other countries’ war crimes. Congress needs to course-correct on rights Regular oversight hearings should explore the administration’s uncritical support of autocratic and abusive governments, including in Hungary, Poland and Thailand. Congress should look at the State Department’s move to strike reproductive rights from its annual global human rights report, and the troubling likelihood that Sudan will be removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Finally, regular meetings with and statements to support independent activists, journalists and lawyers as well as overseas travel are all ways Congress can revive a more inclusive and rights-respecting foreign policy. As lawmakers lay out their agenda and attempt to repair the damage done over the last two years, a crucial part of their leadership requires asserting basic rights as a core policy component — whether domestic or foreign. That's not just the right thing to do, it is in America’s best interests.

#### Congressional action is necessary to convince other countries that there is still strong U.S. support to challenge authoritarianism --- unilateral Trump action will just be read as hypocrisy and cynicism

Nossel, former deputy assistant secretary of state for international organizations at the State Department, 17 (6/19/17, Suzanne - now CEO of the Pen American Center, “It’s OK That Trump Doesn’t Care About Human Rights; America still does,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/19/its-ok-that-trump-doesnt-care-about-human-rights/>, accessed on 6/3/19, JMP)

Amid the endless post-mortem of Donald Trump’s first overseas trip, human rights advocates have focused more fire on what the president didn’t say than what he did: His failure to call out rights abuses in Saudi Arabia or anywhere else left activists aghast. Yet, nearly five months into Trump’s administration, his attitude toward human rights can come as no surprise. The president doesn’t go much for strictures of any kind, much less international legal standards and softer norms developed by humanitarians, activists, and lawyers. He has little regard for precepts and edicts enshrined in treaties and overseen by U.N. institutions. He isn’t moved by the invocation of universal values, principles, or truths. He isn’t even moved by the courage of the powerless citizen who challenges the strongman; between authoritarian rulers and the dissidents who challenge them, he chooses the former almost every time. In light of this, it is time for human rights advocates to pivot from voicing outrage at the president’s failure to press for rights in his global pronouncements and appearances and instead double down on making sure the rest of the world understands he does not speak for all Americans. The idea that the current White House will press Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to release his country’s jailed journalists and academics, urge China’s Xi Jinping to loosen restrictions on anti-government speech, or persuade Arab leaders to usher in democratic reforms is fantasy. Moreover, coming from this president, speeches and statements on human rights would ring hollow, compounding the global propensity to read hypocrisy and cynicism into American articulations of values. Rights advocates would be better off working to temper the worst in Trump’s domestic policies and finding other vehicles and voices to uphold, and ultimately restore, the credibility of the United States as a global human rights standard-bearer. Advocates may find there is a silver lining of sorts in Trump’s silence on rights: It creates an opportunity for more credible actors — from members of Congress to intellectuals and activists — to remind the world that despite Trump’s election, liberal values and support for dissidents remain strong across the United States. Consider Trump’s speech in Saudi Arabia, which aimed to rally Sunni Muslim nations to redouble the fight against terrorism. Trump promised Arab allies, “We are not here to lecture — we are not here to tell other people how to live, what to do, who to be, or how to worship.” Trump’s sojourn in Saudi Arabia made no mention of the country’s imprisoned and brutalized political dissidents, no comment on its repressive policies toward women, gays and lesbians, or minority groups. Foregoing critique of any kind, he pronounced the kingdom “magnificent.” And just weeks before, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson gave a tour d’horizon speech to diplomats that stressed national security and economic interests and slighted human rights and democratic values. Make no mistake: Trump and Tillerson’s silence on human rights issues is a betrayal to rights advocates and those they defend. There is every reason to voice alarm that the U.S. president is surrendering American credibility as a force for human rights, betraying rights defenders and dissidents who have long looked to Washington as an ally, and even undercutting years of rights-oriented policy by demonstrating that America’s commitment to its professed values is politically contingent and expendable. The damage caused by Trump’s reversals will be real and lasting. However fraught and uneven, the U.S. commitment to human rights has long imbued its foreign policy with a sense of moral conviction and uplift, tempered some of Washington’s most bellicose and self-serving instincts, and made international affairs into something more purposeful than a grinding, cyclical power game. But the real blow to U.S. global human rights leadership is, of course, a function of beliefs, policies, and actions — not simply the rhetoric that reflects them. Trump was quick to remake the Obama administration’s standoffish relationship with Egyptian military ruler Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, ending the cold shoulder with the warm embrace of a high-profile visit to Washington and praise for the autocrat’s “fantastic job” as president. Neither Trump nor anyone in the administration has spoken about Egypt’s killing of protesters and arrests of tens of thousands of political dissidents. Trump’s affection has given Sisi license to issue a draconian new law regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), never mind that such laws have previously been used to target and even jail American NGO workers. In late March, Tillerson greenlighted large-scale arms shipments including F-16 airplanes to Bahrain, lifting human rights conditions that the Obama administration imposed after a harsh crackdown on protesters. The most heavily touted “deliverable” of Trump’s Middle East junket was a $110 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia. No amount of homage to jailed activists or pleas for women’s rights could ever have made up for that. Earlier, Tillerson had skipped the public release of the State Department’s annual global human rights report, an event traditionally attended by his predecessors regardless of party. In his initial weeks in office, Trump made clear that he favored reintroducing torture as an interrogation technique and only demurred because Defense Secretary James Mattis talked him out of it. Top human rights posts in the administration either sit empty or have been filled with officials who lack any human rights background or expertise — meaning that when key decisions are made, no one will be at the table to advocate that rights be considered. Trump’s one grand “humanitarian” gesture since taking office, ordering cruise missile strikes on a Syrian air base that was used to launch a chemical weapons attack, was, by his own account, an act of intuition and impulse, driven by outrage and possibly by compassion but not by fealty to an international norm under assault. The Trump administration has also pursued domestic policies that call into question America’s claim to international leadership in areas including press freedom, tolerance for political dissent, women’s rights, and the protection of religious minorities, refugees, and immigrants. Trump’s attacks on the press and false cries of fake news make it impossible for him to act as a champion for the rights of journalists or independent media globally. His indignation at criticism and propensity to lash out against opponents make him an uneasy ally for dissidents worldwide. His slashing of funding for women’s health care and reproductive rights would hollow out any pronouncements he might offer on women’s rights. His restrictive approach to refugees, plans for a wall to block migrants from Mexico, and indifference toward immigrant workers render him unfit to extoll the virtues of a humane approach to global migration. Beyond that, Trump’s refusal to respect the integrity and independence of federal law enforcement institutions, his cronyism, nepotism, lack of transparency, and proclivity toward self-dealing make him an impossible exponent for the values of good governance, accountability, transparency, and rule of law that underpin the defense of human rights. Given all this, human rights advocates need to do more than decry each and every missed opportunity for the president to articulate a set of values that he manifestly does not share. Even those U.S. presidents most passionate about the spread of rights and freedoms — Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and Barack Obama — walked a tightrope in trying to maintain America’s credibility on human rights while seeking to advance a breadth of foreign-policy interests, many of which directly contradicted rights-respecting policies. For as long as the United States has had an articulated human rights policy Washington has been dogged by charges of selectivity, hypocrisy, and empty rhetoric. Against this backdrop, Trumpian pronouncements on human rights seem liable to hurt more than they help, making it easier to impugn other American leaders and future presidents as equally insincere. This is not to suggest that advocates should give up on the role of the United States as a defender of human rights. Now, with authoritarianism on the rise in China, Russia, Turkey, the Philippines, and Hungary and intact in much of the Middle East and Africa — and backsliding likely to accelerate amid an absence of leadership from the White House — brave rights defenders and dissidents in those countries need more international support, not less. Left to their own interests, governments like Russia and China that wish to weaken international human rights institutions and instruments will seize opportunities to expand their influence. Progress made in advancing norms of international accountability, LGBT rights, and the protection of journalists and human rights defenders will almost certainly atrophy. But crocodile tears from President Trump, should they even be offered, will address none of that. Much more important are efforts to show the world that the current administration is neither the only face of America’s role in the world nor the sole vessel for U.S. values. Most foreign governments and informed citizens know that most of Washington regards his leadership with skepticism and that his public approval ratings are at historic lows. Members of Congress, civil society organizations, and other institutions work to defend human rights globally and can speak out and step up where the current administration won’t. The role of these actors in showing solidarity with dissidents, calling out repressive policies, supporting rights defenders, and advocating for the role of institutions and norms should redouble as the White House retreats. That Trump won’t — and can’t credibly — speak out doesn’t mean that American society or even the American government must go quiet. Members of Congress can hold hearings, send letters, take meetings with visiting advocates, take part in delegations, and otherwise demonstrate that the U.S. government as a whole takes seriously its role as a human rights standard-bearer, even if the current administration amounts to an egregious lapse. Funders should step up to help alleviate the strain that civil society organizations face in trying to address the challenges posed by the president’s domestic policies while simultaneously trying to fill the vacuum created by the administration’s retreat from America’s traditional role as a rights defender globally. These groups should not be forced to choose now that the agenda at home has grown so imperative as well. In recent years, private funders of human rights campaigns have been shifting their support away from U.S.- and European-based groups in favor of direct help to advocates working in hotspots around the world. The logic is simple: The solution to human rights abuses in Turkey, Russia, or China won’t be found in Washington. The Obama administration reinforced these efforts through its own campaign to buttress local civil society organizations around the world, offer them financial support, and elevate their participation in international diplomacy. Importantly, this assistance in funding and organizational development came backed with the moral leadership of the U.S. government voiced at the highest levels and through its diplomatic missions. But with President Trump’s budget dramatically scaling back such support, foundations should reinvest additional resources in organizations and partners who can keep faith with international counterparts, raise the global media profile of rights violations and crises, and apply pressure through international mechanisms and forums. Such efforts will help blunt the impact of the Trump administration’s indifference, catalyze the engagement of Capitol Hill on human rights issues, and sustain and strengthen connections internationally. Trump’s retreat from leadership on human rights can be mitigated if nongovernmental groups lean in. Just as civil society organizations and the media are tempering some of the president’s most constitutionally and morally dubious domestic policies, so they should also help to bridge shortfalls in funding, speak out for those who counted on the United States for support, and fortify civil society groups that the Trump administration is abandoning. The best way to preserve America’s global human rights leadership is not to put words in Trump’s mouth but to demonstrate that the U.S. system of government, strong independent civil society, and claim to global leadership are strong enough to withstand his term of office.

### Ext: Leahy Law Model

#### Leahy laws should be applied to all FMS and DCS sales

Mahanty & Eikenberry, 18 --- \*director of the U.S. program at the Center for Civilians in Conflict, AND \*\*director of policy & advocacy at the Yemen Peace Project (12/5/18, Daniel R. & Eric, “How the “Arms Sales Oversight Act” Could Prevent American Arms from Contributing to the Next Overseas Crisis,” <https://www.justsecurity.org/61719/arms-sales-oversight-act-prevent-american-arms-contributing-overseas-crisis/>, accessed on 5/6/19, JMP)

Furthermore, if H.R. 7080 is reintroduced in the 116thCongress, it should be resurfaced alongside a host of measures to strengthen Congress’s hand in overall arms export policy. These can include requiring detailed and unclassified answers from the departments of State and Defense concerning the likelihood that a sale of certain items will exacerbate armed conflict or spur an arms race (theoretically a judgment the executive already makes under AECA) and outlining robust processes for monitoring the way weapons’ are used among recipients with a history of rights violations or violations of the laws of armed conflict, and those for which the indicators suggest a high risk of future violations. Congress should also consider lowering notification thresholds, so that members can vet arms sales valued at less than $50 million. The time is also long past for Congress to unequivocally clarify that the Leahy Law applies to Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), thereby prohibiting State and Defense from permitting the transfer or maintenance of defense articles to security forces that have committed unconscionable human rights violations with impunity.

#### Congress should require that DOS and DOD apply Leahy Laws to FMS

Mahanty & Shiel, 18 --- \*Director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict U.S. Program, AND \*\*spent three years at the U.S. Department of State, where she worked as a policy advisor in the Office of Security and Human Rights (Daniel & Annie, “WITH GREAT POWER: Modifying US Arms Sales to Reduce Civilian Harm,” <https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/With-Great-Power.pdf>, accessed on 5/26/19, JMP)

2. Employ, and therefore strengthen, existing legislation: Congress should more regularly invoke the AECA for risky or concerning sales, including by asking for State and DoD’s analysis of the parameters required in the AECA (e.g., contributing to an arms race or escalating conflict) and by asking for reports on potential violations of the AECA, particularly on the basis of use or behavior. Congress should clarify its intent that existing authorities include compliance with international humanitarian and human rights obligations as a condition of export. Congress should also require that the Departments of State and Defense apply the Leahy Law to Foreign Military Sales.

#### The Leahy Laws aren’t perfect but they would incentivize countries to resolve abuses and are a powerful tool to ensure that arms don’t get to military units committing human rights violations

Striffolino & Smith, 13 --- \*Advocate & Science for Human Rights Project Coordinator for Amnesty International's Crisis Prevention & Response Unit, AND \*\*AIUSA Military, Security and Police (MSP) Coordination group (Kathryn R. Striffolino and Nate Smith, 7/9/13, “Deconstructing the Leahy Law: Fact vs Fiction,” <https://www.amnestyusa.org/deconstructing-the-leahy-law-fact-vs-fiction/>, accessed on 5/26/19, JMP)

There are some misconceptions currently floating around about the U.S. government’s Leahy Law and we want to set the record straight on a few things. The Leahy Law is a powerful yet often-overlooked tool to help prevent the U.S. government from directly arming human rights violators in the ranks of foreign security forces and to help the U.S. avoid complicity in the commission of human rights violations. So how can you distill fact from fiction? Allow us to deconstruct some of the facts, fictions and misconceptions about the Leahy Law. And expect more in the coming weeks about this important law, and other instruments available to the U.S. and global community to prevent arming human rights perpetrators. What is the Leahy Law? The Leahy Law (also known as the Leahy Amendment) prohibits most types of U.S. foreign aid and Defense Department training programs from going to foreign security, military and police units credibly alleged to have committed human rights violations. If the foreign government brings the responsible members of the unit to justice, U.S. foreign aid can be resumed. The Leahy Law is named after Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), a Congressional human rights champion and the chief sponsor of the law. Fact: The Leahy Law is law, not a policy guideline. It originated in 1996 from efforts to control U.S. military aid to Colombia during the period in time when Plan Colombia was materializing and Amnesty International and many other organizations had been documenting egregious violations committed by the Colombian military and police. It is different from other human rights legislation because it does not require a decision to cut off aid to an entire country – which the U.S. government is often reluctant to do – rather it tackles the challenge by prohibiting aid solely from the offending units. Fiction: The Leahy Law solves the human rights problems of foreign military and police units. Interestingly, the Leahy Law places the burden on both the U.S. government and human rights organizations to document and compile information regarding alleged abuses – but the law and associated vetting process is not perfect, nor will it alone solve the human rights problems of foreign security units. Take for example, the vetting process itself. The U.S. government currently utilizes Google key word searches as a first step in its online investigation (and for those who aren’t familiar with this type of search, it does not pick up information in PDFs – so a tip for fellow human rights organizations: make sure your reports are also available in HTML/text). Additional staff dedicated solely to the vetting process have, however, recently been added to the State Department’s payroll – indicating that this process may be strengthening. The Leahy Law is by no means a silver bullet- take for example the gap in oversight of arms sales which the recently adopted (and. we hope, soon to be signed and ratified by the U.S.) Arms Trade Treaty promises to fill. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) requires that arms exporters conduct an assessment of the risk that the arms could be used in committing human rights violations, and to take measures to mitigate that risk or halt the transfer if the risk reaches a certain level. Even this type of historic, multilateral agreement cannot stop all human rights abuses, though. While the government’s obligation to respect, protect and fulfill human rights requires a comprehensive approach, measures such as enacting the Leahy Law and ratifying the ATT are critical, and as such require political will and the determination of the people to hold the government to account. Misconception: Changes in the law two years ago aimed at strengthening its enforcement have complicated U.S. military leaders’ ability to train and equip foreign security forces. The recent revisions to the law strengthen the ability of the U.S. government to ensure that the U.S. is not complicit in arming perpetrators of human rights violations and further encourages accountability. Often, identifying individual perpetrators amongst the ranks is difficult in repressive or insecure environs – victims and their families, facing opaque judicial systems, can be intimidated into silence. This is why the U.S. government now bans entire units from receiving foreign assistance. So while the changes in the law add additional safeguards which may be perceived by military officials as unnecessary barriers in their ability to expeditiously train foreign forces, the safeguards further ensure the U.S. is not arming perpetrators. Military leaders should therefore embrace, not criticize the recent amendments, as ultimately, they help to ensure the U.S. is not complicit in the commission of future abuses by training foreign combatant with a poor human rights record. Fact: The Leahy Law has had an impact. The Leahy Law has saved lives since its passage and it provides an incentive to countries whose security forces’ possess poor human rights records to clean up their act. U.S. policymakers should be looking for ways to make this law and others like it stronger, and in doing so, strengthen the United States’ security and standing abroad. The truth is, there is no human rights panacea – it’s an ongoing struggle, waged by those who believe in basic rights protections for everyone. The Leahy Law is one critical tool in that struggle. Its effectiveness is measured in human rights violations prevented – for those to outweigh the U.S. military’s professed inconveniences, the voices of those who fight for human right must be heard.

### AT: Circumvention

#### Leahy Law vetting has been institutionalized --- government will comply with the mandate of the plan

Hooper, 19 – Lieutenant General and director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (Charles, “How Security Cooperation Advances U.S. Interests,” The Brookings Institution, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/fp_20190604_security_cooperation_transcript.pdf>, 6-4-19)

MR. ISACSON: Thank you very much and thank you, General Hooper. I’m Adam Isacson from the Washington Office on Latin America And just on the last answer on processes that drive you crazy, I’d like to ask about the Leahy law, which is now codified in Title 10 and Title 22 prohibiting assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights with impunity. Do you feel that the Leahy law has, after all these years, been sort of -- the vetting has been institutionalized and it’s now a smooth process? And also, it does not apply to foreign military sales. What would change for you if it did? GENERAL HOOPER: I think, by and large, I think that it has been institutionalized. I can go by my own experience as a security cooperation officer. It was something that we did routinely and it was mandatory that we do. Countries often push back on it. They feel sometimes it’s an infringement on their sovereignty. But nevertheless, they understand that if they’re doing business with the United States, this is something that they have to participate in. If it were applied to foreign military sales, we would adhere strictly to the law and move forward with that. And once again, I think this speaks to the integrity of the U.S. approach to security cooperation that distinguishes us from our strategic competitors. So if it were applied, we would obey the law. And you know what? We’d still be successful and we’d still be consistent with not only our interests, but our values, as well.

#### The DOS can employ Leahy outreach and diplomacy to resolve human rights abuses and preserve stable relations with other countries

Malinowski, 16 – Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor U.S. Department of State (Ted “U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS”, The Brookings Institution, 12-12-19, [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/20161212\_security\_human\_rights\_transcript.pdf)//](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/20161212_security_human_rights_transcript.pdf%29//) kel$

Over the last decade, we have professionalized our Leahy vetting process. We have created a system where every day around the world our embassies are vetting units, vetting individual participants in our military training programs. In fact, we are now vetting 180,000 units and individuals every single year, considering both DOD and State Department assistance. We have doubled down on what we call “Leahy outreach,” explaining the Leahy law and the vetting process to our partners at DOD and our embassies worldwide. Over the last year, our little Human Rights Bureau’s leadership has visited every U.S. military combatant command, apart from UCOM, and many of our embassies and consulates overseas to address and resolve Leahy concerns as they come up. We have also focused on teaching and modeling what we call “Leahy diplomacy.” The whole point of the law is to prompt a discussion with our foreign partners on how we can help them develop institutions of accountability. I’ve used Leahy diplomacy many times all over the world. A good recent example, I was in Sri Lanka in 2009, where the armed forces of that country under what was then a much more authoritarian government, finished off a domestic insurgency, the Tamil Tigers, in a terrible kind of final orgy of bloodletting, in which thousands and thousands of civilians were killed, many people taken prisoner, executed. Our relationship with Sri Lanka was estranged for a number of years as a result of this because we joined international calls for accountability. We now have a very different government, democratically elected government in Sri Lanka, that is committed to democracy and human rights, and that has worked with us at the United Nations to make joint commitments to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses on both sides of that conflict accountable. So, we want to help Sri Lanka. We want to provide all kinds of assistance. We want to rebuild a full and complete and unfettered relationship between our military and the Sri Lankan military. At the same time, we have to insist that these past cases of human rights abuses are addressed, and the Leahy law gives us a great way to do that because it does allow us over time to restart assistance and cooperation with the military while again focusing on those units and individuals that were most problematic. The fact that it is a law enables me, as I did a few weeks ago, to sit down with the heads of the Sri Lankan Navy, Air Force, and Army, to say here’s what you have to do, and if you support your civilian government’s commitments to start a legal process to investigate these allegations and to hold people accountable, here’s what we are going to be able to do to help you, and that’s not just me speaking about our policy preferences, it is the law in the United States. They understand and respect that this is something we have to do. We can’t get around it. That actually helps us a great deal. We have used that stick, but we have also given our partners an off ramp. One of the objectives of the law is to encourage something that we call “remediation,” and we now have a formal policy for the remediation of units that had previously been denied assistance under the Leahy law, a policy that we have agreed to after a lot of careful work with the Department of Defense. It’s basically a roadmap that will show a foreign military force, if this unit is having trouble receiving U.S. training, here are the specific steps that it can take in order to in effect get off of that black list. We launched this policy last year. We now have a number of cases where units have gone through the policy and been restored into the light, as one might say. A good example where we have used this effectively is in Afghanistan. Four cases in the last year. Because the Afghan government credibly investigated, prosecuted and punished individual members of its security force units responsible for human rights abuses, we are now able to work again with those remediated units. During his first visit as President to Washington in 2015, the Afghan President, Ashraf Ghani, publicly and privately vowed to combat abuses by his security forces and to hold perpetrators accountable. Last year, the Afghan Ministry of Interior established a special commission to track, evaluate, and finalize action on these kinds of cases. The Afghan MOI and the Defense Ministry are finalizing plans for a new agency, the Afghan Human Rights Ombudsman, and so on. These are all very concrete results of a partnership between the United States and a foreign security partner in which we have used these provisions in U.S. law to try to incentivize reforms and steps that are very much in its own interest and the right thing to do.

### AT: Won’t Change Behavior

#### Arms embargoes can successfully change countries’ behavior

Miller & Binder, 19 --- \*deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy and served as the director for Egypt and Israel military issues at the U.S. National Security Council from 2014 to 2017, AND \*\*advocacy officer at the Project on Middle East Democracy (5/10/19, Andrew & Seth, “The Case for Arms Embargoes Against Uncooperative Partners,” <https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-arms-embargoes-against-uncooperative-partners/>, accessed on 5/27/19, JMP)

The efficacy of withholding military assistance, including grant aid and arms sales, to modify the behavior of recipient countries is a hotly debated topic in the U.S. foreign policy community. Last month, War on the Rocks published another contribution to this discussion. In “The Case Against Arms Embargos, Even for Saudi Arabia,” Raymond Rounds opposes what he calls an “arms embargo” on Saudi Arabia, arguing that suspending U.S. arms sales as leverage over policy disagreements will only backfire by driving the kingdom to purchase arms from other countries. He contends that suspending sales to Saudi Arabia will fail to alter objectionable Saudi conduct, whether in Yemen or domestically, while “[damaging] ties with Saudi Arabia.” According to Rounds, this dynamic is not unique to Saudi Arabia, but a general proposition that applies to all U.S. arms recipients. If he is correct, arms embargoes — a regular tool of U.S. foreign policy — are quixotic attempts to shape the behavior of foreign governments and put the United States at a strategic disadvantage to global competitors. While this argument seems reasonable, if depressing, it suffers from two principal and serious flaws. First, the empirical record does not support Rounds’ contention that arms embargoes do not deliver. While these suspensions are not a silver bullet, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that they can be effective in changing the policy of a target country. For example, in 2005, the United States successfully used the suspension of a joint weapons project to persuade Israel to cancel a proposed sale of drone equipment to China. In another example, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson secured commitments from Egypt to resolve a longstanding criminal case against 41 foreign NGO workers, including Americans and Europeans, and to suspend military cooperation with North Korea in exchange for releasing $195 million in suspended military aid. More recently, the legislative hold Sen. Robert Menendez placed on an arms sale to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, when combined with threatened legislation to impose further restrictions on transfers to Saudi Arabia, helped pressure the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to re-engage in negotiations with the Houthis, resulting in an imperfect but still important deal on the port of Hodeidah. The author’s argument that arms embargoes do not work cites the 2013 suspension of U.S. military aid to Egypt following that country’s military coup. This policy clearly failed to reverse the military coup led by current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, but there are good reasons to question the validity of the example. Proponents of the suspension argue with good reason that it was not given a fair chance to work. Shortly after the decision was announced, senior U.S. officials told the Egyptians the aid would soon be restored, undercutting the coercive value of the suspension. From the perspective of the Egyptian government, it would have been irrational to make serious concessions in response to what they believed was an idle threat. Just as important, due to a plethora of exceptions and carve-outs, some U.S. military assistance to Egypt continued throughout the suspension period, including maintenance and sustainment, sparing the Egyptian military from the full force of the hold. Despite undercutting its own suspension, the hold still produced some good. U.S. diplomats were able to leverage the policy to deter the Egyptian government from enforcing an arbitrary September 2014 deadline for NGOs to register under Egypt’s draconian 2002 NGO law. And, although Egypt released U.S. citizen Mohamed Soltan from prison two months after aid was resumed, Cairo was partly motivated by the concern that the Obama administration could reverse its decision to resume arms shipments. To be sure, these accomplishments were relatively limited, and we should be careful not to overestimate the efficacy of arms holds. A foreign government is unlikely to fundamentally change its position on what it views as an existential issue. But prior suspensions have yielded tangible gains, and they should remain part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit.

#### Empirically proven that targeting HR violators will get them to change.

Haugaard, 15 –executive director of the Latin America Working Group, which carries out advocacy and public education with a coalition of human rights and encourages U.S. policies that support human rights (Lisa “The Leahy Law Is the Best American Legislation You’ve Never Heard Of, Open Society Foundations, 5-22-2015, https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/law-helps-us-stop-heinous-crimes-foreign-militaries, accessed 6-24-2019)// kel$

An increasingly well-known U.S. human rights law barring American military assistance to foreign security forces that commit crimes like murder, kidnapping, rape, and torture has played an important role in encouraging Central and South American countries to crack down on these crimes. The Leahy Law, named after Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and approved by Congress in the late 1990s, isn’t designed just to penalize a country. It provides an incentive to foreign military and police to clean up dirty units and seek justice for victims of heinous crimes. If the recipient government takes “effective steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice,” the U.S. government can resume assistance to that unit. If no justice occurs, aid to that unit cannot resume. Foreign governments are apt to comply with the Leahy Law because the United States is the world’s most sought-after military trainer and arms supplier. For the Leahy Law to be effective, however, awareness and active participation by local human rights organizations is required. That’s why the Latin America Working Group Education Fund and the Center for International Policy have published a concise, easy-to-use guide to help human rights activists around the globe (as U.S. military assistance is global). For Latin American activists, the guide is available in Spanish. The guide explains how to report a Leahy Law violation, what kind of evidence is needed, how to verify whether a unit has received U.S. training or funding, and how the law’s implementation has recently been improved. Additional resources on U.S. military aid can be found at Security Assistance Monitor. This project is designed to enhance civil society’s role in exposing human rights violations. The Leahy Law has had some noteworthy successes. In the past decade, citizens in several Central and South American countries have seen their governments bring perpetrators to justice in order to receive U.S. security assistance. Much more, of course, must be done to bring these security forces fully in compliance with human rights standards. In 2012, in Honduras, Juan Carlos “El Tigre” Bonilla was promoted to national director of police. But several human rights organizations produced evidence that Bonilla had ordered extrajudicial killings a decade ago in San Pedro Sula. Meanwhile, news articles in the United States revealed that units under Bonilla’s command were receiving U.S. assistance. In 2013, a year after taking command, Bonilla resigned under pressure, fearing that the U.S. would be forced to cut off all security assistance to the Honduran police. In 2011, a Guatemalan court convicted four members of the Kabiles, an elite special forces unit in the Guatemalan army, of killing more than 200 civilians in the Dos Erres massacre in 1982. Each man was sentenced to 6,050 years in prison. Their convictions for their roles in the massacre nearly 30 years prior, in which army soldiers killed more than 200 men, women, and children, would not have happened if not for the courage of victims of violence and Guatemala’s attorney general, Claudia Paz y Paz. After the convictions of the Dos Erres four, based on a Guatemalan government’s commitment to reorganize its special forces units, the U.S. Department of Defense resumed military aid. Finally, the Leahy Law played a part in helping to halt thousands of extrajudicial executions by the Colombian army. Largely between 2004 and 2008, Colombian soldiers killed more than 4,000 poor young men and dressed them in guerrilla uniforms to claim monetary bonuses and other perks for “combat kills.” Human rights activists provided key information about this practice, which led the United States to bar specific Colombian Army individuals and units from receiving U.S. training and assistance. In addition, human rights groups provided information to the U.S. Congress about how these killings violated country-specific human rights conditions on all U.S. security assistance to Colombia. That information led Sen. Leahy to freeze some U.S. military aid from going to Colombia’s military. The U.S. government—along with the United Nations, Colombian human rights activists, media, and the valiant leadership of the victims’ mothers—brought diplomatic pressure to bear on Colombia to encourage prosecutions in civilian courts. The Leahy Law is only one instrument—and a limited one—that can be used to promote justice and curb security force violations. But many foreign military units still receive U.S. training and assistance despite their commission of human rights crimes. The proactive, organized work of human rights groups in countries whose security forces receive substantial U.S. aid, ideally working in concert with U.S.-based organizations, is essential to realize the law’s potential.

### AT: Fill-in

#### Stopping U.S. arms sales is critical --- fill-in unlikely and would take years to happen

Hartung, 5/15/19 --- director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy (William, “It’s Time to Stop Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” <https://lobelog.com/its-time-to-stop-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/>, accessed on 5/28/19, JMP)

The Senate’s failure to override President Trump’s veto of its effort to end U.S. military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen is not the end of the story. A way can and must be found to stop U.S. assistance in refueling, targeting, and other activities that bolster the Saudi/United Arab Emirats (UAE) war effort, which has killed tens of thousands of civilians and left millions of Yemenis at risk of famine and fatal, war-induced diseases. For starters, Congress should work to close off the other main avenue of U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition—the sale of bombs, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, and other equipment to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two primary perpetrators of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. According to statistics from the Security Assistance Monitor, the United States has offered over $68 billion in weaponry to those two nations since the start of the current Yemen conflict in March 2015. As Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution has noted, these U.S.-supplied systems are the backbone of the Saudi military, and without those weapons and related maintenance and support they could not sustain their intervention in Yemen. The Trump administration, the U.S. arms industry, and the Saudi and UAE lobbies have made numerous arguments in favor of keeping U.S. weapons flowing to its Gulf allies, but none of them holds up to scrutiny. With respect to the sales of precision-guided bombs—whose use has been documented in the widespread killings of civilians—the argument of choice has been that even more civilians would die in Saudi/UAE air strikes if the coalition were limited to “dumb” bombs that could not be targeted as accurately. This assertion is premised on the idea that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are making good faith efforts to avoid hitting civilians. The sheer volume of strikes on targets like hospitals, a school bus, funerals, factories, water treatment plants, and other civilian infrastructure puts the lie to this argument. Air strikes on civilians are not “mistakes.” They are part and parcel of the Saudi/UAE strategy to bomb Yemenis into submission and end the war on terms favorable to their coalition. Another popular argument for continuing arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is “if we don’t do it, somebody else will.” But the United States and its European allies supply the Saudi air force and the majority of the arsenals of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Saudi and UAE militaries could not turn on a dime and seek Russian or Chinese systems to substitute for any cutoff of U.S. weaponry and support. It would take a decade or more for these nations to end their dependence on U.S. arms. A few deals with Moscow or Beijing would have limited impact on Saudi and UAE military capabilities, if Russia and China were even willing to supply arms to two nations that are responsible for the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe, with the international opprobrium that would accompany any decision to do so.

#### The plan reduces the overall weapons trade by making them more expensive --- also the moral action to take

Christensen, 18 --- Lecturer in Political Theory, Department of Government, University of Essex (2/28/18, James, “Can selling weapons to oppressive and violent states ever be justified?” <http://theconversation.com/can-selling-weapons-to-oppressive-and-violent-states-ever-be-justified-91348>, accessed on 6/3/19, JMP)

Democratic governments regularly supply weapons to what are sometimes called “outlaw states” – oppressive regimes that violate the basic rights of their own citizens, or aggressive regimes that wrongfully threaten the security of outsiders. Sometimes democratic governments sell the weapons themselves; sometimes they issue export licenses to private arms firms within their jurisdiction. Both practices are frequently condemned on moral grounds. But how might governments who help to arm outlaw states try to defend themselves? What arguments could they appeal to in an attempt to justify their actions? Politicians sometimes claim that their acts make no difference to the degree of suffering inflicted by the regimes that they arm – that if they didn’t sell weapons to the regimes in question, some other government would. For example, when it was revealed in 2014 that Hong Kong’s riot police had used British-made tear gas against unarmed pro-democracy protesters, then foreign secretary Philip Hammond remarked: “CS gas is available from large numbers of sources around the world. To be frank, I think that is a rather immaterial point. They could buy CS gas from the US.” But as I argue in an article for the journal Political Studies, this kind of argument has multiple shortcomings. When a government permits its firms to compete for certain customers in the international arms market, it puts downward pressure on prices, and this could allow outlaw or oppressive states to purchase weapons in larger quantities. Some governments also offer certain kinds of weapons, or weapons of a particularly high quality, that recipients would not be able to acquire from elsewhere. By offering these weapons, governments increase the efficiency with which their trading partners can pursue their unjust ends. In addition, the intentions of other suppliers should not be regarded as inalterable features of the world. After all, this is not generally how governments regard the intentions of their foreign counterparts. If it were, diplomacy would be dismissed as a waste of time and resources. When a government wants another to change its behaviour, it tries to persuade it to do so. If the British government thought it would be better if the Hong Kong authorities lacked easy access to tear gas, it could have impressed its rationale upon its American allies, rather than simply taking the Americans’ behaviour as a given and then trying to exploit that behaviour as a justification for its own. The enemy’s enemy As I’ve tried to demonstrate in recent work, while many of the arguments that governments employ to defend the sale of weapons to outlaw states are weak and self-serving there is one that, when applicable, has potentially greater force. Sometimes, arms transfers to an oppressive regime can reasonably be expected to actually reduce the degree of oppression that is inflicted. Arms transfers can do this when they help a regime to repel an even more oppressive rival that threatens to overthrow it. Consider the US Lend-Lease programme, which sanctioned arms transfers to the Soviet Union during World War II. This policy could be defended on the plausible grounds that arms transfers enabled the Red Army to resist the greater oppression that would otherwise have been imposed by the Nazis. Of course, situations like this don’t arise often – and even when they do, arms transfers are not necessarily justifiable. Evaluation of a proposed arms transfer to an outlaw state must take a comparative form. Whether the transfer can be justified depends on how it fares compared to other actions that could be taken instead. If the transfer is expected to produce worse outcomes than alternative available options, then it isn’t morally acceptable. Different kinds of intervention or assistance have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, but arms transfers always come with serious problems. Most obviously, they provide outlaw states with tools that can be used for oppressive and aggressive ends (in addition to any legitimate defensive ends): other types of support lack this feature. Then there’s the problem of “leakage”. Outlaw states may pass on weapons to third parties, or be unable to ensure the security of stockpiles. The risk of stockpiles being looted is especially high in times of crisis. In short, supplying weapons to outlaw states is difficult to justify even under the most favourable circumstances. If democratic politicians care about the ethical status of their acts, and aspire to conduct themselves in a manner that can be justified to others, then they should take this fact seriously, and end their casual, callous promotion of trade with tyrants.

#### Fill-in unlikely --- switching buyers extremely difficult and would result in lower quality weapons

Deen, 19 ---Director & Senior Editor, UN Bureau, Inter Press Service (4/26/19, Thalif, “US & Western Arms in Yemen Conflict Signal Potential War Crime Charges,” <http://www.ipsnews.net/2019/04/us-western-arms-yemen-conflict-signal-potential-war-crime-charges/>, accessed on 6/8/19, JMP)

UNITED NATIONS, Apr 26 2019 (IPS) - When US political leaders urged the Trump administration to either reduce or cut off arms supplies to Saudi Arabia – largely as a punishment for its indiscriminate bombings of civilians in the four-year old military conflict in Yemen—President Trump provided a predictable response: “If we don’t sell arms to Saudi Arabia, the Chinese and the Russians will.” Perhaps in theory it’s plausible, but in practice it’s a long shot primarily because switching weapons systems from Western to Chinese and Russian arms— particularly in the middle of a devastating war– could be a long drawn out process since it involves maintenance, servicing, training, military advice and uninterrupted supplies of spares. Asked for a response, Pieter Wezeman, Senior Researcher, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IPS: “If, (very hypothetical) the USA and the UK would stop supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, this would be a major problem for Saudi Arabia, in military and financial terms”. He pointed out that Saudi Arabia would find it very hard to maintain the US and UK weapons its armed forces largely rely on without the support of the large numbers of US and UK service personnel in the country right now. The Saudi military might be able to keep the weapons going for a while, but presumably at a much lower operational level. He said it will not only be very costly for Saudi Arabia to replace the expensive existing equipment — which is supposed to be in service for decades– but it also means that Chinese and Russian weapons will not be as high quality as what Saudis now receive from the USA and Western Europe. And New York Times roving correspondent Nicholas Kristof says “some Saudis kept trying to suggest to me that if we block weapons sales to Riyadh, the kingdom will turn to Moscow.” “That’s absurd. It needs our spare parts and, more important, it buys our weapons because they come with an implicit guarantee that we will bail the Saudis out militarily if they get into trouble with Iran.” In an oped piece, Kristof said the Saudi armed forces can’t even defeat a militia in Yemen. So, how could they stand up to Iran?, he asked. “That’s why we have leverage over Saudi Arabia, not the other way around.” The next step, he argued, should be a suspension of arms sales until Saudi Arabia ends its war in Yemen, for that war has made the US complicit in mass starvation. The Times said last year that some US lawmakers worry that American weapons were being used to commit war crimes in Yemen—including the intentional or unintentional bombings of funerals, weddings, factories and other civilian infrastructure—triggering condemnation from the United Nations and human rights groups who also accuse the Houthis of violating humanitarian laws of war and peace.

### AT: Influence Turn

#### Challenging transactionalism in the area of arms sales will give the U.S. authority to counter abusers and check the slide toward authoritarianism globally

Baker, 18 --- chief White House correspondent for The New York Times (10/14/18, Peter, “In Trump’s Saudi Bargain, the Bottom Line Proudly Wins Out,” <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/14/us/politics/trump-saudi-arabia-arms-deal.html>, accessed on 5/28/19, JMP)

WASHINGTON — When President Trump made Saudi Arabia his first foreign destination after taking office last year, he struck what amounted to a fundamental bargain with the royal family: He would not lecture them about human rights, and they would buy plenty of American weapons and military hardware. So as the world recoils at reports that the Saudis sent agents to Turkey to kill and dismember a Saudi dissident journalist with a bone saw, Mr. Trump faces the most profound test of that trade-off. For days, he has rebuffed pressure to punish the Saudis by canceling arms sales that he secured during his visit, arguing that it would cost Americans money and jobs. That he would prioritize potentially tens of billions of dollars for the United States over moral outrage about the apparent death of a single dissident may not be a major surprise. Other presidents have tempered concerns about human rights overseas with what they perceived to be America’s own security or economic interests. What is different is how open Mr. Trump has been in expressing that realpolitik calculation no matter how crass or cynical it might appear. “Any president’s going to be stuck in this awkward place,” said Steven A. Cook, a specialist on the region at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The one thing about Trump is he’s basically willing to say: ‘I don’t really care. He’s not an American citizen. Yes, it’s terrible, but we’ve got all this business with them.’ He doesn’t shy away from saying that.” But that approach could put Mr. Trump on a collision course with Congress, where there is sentiment among members of both parties to use the leverage of arms sales to send a message to Saudi Arabia that it cannot get away with killing a journalist with American ties on foreign soil. Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, said on Sunday that curbing arms sales would be on the menu of possible responses if it is determined that the Saudi government did kill the journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, who lived in Virginia and wrote columns for The Washington Post. Turkish officials have concluded that Mr. Khashoggi was murdered as he visited the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul two weeks ago; the Saudi government has rejected the accusations. Mr. Rubio said it was important for the United States to have the moral authority to criticize autocrats like President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. “All of that is undermined and compromised if we somehow decide that because an ally who is important did that we’re not going to call it out,” he said on “Meet the Press” on NBC. “So I will just say this to you with full confidence: If this is proven to be true, there is going to be a response from Congress,” he went on. “It’s going to be nearly unanimous. It’s going to be swift. And it’s going to go pretty far. And that could include arms sales. But it could include a bunch of other things as well.” The Saudi government reacted harshly on Sunday to the specter of a punitive American response, saying it would respond to any action “with greater action,” backed by its economic might. The threat came in response to a promise Mr. Trump had made in an interview on “60 Minutes” to exact “severe punishment” if the Saudis’ complicity in Mr. Khashoggi’s apparent killing is demonstrated. But the seriousness of his commitment to that vow was unclear. Asked by reporters on Saturday what specifically he had in mind, he offered no examples and instead asked a senator visiting the Oval Office for his thoughts. Mr. Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 was meant to be a signal of his foreign policy priorities. He was hoping to realign the region by rebuilding America’s alliance with Riyadh, which had frayed under President Barack Obama, and by making clear that he was getting the United States out of the business of lecturing friends about domestic matters. “We are not here to tell other people how to live, what to do, who to be or how to worship,” he told the Saudis in a message heard elsewhere around the world. Instead, he focused on the economic benefits of the relationship, boasting that he had secured $110 billion in arms sales during his trip. That figure, though, was wildly inflated and misleading. Mr. Trump’s package essentially consisted of letters of intent or interest, not actual contracts, and the possible deals began in the Obama administration, when the Saudis bought $112 billion in aircraft, missiles and other military equipment over eight years. Seventeen months later, the Trump arms bonanza still has not materialized. The kingdom has not bought any new arms platform during the Trump administration, noted Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. official and a Saudi expert at the Brookings Institution who advised the Obama administration on Middle East policy. The possible deal with the highest profile, a $15 billion purchase of a missile defense system known as Thaad, seems stalled as the Saudis let a September deadline with Lockheed Martin pass, Mr. Riedel pointed out in a paper last week. Even so, Mr. Trump has remained committed, citing the package as a signal accomplishment and explicitly rejecting any pause, much less cancellation. “I worked very hard to get the order for the military,” he told reporters on Saturday. “If they don’t buy it from us, they’re going to buy it from Russia or they’re going to buy it from China, or they’re going to buy it from other countries.” Mr. Trump has a point about competitors. As the Saudis hedge on Thaad, they have been in talks with Russia for the purchase of its S-400 air defense system. But more broadly, Saudi Arabia would find it hard to switch wholesale to other arms suppliers. The Royal Saudi Air Force depends on American and British support for its fleet of F-15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters and Tornado aircraft, Mr. Riedel pointed out. Its army is likewise dependent on Western parts and support. But Mr. Trump’s focus on the bottom line sends an unmistakable message. “The president, through his reluctance to scuttle the arms deal, is telegraphing to authoritarian regimes that they can buy a pass on repressive, brutal measures without incurring consequences from the United States,” said David J. Kramer, an assistant secretary of state for human rights under President George W. Bush and now a senior fellow at Florida International University. Elisa Massimino, former president of Human Rights First, an advocacy group, said that every president had to navigate complex relationships with allies, balancing sometimes competing interests, but that Mr. Trump did not understand the power that came from being clear about values. “His short-term, transactional approach not only undermines those working for democratic change in their own countries, but robs the United States of key leverage on strategic interests across the board,” she said. Other presidents have continued arms sales to countries with loathsome human rights records and, in moments like this one, tried to find ways around cutting off such transactions. After Egypt’s military overthrew its elected president in 2013, Mr. Obama skirted a law requiring the halt of military aid to countries that experience a coup by refusing to declare whether the situation in Cairo amounted to one. He ultimately ordered a modest and temporary suspension of some military aid, delaying delivery of F-16 aircraft, Harpoon missiles and M1A1 Abrams tanks, and then resumed them 17 months later. But Mr. Trump’s predecessors justified their decisions to keep arms flowing to wayward allies by warning of the national security implications of cutting them off — not by focusing on the financial well-being of defense contractors. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are both important partners of the United States in regional issues, particularly the fight against terrorism. “What Trump is doing here is not claiming that American national security should weigh more heavily than our human rights commitments — an argument many Americans would accept,” said Tamara Cofman Wittes, a State Department official under Mr. Obama who is now at Brookings. “Instead, he is claiming that commercial transactions with private American weapons manufacturers should weigh more heavily than our human rights commitments, because the spending produces jobs.”

#### Trump’s transactionalism is collapsing U.S. foreign policy and risks another world war --- only a reboot that emphasizes human rights and democracy can resolve it

* no shared interests
* rogue regimes are more unreliable and unstable
* public won’t support it
* every alliance doesn’t have to be grounded in shared democratic values but it is still bad to coddle autocratic regimes

Rubin, 18 --- J.D. from UC Berkeley (10/19/18, Jennifer, “Why transactional foreign policy is destined to fail,” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/opinions/wp/2018/10/19/why-transactional-foreign-policy-is-destined-to-fail/?utm_term=.46ee0d235054>, accessed on 6/12/19, JMP)

Since the Iraq War, debate has raged in U.S. foreign policy circles and in public discussion about the extent to which the United States should involve itself in the world and exert global leadership. Critics of President George W. Bush (who said in his second inaugural address that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”) and of President Barack Obama asserted that Bush overextended the United States while Obama “led from behind” with unsatisfactory results. Both, however, understood that our closest allies were democracies that shared our values. Then along came President Trump. My colleague Robert Kagan wrote in June that Trump saw “the United States as rogue superpower, neither isolationist nor internationalist, neither withdrawing nor in decline, but active, powerful and entirely out for itself. In recent months, on trade, Iran, NATO defense spending and perhaps even North Korea, President Trump has shown that a president willing to throw off the moral, ideological and strategic constraints that limited U.S. action in the past can bend this intractable world to his will, at least for a while.” Even worse, the less democratic and the more vicious the regime (with the exception of Iran), the more Trump has lavished praise on it, giving the impression that our interests and theirs are in perfect sync, while our traditional allies (with the exception of Israel) were taking advantage of us, weighing us down. It wasn’t enough to conduct polite, self-interested diplomacy with the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan; we had to fawn over them and act as their PR agents. Such a foreign policy was bound to fail for no less than three reasons. First, it’s not based in reality. Russia doesn’t share our interests in Europe or the Middle East, and therefore cannot be our partner. North Korea does not seem to share our interest in denuclearizing (unless it wrenches South Korea out from U.S. protection). Inevitably conflicts arise when the glowing orb or the red carpet get put away. Second, rogue regimes are by their nature unstable and unreliable. Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt was a case in point. In providing nondemocratic partners with undiluted praise and support, we encourage behaviors that ultimately make them less stable, less prosperous and more corrupt. And third, ultimately the American people won’t stand for it, as we’ve seen with Saudi Arabia, when our supposed partners shatter international norms, commit human rights atrocities and impinge on their neighbors’ sovereignty — which they inevitably do. As Kagan explained, “Trump’s policies are pure realism, devoid of ideals and sentiment, pursuing a narrow ‘national interest’ defined strictly in terms of dollars and cents and defense against foreign attack. Trump’s world is a struggle of all-against-all. There are no relationships based on common values. There are merely transactions determined by power. It is the world that a century ago brought us two world wars.” At present, such a foreign policy brings about continual disappointment and visceral backlash from the American people. It diminishes our moral authority in the world, alienates our actual democratic friends, makes us look weak and entangles us in costly and counterproductive trade wars. Trump and his enablers are now caught: They cozied up to a regime that acts in repugnant ways (slaughtering civilians in Yemen, killing a U.S. journalist), triggering a backlash in Congress and the court of public opinion. In lieu of our own coherent Iran policy we relied on a regime that acts in ways the American people find intolerable. Our “transaction” no longer works, and we have no backup plan. This does not mean that all of our alliances must be grounded in shared, democratic values. It does, however, require that we not outsource our foreign policy to autocratic regimes and that we hold them accountable for their conduct. We must continue to stand up for universal human rights. It also means we need to commit our own resources and assemble our own coalitions to burden-share (as we did in the first Gulf War). For the sake of international comity, we must avoid knee-jerk repudiation of international agreements. Otherwise, we wind up looking like suckers at the mercy of corrupt, brutal regimes. This is not winning, by any definition.

### AT: Transparency Turn

#### Holding allies accountable for human rights conduct by reducing arms sales strikes the right balance in dealing with friendly dictators --- doesn’t sever relationships but is necessary to check the global slide toward illiberalism

Brands, Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins, 18 (10/15/18, Hal – Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, “Saudi Crisis Shows the U.S. Needs a New Way to Deal With Dictators; Washington has to recognize the downsides of alliances with nations that quash democracy and human rights,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-10-15/khashoggi-crisis-shows-u-s-needs-new-way-to-deal-with-dictators>, accessed on 6/10/19, JMP)

The disappearance of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi has precipitated a new crisis in U.S.-Saudi relations. Yet that crisis has also revived a much older dilemma in American strategy: How to deal with allies that also happen to morally abhorrent, even murderous, dictatorships. The basic predicament has been around for over a century. As the U.S. established its dominance in the Western Hemisphere in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it often cooperated with local strongmen who could provide some semblance of stability. Throughout the Cold War, containing communism required working with partners that were far from morally pure — dictators who ruled key allies such as South Korea, Turkey, Portugal and Greece at various points, as well as a clutch of Latin American and Middle Eastern despots. The rapid spread of democracy from the 1970s through the early 2000s eased this dilemma, by aligning the frontiers of freedom more closely with the frontiers of America’s European and Asia-Pacific alliances. Yet the problem has now returned, and not just in the Middle East, because of two factors. The first is the so-called democratic recession that began around 2006, and which has subsequently weakened democracy in dozens of countries around the world. Illiberal and anti-democratic practices have taken hold in key NATO countries: Turkey, Poland and Hungary. In the Asia-Pacific, one U.S. ally — Thailand — has been under military rule since 2014, while another — the Philippines — has reverted to a bloody form of illiberal democracy under Rodrigo Duterte. In the Middle East, George W. Bush’s Freedom Agenda and the hopes of the Arab Spring have faded; authoritarianism and instability are again the status quo. The challenge of handling these friendly authoritarians is greater because of the second trend: the resurgence of geopolitical revisionism. As hostile authoritarian powers — China, Russia and Iran — challenge existing regional orders across Eurasia, they are putting U.S. power and influence under pressure and sharpening the dilemmas America faces in handling its more autocratic allies. Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines may be acting in deeply distasteful ways, but they occupy critical geostrategic real estate in today’s most important geopolitical competitions. There have traditionally been two schools of thought on coping with this problem. One was expressed most forcefully by Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose famous article “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” was published in 1979 and vaulted her to the forefront of U.S. policy-making during the Ronald Reagan years. Kirkpatrick argued that insisting that authoritarian allies adhere to U.S. standards of political freedom and individual rights was an invitation to disaster. It would destabilize those regimes internally, raising the likelihood of a takeover by more radical and hostile forces. This, Kirkpatrick alleged, was just what had happened in Nicaragua and Iran in 1979, where U.S. pressure to respect human rights had weakened authoritarian allies against the revolutionaries who toppled them. Preserving a stable strategic environment in which the U.S. and its allied democracies could thrive, and aggressive dictatorships such as the Soviet Union could be contained, meant partnering with some friendly devils along the way. The second school of thought, expressed most prominently by Reagan’s secretary of state, George Shultz, held that this choice between interests and ideals was a false one. Supporting dictators was no guarantee of stability, because those regimes provoked hatred and discontent that could eventually erupt into revolution. Even supposedly friendly dictators could prove dangerous and unpredictable, as the Argentine junta showed when it invaded the Falkland Islands in 1982 and triggered a war with the U.K. And surely the U.S. — the world’s leading democracy — would be more secure and influential in a world populated more fully by other democracies. The U.S. could not promote democracy and confront authoritarians everywhere, Shultz acknowledged. But generally speaking, spreading human rights and democracy, while also holding friendly authoritarian regimes to account, was a geopolitical imperative as well as a moral one. Shultz’s view won out in the Reagan administration, which played a critical supporting role in the triumph of democratic forces in countries from the Philippines and South Korea to El Salvador and Chile. Yet because democracy was spreading like wildfire in the 1980s, and because the Soviet threat was starting to fade, the choices were in many ways less difficult for U.S. policymakers than they are now. Today, Washington can usefully embrace insights from both schools of thought. From the Kirkpatrick school comes the hard truth that the U.S. can’t afford a break with many of its authoritarian allies today. If holding the line against Chinese expansionism in the Asia-Pacific seems hard now, just wait until the already-weak U.S. alliance with the Philippines falls apart. Putting relations with Turkey, Poland or Hungary into the deep freeze might be morally satisfying; it would also create more opportunities for Russian mischief on NATO’s eastern flank. In the Middle East, the U.S.-Saudi partnership remains important for counterterrorism cooperation and as a bulwark against Iranian ambitions. Isolating Saudi Arabia might push Riyadh to deepen its relations with Moscow and Beijing. Iran, Russia and China are seeking to expand their influence by weakening the strength and cohesion of U.S. alliances: Washington should not do its rivals’ work for them. Yet neither should America do what the Trump administration often seems included to do: Give its allies a green light to violate human rights and flout the rule of law. Doing so simply gives incentive for further misdeeds. It erodes U.S. moral standing by leaving Washington vulnerable to charges of selective morality and outright hypocrisy. And as illiberalism spreads, it weakens the liberal ideological glue that helps bind the U.S. to its closest allies; it creates ideological affinities between Washington's friends and its rivals (just look at the warm relationship between Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s strongman, Viktor Orban); it raises the longer-term dangers of serious domestic instability and even revolution. One can hardly look at Turkey or Saudi Arabia today and wonder whether harsh, autocratic rule is not driving up the likelihood of debilitating internal strife. The U.S. must therefore exact a cost, measured but real, on the illiberal actions of its allies. This could mean reducing — but not fully halting — arms sales, speaking out more strongly against repressive behavior, and perhaps even excluding quasi-authoritarian allies such as Hungary from NATO exercises. Also helpful would be quiet but consistent advocacy of respect for basic human rights in bilateral diplomatic discussions, and — where feasible — increased support for embattled democratic actors through institutions such as the National Endowment for Democracy. These measures can be calibrated according to the specifics of the case and the degree of leverage Washington possesses: America can probably take a harder line with Poland, which has nowhere else to go, than it can with the Philippines, which has already been repositioning itself closer to Beijing. Above all, the U.S. must avoid conveying its approval of or simple indifference to illiberal practices. Unfortunately, President Trump has repeatedly done just this, by praising Duterte’s vicious drug war, by singling out a backsliding Poland for praise in major international speeches, by uncritically backing Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and his power grab in Saudi Arabia, and by cultivating an air of presidential indifference to issues of human rights and democracy. In fairness, the president’s comments that the U.S. would exact punishment on Saudi Arabia if it's proved that Riyadh was responsible for Khashoggi’s disappearance were a good sign in this regard; his pre-emptive public refusal to even consider restricting U.S. arms sales, however, was a very bad one. Striking the right balance in dealing with friendly dictators will always be difficult. But the U.S. risks compromising its ideals and its interests if it doesn’t even try.

#### **Suspending arms sales allows the U.S. to rebalance these relationships --- avoids reckless blowback without compromising military access**

Miller and Binder 19 – Miller is the deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy and served as the director for Egypt and Israel military issues at the U.S. National Security Council from 2014 to 2017; Binder is the advocacy officer at the Project on Middle East Democracy. Previously he served as the program manager and research associate at the Center for International Policy’s Security Assistance Monitor program, where he focused on U.S. security assistance and arms sales policy (Andrew Miller and Seth Binder, 5-10-2019, "The Case for Arms Embargoes Against Uncooperative Partners," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2019/05/the-case-for-arms-embargoes-against-uncooperative-partners//, DOA: 6-29-2019, smarx ) //SS

The efficacy of withholding military assistance, including grant aid and arms sales, to modify the behavior of recipient countries is a hotly debated topic in the U.S. foreign policy community. Last month, War on the Rocks published another contribution to this discussion. In “The Case Against Arms Embargos, Even for Saudi Arabia,” Raymond Rounds opposes what he calls an “arms embargo” on Saudi Arabia, arguing that suspending U.S. arms sales as leverage over policy disagreements will only backfire by driving the kingdom to purchase arms from other countries. He contends that suspending sales to Saudi Arabia will fail to alter objectionable Saudi conduct, whether in Yemen or domestically, while “[damaging] ties with Saudi Arabia.” According to Rounds, this dynamic is not unique to Saudi Arabia, but a general proposition that applies to all U.S. arms recipients. If he is correct, arms embargoes — a regular tool of U.S. foreign policy — are quixotic attempts to shape the behavior of foreign governments and put the United States at a strategic disadvantage to global competitors. While this argument seems reasonable, if depressing, it suffers from two principal and serious flaws. First, the empirical record does not support Rounds’ contention that arms embargoes do not deliver. While these suspensions are not a silver bullet, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that they can be effective in changing the policy of a target country. For example, in 2005, the United States successfully used the suspension of a joint weapons project to persuade Israel to cancel a proposed sale of drone equipment to China. In another example, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson secured commitments from Egypt to resolve a longstanding criminal case against 41 foreign NGO workers, including Americans and Europeans, and to suspend military cooperation with North Korea in exchange for releasing $195 million in suspended military aid. More recently, the legislative hold Sen. Robert Menendez placed on an arms sale to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, when combined with threatened legislation to impose further restrictions on transfers to Saudi Arabia, helped pressure the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen to re-engage in negotiations with the Houthis, resulting in an imperfect but still important deal on the port of Hodeidah. The author’s argument that arms embargoes do not work cites the 2013 suspension of U.S. military aid to Egypt following that country’s military coup. This policy clearly failed to reverse the military coup led by current President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, but there are good reasons to question the validity of the example. Proponents of the suspension argue with good reason that it was not given a fair chance to work. Shortly after the decision was announced, senior U.S. officials told the Egyptians the aid would soon be restored, undercutting the coercive value of the suspension. From the perspective of the Egyptian government, it would have been irrational to make serious concessions in response to what they believed was an idle threat. Just as important, due to a plethora of exceptions and carve-outs, some U.S. military assistance to Egypt continued throughout the suspension period, including maintenance and sustainment, sparing the Egyptian military from the full force of the hold. Despite undercutting its own suspension, the hold still produced some good. U.S. diplomats were able to leverage the policy to deter the Egyptian government from enforcing an arbitrary September 2014 deadline for NGOs to register under Egypt’s draconian 2002 NGO law. And, although Egypt released U.S. citizen Mohamed Soltan from prison two months after aid was resumed, Cairo was partly motivated by the concern that the Obama administration could reverse its decision to resume arms shipments. To be sure, these accomplishments were relatively limited, and we should be careful not to overestimate the efficacy of arms holds. A foreign government is unlikely to fundamentally change its position on what it views as an existential issue. But prior suspensions have yielded tangible gains, and they should remain part of the U.S. foreign policy toolkit. Second, Rounds also overstates the costs of suspending arms transfers. He is particularly focused on the potential for losing “access,” a term that encompasses relationships with the recipient country’s military leadership; insight into their views, organization, and doctrine; and permission for the U.S. military to use that country’s bases and airspace. These are legitimate concerns, but suspensions do not automatically compromise access. Egypt, for instance, never curtailed the U.S. military ability to use the Suez Canal or Egyptian airspace while arms transfers were on hold. And, while intelligence about a foreign military is valuable, we often have other, clandestine ways to acquire such information. Moreover, we should not conflate access with influence. U.S. military officials had access to their Egyptian counterparts during the events of 2013, but those channels were of no use in deterring Egypt’s military from removing the country’s democratically elected president. Nor has U.S access reduced civilian casualties from Saudi-coalition bombing in Yemen. In these cases, access without influence does not absolve the United States of complicity. The author’s other major concern is that arms suspensions could result in the loss of arms sales to strategic competitors like Russia or China. The jobs created by such sales are not trivial matters, but studies have found that they do not provide the economic benefits or jobs that are often touted. Nor are these sales necessary to maintain the military industrial base, which is powered by billions of dollars each year from domestic purchases, except in rare cases. Fundamentally, the author’s implicit argument — that if the United States reliably supplies weapons to strategically important countries, they won’t seek them elsewhere — is suspect. Countries, including close partners like Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, have long sought to diversify their weapons stockpiles, and in an increasingly multipolar world, more countries are seeking to diversify their arms suppliers to maintain their own independence. While U.S. arms will continue to compete with Russian or Chinese counterparts on a sale-by-sale basis, it will become increasingly unrealistic to be the exclusive supplier of any partner country, irrespective of how reliable the United States is. The reluctance to use the leverage afforded by arms transfers is symptomatic of a broader pathology in U.S. foreign policy: a fixation on maintaining relationships without regard to the value they provide. Relationships are important, but the United States should receive a commensurate return on its investments. When this is not the case, the United States should not hesitate to adjust the status and intimacy of a bilateral relationship, including through the suspension of arms transfers. Contrary to Rounds’ argument, such steps can yield important policy gains. Even if they do not, we can at least avoid some of the blowback of enabling reckless and rights-abusing actions. Distance does not have the allure of access, but it may ultimately put the United States in a stronger strategic position

## FRAMING

### Ext: Structural Violence

#### Ongoing conflicts should be prioritized – we should focus on what is happening rather than what could

Westlund 14 (Donna Westlund; citing Virgil Hawkins is a former NGO worker in Asia and Africa and a current associate professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, as well as a research associate at the University of the Free State, South Africa; 02-17-2014; "Media Coverage of Conflict in Africa Inadequate"; Guardian Liberty Voice; https://guardianlv.com/2014/02/media-coverage-of-conflict-in-africa-inadequate/; Accessed: 6-28-2019 //GBS Rudolph)

The number of deaths, refugees and internally displaced people due to the conflicts and civil wars in Africa is astounding. If these statistics were scaled down to proportion and occurred in Europe, the situation would be called World War III by the media. The rest of the world would rush to defuse and mediate the situation, and the mainstream Western media would provide in-depth coverage. In terms of numbers of people who have been displaced and killed, Africa has been largely ignored by the media when compared to the coverage of fomenting tensions and following crises of geographical locations like Palestine and Israel, Iraq and Kosovo. In one study, it was shown that 88 percent of the conflict-related deaths occur in Africa, but it did not even figure into 10 percent of the coverage by mainstream Western media outlets. The study’s author, Virgil Hawkins, is a former NGO worker in Asia and Africa and a current associate professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy, as well as a research associate at the University of the Free State, South Africa. In Hawkins’ book Stealth Conflicts: How the World’s Worst Violence Is Ignored, he declares it his mission “to shed light on…the mechanisms that are behind [these conflicts’] marginalization.” AfricaThe book features a set of maps called New World Maps that are designed to give readers a “fresh perspective on the way things are, and the way they are shown to us.” They use conflict-related deaths as the parameter for size. Other maps depict the way various media outlets (CNN, BBC, New York Times, Le Monde, Yomiuri) perceive the world. Hawkins notes that the purpose of these maps is “not to suggest that levels of media coverage should be proportionate to the…sheer scale of a conflict (death toll),” although she says they should certainly be a factor. Why is the media coverage, for example, of conflicts in Nigeria and the Central African Republic important to countries in the West that do not appear to be involved in them? Anup Shah, author and owner of the Global Issues website, offers some answers to that question. Shah points out that simplistic views, at worst, are racist, whether intentional or not, and at best, offer no platform on how to move forward.Hawkins says his research led him to the quick and obvious fact that those conflicts that have dominated the agendas of people in a position to respond–such as policymakers, the public, the media, and academia–are often small in scale in comparison to many of those that have consistently failed to attract attention. The issues need to be put in front of people who are, as Hawkins says, “in a position to respond.” Countries such as those in the West have direct and indirect influence when it comes to international affairs. And finally, the opposite is just as true–all countries have direct and indirect effects on all other countries. To understand this best, Shah provides a quotation from J. Brian Atwood, the former head of U.S. foreign aid policy: “Failed states threaten our nation. They cost us too much…They destabilize other nations. They…deny us economic opportunity in the largest new marketplace — the developing world.” The media tends to ignore the conflicts in Africa or oversimplify them. Provocative images abound, but conflict analysis is lacking. There is little understanding how monetary aid both helps and hinders Africa, and the issue is not being addressed enough by mainstream Western media, nor are the reasons for Africa’s exportation of crops despite its persistent famine and hunger. As Hawkins says, “The marginalization of these conflicts is the result of a series of deliberate choices on the part of those in a position to respond.” The media, in large part, chooses to respond inadequately to the conflict in Africa. In turn, its response affects the present and future of those conflicts.

#### Reducing material violence comes first --- only way to prevent inevitable deaths.

Almutawakel & Alfaqih, 18 --- co-founders and leaders of Mwatana Organization for Human Rights (11/8/18, Radhya & Abdulrasheed, “Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates Are Starving Yemenis to Death; The world was rightly outraged by the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, but the bombs of Mohammed bin Salman and his Emirati allies are killing dozens each day in Yemen,” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/08/saudi-arabia-and-the-united-arab-emirates-are-starving-yemenis-to-death-mbs-khashoggi-famine-yemen-blockade-houthis/>, accessed on 6/16/19)

Jamal Khashoggi was but the latest victim of a reckless arrogance that has become the hallmark of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy. Yemenis were saddened, but not surprised, at the extent of the brutality exhibited in Khashoggi’s killing, because our country has been living through this same Saudi brutality for almost four years. As human rights advocates working in Yemen, we are intimately familiar with the violence, the killing of innocents, and the shredding of international norms that have been the hallmarks of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in our country. For nearly four years, Saudi Arabia has led a coalition, along with the United Arab Emirates, that has cynically and viciously bombarded Yemen’s cities, blockaded Yemen’s ports, and prevented humanitarian aid from reaching millions in need. According to the Yemen Data Project, Saudi and Emirati aircraft have conducted over 18,500 air raids on Yemen since the war began—an average of over 14 attacks every day for over 1,300 days. They have bombed schools, hospitals, homes, markets, factories, roads, farms, and even historical sites. Tens of thousands of civilians, including thousands of children, have been killed or maimed by Saudi airstrikes. But the Saudis and Emiratis couldn’t continue their bombing campaign in Yemen without U.S. military support. American planes refuel Saudi aircraft en route to their targets, and Saudi and Emirati pilots drop bombs made in the United States and the United Kingdom onto Yemeni homes and schools Nevertheless, U.S. attention to the war in Yemen has been largely confined to brief spats of outrage over particularly dramatic attacks, like the August school bus bombing that killed dozens of children. Saudi crimes in Yemen are not limited to regular and intentional bombing of civilians in violation of international humanitarian law. By escalating the war and destroying essential civilian infrastructure, Saudi Arabia is also responsible for the tens of thousands of Yemeni civilians who have died from preventable disease and starvation brought on by the war. The United Nations concluded that blockades have had “devastating effects on the civilian population” in Yemen, as Saudi and Emirati airstrikes have targeted Yemen’s food production and distribution, including the agricultural sector and the fishing industry. Meanwhile, the collapse of Yemen’s currency due to the war has prevented millions of civilians from purchasing the food that exists in markets. Food prices have skyrocketed, but civil servants haven’t received regular salaries in two years. Yemenis are being starved to death on purpose, with starvation of civilians used by Saudi Arabia as a weapon of war. Three-quarters of Yemen’s population—over 22 million men, women, and children—are currently dependent on international aid and protection. The U.N. warned in September that Yemen soon will reach a “tipping point,” beyond which it will be impossible to avoid massive civilian deaths. Over 8 million people are currently on the verge of starvation, a figure likely to rise to 14 million—half of the country—by the end of 2018 if the fighting does not subside, import obstructions are not removed, and the currency is not stabilized. To be clear, there is no party in this war is without blood on its hands; our organization, Mwatana, has documented violations against civilians by all parties to the conflict in Yemen, not only Saudi Arabia. The Houthis have killed and injured hundreds of civilians through their use of landmines and indiscriminate shelling, while militias backed by the United Arab Emirates, Yemeni government-backed militias, and Houthi militias have arbitrarily detained, forcibly disappeared, and tortured civilians. But the de facto immunity that the international community has given Saudi Arabia through its silence prevents real justice for violations by all sides. The people of the Middle East have long and bitter experience with international double standards when it comes to human rights, as purported champions of universal rights in the West regularly ignore grave violations by their allies in the region, from the former shah of Iran to Saddam Hussein to Saudi Arabia’s current crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman. This double standard was on display during the crown prince’s recent tour of world capitals and Silicon Valley, where he was generally praised as a “reformer,” and media figures recited his vision for Saudi Arabia in the year 2030 without asking what will be left of Yemen by the year 2020 if the war continues. Similarly, this double standard is on display when Western policymakers downplay Saudi and Emirati violations of Yemenis’ human rights by claiming that a close partnership with Riyadh is needed to prevent perceived Iranian threats to the international community, without asking whether that same community is also endangered by Saudi Arabia’s daily violations of basic international norms. And yes, there is a double standard in the wall-to-wall coverage of Khashoggi’s horrific murder, when the daily murder of Yemenis by Saudi Arabia and other parties to the conflict in Yemen hardly merits mention. Those in the United States and elsewhere who are incensed by Khashoggi’s murder must summon similar moral clarity and condemn Saudi Arabia’s daily killing of innocents in Yemen. If Saudi violations are to be genuinely curtailed, Khashoggi’s killing must mark the beginning, not the end, of accountability for Saudi crimes. Khashoggi’s death has been reduced to a single data point, rather than being seen as the result of subverting universal values in favor of geopolitics or business interests. Reversing course—ending U.S. military support for the Saudi-Emirati intervention in Yemen and supporting U.N.-led peace efforts and the reopening of Yemen’s air and sea ports—can still save millions of lives. If U.S. lawmakers had spoken up and taken action on Yemen years ago, when Saudi Arabia’s rampant violations were already well known, thousands of Yemeni civilians who since then have been killed by airstrikes or starvation would still be alive today—and perhaps Jamal Khashoggi would be, too.

### Ext: Probability

#### Traditional risk analysis fails and only perpetuates the impacts they seek to eradicate – studies are often rooted in biases that seek to justify other political motives

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Students of regulatory policy know of the precautionary principle, an idea about risk favored by advocates of various health and environmental regulations. The concept can be stated as follows: Whenever some activity poses a possible risk to health, safety, or the environment, the government should take preventive action. Government intervention is warranted even if the evidence that the activity is harmful is uncertain and the cost of preventivee action is high. In Laws of the Fear, University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein demonstrates that the precautionary principle is incoherent. The principle fails to acknowledge that decisions about risk, whether they regulate health hazards or arm against a state, cannot deal with one risk alone. Because resources are always limited, efforts to head off a particular danger take resources away from other government programs and from private investment that also reduce risk. Also, because of unintended consequences, actions that prevent one danger can create new ones. If we took the precautionary principle seriously, we would have to be cautious about all the dangers a particular decision touches. That includes the danger of doing nothing. Taken literally, the principle prevents all action and inaction, making it useless. States often ignore this logical failure and apply the precautionary principle to particular hazards. Sunstein argues that in many of those cases, precautionary action will be more harmful to society than running the risk. Those are cases where the danger is small and the cost of prevention is large. The use of asbestos as building insulation is an example. When contained in walls, asbestos is harmless. If the materials containing it deteriorate, however, the asbestos might be inhaled or ingested and, in very rare cases, could cause respiratory diseases including lung cancer. The precautionary principle can be evoked by those demanding the material’s removal. But removal creates new cancer risks and its cost is enormous. Whoever bears it, that cost will take money away from other risk-reducing uses, be it savings, health care, or education. Removal harms society more than leaving the asbestos in place. Another example is genetically modified foods. European regulators argue that the uncertain risks of genetically modified crops justify limiting trade flows and the resulting higher prices on consumers. They exchange an uncertain risk for a sure one. The illogic of the precautionary principle does not mean that states should not regulate against uncertain dangers. The point is that dangers should be evaluated by cost-benefit analysis. This means that decisions about risk should consider the cost that preventive action would avert, the likelihood that preventive action will work, and the action’s cost. Decisionmakers should also consider, as Sunstein notes, not just total costs and benefits, but the equity of their distribution. The problem with cost-benefit analysis is that it relies on unavailable information about the magnitude and likelihood of the harm. Everyone would agree to head off disaster at low cost and to avoid costly defenses against tiny dangers. Everyone agrees that research is helpful to getting policy right. But some degree of uncertainty is hard to extinguish. You never know, some will say, what the true cost is of asbestos as insulation . If science is never complete, cost-benefit analysis is impossible. The problem with this critique of cost-benefit analysis is that its virtue does not depend on getting rid of uncertainty. Analysts use cost-benefit analysis to get all the potential costs into the debate and force recognition of choice. They show that the pursuit of perfect safety, of chasing a danger out of existence, creates other dangers. This point shows why debate about the precautionary principle is often phony. Inherent uncertainty means that the decisions about risk are likely to be made by some criteria other than a principle about risk. That criterion will be a prior political preference — in the case of genetically modified foods, probably protection of domestic producers. Critics of the precautionary principle charge that it is a justification for regulation, not its cause — that the principle’s defenders care more about the environment than other public goods. Defenders of the principle claim that cost-benefit analysis serves corporate bottom lines. They are both part right. Fights about regulating risks are about which risks to confront and which to accept, not about how much risk to accept. All government policies ultimately reduce one risk or another. Politics is competition between risk preferences. Societies are not consistent in their approach to dangers. They are precautionary about certain risks and acceptant of others. Americans are less fearful — less precautionary — than Europeans about global warming and genetically modified foods. We are more cautious about secondhand smoke, drug approval, and nuclear proliferation. The differences cannot be justified by objective appeals to science. Scholars offer various explanations for the origins of those preferences. In Risk and Culture, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky argued that culture causes risk perception. They claimed that groups are organized by preferences about what dangers ought to be confronted collectively and that the rise of new political coalitions brings new priorities about danger. University of Oregon psychologist Paul Slovic points to people’s psychological tendencies to react to certain risks — such as those that are novel or involve a perceived loss of control — and the way those perceptions spread by social interaction and media. mit’s Harvey Sapolsky argues that risk perception results from the balance of the various special interests that benefit from society either confronting or running the risk. The groups compete to guide public opinion about danger. The variance in the balance of interest groups’ power across countries explains their variant reaction to risks. Whatever their origin, political preferences drive demand for regulation of risks. Statements about the certainty or uncertainty of science are often disguises for those preferences. This discussion about the precautionary principle applies to national security dangers in two ways. First, American national security policy is explicitly precautionary and is thus subject to the same problems as the application of the precautionary principle in other policy areas. Second, the precautionary reasoning advanced to defend our security policies hides political motives. As with the regulatory arena, cost-benefit analysis can help expose choices among risks that advocates of precaution shroud with claims of uncertainty. Some will argue that security dangers are so distinct from health and safety risks that the comparison is useless. Certainly the two sorts of risk are different. Politics produces national security dangers, making them more uncertain than environmental risks that result from physical phenomena. Moreover, national security dangers — conquest, mass death, economic devastation — are generally catastrophic and sudden. Some health and safety risks share that quality, but in most cases they exact a creeping toll. The unique attributes of security dangers do not remove the danger of precautionary reasoning. True, uncertain dangers of potentially great and irreversible consequence merit extensive preventive efforts. That is why states have traditionally devoted large portions of their budgets to defense. But high uncertainty and potential consequences do not mean that states can ignore the costs of defenses. Moreover, national security dangers are not always as uncertain and dangerous as we hear.

#### Risk analysis that prioritizes speculation makes any policy discussion irrelevant – imagination and fear of an improbable impact trades off with effective analysis and serial policy failure

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(CNN) -- At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn't get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There's a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it's only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it's based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don't build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland's volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don't, organs won't arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don't invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don't know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's quote? "Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn't a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can't wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can't know what's likely to go wrong, let's speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we're not appalled that they're harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first-graders off airplanes. You can't be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet's television broadcasts because they're radiating into space? It isn't hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it's a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn't really a principle; it's a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don't need to refute counterarguments, there's no point in listening to them.

### AT: Extinction First

#### Apocalyptic impact framing posits future catastrophe as a priority, which trades off with discussion of problems that are already here and only increases the probability of the impact – reorienting our politics to a focus on immediate impacts, is key to accurate risk analysis

Gilles & Gross 12 (Mel, highly successful web author, and Mathew, director of internet communications for Howard Dean’s presidential campaign, highly regarded media strategist, “The Last Myth: What the Rise of Apocalyptic Thinking Tells Us About America”, Prometheus books, p. 132) -TB

But epidemics are only one apocalyptic media darling. Over the last decade, the twenty-four-hour news cycle and the proliferation of media channels has created ever-more apocalyptic content that is readily available to us, from images of the Twin Towers falling in 2001 to images of the Japanese tsunami in 2011. So, too, have cable channels like Discovery and History married advances in computer-generated imagery with emerging scientific understanding of our planet and universe to give visual validity to the rare and catastrophic events that have occurred in the past or that may take place in the distant future. Using dramatic, animated images and the language of apocalypse to peddle such varied scenarios, however, has the effect of leveling the apocalyptic playing field, leaving the viewer with the impression that terrorism, bird flu, global warming, and asteroids are all equally probable. But not all of these apocalyptic scenarios are equally likely, and they're certainly not equally likely to occur within our lifetimes—or in our neighborhoods. For example, after millions of Americans witnessed the attacks of 9/11 on television, our collective fear of terrorism was much higher than its actual probability; in 2001, terrorists killed one-twelfth as many Americans as did the flu and one-fifteenth as many Americans as did car accidents.9 Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, the odds of an American being killed by a terrorist were about 1 in 88,000—compared to a 1 in 10,010 chance of dying from falling off a ladder.10 The fears of an outbreak of SARS, avian flu, or swine flu also never lived up to their media hype. This overreliance on the apocalyptic narrative causes us to fear the wrong things and to mistakenly equate potential future events with current and observable trends. How to discern the difference between so many apocalyptic options ? If we ask ourselves three basic questions about the many threats portrayed apocalyptically in the media, we are able to separate the apocalyptic wheat from the chaff. Which scenarios are probable? Which are preventable? And what is the likely impact of the worst-case model of any given threat? In answering these questions, it becomes clear that much of what the media peddles as apocalyptic is not. The apocalyptic scenarios involving global disaster—from meteor impacts to super-volcanic eruptions—are extraordinarily rare. An asteroid could hit the Earth and lead to the extinction of all mammals, including us, but the geologic record tells us that such massive strikes are unlikely, and logic tells us that there is little we can do to prevent one. Nor are terrorist attacks or an outbreak of avian flu likely to destroy humanity; their impact is relatively small and usually localized, because we can be prepared for such threats and can contain and mitigate their effects. The apocalyptic storyline tells us that most of these events are probable, largely unpreventable, and destined to be catastrophic. But none of this is true—their probability is either low or can be made lower through preventive means, or their impact is containable. (The degree of damage caused by Hur-ricane Katrina, for example, could have been minimized through better preparation both in infrastructure and in the government's response. Yet even without such preparations, the impact remained relatively localized.) The danger of the media's conflation of apocalyptic scenarios is that it leads us to believe that our existential threats come exclusively from events that are beyond our control and that await us in the future—and that a moment of universal recognition of such threats will be obvious to everyone when they arrive. No one, after all, would ever confuse a meteor barreling toward Earth as anything other than apocalyptic. Yet tangled up in such Hollywood scenarios and sci-fi nightmares are actual threats that aren't arriving in an instant of universal recognition; instead, they are arriving amid much denial and continued partisan debate. For example, annual climate-related disasters such as droughts, storms, and floods rose dramatically during the Apocalyptic Decade, increasing an average 75 percent compared to the 1990s—just as many climate models predicted they would if global warming were left unchecked.11 Yet this rise in natural disasters hasn't produced a moment of universal recognition of the dangers of climate change; instead, belief in climate change is actually on the decline as we adjust to the "new normal" of ever-weirder weather or convince ourselves that our perception of this increased frequency is a magnifying trick of more readily available cable and Internet coverage. Despite the media's best efforts to conflate them with improbable scenarios, the existential challenges that we must confront in the twenty-first century don't fit into the apocalyptic storyline of future cataclysmic events that are beyond our control—because they aren't truly events but rather are trends. Whether or not we will be able to control them hinges on our understanding that the moment of revelation doesn't lie before us in some indeterminate future—it is already here.

#### Crisis avoidance makes extinction inevitable by occluding the structural causes of instability and fueling militarized conflict around the globe---interrogating their epistemological failures is a pre-requisite to effective policy

Ahmed 11 – Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, International Security Analyst, Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and DPhil, Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University of Sussex, “The International Relations of Crisis and The Crisis of International Relations: From the Securitisation of Scarcity to the Militarisation of Society,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Volume 23, Issue 3, Taylor and Francis

Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics.84 Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises.87∂ By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’ them – and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity.∂ ‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89 ∂ The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms.∂ Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism.∂ 3.2 From theory to policy∂ Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’.95∂ In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations.∂ A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99∂ 3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation?∂ Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100∂ But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of ‘othering’ in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102∂ In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104∂ Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105∂ This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence.∂ Conclusions∂ While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.∂ The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.∂ As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.∂ There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.∂ Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.∂ Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.